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List of diagrams
What is told on the following pages is a history of the Danish-Greenlandic relationship
over one hundred years. It covers the history of Danish Greenland policy, and the history
of political and economic development in Greenland. With only a very basic knowledge
of Greenlandic I had to base my account on sources written in Danish. This is less of a
problem than might be supposed because the language of administration has been Dan-
ish, including even the minutes from the local political assemblies. Over the years much
Greenlandic writing has also been translated including some novels, and anything writ-
ten to the authorities in Greenlandic has been translated. Nevertheless, the account is
necessarily that of an outsider unable to fully analyse the linguistic expressions of the
Greenlanders.
Written in a Danish context it covers Danish Greenland policy and its background in
and impact on Greenland society. This Danish perspective is predominant at the begin-
ning, but as the Greenlanders took over more and more of the administration it is almost
lacking in the latter part, dealing mostly with developments in Greenland.
Many colleagues are to be thanked for discussions over the years, but in particular
publisher Christopher Hurst, London, and my colleague at the University of Gloucester-
shire John R. Howe who has been indispensable in rooting out the many Danish expres-
sions in the script. Any shortcomings are however mine.
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Preface

Greenland is an arctic/sub arctic country with a per-
manent ice cap covering the whole inland area and in
places projecting into the sea. Human habitation is
only possible in the coastal area of 350,000 square km.
Up till recent times the permanent ice was impassable.
All communication had to be by ship along the coast
and in the northern part by foot or dog-sledge on the
frozen sea and fiords in winter.
The first known settlements in Greenland date
from around 2,500 B.C. and were found in the most
northerly part called Peary Land. They were estab-
lished by Eskimo tribes from Arctic America. In the fol-
lowing centuries more came in larger or smaller
groups, the latest about 1000 A.D.
Greenland’s relationship with Europe started in
the Viking Age. In 982 people from Iceland settled in
the southern part of Greenland in the Qaqortoq
(Julianehaab) and Nuuk (Godthaab) areas, which
were not at that time occupied by the Eskimos. The
Norse settlements in Greenland as well as in Iceland
were free, independent societies for a couple of cen-
turies. However, in 1261 Iceland, mostly inhabited by
Norwegian settlers, accepted a subordinate status
under the Norwegian crown and the settler community
in Greenland did likewise. Bergen in Norway became
the link to the two dependencies in the North Atlantic.
In 1380 Denmark and Norway became a double
monarchy, soon with Denmark in the leading role.
Thus Greenland became a part of the possessions of
the Danish crown. However the possession of Green-
land added little to the king’s power because the Norse
population there died out about 1500 following a
period of 100 years out of all contact with other parts
of the realm. In fact, their extinction was not realised
in Denmark till much later. The actual circumstances
surrounding the disappearance of the Norse popula-
tion in Greenland are still an unsolved riddle although
there have been many hypotheses. Among the plau-
sible ones is an evident worsening of the climate and
assumed competition for means of subsistence with
incoming Eskimo settlers.
Although no relationship with Greenland had
been maintained for centuries the Danish kings still
regarded it as one of their dependencies, but despite
several attempts contact was not re-established till
1721. This re-colonization of Greenland was seen at the
start as a reopening of contact with an old part of the
realm, but it became hardly distinguishable in charac-
ter from any other colony acquired at that time. A
Norwegian priest, Hans Egede, set out to bring the
true Lutheran faith to the descendants of the ‘Old
Norse’ who were believed to be still living in the dark-
ness of Catholicism. He found none, but kept looking.
However, he did find a ‘wild’ population, which he
began to Christianise. As the years passed and knowl-
edge of the Greenland territory grew, the hope of find-
ing Norse descendants vanished, and the contact
made in 1884 with the Eskimo tribe at Ammassalik on
the east coast extinguished the last hope. No more
unknown areas existed where Norse descendants
could be living.
The fact that the Norse population was no longer
there, and that the new population of Eskimos was
non-white and non-christian made no difference to
the Danish king. The territory was regarded as being
under indisputable Danish sovereignty on an equal
footing with Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Despite
their quite different origins the inhabitants were
regarded as the King’s subjects because they lived in
his land, and the King for his part felt entitled to rule
over them as well. However it has to be understood
that this was the Danish point of view. For their part
the  Greenlanders have always regarded Greenland as
their country and the Danes or Norwegians as for-
eigners. They have tolerated the foreign presence, and
to a certain extent have also used it for their own bene-
fit. For his part the Danish King was free to think of the
Greenlanders as his subjects. After all, he did them no
harm.
At first the main ‘civilising’ task was to Chri-
stianise the local population, a mission that was sup-
posed to be financed by the profits from trade. In 1731
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the priorities came clearly into the open when a new
king ordered that the establishment in Greenland be
abandoned because it ran a substantial deficit. Hans
Egede successfully appealed to the king’s conscience to
allow the mission work to continue. Since then no
Danish government has ever taken any initiative to
abandon Greenland.
The missionaries had a clear policy: paganism was
to be rooted out, and therefore they did not tolerate
shamanism or any other part of the Greenlanders’ cul-
ture which they considered to be rooted in hea-
thenism. Modern research has claimed that in this way
the missionaries destroyed the weak structure of
authority within Greenlandic society. The policy of the
Trading Company was more cautious. It soon realised
that buying hunting products from the Greenlanders
was the only way to make a profit. Thus from 1776,
organised as a state company named the Royal Green-
land Trade Department, it encouraged and supported
traditional hunting, leaving Greenlandic society other-
wise untouched. This led to the growth of a latent
antagonism between the two services. The missionar-
ies were certainly inclined to interfere in Greenlandic
society as they regarded their mission as having a
higher priority than that of the Trading Company. The
result of this schism was a paternalistic native policy.
Legal and administra tive interference was possible,
but the regulations were vaguely formulated and put
into practice with caution.
In the Instruction of 1782 which laid the founda-
tion for Danish rule in Greenland, it was stipulated
that the King’s servants should ‘meet the inhabitants
with love and meekness, come to their assistance when-
ever they can, set a good example, and take care that
they come to no harm in any way.’ The instruction con-
tinues: ‘Should anything indecent be committed by the
Greenlanders, like either theft or various coarse vices,
then the merchant must advise them in a most indulgent
way to abstain from it. Should this fail, or should the
felony be very coarse indeed, they should be punished
according to the circumstances and the character of the
crime.’1 In case of epidemics or famine among the
Greenlanders, they should be given provisions, those
for the poorest being free.
For the Greenlanders this was hardly very oppres-
sive. In 1856 Hinrich Rink, inspector in South Green-
land, characterised the Greenlanders’ perception of
their legal position as follows: first, they should be
helped and fed when they were genuinely in need; and
second, they should be set a good example and given
admonitions, but only punished according to the cir-
cumstances of the particular case when they really
broke the rules.2 One could say that this showed a very
exact understanding of the instruction of 1782.
In 1814 Denmark lost another war. This time the
cost was the cession of Norway to Sweden with the
exception of Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands.
It is not entirely clear how Denmark managed to
exclude these dependencies from the cession. How-
ever, a British divide-and-rule policy towards Den-
mark and Sweden seems a plausible explanation.3 The
loss of Norway did not affect the administration of
Greenland, which had never been ruled as a part of
Norway, but the great historical transformations in the
wake of the Napoleonic Wars did. The widespread
process of industrialisation and the increased power of
political liberalism were both developments with pro-
found impact in Greenland.
The minor impact was felt in economic policy. The
state trade monopoly was maintained, especially after
an experiment with a private trade department deci-
sively failed in 1840. The purposes of the state monop-
oly were then more clearly formulated. Thus, in that
year a commission agreed that the state ought not to
profit from the trade, but rather let any surplus benefit
the Greenlanders. The financial authorities accepted
GREENLAND BEFORE 1900
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1. “med kærlighed og sagtmodighed omgås indbyggerne, være dem til hjælp i hvad man kan, foregå dem med gode eksempler,
samt nøje tilse, at dem ingen uret eller overlast i nogen måde vederfares.” and “Skulle noget usømmeligt af grønlændere
begås, som enten tyveri eller andre grove laster, da må købmanden med al lemfældighed formane dem til at afstå derfra.
Frugter dette ikke, eller forseelsen er særdeles grov, straffes de derfor efter omstændighederne og forbrydelsens beskaffen-
hed.” (Bobé 1936: 371).
2. Letter to the Minister of the Interior by Rink (1856: 233): “1) at de skulle hjælpes og fødes, når de virkelig trænger til det; 2) at
man skal foregå dem med et godt eksempel, samt formane dem, og kun når de virkelig forser sig, straffe dem efter bedste
skøn.”
3. Gad 1979: 187-205.
this, although they insisted that a decent rate of inter-
est on the state’s investments in Greenland had to be
paid first.
The trade surplus was ploughed back into Green-
land in two ways. First, the prices paid to the Green-
landic producers were raised to stimulate their pur-
chasing power. Second, some expenditure was initi-
ated to benefit the whole society. In 1845 two teacher
training colleges were established to improve the qual-
ity and increase the number of teachers of primary
schools, and another physician was employed to raise
health standards. A few Greenlanders were sent to
Denmark for further education. In 1837 luxury articles
such as coffee, tea, sugar and pearled grain were
released for sale generally having previously been
withheld from the market to avoid ‘spoiling‘ the Green-
landers. The sale of spirits and beer was still restricted.
Against this background it seems fair to conclude that
the material living standards of Greenlanders im -
proved during this period, based on a sound economic
foundation in trade.
The influence of political liberalism in Greenland
reached its high point with the establishment of local
assemblies, which gave elected Greenlanders the
opportunity to participate in local government. Such
assemblies are a well-known feature in colonial ad -
ministration, especially in the British colonies where
at first the councils were composed of higher civil ser-
vants and in some cases also of white colonists. Later,
natives were admitted and the council’s authority
grew. In the end the councils developed into parlia-
ments based on universal suffrage, and the adminis-
tration became a responsible government. This stage
marked the transition from colony to dominion, and
the last governor could be welcomed as the first High
Commissioner.
In Greenland something vaguely resembling the
British colonial councils existed under the terms of the
Instruction of 1782, which required the colony man-
ager to listen to his employees’ advice if he was uncer-
tain how to handle a case. The provision was little
used, and by the middle of the 19th century the issue
was opened from quite another angle, inspired by the
introduction of local assemblies in Denmark in 1841
headed by the local priest. Each district in the colony
got in 1857 a guardians’ council with the highest-rank-
ing civil servants and appointed Greenlanders as
members. The council was empowered to appoint new
members when a vacancy occurred among the Green-
landers. Set up in 1857 as an experiment, they were put
GREENLAND BEFORE 1900
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Fig. 1. Light kayaks are easily carried ashore from open water and over the ice bream. The photo is from around 1900 and proba-
bly taken near Qeqertarsuaq in Northwest Greenland. Photo Jens Daugaard-Jensen/Arctic Institute.
on a permanent basis in 1862. As in Denmark a priest
(missionary) headed the council, and the colony man-
ager was accountant. Their principal task was to take
over poor relief, which till then had been administered
by the Trade Department’s staff. The councils were
also allowed to spend money on any project which
they considered to be the common good in the district.
Their income was directly related to production, since
the Trade Department contributed 20 per cent of the
value of its purchases of Greenlandic products. A so-
called re-partition was introduced to promote the
utmost economy with public funds and to encourage
industry. This envisaged that all funds remaining after
payment of expenses should be divided among the
Greenlandic seal-hunters according to the size of their
catch, which meant in other words that the more
industrious got the larger shares.
In addition to their economic duties the guar -
dians’ councils also held judicial powers where Green-
landers were concerned. Civil cases and minor
offences could be dealt with summarily on the spot,
but for major offences the council only held powers of
inquiry and had to refer the case to the governor sug-
gesting a suitable punishment. There were no written
laws apart from three short paragraphs outlining ille-
gal activities:
(1) Unauthorised use of property belonging to
others such as using their tools without permission;
damaging such tools; keeping other hunters’ catches
without payment; taking possession of driftwood
which another person had already dragged above the
high water mark;
(2) Simple theft and evident disobedience to the
authorities;
(3) Capital crimes such as manslaughter and other
serious offences such as concealment of births.
In all other cases unwritten Greenlandic law
applied. The Danish authorities were obviously very
reluctant to impose rules, which might contradict the
Greenlandic sense of justice.
Not much research has been done into the activi-
ties of the guardians’ councils. However, from the pub-
lished accounts it is clear that a series of precedents
were made, either following the direct rulings of the
authorities or as approval of suggestions from the
guardians’ councils. The history of this development
will not be told here, but it should be noted that the
fight against contagious venereal diseases from the
crews of visiting ships led to some firm prohibitions
such as a ban in 1890 on Greenlandic women going on
board those ships.
The guardians’ councils operated till 1911 when
their authority was transferred to new municipal
councils. The historical assessment of their activities
GREENLAND BEFORE 1900
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Fig. 2. Nuuk 1910. The white house to the left was build for Hans Egede, the first missionary in Greenland from 1721 to 1736,
and it is the oldest building in Greenland. The Greenland governors resided here for many years. The church and the nearby
house of the dean are seen further up the hillside. Photo Morten P. Porsild/Arctic Institute.
has varied with time. All the same, it seems fair to say
that the councils played an important part in the
establishment of democratic processes in Greenland.
This point was made by Oldendow in 19364.
The commercial principles, which were laid down
in the instruction of 1782, applied almost unchanged
till 1950. The prices of goods sold to the Greenlanders
(trading-out) and the prices for Greenlandic produce
(trading-in) were the same all along the coast regard-
less of internal transportation costs. The reason for
this was to maximise the catch by inducing the Green-
landers to cover as large a hunting ground as possible.
Thus the Greenland economy operated on highly
politicised prices. To the prices laid down in Copen-
hagen for goods destined for Greenland were added
varying percentages to cover freight and other costs
according to the importance of the goods in question
to local production in Greenland. Quite low percent-
ages were put on producer goods such as rifles, gun-
powder, lead, iron and steel. Stoves and coal were even
sold at a loss in the nineteenth century in order to get
more blubber for export rather than being used locally
in the traditional way for heating. The trading-in
prices were set with a view to the Greenlanders retain-
ing what they needed to maintain production over the
long term. Economically speaking this was so they
could provide for investments, in real terms keeping
blubber for heating and hides for clothes and for coat-
ing the kayaks and boats.
While the profit on the goods sold in Greenland
could hardly cover the costs of providing them, that on
Greenlandic products sold in Copenhagen financed
the entire Danish presence in Greenland – at least
when the trade did not incur losses. Seen over the
period 1721-1900 it could be argued that the Danish
state did not lose on the Greenland trade. An account
from 1904 made the balance Dkr. 3.5 million in favour
of the state.5 This result was due to the royalties from
the cryolite mining at Ivittuut which had begun in
1857, totalling Dkr. 4.1 million.6 Annually from the
1880s the trade department was unable to cover its
overall expenses even with the royalties.
Changes in traditional Greenlandic
society
Obviously changes took place in Greenlandic society
from 1721 to 1900, and it can be assumed that the Dan-
ish presence played a major part in this.
Growth in population
As table 1 shows, the Greenlandic population has
grown steadily except for the years 1805-16 (the war of
1807-14) and 1855-70. The stagnation and decrease
1855-70 only occurred in southern Greenland. Apart
from that, growth has been more uneven than in Den-
mark, doubtless because of the smaller number of
 people. Table 1 also shows the few Europeans (most of
them Danes). The variation in numbers of the Euro-
peans was probably due to involuntary winter stays by
ship’s crews.
From these figures it could be argued that Green-
land can support about 5,000 people with its tradi-
tional mode of production. Growth would then be the
result of division of labour by gradual incorporation in
the world market through Denmark.
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Table 1. Population of West Greenland (except Thule), 1789-
1901. The figures for 1789-1824 are taken from the litera-
ture, the rest are from official censuses. The figure for 1789 is
too unreliable to calculate a growth rate.
Greenlanders Euro- Growth rate per annum %
peans Greenland Denmark
1789 5,122
1805 5,888 0.71
1816 5,836 -0.08
1824 6,331 1.02
1834 7,356 196 1.51 0.87
1840 7,877 251 1.15 0.77
1845 8,501 234 1.54 1.03
1850 9,352 225 1.93 0.84
1855 9,648 248 0.63 1.28
1860 9,648 232 0.00 1.31
1870 9.586 239 -0.06 1.05
1880 9,72 280 0.14 0.99
1890 10,207 309 0.49 0.99
1901 11,19 262 0.84 1.11
Occupations
Pre-colonial Greenland was a society of hunters and
gatherers. With the colonisation new ways of earning
a living were introduced, as the Greenlanders were
drawn into the work of the mission and the trade
department. In the nineteenth century this Greenlan-
disation became a very conscious policy because local
labour was much cheaper than workers imported from
Europe. The development is shown in table 2.
The figures for occupations are somewhat unreli-
able for earlier periods. The numbers of people em -
ployed full-time in European occupations are reliable
enough, but part-time employment is harder to esti-
mate. The same consideration applies to Greenlandic
occupations. Fishermen were first counted separately
in 1901, but fishing had already been an activity earlier,
since the Greenlanders‘ traditional hunting included
fishing. Only significant changes are worth noticing.
The table shows that the percentage of Greenlanders
in European occupations fluctuated around 15 per
cent. Nevertheless, because of a growing population
while the number of Europeans barely changed, the
Greenlandic share of European occupations was in -
creasing. Table 3 shows this.
Greenlanders occupied nearly all the subordinate
positions, and during the century they formed also a
growing proportion of the skilled workers. Only at the
top level was there a reverse trend. None of the 3-4
doctors or the 10-13 missionaries was a Greenlander in
this period.
Greenlandic society at the turn of 
the century
Some 11,000 Greenlanders lived in small settlements
scattered along the west coast from Qaqortoq (Ju -
lianehåb) in the south to Upernavik in the north. On
the east coast a single trading and mission station was
established at Ammassalik in 1894. Some 400 Green-
landers had their homes in this area. In 1910 a mission
and trading post was founded in the Qaanaaq area to
serve about 200 people. The Danish state was reluc-
tant to extend its trade monopoly to this area, so the
station was a private initiative.7 However in 1937 it was
taken over by the state.
Along the west coast were approximately 200 set-
tlements, the number of inhabitants ranging from
around fifty to 300-400. Their material lives were
mostly based on subsistence economy with seal hunt-
ing as the main occupation. The seal meat was eaten;
most of the blubber was sold to the Royal Greenland
Trade Department but only a quarter of the hides were
sold.8 The remainder were used for the kayaks and
umiaks9 and for clothing. Income from what they sold
was spent on imported tools, mainly sewing needles
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Table 2. Occupation of Greenlanders, % (official censuses).
1834 1860 1890 1901
European occupations
Administration 0.0 1.1 1.8 0.0
Trade 5.6 7.4 6.3 6.2
Mission, church, school 8.2 9.1 3.8 4.7
Other 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.0
All 13.8 17.6 12.1 12.9
Greenlandic occupations
Hunters 86.2 82.4 87.9 72.4
Fishermen 14.6
Other 0.1
All 86.2 82.4 87.9 87.1
Number employed 1,290 1,971 2,407 2,749
Table 3. Europeans jobs occupied by Greenlanders, % (official
censuses).
1834 1860 1890 1901
Catechists 100 100 100 99
Crew (labourers, sailors, 
apprentices) 75 88 100 100
Midwives 0 95 100 98
Artisans 34 62 82 99
Formen, skippers 13 68 87 87
Outpost managers 0 30 51 64
Colony managers, 
manager assistants 7 3 4 0
Overall percentage 59 73 78 86
No. of Greenlanders 175 248 291 355
European jobs, total 297 477 373 415
and knives, but also rifles, with one for every two male
inhabitants.10 Wooden boats from Denmark were
introduced in the 1880s; in 1900 there were 157 and
still more were to come.11 Consumption of imported
food was modest. The total of imported meat would
have given only 11 grams if it had been consumed just
by the Europeans. A considerable quantity of fresh
meat was delivered by the Greenlandic hunters to the
Europeans, and is in fact recorded abundantly in con -
temporary sources.12 The same calculation on im -
ported butter and fat would imply that the Europeans
consumed 52 grammes a day, which is probably suffi-
cient. Other provisions such as flour, groats, biscuits
and coffee were imported in greater quantities than
the Europeans could consume, and a proportion was
clearly sold on to the Greenlanders. If shared equally it
would give them a daily ration of 10 grams of coffee
and 84 grams of cereal,13 – a somewhat modest contri-
bution to their nutritional needs –. The extent of the
subsistence economy can also be seen from the fact
that the 85 per cent of the Greenlanders who were
hunters and fishermen sold goods to earn an average
of Dkr. 100 a year. By contrast the lowest-paid workers
in Greenland were paid between Dkr. 250 and 600 a
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Fig. 3. This is a picture of all Danes living in Nuuk in April 1905. They are placed on the staircase of the house of the dean, C.W.
Schultz-Lorentzen. Photo C.W. Shultz-Lorentzen/Arctic Institute.
year.14 Even if we include the hunters’ private sales to
the non-hunters, it is safe to characterise the native
economy as predominantly one of subsistence.
In the smallest settlements (bopladser) the Green-
landers could live their lives pretty much undisturbed
by the Danish presence apart from the overall condi-
tions of their existence stemming from it. No Euro-
peans lived permanently there. There might be a
native community council member and a so-called
‘reader’ to teach the children reading and writing
when he could spare the time. Maybe they were lucky
enough to have one of the fifty-five native midwives in
their settlement;15 if not, they had to go to the nearest
trading station or colony. That journey could take a
day, if indeed the weather conditions allowed travel-
ling at all.
The trading post (udsted) had a store where the
Green landers could sell their produce and buy
imported goods. The store manager was a civil ser-
vant, often a native who got his goods from the colony
to which he belonged and to which the Greenlandic
products were transported. The trading post also had a
room for church and teaching undertaken by educated
native catechists. From 1845 onwards there was formal
teacher training in the country, and long before the
turn of the century nearly all adults were able to read
and write. The trading post was very much a native
community. The store manager could be a Dane – a
quarter of them were at that time – but in that case he
would be fluent in Greenlandic and often married to a
Greenlander. Several times a year, however, the
schooner from the colony would call for commercial
and administrative reasons and might bring in people
who could only communicate through an interpreter.
A visiting physician would certainly need one, whereas
a visiting priest would not since the Danish priests
serving in Greenland were thoroughly educated in the
Greenlandic language.
The biggest station in each district was called a
colony. At the time there were thirteen of them. From
south to north in order (Danish names in brackets):
Qaqortoq (Julianehåb),  Paamiut (Frederikshåb),
Nuuk (Godthåb), Maniitsoq (Sukkertoppen), Sisimiut
(Holsteinsborg), Aasiaat (Egedesminde), Qasigiaan-
guit (Christianshåb), Ilulissat (Jakobshavn), Qeqertar-
suaq (Godhavn), Appat (Ritenbenk), Uummannaq
and Upernavik and on the east coast: Ammassalik. In
each district a colony manager, a Dane, was the supe-
rior of all staff except the priests and catechists, and
the physician – if you were so fortunate to have one of
the three in Greenland living in your colony. In that
case you would also have a small hospital, often with a
nurse educated in Denmark. The Danish educated
priests of whom nearly every colony had its own were
responsible for all school and church matters in the
district. Usually the colony was provided with a Dane
second in command. He ran the store, and supervised
the work of the skippers of small boats, carpenters,
coopers, and common labourers who were employed
in the service of the Trade Department. A colony fore-
man, often a craftsman himself, usually undertook the
actual supervision.
Economically, each of the thirteen colonies func-
tioned independently and had direct communication
with Copenhagen. However, the colony managers
were subordinate to the two inspectors, one in Qeqer-
tarsuaq for the northern part of the west coast, and the
other in Nuuk for the southern part. The inspectors
were the highest-ranking civil servants, and had over-
all supervision of all activity in Greenland except –
once again – the church and school. They had direct
access to the minister responsible for Greenlandic
affairs. Most were recruited from the ranks of the
Royal Greenland Trade Department, and following old
practice, all cases referred to the minister passed via
the board of that Department which thus effectively
administered Greenland. The Department had the
monopoly of all commerce with the Green landers, and
its servants in Greenland were in charge of nearly
everything related to the administration of the com-
munity.
Thus Greenlandic society at the turn of the cen-
tury had been profoundly influenced by the European
presence since 1721. Paganism had disappeared from
the west coast and left behind a people as Christian as
any. Thanks to the mission the language had become a
written one, finding its long-lasting shape in the
orthography of the Moravian Brother Samuel Klein-
schmidt in the mid-nineteenth century. Another pro-
found feature was the racial mixture with the Euro-
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peans, partly as the result of relations with visiting
sailors and other fortuitous romances, partly as the
result of regular intermarriage especially among the
humbler strata of the colonial staff. In the late nine-
teenth century racial mixture was so common that the
official censuses ceased to distinguish between gen-
uine Greenlanders and crossbreeds. All were counted
as Greenlan ders. Although the public services as well
as trade and communication had been set up by the
Danes, about 15 per cent of the Greenlanders were
employed by the Royal Greenland Trade Department
or by the church and school authorities.
Most undisturbed was the primary occupation,
the catching of sea mammals based on one man hunt-
ing from a kayak. In the north, from Disko Bay and fur-
ther north, the dog sledge was still an indispensable
means of transport during winter. Among manufac-
tures the imported rifles, iron and steel had long been
indispensable. The Greenlandic language had sur-
vived. There had been no cultural imperialism due to
the Lutheran practice of reaching souls in their native
tongue. Borrowed words to describe imported goods
and ideas existed, but surprisingly many were trans-
lated into Greenlandic. Many others were so greenlan-
dised that their European origin was hard to trace
including, for example, Christian names borne by
almost all Greenlanders.
Hitherto this society had been administered by
rules made by the Royal Greenland Trade Department
and the government. The Danish Parliament set up in
1849 had only taken part in Greenlandic matters when
the economy was involved. When debating the yearly
budget, which covered Greenland as well as the
metropolis, Parliament was eager to keep expenses
low, especially by reducing the size of the administra-
tion, which it thought was overstaffed. Twice – in 1851
and 1863 – Parliament set up special commissions to
look into the matter, but the recommendations in the
resulting reports were not acted upon. By 1863 even a
recommendation to prepare for the abolition of the
trade monopoly came to nothing. The overall objective
– the well being of the Greenlanders – and probably
the fear of incurring greater expenses later – induced
the government to carry on with the established sys-
tem
At the turn of the century that part of the picture
changed.
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The period between the turn of the century and 1912
was a turbulent one where Greenlandic affairs were
concerned. For the first time the Danish Parliament
passed acts concerning Greenland. The Greenland
mission became a separate church in 1905. They also
established two provincial councils (landsråd), one for
the north and one for the south of the west coast and
sixty-two municipal councils (kommuneråd). These
were intended to expand the Greenlanders’ participa-
tion in the governance of their provincial affairs. In
this period too efforts to encourage new economic
activities in Greenland were intensified.
The cause of this transformation could be sought
in conditions in Greenland or circumstances in Den-
mark. Had development in Greenland been so miscon-
ceived that something had to be done? Or was there a
new political climate in Denmark that spilt over to
Greenland to make a new start? The latter certainly
seems to be the case.
There is little evidence of deteriorating conditions
in Greenland, which might have provoked reformers
to take action. Some statistics suggest a decline in the
seal catch, while others indicate a steady rise in the
standard of living. The statistics for the seal catch
before 1903 are defective, but lines can be drawn
deduced from the sales of hides and blubber to the
Royal Greenland Trade Department. The sale of seal
hides to the Department reached peaks in 1885 and
1894, but overall the level in 1900 was only slightly
lower than ten years before, and blubber sales show a
fluctuating but generally upward trend to 1911.
Living conditions seemed to have improved. The
number of people living together in one house gradu-
ally decreased. From an average of ten people per
house in 1880, the number fell to 8.4 in 1890 and 7.5 in
1901.16 Research in some places seems to suggest that
this meant more space per person.17 The distribution of
poor relief decreased dramatically during the 1880s
and 1890s, which may mean improved living condi-
tions, but it may also be the result of a more restrictive
practice. The revised rules from 1881 stated that aid
should be given only when people were in danger of
starving while the wording of the 1872 rules was “aid
for those who by winter time did not have the most essen-
tial clothing and tools’. Over all, however, the evidence
certainly suggests that no decline had taken place;
rather there was an improvement.
If any tension existed in Greenland, it was found
in the guardians’ councils. In these the missionaries
were supposed to co-operate with the Trade Depart-
ment officials. The system had worked since the 1860s
and a modus vivendi had been found. The sharpening
of the latent tension around the turn of the century
clearly seems to have received its impetus from
changes in the political climate in Denmark as new
missionaries came to Greenland with new ideas.
Greenland enters struggle between
political parties in Denmark
Under the Danish constitution of 1849, revised in 1866,
governments were appointed by the King. The Conser-
vative administrations of the 1880s and 90s thus
 governed with a majority of their opponents in the
lower chamber, though with a majority in the upper
chamber. From 1901, after years of political struggle, it
became a fixed principle that the government could
not hold office when opposed by a majority in the
lower chamber. In Danish historiography this is called
‘the change of system’, and it cleared the way for social
and political reforms, for which the new party in
power – the Liberal Left, consisting of the wealthier
farmers and progressive liberals from the towns – had
long strived. However, the new government had to
take the Conservative majority in the upper chamber
20
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into account, which made the urban liberals uneasy,
and after 1901 the growing Labour Party, the Social
Democrats, ended its co-operation with the Liberal
Left which had lasted from the days of struggle for
new constitutional practice. The tensions within the
governing party led to a new party, the Radical Left,
being formed in January 1905. Its supporters were pro-
gressive liberals in the towns and small farmers.
Already as a group within the ruling party these
voters had brought Greenland into Danish party poli-
tics, with the willing support of the Social Democrats.
The rallying points were rule by the people, social
equality and intellectual freedom. The administration
of Greenland was well suited to push forward general
principles. The unhampered rule by civil servants, the
exclusion of Greenlanders from political influence, the
low standard of living compared to Denmark, all were
vigorously attacked. But first the situation had to be
made known outside the offices of the Royal Trade
Department. An opportunity for this arose in 1902.
A well-known journalist and writer, Mylius-Erich-
sen, who aired his radical views with a sharp-pointed
pen in the newspaper Politiken, was allowed to visit
Greenland by the new Minister of the Interior despite
warnings from the Trade Department. Thus the so-
called ‘Literary Expedition’ took place in 1902-4. In his
application Mylius-Erichsen had not concealed his
intention to look at Greenland with a critical eye, and
his articles from the summer of 1902 were full of criti-
cism of the Royal Trade Department. From the begin-
ning he made it clear that his purpose was to shed light
on the country and its administration.18 Enlightenment
was a banner of the Radical Left.
No articles could reach the press while the Liter-
ary Expedition remained isolated in Qaanaaq in 1903,
but politicians who later joined the Radical Left found
other corners of the administration where enlighten-
ment was needed. In 1903 some cases were discovered
of staff helping themselves to “redundant” goods from
the Trade’s warehouse in Copenhagen. C. Th. Zahle,
later a member of the Radical Left and Prime Minister,
acknowledged the precautions taken by the govern-
ment, but spoke in Parliament of a small enclave left
over from old autocratic regime where carelessness
was the norm, in which light and fresh air were
needed. The Social Democrats backed him eagerly.
The newspapers Politiken and Socialdemokraten pur-
sued the issue and filled their pages with stories from
former employees of the administration about mal-
practices. The board of the Royal Trade Department
and other civil servants denied the accusations in the
press, but the Minister of the Interior could not ignore
the criticism and ordered an investigation. Although
this eventually cleared the accused, the heated debate
inevitably left the public with the impression that
something was rotten in the state of Greenland, and
created a perfect basis for demanding changes in the
way it was governed. Further impetus came from criti-
cal voices in Greenland as well.
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Turbulence in Greenland19
The discussion in Greenland was entirely a matter for
the Danish civil servants.
The Greenlanders did not participate at all, and in
their monthly magazine Atuagagdliutit the heavy crit-
icisms of Greenlandic affairs were not mentioned.20
From the very beginning of colonisation in 1721
Trade Department and Mission had different objec-
tives. The Mission’s objective was to bring Christianity
to the heathen, and the Trade Department’s was to
secure the economic foundation of the Mission and if
possible earn a profit for its financial backers, private
citizens and the Crown. Each branch of the colonial
administration thought of itself as the more impor-
tant, and this often led to local quarrels. Naturally, as
friendship may follow strange trails, there is much evi-
dence of cordial relations between individual mission-
aries and colony managers. When the guardians’ coun-
cils were established, the two branches were brought
together with the missionary as chairman. It was
painful for the Trade Department to be subordinate to
a missionary, even more so, if he should be absent and
a native senior catechist took the chair in his place.21
Such latent tensions broke out openly when new per-
sonnel from Denmark came to Greenland.
Among the latter the missionary C.W. Schultz-
Lorentzen was pre-eminent. As chairman of the
 Aasiaat guardians’ council, he soon came to be at odds
with the board of the Royal Trade Department. A  trivial
case concerning erratic book-keeping in 1899 became a
matter of principle when Schultz-Lorentzen disputed
the board’s authority to decide in the matter and
wanted the case heard by the Minister of the Interior.
However, the Minister decided in favour of the board,
also on the question of principle. Later, when Schultz-
Lorentzen was transferred to Nuuk as missionary and
head of the teacher training college, and consequently
became chairman of the guardians’ council there, trou-
ble started again. In 1903 the hunters in the fiord of
Kangerluarsussuaq (Grædefjorden) had been denied a
store at their settlement, which the guardians’ council
deplored at its autumn meeting. It was far from usual
for guardians’ councils to have words with the board of
the Trade Department, and it became worse when the
Danish members of the council paid for a commodity
depot at Kangerluarsussuaq out of their own pockets.
This was open defiance of the inspector’s and the
board’s wisdom. Finally in 1904, the board authorised
the Trade Department to establish a depot of its own in
Kangerluarsussuaq. Perhaps the outcome whetted the
ap petite of Schultz-Lorentzen, for more was to come,
and in Nuuk he did not stand alone as in Aasiaat.
Together with the physician Gustav Koppel, he devel-
oped new rules of procedure for the guardians’ council
to give the Greenlandic members the greatest possible
influence. The two reformers returned to the original
idea about the creation of the guardians’ councils, in
their words: to initiate municipal self-government that
would be independent both of the Trade Department
and of the Mission. They argued that the guardians’
councils had to be empowered to criticise the inspec-
tor’s and the ministry’s administration of Greenlandic
funds.
The guardians’ council in Nuuk approved the new
rules at its spring meeting in 1904, and during the
summer Schultz-Lorentzen and Koppel were active
propagating their ideas. At a meeting at Paamiut in
August, attended mostly by missionaries, the so-called
‘Frederikshåbpunkter’ (the agenda from Paamiut)
were approved. They criticised the board’s suggestion
for new rules for the guardians’ councils (to be dealt
with later) asserting that the guardians’ councils
should formulate the new rules themselves. Also the
Greenlanders’ lack of real influence over their own
affairs was criticized. Their efforts succeeded inas-
much as the Paamiut guardians’ council supported the
proposals on their autumn meeting. Before that, how-
ever, the course of events in Nuuk became turbulent.
In August the inspector dismissed Schultz-Lorentzen
from the guardians’ council on dubious grounds. He
protested forcefully, and in response sent his new rules
of procedure in a circular letter to all guardians’ coun-
cils to be implemented forthwith. He was attempting
to be ahead of the board with a fait accompli.
Such an open rebellion gained however limited
support. Even the newly-appointed guardians’ council
chairman in Nuuk had second thoughts as he revealed
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by enclosing a private letter to the other chairmen
telling them to avoid misinterpretation of the rules of
procedure because that might, as he put it, nourish the
existing distrust and suspicion of the authorities.
Avoiding the issue was easy for the chairman in charge
at Maniitsoq who was the colony manager because
both the missionary and the catechist were unable to
attend. He simply returned the circular letter to Nuuk
without discussing it with the guardians’ council at all.
In Qaqortoq the guardians’ council was also slightly
irritated by the way Schultz-Lorentzen had acted, but
felt able to support his main idea. Only in Paamiut and
Ilulissat were reactions positive. The other seven
guardians’ councils said nothing – apparently the cir-
cular letter was not even put on their agenda.
So no united front against the Trade Department’s
board was created. It was hardly a Greenlandic ‘upris-
ing’ since no Greenlander had participated in the dis-
cussions which were confined to some Danish civil ser-
vants who, to judge by their arguments, were inspired
by the new tide in Denmark and tried to change the
prevailing system in Greenland as well. The board of
the Royal Trade Department viewed the matter very
seriously, and wanted to see the participants put on
trial for their indiscipline. But before that could be
done, events in Denmark had moved on to the point
where a new act of Parliament was introduced, which
would reduce the power of the Trade Department in
Greenland and increase the Greenlanders’ influence to
a far greater degree even than Schultz-Lorentzen and
Koppel had suggested. No charges were brought
against them. On the contrary, in 1904 Schultz-
Lorentzen had already been co-opted to help in the
preparation of new laws for the church and education
in Greenland. Koppel was honourably discharged from
the service in 1906 with his pension.22
The Act of 1905 concerning church and
education in Greenland23
The first result of the debate in the early years of the
twentieth century was the act of 1905 which regulated
and improved both the church and education. This
was the first legislation passed by the Danish Parlia-
ment specifically for Greenland.
The act was passed at a time when the reformers
in Denmark were clarifying their main points regard-
ing Greenland. The rallying points became: separation
of the Trade Department from the civil administration
in Greenland and municipal self-government for the
Greenlanders. One of the reformers, Mylius-Erichsen,
had returned home with the ‘Literary Expedition’ in
1904, and severely criticised the Greenland admini-
stration in an internal report. From bottom to top, no
one was spared, and Mylius-Erichsen offered to join a
committee dedicated to the Greenlanders’ welfare.24
The Ministry reacted in a relaxed way to this far from
relaxed criticism. Later, it used Erichsen as a special
expert on Greenland, perhaps hoping thereby to pre-
empt criticism from the Radical Left. The main issue
arose in the Finance Committee on 17 December 1904
when the Minister of the Interior promised to consider
the possibility of separating administration and
trade.25 The following month C.Th. Zahle again
showed his interest in Greenland policy when he spoke
in favour of reform during the debate on the budget
bill in January 1905. In his phrase a major reconstruc-
tion was needed to promote the culture and self-
government of the Greenlandic nation.26
A clear connection existed between these initiati-
ves in Denmark and the reformers in Greenland.
Mylius-Erichsen referred explicitly to them in his
report, and Zahle in his speech referred to ‘a very
renowned and capable civil servant in the mission’ and
especially the report produced by Schultz-Lorentzen
when the bill concerning the church and education in
Greenland was on the agenda in February.27
Several times over the years, missionaries had
suggested improvements in the education of both chil-
dren and catechists. The new Liberal Left government
accepted the task, and asked Schultz-Lorentzen to
work together with the other missionaries in Green-
land to produce a report on the future organisation of
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the school system. Their report suggested enlarging
the school for catechists by (among other things)
employing a teacher educated at a Danish teacher trai-
ning college, thus attaching more weight to ordinary
school subjects in Greenland’s still predominantly reli-
gious education. The ensuing Act embodied this pro-
posal. Other regulations were made to augment the
number of Greenlandic educated catechists. The bill
unanimously passed both chambers of Parliament,
which was regarded as a victory for the reformers in
Greenland – the more so since it so abundantly repre-
sented the ideas of Schultz-Lorentzen. In 1906 he was
appointed the first rural dean in Greenland, a position
created by the act.
The Governing Act of 1908
The preparatory work, 1903-07
In April 1903 the new director of the Royal Trade
Department, Carl Ryberg who had been appointed in
1902, urged the Minister of the Interior to scrutinise
the rules governing the guardians’ councils with a
view to making changes. The administration of justice
required particular attention, but also poor relief, sub-
sidy, and repartition (the technical term used to
describe the yearly repayment to the hunters of the
balance left over in the coffers of the guardians’ coun-
cils) should also be revised. The intention to reform
was immediately communicated to the guardians’
councils to enable them to comment on a draft version
the following year. As mentioned above, some of the
Danes in Greenland were dissatisfied by the passive
role envisaged for the guardians’ councils in this pro-
cedure; they wanted greater changes than those the
director suggested. However, Ryberg persisted with
his suggestion despite the criticism from the mission-
aries in Greenland, which was essentially that the
guardians’ councils should be placed directly under
the Ministry of the Interior, thus by-passing the Royal
Trade Department. Up till this point the suggestion
was consistent with the reformers’ ideas, but where
greater influence for the Greenlanders was concerned,
Ryberg went much further than the reformers. He
wanted to exclude Danes altogether from membership
of the guardians’ councils, leaving the Greenlanders
alone to decide – although under the close supervision
of the inspector and with the colony manager as
accountant.28
However, it was no longer possible merely to
revise the guardians’ councils, since Zahle as we have
seen already, had presented the main demand in his
speech on the budget: self-government in Greenland
and separation of the trade from the administration.
Parliament very much favoured stimulating the econ-
omy and education of the Greenlanders to achieve
self-reliance and a ‘higher culture’. By passing the law
on church and education in April 1905, it had already
done something as we have noted for the cultural side
of society.
Meanwhile, from February 1905 Mylius-Erichsen
was strongly criticising the Danish administration of
Greenland. He had supporters in the press, and the
criticism grew into a real assault on the Trade Depart-
ment and its director Carl Ryberg, who finally
responded by requesting to be tried for his conduct of
affairs. He was totally acquitted.29 Thus the minister of
the interior received Ryberg’s proposal in a time of cri-
sis, and he did not endorse it straight away, asking for
comments from among others Schultz-Lorentzen and
Mylius-Erichsen. They were told that a bill separating
the trade department and the administration was
being prepared. The two reformers saw no merit in
Ryberg’s proposal. Schultz-Lorentzen especially criti-
cized the exclusion of Danes from the guardians’ coun-
cils arguing that this placed the assemblies totally in
the power of the inspector.30 Even if Schultz-Lorentzen
genuinely wished to secure real influence for the
Greenlanders, we must bear in mind that Ryberg’s pro-
posal would have prevented the missionaries playing
the role in the guardians’ councils which they had
hitherto played with good results.
As well as asking experts in Denmark, the Ministry
also consulted the guardians’ councils directly in
August 1905 on their views concerning reform. This
inquiry received a most peculiar treatment. The in -
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29. Oldendow 1936: 94-7; Gad 1946: 193f; Andersen 1979: 51f.
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spector for South Greenland, Ole Bendixen, openly
sought to avoid it by sending the guardians’ councils a
string of leading questions instead of the consultation
document; he was forced to recall these letters and
send the Ministry’s letter. In spite of this, only the
Sisimiut guardians’ council put the request on the
agenda, the rest is silence.31 However, the Ministry did
receive an answer. In November 1905 the inspector for
North Greenland, Jens Daugaard-Jensen, dispatched
his ‘strictly personal views‘ to the Ministry. He agreed
with Ryberg on excluding Danes from the elected
councils, and went further in proposing the abolition
of the guardians’ councils, and their replacement by an
advisory council in each of the two inspectorates.
These councils should be consulted on the enactment
of laws and regulations for Greenland. Local admini-
stration of poor relief and the subsidy would be the
responsibility of new municipal councils. However, the
administration of justice would have its own organisa-
tion. Daugaard-Jensen also favoured separation of the
trade from the administration in Greenland and the
administration of Greenland from Denmark.32 With
this proposal Daugaard-Jensen thrust himself into the
midst of the ongoing debate.
The debating group was soon enlarged. In 1902, a
new association had been formed, the Danish Atlantic
Islands, its main purpose being to retain the Danish
Virgin Islands in the West Indies. The association’s
members were colony administrators and important
businessmen, who wanted to strengthen the bonds
between the colonies and the mother country by mak-
ing them more profitable to Denmark. The Green-
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Fig. 4. Very few pastures are available in Greenland, and the growing season is too short and cold to produce fodder enough for
even a small herd of cows. Attempts are made though, e.g. on this pasture near Qaqortoq, about 1900. Cows were also held in
the Norse period. Photo Henrik Deichmann/Arctic Institute.
landic section of the association was heavily weighted
by the radical reformers in the debate, among them
Schultz-Lorentzen and Mylius-Erichsen, who used the
association to make contact with influential circles
which were certain to be sympathetic to the idea of
separating the trade and the administration. Their
membership did not however mean that their con-
cerns were focused on Danish business rather than the
Greenlanders as Schultz-Lorentzen later clearly
demonstrated.
The anxious controversy over Greenlandic matters
also engaged the old guard. The civil servants in the
administration and especially the Trade Department
felt that they had been subjected to many unjust accu-
sations, and in 1905 to counteract them they founded
the Greenlandic Society, of which civil servants,
retired as well as active, could become members. Its
object was to tell the public the truth about Greenland
and to work for the benefit of Greenlandic society and
the civil servants there. The Society made suggestions
to the authorities, and from 1906 published a year-
book, which in 1953 became a monthly periodical,
which is still in print. Throughout the years the Green-
landic Society has taken part in the ongoing debate on
Greenland and published a series of books. In 1926 its
membership was opened to the public.
Economic issues
Besides administrative and political reforms the re -
formers in Greenland wanted to modernise the econ-
omy by introducing new occupations for the Greenlan-
ders since they did not consider that sealing could pro-
vide them with a living. Animal husbandry and com-
mercial fishing were suggested. Cattle and sheep had
been raised in the medieval Norse settlements, and it
was argued that it should be made possible again. In
fact sheep farming had begun on a modest scale in this
period. On his own initiative a Greenlandic priest, Jens
Chemnitz, kept a few sheep at his vicarage in Narsaq
Kujalleq, South Greenland, and the experiment was
copied by other private operators. Not till 1913 did the
Royal Trade Department become involved, creating
breeding stations to produce a stock of sheep and to
advise Greenlanders wanting to try their hand in the
business.
Fishing was more promising. In the middle of the
nineteenth century some fish was exported, but that
came to an end as the supply of fish declined. How-
ever, by 1903 Atlantic salmon and halibut were in -
cluded in the monopolised export, because Danish
civil servants had begun to export these fish privately,
and the Trade Department wanted part of the profits.
No shift in policy was intended. As the debate pro-
gressed, the Royal Trade Department repeatedly
stressed that sealing had always been the foundation
of the Greenlandic economy and would continue to be
in the future. Other occupations were welcome pro-
vided they did not harm the sealing.
Reformers in Greenland, backed by the new polit-
ical majority in Denmark, continued to put pressure on
the Trade Department to become involved in develop-
ing fisheries, and in 1906 a Faeroese, Napoleon An -
dreasen, was hired to try deep sea fishing in Green-
landic waters. No cod in significant quantities was
found. Adolf S. Jensen continued state-initiated fish-
ery experiments from 1908, again with little success.
However, commercial fishing for halibut started in
1910 in the south, almost exclusively in a single fiord,
Alluitsoq.
These endeavours can be seen as a response to
pressure from the Danish political establishment, the
more so since private enterprise had become inter-
ested in the opportunities in Greenland.
Private enterprise had its place in Greenland, but
did not form part of the economic life of the Greenlan-
ders. Since the 1860s a private company had mined
cryolite in Ivittuut, but it was an entirely expatriate
business. All workers were imported from Denmark
and no contact between them and the local population
was allowed. The mining company paid the state roy-
alties, which were tacitly placed at the disposal of the
Royal Trade Department, thus helping to cover part of
the overall deficit. By the turn of the century more
companies had become interested. In 1902 a wholesale
dealer, Berneburg, got a twenty-year concession to
mine anything except cryolite in Greenland. The con-
cession was on the same terms as the cryolite mining:
no local labour, no contact with the population and a
royalty to the state. Until the 1930s the company
mined copper, graphite and mica at several small sites.
Such an enterprise was welcomed by the Royal Trade
Department, since it presented no threat to the sealing
and the trading monopoly.
Another application from a private company con-
cerning whaling could be handled inside the overall
policy because the Royal Trade Department managed
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to turn it into a joint venture in 1903-4. Commercial
whaling was not considered a desirable occupation for
Greenlanders, and as co-partner the Royal Trade
Department could ensure that its interests were
respected. However, the Minister of the Interior feared
the enterprise would run at a loss and rejected the
application.
More threatening to the traditional policy were
four new applications in 1905. Three of them were
from relatively small companies that wanted to engage
in deep-sea fishing as well as fishing in the fiords and
rivers; they also wanted to buy fish from the Greenlan-
ders and employ them in the industry. The fourth
application was from the Consortium, a group of large
Danish businesses also active in the Danish Atlantic
Islands – and supported by some of the Greenlandic
reformers. The Consortium would do it all: fishing,
whaling, sheep rearing, reindeer breeding, eider
ducks, and fox rearing for furs. The company wanted
to employ Greenlanders.
The Royal Trade Department firmly rejected these
applications. The buying of fish from the Greenlanders
and their employment with the interested companies
would endanger the sealing making the population
more dependent on European imported food. Further-
more, fishing might in time become an occupation for
the Greenlanders, but letting these companies in
would make it almost impossible for the Greenlanders
to compete. The Trade Department considered the
consortium’s proposed procedure for employing and
paying their workers objectionable. Not only would
the Consortium exploit the business opportunities in
Greenland on a massive scale, but it also would change
the Greenlanders into employees working for low
salaries. The Trade Department predicted the extinc-
tion of the Greenlandic population if such enterprises
were allowed.
However, the Ministry wanted a second opinion,
and referred the applications to Schultz-Lorentzen
and Daugaard-Jensen. It wanted their opinion not
only on the project but also on the maintenance of the
state monopoly itself. Although the two referees
wanted reforms in Greenland, they completely sup-
ported the Trade Department in rejecting the applica-
tions. As Schultz-Lorentzen bluntly put it, ‘the sole aim
of private capital is to enrich itself at the expense of the
Greenlandic population’.33
The unanimous rejection of the idea of breaking
the Trade Department’s monopoly by the Ministry’s
advisers effectively settled the case. Later in the year
the Ministry set up a committee to look more closely
into the Royal Trade Department, but the scope of
revision was restricted with the statement that ‘the
trade shall continue be a monopoly under the Crown’.34
The committee was composed of three wholesale
merchants, two ship-owners and three civil servants.
Its sole task was to examine the working of the Trade
Department, and not surprisingly the majority of the
private businessmen concluded that its expenses could
be reduced. The civil servants, especially the director
of the Royal Trade Department, expressed their scepti-
cism at the realism of the suggested reduction. The
committee’s report, completed in February 1908, had
no relevance to the Governing Act, which had already
been prepared for Parliament about January 1907. The
bill was to a large extent an extension of Daugaard-
Jensen’s proposal duly elaborated by the civil servants
in the Ministry, the Trade Department and the inspec-
tors. However, the Minister of the Interior, Sigurd
Berg, had had no response from the guardians’ coun-
cils, so in the summer of 1907 he went to Greenland to
confer with them in person. On 15 February 1908 the
bill was at last presented to parliament where it got
through easily, perhaps because it had been so thor-
oughly prepared over a long period, perhaps because
everyone agreed with its main principles.
The terms of the Act35
The Act concerning the Governing of the Colonies in
Greenland became law on 27 May 1908. It definitively
separated Trade from Administration. The Trade
Department became a special division, headed by a
trade manager who had direct access to the Minister,
as had the director of the administration. This divi-
sion, still bearing the name ‘the Royal Trade Depart-
ment’, controlled the purchase of goods for Greenland,
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the sale of Greenlandic produce, trade inside Green-
land, and transport to and from Greenland. The argu-
ment put forward for this separation from the admin-
istration was that with business experts to run it, the
Trade Department would work more economically. On
the other hand the task of administering Greenlandic
society had become so complex that a special depart-
ment was needed.
In this way, it was asserted, the system would be
best fitted to handle the Greenlanders’ interests. The
business argument had its followers among wholesale
dealers and shipowners and in the ranks of parliamen-
tarians. It was equally appealing for those who wanted
profits to go to the state as for those who wanted the
Greenlanders to have them. The separation of trade
from administration was the over-arching idea of the
reforming civil servants who had long before raised
this question in Greenland. It also had its supporters in
Parliament, especially in the Radical Left Party and the
Social Democrats.
The Trade Department was not supposed to
 operate entirely independently in Greenland. The
heads of the administration, the two inspectors,
retained a supervisory role to ensure that the Depart-
ment was run in a way that enabled the Greenlanders’
economy to thrive. The two inspectors should keep an
eye on the Trade Department’s setting of prices, the
setting-up of trading posts, and the volume of produce
bought from the Greenlanders. In Copenhagen the
director of the administration was responsible for the
Trade Department in general.
Thus the difference between the new system and
the old was negligible. The desire to improve the
 trading economy was made explicit, but this was to be
achieved by selling operations in Denmark, not by
improving the local economy to the detriment of the
Greenlanders. On the contrary, it was intended to
make them better off. In economic terms the intention
was to make Greenland self-sufficient. The Radical
Left Party and the Social Democrats tried hard to
incorporate in the act a guarantee that the Green-
landic population would benefit from any profit in
Greenland, even from mining concessions. The major-
ity of the internal Parliamentary committee agreed
that any profits the Trade Department made should
benefit Greenland, but those from mining were
another matter. At the second reading in Parliament,
the spokesman for the governing Liberal Left Party
maintained the view that the government and Parlia-
ment should be free to dispose of any profits which
might come from for example a profitable gold mine.
This is probably why the act stated only that the
monopoly trade should be carried out at the state’s
expense. Again, this is not greatly different from the
earlier basis of economic policy. From the 1880s the
state had run a deficit on Greenland, even allowing for
the royalties from the cryolite mine.
More radical changes appeared in the political-
administrative structure. The guardians’ councils were
abolished and their responsibilities divided between
two new agencies: provincial councils and municipal
councils; the latter had the task of administering poor
relief and subsidies, and were also entitled to provide
services for the common good in the municipality. The
remainder of the revenue was to be distributed, as
before, among the producers i.e. the hunters and fish-
ermen. All in all, sixty municipalities were established
on the West Coast, ranging from thirty to 360 inhabi-
tants. The electoral system remained unchanged from
the guardians’ councils, the franchise being restricted
to heads of families who could elect only proficient or
formerly proficient seal hunters. The Radical Left
Party and Social Democrats tried in vain to introduce
eligibility for males aged twenty-five and over, but the
government stuck to the possibility of electing a profi-
cient younger seal hunter and excluding an inferior
older one.
Thereafter, the Minister sought the views of the
provincial councils before amendments to the propos-
als were made. The hearings took place in 1911-13, and
the final decree of 16 June 1913 broadly incorporated
the councils’ proposals bringing radical change. The
voting age was fixed at twenty-two, and any man aged
twenty-five who was subject to Greenlandic justice
(see later) could stand for election regardless of occu-
pation provided he had not received poor relief or
been sentenced for a misdemeanour less than a year
before the election. There were some deviations from
the proposals of the provincial councils. In the North
they had argued that receiving poor relief should not
exclude a person from joining the electorate, and in
the South they wanted the Greenlandic priests and
senior catechists included, although they were subject
to Danish justice.
While the municipal councils continued the local
administration of the guardians’ councils, greater
YEARS OF REFORM 1900-1912
28
responsibilities were assigned to the new provincial
councils whose members were elected by the munici-
pal councils. Qualifications were the same as for the
municipal councils so no Danes were eligible. Schultz-
Lorentzen was not pleased, but the Danish parliamen-
tarians upheld Ryberg’s 1905 proposal. As the Minister
of the Interior said in Parliament, ‘It is essential to know
the Greenlanders’ opinion – the Danes can be reached
through other channels’. Not surprisingly, at the first
election all members were seal hunters except for
three who had presumably retired from that occupa-
tion. The councils were to meet once a year to discuss
matters of common concern for the province. Issues
could be put on the agenda by the Danish government
or the Greenland administration, or by the councils
themselves as they pleased. However, the provincial
councils had only an advisory function. The govern-
ment had no obligation to hear the provincial councils
before enacting laws concerning Greenland, but as the
importance of the councils increased, the government
generally sought their advice. Their decision-making
powers were restricted to the funds in their care.
There were three funds: the municipal funds, the
provincial funds and the common fund. They were
financed, as in previous years, by a charge of 20 per
cent on the purchase price of Greenlandic produce for
export paid by the Royal Trade Department. A new
source was opened with the Act of 1908, which intro-
duced a 2 per cent duty on all salaries paid to Green-
landers. The income from the charge and duty was
divided among the three funds. The local municipal
fund got two-thirds, the provincial fund two-ninths,
and the common fund got the remaining one-ninth.
The freedom of the provincial councils to decide
how to spend their fund was limited. If the inspector
agreed, they could support municipal funds that were
in deficit, and reward capable hunters with loans for
house-building and the purchase of rifles – like the for-
mer guardians’ councils. The Minister had to authorise
any other use of the money and also controlled the
common fund with the aim of benefiting the Green-
landic population in general. The provincial councils
were entitled to suggest how the fund should be
applied. We shall see later how the Greenlandic agen-
cies spent the money.
New structures were also introduced in the ad -
ministration of justice. From the beginning of coloni-
sation in the eighteenth century, the incoming Danes
had remained under Danish civil and criminal law,
while the Greenlanders managed their justice as they
had done since time immemorial. Little by little, the
inspectors had taken over responsibility for dealing
with serious criminal offences of Greenlanders such as
murder and arson. However, civil law remained in the
hands of the Greenlanders without interference from
the Danish authorities. That system was continued in a
modified form in the guardians’ councils, in which the
Greenlandic members were to give their verdict before
the Danish members had their say. Criminal offences
were placed under the inspectors. However, the
 highest-ranking Greenlanders in the administration
were placed under Danish laws.
This dual system was recognised by the act of 1908
which placed all persons designated as of ‘Greenlandic
nationality’ under Greenlandic justice except Green-
landers with high rank in the civil service who were
appointed directly by the crown or the minister such as
the colony managers and priests. The existence of sep-
arate systems of justice, for the colonisers and the
colonised, in this case the Danes and the Greenlanders
is a common feature of colonial empires. It is often
considered discrimination against the natives. A closer
look at the rules in Greenland will reveal whether this
was indeed the case there.36
It was ruled that the municipal councils would
decide cases concerning inheritance and the admini -
stration of a deceased Greenlander’s belongings, nor-
mally according to common Greenlandic custom. If
considerable capital or goods were in question, an offi-
cial division between the heirs should take place. If the
deceased had been employed in public service, the
inspector should participate in administering the
estate – apparently, in order to secure the administra-
tion its outstanding debts. The inspector administered
the estates of persons placed under Danish law,
although his verdicts could be appealed to the Danish
High Court. Both systems aimed to protect the inter-
ests of minors.
The municipal council judged civil cases between
Greenlanders in an ordinary trial, while the inspector,
accompanied by two Danish lay judges, settled suits
against persons under Danish law. If no settlement was
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reached, the case would be tried in Copenhagen. A
mixed court would try civil cases between people
belonging to different systems. Each colony district
had a mixed court with the inspector as chairman, and
two Danes and two Greenlanders as lay judges. It is not
easy to say which system best served the interests of an
injured party – e.g. how a Greenlandic malefactor’s
treatment by the municipal council would compare
with that of a mixed court. Systematic research of the
years 1938 to 1948 has shown that the Greenlandic atti-
tude of mind was more lenient to malefactors than a
Danish court would have been37 so the injured party
might have enjoyed better protection under Danish
than Greenlandic law.
Criminal law – which in Greenland covered all
cases to which punishment was attached, was con-
siderably milder under Greenlandic than under Dan-
ish law, especially where the severity of fines and the
nature of other punishments was concerned. The
municipal councils were authorised to fine the Green-
landers for offending against the rules set by the coun-
cils. Other cases against Greenlanders were brought
before the mixed courts in which the Greenlandic
members had to vote first, then the Danes, and finally
the chairman. The inspector had to ensure the legality
of the procedure, but there was also a right of appeal.
Criminal offences were to be judged by the standards
set for the guardians’ councils in 1872,38 which fall into
three categories according to the sentence which
could be imposed by the court:
1. A fine of Dkr. 4 payable to the provincial fund and
an indemnity to the person against whom an
offence had taken place. This could be levied by
the mixed courts for use without permission of
property such as tools belonging to others, dam-
aging such property, keeping another person’s
catch of fish or seals without payment, taking into
possession drift wood which somebody else had
already dragged above the high tide mark.
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Fig. 5. The South Greenland Provincial Council in session for the first time in 1911. The gentleman in uniform is inspector Ole
Bendixen. Photo Arctic Institute.
2. A fine of Dkr. 10 to the provincial fund and an
indemnity to the victim. This could be imposed in
a case of plain theft. Furthermore, a clear case of
disobedience to the authorities and superiors was
punishable by this penalty.
3. With capital crimes the mixed courts would inves-
tigate the case, and refer it to the inspector. This
would be the case with manslaughter cases and
other serious crimes including clandestine child-
birth.
The inspector could fine anybody placed under Danish
law who broke the by-laws of the municipal councils,
and he could increase the fines according to the paral-
lel Danish rule and the offender’s financial position.
The intention was that the impact of the fines on the
Danes should be no less than on the Greenlanders.
Only Danes could be charged with infringing the trade
monopoly, there was no law forbidding the Greenlan-
ders from bypassing the Trade Department in their
sales, although they forfeited their right to ‘repartition’
if they did so. If a case against a Dane was serious
enough to warrant imprisonment or dismissal from
the civil service, the inspector acted in the capacity of
examining judge, and judgment in the case was
referred to Copenhagen. The intention was clearly that
those subject to Danish law in Greenland should get
more severe penalties than those under Greenlandic
law, but whether this was in fact what happened is not
clear.
The revision of 1912
The passage of the 1908 act was expected to meet all
Greenland’s needs. There was no one who did not have
cause for satisfaction. The Greenlanders were taking a
greater part in administration, and institutions had
been set up to make their views known to the Danish
political world. The Trade Department had been sepa-
rated from civil administration, to some extent at least.
Still, satisfaction was not universal. Schultz-Lo -
rentzen continued to criticise both the exclusion of
Danes from the Greenlandic councils and the amount
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Fig. 6. A municipal council meeting in Nuuk 1927. Every settlement over 100 inhabitants elected members to the municipal coun-
cils which at least should have 3 members. They wore a badge on the sleeve and an official cap outdoors because they also had
certain police functions beside distributing poor relief and acting as court in dispute among Greenlanders. Photo Arctic Institute.
of power exercised by the inspectors39 though his
views were largely ignored, but the separation of the
Trade Department and administration proved almost
impossible. Because the Greenlanders’ interests were
considered paramount, the administration was
inevitably involved in all trade issues in the capacity of
either decision-maker or adviser. Relations between
Ryberg, the head of the administration, and the new
head of the Trade, Oscar Wesche, were strained, and
confusion began to appear. Although the inspectors
and the health service were unquestionably under the
direction of the administration, the colony managers
and other staff had obligations to the Trade Depart-
ment as well. In the case of contradictory orders,
which was to be obeyed?40
The remedy was to re-shape the Act of 1908 and
create a single command system for all Greenlandic
issues. A single director was put in charge over all staff
in all branches, including schools and churches. Over
these matters the director would be answerable to the
Minister for Church and Education, but in all other
maters to the Minister of the Interior. Under the direc-
tor a trade manager should buy and sell in Denmark
and be advisor to the director on all trade matters.
Apparently to mitigate the exclusion of Danes
from the Greenlandic councils, the Danish civil ser-
vants in Greenland were allowed – singly or collec-
tively – to make representations to the inspector on
questions of general interest to Greenland or to them-
selves, and the Minister could allow them to meet offi-
cially for this purpose.41
After this peace reigned for a long time in matters
concerning Greenland, partly because of the sound-
ness of the act, and partly because Jens Daugaard-
Jensen, who became director in 1912, had a special gift
for getting things done smoothly.
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These were quiet years for politics and administration.
Management was centred on the Administration of
Greenland (Grønlands Styrelse), which had complete
overall control of the different services. The main
fields were civil administration, trade, church and
education, and health. There were also the Trade
Department’s business in Denmark and transport to
Greenland. The director held all the threads in his
hands. It may seem as if Daugaard-Jensen enjoyed
absolute power, but the situation was not quite as it
had been formerly. Parliament had become more
watchful, and now the Greenlandic councils existed to
voice Greenlandic opinion. Despite these limits the
Administration continued to dominate in Greenland,
and every aspect of its society. It controlled, it sup-
ported, and it saw to it that the tasks were carried out.
There was a story in Greenland that when a little girl in
school heard about baby Jesus being placed in a
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The Daugaard-Jensen period, 1912-1940
Fig. 7. Director of the Greenland Administration Jens Daugaard-Jensen (1871-1938) in his office in Copenhagen in the 1920es.
He served in the Greenland administration all his life, started as an assistant in 1893 and became the inspector for Northern
Greenland in 1900. 1912-1938 he was Director of the Administration of Greenland. His competence earned him respect and
trust not least of the Greenlanders. He cautiously led the Greenlandic society into modern times and was one of the most impor-
tant civil servants in twentieth century Greenland. Photo Arctic Institute.
manger, she cried out: ‘Why didn’t the Administration
send a cradle?’ The almighty Administration was cer-
tainly a present reality.
Population growth and employment
From the 1880s the population had grown steadily,
and the growth became even more rapid in the first
half of the new century as can be seen in table 4. The
lower rate 1911-21 was in part due to the deadly influ-
enza epidemic in the summer of 1919 which resulted in
249 deaths, and a reduction in the total population of
126 persons in that year. Note that the growth rate in
Greenland was maintained after 1920 while decrea-
sing in Denmark due to a decline in fertility.
Greenlandic occupation structure remained very
stable until 1930, as is shown in table 5. Unfortunately
there was no census between 1930 and 1945, so it is not
possible to determine whether the shift in occupation
apparent in 1945 took place in the 1930s or during the
war. Among the Greenlandic occupations a marked
shift to fishing took place. We will look into this issue
later.
The censuses reveal which positions Greenlanders
held in European occupations. Table 6, unfortunately
only up to 1930, shows that Greenlanders dominated
the first four categories with relative fewer as foremen
and skippers. Only three Danes were employed in this
category in 1911, ten in 1930. Among the priests the
Greenlanders grew to have a solid majority. Only at the
highest-level was Greenlandic participation modest.
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Fig. 8. A Greenland halibut caught in
western Greenland in the 1920es. The
commercial halibut fishing in south
Greenland took place in open sea. It
started 1910 under Danish managers
who towed the Greenlanders’ small
boats to the fishing places to set the
long lines. Photo Holger Dan Møller/
Arctic Institute.
The proportion of Greenlanders in the different
branches of colonial service is shown in 7. Significant
changes occurred in administration and mining. The
growth of Greenlandic employment here was due to a
growing number of jobs in the Greenlandic councils
and advances in communication. The opening of a
coalmine at Qullissat in 1924 explains the growth in
mining jobs. The difference in 1930 between the em -
ployed with or without families is simply due to the
excess of young unmarried men among the Danes.
These changes in employment structure were caused
by changes in the economy between 1912 and 1940 to
which we now turn.
Change in the Economy
Between the wars Greenland experienced a shift from
an age-old subsistence economy to a modern fishing
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Fig. 9. Cod was the main catch. Piles of dried and salted cod in a fishery house in Paamiut 1919. Photo Jens Daugaard-
Jensen/Arctic Institute.
Table 4. Population of Greenland 1901-38, except Thule, with
the Danish growth rate for comparison). * 1930-40.
Growth rate
Europeans Greenlanders Greenland Denmark
1901 262 11,190
1911 382 12,510 1.12 1.190
1921 266 13,401 0.69 1.190
1930 399 15,345 1.52 0.930
1938 383 16,970 1.27 0.80*
Table 5. Greenlanders by occupation 1911-1945, %. * Family
included.
1911 1921 1930 1930* 1945*
European 
occupations
Administration 2.9 3.6 2.9 1.8 2.3
Trade 6.3 7.7 7.4 8.6 18.0
Church and 
education 6.0 6.3 4.3 5.1 6.5
Other 0.6 0.7 1.7 1.2 7.1
Total 13.8 18.2 16.2 16.8 33.9
Greenlandic 
occupations
Hunters 73.0 66.5 49.0 n.a. 41.6
Fishermen 11.1 15.1 32.0 n.a. 20.1
Other 0.1 0.2 2.8 n.a. 4.4
Total 84.2 81.8 83.8 83.2 66.1
Numbers 
employed 2,902 3,154 4,139 15,32 16,457
economy, a shift which had been seen earlier in other
parts of the North Atlantic. In the later 19th century
Iceland and the Faroe Islands shifted from a predomi-
nantly agrarian society to sea fishing as the main eco-
nomic activity. In Greenland the shift from a hunting
society was in many ways a greater leap. In none of the
three places did changes occur overnight, but in
Greenland they were certainly very rapid. Let us look
at the details. Sealing declined from about 1910 from
an annual level of eight seals per inhabitant to barely
five in 1934 as can be seen in diagram 2.
Fortunately, and certainly related to the decline in
the seal catch, there was an expansion in two new
industries: fishing and sheep-breeding.
Fishery
Even minute changes in the climate have a profound
impact on a society at the margin of habitation such as
Greenland throughout its history. From drilling of the
ice core it can be deduced that the Norse immigration
took place towards the end of a mild period with aver-
age temperatures of a half degree Celsius above those
at the end of the twentieth century. The Norse disap-
pearance took place during a cold period which
reached its lowest point around 1350 with an average
temperature of two degrees Celsius below our times.
About 1700 the average temperature rose by one
degree, and renewed colonisation took place. It con-
tinued in spite of a slight fall of a half degree till 1900
when a new warmer period began.42 From about 1870
the temperature has been recorded on a regular basis,
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Table 6. Proportion of Greenlanders in European occupations
1911-30, mining excluded.
1911 1921 1930
Catechists 100 100 97
Crew 100 100 100
Midwives 99 99 100
Artisans 94 98 93
Foremen and skippers 96 90 76
Trading post managers 78 85 83
Priests 18 71 77
Colony manager and manager 
assistants 9 4 6
Proportion of Greenlanders in 
European occupations 87 91 84
Number in European occupations 
(Greenlanders and Danes 508 616 728
Table 7. Proportion of Greenlanders in colonial service, 1911-
45. * Family included. ** Administration and health service
combined.
1911 1921 1930 1930* 1945*
Administration 30 80 57 63
Health service 90 90 84 83+ 88
Trade 83 87 83 91 95
Church, education 95 98 96 97 91
Mining and similar 8 14 30 52 85
Overall proportion 65 75 72 86 91
Overall number 
(Greenlanders 
and Danes) 702 763 932 2,958 6,126
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Diagram 2. Seal catch 1887-1934 West
Greenland per inhabitant.
42. Dansgaard 1975: 72.
and its precise development can be plotted as in dia-
gram 3.
The decisive change in temperature began in 1916
and reached an all-time peak about 1930. How many
fish this change brought into the Greenlandic waters
cannot be known, but the catch rose explosively. In
diagram 4 the value of the fish catch is set against that
of the traditional hunting products.
These statistics record the amount brought to
Denmark during a calendar year and therefore differ
slightly from annual figures from Greenland, which
are reckoned in fiscal years (April – March). Obviously
the main trends are the same. Fishery products rose
steadily from an insignificant beginning in 1915 to a
peak in 1930, intersecting the curve for hunting prod-
ucts in 1923.
The change from seal hunting to fishing was most
marked in the South, and had weightier consequences
than a mere exchange from the rifle and harpoon to
the fishing line. Boats were needed as well as land-
based factories to process the fish, which in those days
meant producing salted fish. The number of wooden
boats owned by Greenlanders rose rapidly from 157 in
1900 to 287 in 1920, and 1,471 in 1935. Soon the first
motorboats owned by Greenlanders made their
appearance. In 1925 there were only two, eight in 1929,
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Diagram 3. Variations in Surface
Temperature (degrees Celsius).
Variations April-September in West
Greenland between Paamiut and
Disko, 5-year deviation from average,
1876-1915 (TG Grønland 1965: 400).
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Diagram 4. Greenland exports by value,
DKK (Danish Statistical Yearbook).
thirty-eight in 1934, and in 1939 seventy-two. Some
were paid for in cash, but most were financed by loans
from the administration.
The building and operation of the fish processing
plants were tasks for the administration. The Green-
landers themselves had no experience of running a
fishing industry and had no capital to invest. During
the years 1910-39 125 fishing plants were built, a de-
velopment shown in table 8.
These figures show a rise in processing capacity,
but we cannot be certain whether it met the actual
needs. The south provincial council was constantly
asking for longer opening hours and additional build-
ings. The change to fishery could explain the migra-
tion from the smallest settlements to the bigger ones,
which took place in this period, but there must be or
have been other factors as well since the phenomenon
also occurred in North Greenland where fishing was
still a supplementary occupation.
Sheep breeding43
Only in the southern part of Greenland, that is the dis-
trict of Qaqortoq (Julianehåb), did climatic conditions
allow a significant amount of animal husbandry. As
has been mentioned, in 1906 the priest at Narsaq
Kujalleq (south of Nanortalik), Jens Chemnitz, gave it
a try using sheep from the Faroe Islands, and system-
atic breeding began in the state breeding stations in
1913-1915.
With the milder climate the herds grew steadily.
In 1915 there were only 200 sheep, 2,000 in 1926, 5,000
in 1929, and about 10,000 in 1936. Then came two hard
winters, which reduced the flocks to 7,000. The num-
ber of sheep farmers also increased. During the 1920s
they numbered 100, and shortly before the Second
World War 200; however, only about fifty had sheep
rearing as their main business. Thus in the overall
economy sheep-farming was of minor importance,
except in Qaqortoq district, which was hardest hit by
the dwindling of the seal stock; there sheep-farming
also led to a dispersion of settlements because condi-
tions for sheep farming were most advantageous deep
in the fiord lands, while sealing was most promising at
the outer coast. The meat produced – between 22 and
48 tons a year – was mainly sold in Greenland to the
quarry at Ivittuut and to ocean-going ships. The rest
was sold in Denmark in widely varying quantities.
As a new occupation sheep farming certainly had
the attention of the administration and the provincial
councils. The latter offered loans for building of sheep-
cotes (1920), and in 1925 they ruled that sheep farmers
could share the so-called repartition, which originally
was meant for seal hunters. This gesture was a vindica-
tion of the new occupations in the ongoing debate
between the Greenlanders about who counted as a
real Greenlander. This topic will be dealt with below.
By 1936 sheep were so numerous that marking was
made compulsory.
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Table 8. Building of fish processing plants in Greenland 1910-
1939 (SSOG-46: table 196).
Plants built m2 total m2
1910-14 11 725 725
1915-19 3 129 854
1920-24 24 1506 2360
1925-29 21 1077 3427
1930-34 52 3144 6571
1935-39 14 1104 7675
Table 9. Settlements by size of population (SSOG-46: table 21).
North Greenland South Greenland Total
<50 51-200 >200 Total <50 51-200 >200 Total
1886 23 39 0 62 34 39 4 77 139
1901 56 38 1 95 44 38 4 86 181
1921 46 45 3 94 31 43 7 81 175
1938 30 46 7 83 29 40 11 80 163
Other social developments
The shift in basic economic activity had an impact on
many parts of society. The modernisation and Euro-
peanisation of society might have happened anyway,
but there can be no doubt that the decline of sealing
and the growth of fishing speeded the process.
The money economy became ever more domi-
nant. Public statistics cannot show every aspect of that
process, but the development in money income from
the trading-in of Greenlandic products can be shown,
see diagram 5.
Clearly visible is the distinct rise in the 1920s,
when the money income from trading-in more than
doubled. This diagram understates the money actually
in circulation, because besides trading-in, the Green-
landers earned money from sales to private citizens
and from salaries.
The distribution of different kinds of money
income has been calculated for some districts. Table 10
shows one from Disko Bay (Qasigiannguit) and
another from South Greenland (Qaqortoq).
Seen over these thirty-eight years a shift of 10 per
cent of income from trading-in to wages is significant,
but not dramatic. The selling of Greenlandic products
– fish and seals – still counted for over one-third of the
income.
The increased money income was used for invest-
ment in businesses, building houses, and the purchase
of imported food – necessary to compensate for the
decline in sealing. From 1901 to 1930 the number of
dwelling-houses grew from 1,503 to 2,525, proportion-
ately more than the increase in population. Thus the
number of inhabitants per house was declining,
namely from 7.5 in 1901 to 6.1 in 1930,44 resulting in
more space per person.45 In addition domestic heating
was improved since almost all the Greenlanders’
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Diagram 5. Greenlanders’ income from
sales to the Trade Department (actual
prices) (SSOG-46 table 282).
Table 10. Distribution of money income by kind among the Greenlanders (SSOG-46: tables 444-5).
Qaqortoq district Qasigiannguit district
Wages Trading-in Miscell. Wages Trading-in Miscell.
1899-1904 40.9 48.6 10.5 42.3 48,6 9.1
1910-14 46.4 43.2 10.4 40.3 51.2 8.5
1920-24 51.0 40.7 8.3 46.3 45.5 8.2
1930-1934 41.8 46.6 11.6 44.7 45.1 10.2
1935-38 50.0 36.2 13.8 52.1 38.2 9,7
houses were fitted with stoves. Thus some of the
increased cash income was used to improve living con-
ditions.
To a large extent the money for houses and busi-
ness equipment was borrowed from Greenlandic funds
which, as mentioned earlier, were generated from the
Trade, so in a sense their source would be Greenlandic
production at least if there was a trade surplus overall.
This had not in fact been the case since 1885 except for
some years during the First World War. From 1935,
however surpluses were produced by the increased
demand for cryolite used for making aluminium,
which in turn was used for building aircraft. The ear-
lier deficit was made up by the Danish treasury, but
carefully recorded so that Greenland could repay it
should that ever be possible. In those days balancing
the government budget was a virtue also where
colonies and dependencies were concerned. No state
financing of economic activities in those areas was
intended, but in Greenland it happened by default.
Most of the lending from the Greenlandic funds
was for house building, as shown in table 11.
The improvement in housing conditions should
have benefited health, but expenses also grew in the
expanding health sector. It appears that this expendi-
ture was not related only to health conditions and
needs, but followed an overall expansion of the econ-
omy.
Compared to Denmark, Greenland had more mid-
wives and hospital beds but fewer nurses. The ratio of
doctors was similar. No clear picture of the health of
the population emerges from the figures. The differ-
ences between Denmark and Greenland were too great
for any valid comparison to be made. The general
opinions aired in contemporary sources were that
there was more disease in Greenland than in Den-
mark, and that the health service was less comprehen-
sive, partly at least due to the vast distances between
settlements in Greenland.
The change to fishing resulted in a greater trade in
goods with the outside world. The decline in the huge
amounts of meat from sealing necessitated increased
food imports. Diagram 6 shows the two kinds of food
for which demand rose in that period.
This development had profound implications. The
daily sugar intake per person had grown from 12.5
grams in 1899 to 98.8 grams in 1938. In spite of this
increase of 700 % it was still some 15 kilos a year less
than Danish consumption. Likewise daily consumption
of cereals and beans rose from 66.3 grams to 162.2
grams in 1938. Seen in terms of bread it corresponded
to an increase from two to five slices daily.46 The pro-
portion of imported food consumed by the Greenlan-
ders has been calculated. In 1910-15 imported food
accounted for 22%, in 1915-20 for 24%, and in 1930-5
for 50%.47 Individual consumption of other imported
goods rose too: clothes, wood products, fuel, ironware
and tools, while goods such as coffee, tea and tobacco
were in constant demand.
This increased trade demanded a corresponding
increase in internal transport capacity. More numer-
ous and heavier coastal freighters were used. The total
of register tonnage rose from 466 in 1900 to 1,487 in
1938. Because motor power replaced sails at the same
time, the quicker voyages meant a significant expan-
sion in transport capacity above the growth in ton-
nage. Transatlantic freighters also replaced sails with
motors, which reduced voyage time. The average tran-
sit time for Copenhagen – Greenland – Copenhagen in
1900 was ninety-nine days; in 1938 it had dropped to
fifty-eight. The number of ocean freighters was nearly
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Table 11. Lending from the Greenlandic funds to house build-
ing and business equipment (SSOG-46: table 63).
House Business Total
building equipment Dkr
(%) (%)
1915-26 68.4 31.6 32,272
1927-31 86.4 13.6 164,553
1932-36 86.4 13.6 234,464
Table 12. Health sector in Greenland (SSOG-46: tables 41, 42).
* 1900.
Expenses Doctors Nurses Midwives Beds
Dkr
1910 85,186 7 4 84 *30
1930 314,239 10 11 100 240
1935 393,459 10 16 112 325
the same, but thanks to the higher speeds more trips
could be made in a year. Thus the transatlantic ton-
nage capacity rose from 5,576 in 1900 to 9,998 in 1920
and 25,480 in 1930.48
Not only did transport of goods across the Atlantic
increase but other forms of communication rose as
well. The number of letters sent to Greenland in 1900
was 3,297, but it had risen to 14,100 by 1930 and to
25,350 by 1939.49 Wireless telegraphy was introduced
in 1925 with three stations (Qeqertarsuaq, Nuuk and
Qaqortoq). By 1939 there were twenty-seven stations
all over Greenland. The transmitting station was
Qaqortoq from where the traffic was cabled to Reyk-
javik in Iceland and thence to Copenhagen. Already in
1927 a short-wave transmitter in Qaqortoq could send
the traffic all the way to Copenhagen; the number of
telegrams rose from 300 in 1925 to 6,500 in 1930 and
13,000 in 1939.50
Thus a tremendous change had taken place before
the Second World War so Greenland was in no way an
untouched aboriginal society. Commercial fishing had
largely overtaken hunting as the primary occupation
of the people, and this involved a much greater trading
relationship with the outer world at large, and an
expansion of the internal structure of society. Even if
some of these developments might have taken place
anyway, it is fair to conclude that the decline in the
stock of seals and the arrival of a huge quantity of fish
precipitated the modernisation of Greenlandic society
in this period.
Cultural Developments
The Greenlandic debate51
At the beginning of the twentieth century Greenlan-
ders began to discuss the future of their country and
their own role in the process. This could have been in
reaction to Danish discussions of the question or to the
changes taken place in Greenlandic society. In their
monthly periodical from 1861 they had encouraged
each other to be more industrious as seal hunters,
more skilful in rowing kayak and more far-sighted in
storing enough of the catch to last through the winter.
The perspective was clearly that they depended on the
seals – but could use fish as a supplement when sealing
produced insufficient catches.
By the turn of the century when fish became a
product to be traded-in, a fierce debate took place
between defenders of traditional sealing and advo-
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Diagram 6. Consumption in Greenland
of imported food per inhabitant
(SSOG-46, Table 315, 329).
cates of new ways. The strong feelings stemmed from
the fact that sealing was a core element in their self-
identification as Greenlanders: a good Greenlander
was a good Christian and a good hunter. When hunt-
ing from kayaks the Greenlanders greatly excelled the
Europeans, who for their part encouraged the Green-
landers to achieve excellence in hunting because its
products were what kept the society in being.52 The
traditionalists maintained that fishing could be no
more than supplementary because fish could not pro-
vide them with the hides with which they covered
their kayaks and umiaks, while the advocates of new
ways argued that with a dwindling stock of seals the
society would die out if nothing else could be found. If
other nations could subsist on fish, so could the Green-
landers.
The debate on national self-consciousness was fed
by another stream. The group of Greenlanders with
European occupations: employees in the trade, the
church, and the school system had hitherto supported
the traditional view that a real Greenlander was a seal
hunter, but now some of them opposed the idea that
seal hunting should be the test for being a true Green-
lander. A more modern notion of nationalism was
expressed, based on common language, history and
love of country.53 Clearly a new group of people was
fighting for its right to a place in society.
Peqatigiinniat
The sense of a new era dawning also stimulated the
setting up of Greenlandic organisations notably with
the founding of the Peqatigiinniat association in
1908.54 Its roots were mainly Christian, its stated pur-
pose to promote a Christian way of life in togetherness
and induce others to do the same. This was clearly
inspired by contemporary revivalist movements in
Denmark: while the Greenlanders took the initiative
and called the meetings, they were supported by the
Danish missionaries, not least Schultz-Lorentzen who
in 1908 reported to friends in Denmark the happy
news that a true revivalist movement had been
founded.55
The revivalist trend was not the only one in
Peqatigiinniat. Concern for this world was a constituent
part of the movement. If any outside influence for this is
to be found it may be the Folk High School movement in
Denmark based on the ideas of the priest, poet, and par-
liamentarian, N.F.S. Grundtvig, who argued that a true
and industrious human life was a prerequisite condition
to a true Christian one.56 Certainly, the strong national
tone in Grundtvig’s writings is to be found also in
Peqatigiinniat, but as a Greenlandic one. The Green-
landic parallel to the songbook of the Danish Folk High
School from 1908, Erinarsuutit, did contain Christian as
well as patriotic songs that praised the country, and
which are still regarded as the heart of Greenlandic
song. The outstanding contributors were Jonathan
Petersen in Nuuk and Henrik Lund in Narsaq, who
wrote a national anthem. Its last verse was:
It is no longer good to hold oneself back -
Kalaallit, arise and go forward!
A human life is to be valued;
Start believing in what you can do for yourselves.57
The movement spread along the coast from Qaqortoq
in the south to Disko Bay, but it did not reach the
northern districts of Uummannaq and Upernavik due
to lack of interest among the local missionaries,58 or
the East Coast and the Qaanaaq area.
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53. Langgård 1999: 57.
54. The association in Nuuk was initiated on 13 March 1908, the date most often cited as the starting point (Thuesen 1988: 90).
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enlightening meetings in the parish of Narsaq Kujatdleq were summoned under the name ‘peqatigiinniat’ (Langgård 1998:
16). Even if ‘peqatigiinniat’ literally means association, the term was only used for this kind of organisation. For other meet-
ings and organizations other words were used. The reason why the Nuuk initiative is seen as the starting point may be that it
alone aimed to spread the idea to other parts of Greenland.
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56. Langgård (1999: 52) points to this.
57. Translated by the author. The Greenlanders were often reproached for their ‘self-restraint’ by the more audacious among
them.
58. Thuesen 1988: 98f.
In the beginning there were weekly meetings with
prayer and Bible reading, but there were also talks on
how to improve the material conditions of life. Mem-
bers visited the sick, collected funds for church build-
ing, and arranged great summer meetings, 600 people
gathered at Ilulissat in 1912 to hear the Gospel and
speeches about the need for material progress.59
Peqatigiinniat still exists in some places, but it lost
its momentum in the 1920s. Its significance lay in its
ability to gather native citizens around the idea of pro-
gressing in the same direction as other civilised coun-
tries. Such movements are a common feature in all
colonial societies.
Schools
Education is the key to progress, and the spokesmen
for the Greenlanders repeatedly pressed for teachers
in Greenland to be qualified. Over the period 1900-40
the number of school and church staff developed as
shown in table 13.
Clear trends were that Greenlandic preachers took
over from the Danish ones, that Danish and Green-
landic teachers trained in Denmark began to arrive,
and that the number of catechists without education
decreased. There was also an increase in the number
of people whom the preachers and teachers had to
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Fig. 10. Teaching at the small settlement Saqqarliit in 1936. Judged from the altar in the background the room also served as
church. Photo Jette Bang/Arctic Institute.
Table 13. School and church staff in Western Greenland, 1910-
37 (SSOG-46: table 394, 399, 404). * 1921.
1910 1920 1930 1937
Danish priests and 
qualified preachers 12 7 5 6
Greenlandic priest and 
qualified catechists 4 10 12 13
Danish teachers 0 0 4 9
Greenlandic teachers 0 0 3 4
Catechists (educated 
at college) 45 60 68 69
Catechists (educated 
otherwise) 52 49 56 78
Catechists (without 
education) 83 62 46 45
Total 196 188 194 224
Children attending school 2,67 2,870* 2,64 3,345
Population 12,486 13,474* 15,527 16,917
serve. In 1910 there were 14.8 children per teacher and
63.7 people per preacher, and in 1937 these numbers
had increased respectively to 16.3 and 83.3.
The school curricula were expanded. More hours
were devoted to reading and writing, also to scripture,
history and science. A novelty in this period was the
teaching of Danish: beginning in the 1920s it rose
sharply until the war – according to the rural dean this
was more a sign of growing popular interest, rather
than the teachers’ ability and facility in the language.60
Teaching Danish in the schools
The growing interest in the teaching of Danish in the
Greenlandic schools may seem at odds with the nas-
cent pre-nationalism of that period, but clearly the
Greenlanders’ nationalism was not directed against
their colonial masters the Danes, whom they viewed
as friends dedicated to furthering their progress.
Indeed this was the official policy, and the Danes with
whom the Greenlanders came in contact were civil ser-
vants sent to Greenland to implement that policy, and
those they met in Denmark mostly held similar views.
At the teacher training college Danish had always been
taught as a means of gaining access to a bigger litera-
ture and wider horizons of knowledge, and that was
exactly why Greenlandic parents now wanted their
children to learn Danish: they should be equipped to
cope with the new times ahead. Furthermore, because
the upper layer of society in Greenland consisted of
Danes, a Greenlander would feel more important
knowing their language. This was the view of an expe-
rienced observer, the later rural dean Aage Bugge a
Dane born and raised in Greenland.61
Introducing the Danish language in Greenland
had never been part of official policy, partly because of
the missionary aim to reach souls using their own lan-
guage, and partly also because of the practical obsta-
cles. And there was no need to learn Danish as long as
the main goal was the preservation of a traditional,
high-producing seal economy. With the introduction
of a more diversified economy and the need to learn
new occupations brought in from abroad the choice
was either to translate everything into Greenlandic or
to use the working language associated with the inno-
vations. This is the core problem where the moderni-
sation of a traditional society is concerned. It is well
known for example from the spread of industrialisa-
tion in eastern Europe that the better the Czechs mas-
tered the German language the better they could man-
age in the new machine age. This development pro-
duced in response a more vigorous Czech nationalism
to preserve the national identity.62 A similar develop-
ment took place in Greenland, but not until several
decades after the Second World War. For the time
being the Greenlanders chose Danish as the instru-
ment of their own progress.
Already in 1914 Mathias Storch, later (1927) rural
dean in North Greenland advocated to his colleagues
in the church that Danes should be employed as
 teachers, but he did not gain support for this proposal.
In 1919 the suggestion was carried through the conven-
tion,63 and the reluctant Danes became convinced that
this was actually the wish of the Greenlanders. The
question was also raised in the provincial councils (see
below). A member from the north deplored in 1919
that the Danish priest had left because this had
resulted in a deterioration of the children’s knowledge
of Danish.64 Against this background it was natural for
the committee which was to prepare a revision of the
governing law for Greenland in 1920 unanimously to
recommend the introduction of Danish as a subject in
Greenlandic schools. The committee stated the pur-
pose of the policy was to develop the Greenlanders’
moral and economic maturity to the point where they
would be able to live in free communication with the
rest of the world once the present state of isolation had
come to an end. They believed that to achieve this end
it was essential to attach Greenland as closely as possi-
ble to Denmark and bring Danish civilisation and cul-
ture to the country.
This was their reason for supporting the teaching
of Danish in Greenland. The ethnocentricity of their
language was not uncommon at a time when the idea
of ‘the white man’s burden’ still lingered on, but it was
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indicative of the general mood among the Green-
landers that the proposal was also supported by the
few of them on the committee. The reading of the bill
in Parliament took place in 1923 and the Liberal Left,
the Social Democrats and the Conservatives were sup-
portive, stressing that the introduction of Danish was
the wish of the Greenlanders. The degree of emphasis
on the benefit to them and the assurance that such a
move could give for the attachment of Greenland to
Denmark in the future varied among the members.
The spokesman for the Liberal Left Party, J.C. Vang-
gaard, stated unequivocally that the Greenlanders
should be made as Danish as possible so that the coun-
try could later be opened up without the danger of
 losing it. The Radical Left expressed fears that compul-
sory teaching in Danish would offend the nascent
national movement in Greenland, and remained
unconvinced by the minister’s assurance that it was
the Greenlanders’ own wish.65
Due to other circumstances the bill was postponed
in 1923 and a parliamentary delegation travelled to
Greenland to meet the two provincial councils and a
number of municipal councils to seek the views of the
Greenlanders. Doubts as to the reality of the demand
to make Danish a subject in their schools were made
clear by the fact that the delegation asked this same
question in all its consultations. Everywhere the
Greenlanders strongly supported Danish-language
teaching.66 This closed the issue.
At the next reading of the bill in Parliament in
 January 1925 support for compulsory teaching of
 Danish in Greenland was total. Compulsion was not an
issue. The subject was so highly esteemed in Green-
land that all children who had the opportunity partici-
pated.67 On the same occasion in 1925 compulsory
school attendance was introduced for all children aged
between seven and fourteen as in Denmark. Until then
children in Greenland had started to attend school as
soon as they wanted it, often much earlier than seven,
and continued till their confirmation which was often
after the age of fourteen. Thus, the change had the
peculiar result of reducing the number of pupils. In
1921 the percentage of children aged between five and
fourteen attending school was 78.9, but in 1930 it had
dropped to 68.7.68
In this matter the Danish politicians could be sure
that they were on solid ground. Not only was the bill
carried through Parliament unanimously, but all social
levels in Greenland were also in favour. Further assur-
ance could be found in the speech, which the explorer
and writer Knud Rasmussen gave before Parliament in
February 1925 having just completed his famous fifth
Thule expedition from Greenland through the Inuit
areas of North America which had won him tremen-
dous acclaim. He reported the positive experience in
Alaska where English had been the compulsory
medium since 1890. He subscribed to the American
view that only by letting the Eskimos slip into the rul-
ing culture could they have a chance of survival.69 The
years up to the Second World War saw no change of
public opinion in Greenland in this matter – indeed the
Greenlandic politicians pressed for improvement in
the teaching of Danish.
In 1935 the ministry tried to conciliate by describ-
ing the goal as leading the children to read, speak and
write Danish.70 However, the problem was not the zeal
for education but finding qualified teachers. Therefore
in 1937 Pastor G. Egede suggested in the provincial
council that the teaching of Danish should be ex -
panded by sending more teachers from Denmark to
Greenland. This was agreed,71 but the following year
the ministry answered that the results of the ongoing
teaching should first be evaluated, and that Danish
teachers would have trouble in teaching Greenlandic
children who only understood Greenlandic. But Pastor
Egede was determined and raised the question again;
once more the provincial council supported him unan-
imously arguing it was necessary beyond any doubt to
learn Danish as a link to the outside world, and
because Danish is a cultural language. (probably
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meaning that it is a vehicle for art and science). It was
impossible to take the Greenlanders back to their tra-
ditional stage, and that was why the endeavour should
be to make them capable of competing with other
nations.72 The ministry gave in and in 1939 announced
that it would try to get more Danish teachers to Green-
land.73
Similar examples of seeking new goals were to be
found in other aspects of Greenland’s cultural life. In
1930 Pastor Mathias Storch published a novel, ‘Strej -
flys over Grønland’ (Gleam of Light over Greenland),
in which a single provincial council speaking for the
whole of Greenland, and Greenlandic representation
in the Danish Parliament were envisaged. Through
education and cooperation with the Danes the Green-
landers should become capable of having an open
economy in free communication with the outside
world. In 1931 Augo Lynge, later a prominent politi-
cian, published a book ‘Ukiut 300-nngornerat’ (300
years after) which foresaw a modern Greenland with
factories and a deep sea fishing fleet working in
friendly cooperation with Danes. Thus there is no
doubt that the Greenlandic elite was much in favour of
a modernised Greenland, and saw assimilation with
Denmark and the Danish language as the only possible
way forward. To what extent the common Greenlan-
der shared this view cannot now be determined. There
is no evidence that the spokesmen lacked support.
Aage Bugge wrote in 1931 that the passive incompre-
hension of the introduction of Danish teaching, which
could be felt at times in certain circles, was definitely
on the way out.74
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Fig. 11. The Danish King Christian X visited Nuuk in 1921 to celebrate the 200 years anniversary of Danish rule. He is saluting
women wearing their finest dresses. Photo Harald Lindow/Arctic Institute.
Political Development
Provincial councils
The role in society of the provincial councils which
were set up in 1911, and the exact nature of their coo-
peration with the authorities in Denmark have not yet
been systematically analysed. In 1936 Knud Oldendow
(the office head of the Greenland administration)
wrote a survey for the councils’ twenty-fifth anniver-
sary. Considering his position and the occasion for
writing it, the book has virtues. It carefully characteri-
ses the inspectors and governors and conveys the
nature of the issues debated; most of them are raised
by the authorities but others raised by the members.
Oldendow implies cautiously that the inspectors/
governors should be credited with the smooth running
of the councils. The trend over time is a growing capa-
bility on the members’ part to use the councils to pro-
mote development in Greenland. This observation was
later confirmed by counting the issues raised by mem-
bers compared to those put before the councils by the
authorities.
Research into the minutes of the periods 1911-16
and 1934-8 reveals that whereas 37% of the issues rai-
sed by the members in the first period concerned Gre-
enland as a whole, as many as 72% fell into that cate-
gory in the second period. Table 14 indicates that a
smooth development had taken place between the
periods. The minutes also reveal the occupational
 balance of the members (Table 15).
The replacement of hunters by employees, espe-
cially catechists, is obvious. Other self-employed occu-
pations apart from hunting were only represented in
the southern provincial council – by a carpenter and a
writer. It was usual for nearly all members to be repla-
ced at each election. This could hardly be explained by
dissatisfaction on the part of the electorate since it had
no direct vote. The election committees were quite
small – rarely with more than ten members, so the
high rate of replacement is likely to mean that mem-
bership was seen by the election committees’ members
as a rotating duty. Some individual cases may illu-
strate certain aspects of the work in these councils. In
1911 the administration put a number of issues before
the councils to be added to a newly ratified act toget-
her with some other cases in which Copenhagen wan-
ted rules that would apply in the whole of Greenland.
Reaching a decision took a considerable time because
if the two councils reached different opinions, the
administration in Copenhagen would send them back
to get agreement. The provincial councils were very
reluctant to yield to each other’s opinions, so in some
cases different rules were issued for the North and the
South. Typical cases were those about where Green-
landers were allowed to build houses, and the question
of who could benefit from the repartition of common
funds.75 Some issues raised in 1911 were not resolved
till 1916. The inspector for North Greenland wanted to
introduce rules laying down which municipality had
the responsibility of paying poor relief when individu-
als moved between municipalities, and laying an obli-
gation on a house holder to maintain those living his
house. A member in the North Greenland provincial
council suggested that the municipalities should be
permitted to pay an allowance to members for attend-
ing meetings, and although the inspector regarded the
suggestion as unreasonable, the matter was pursued in
the following years, and was finally accepted in 1916.76
Most of the rules common to the whole of Green-
land, which arose from the discussions in the provin-
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Table 14. Issues raised in the Provincial Councils by members,
% (SSOG-46: table 57).
1911-15 16.8 %
1916-20 23.3 %
1921-5 36.1 %
1926-30 43.1 %
1930-5 60.6 %
Table 15. Provincial council members by occupation, 1911-39.
1911 1917 1923 1927 1933 1939
Self employed
Hunters 17 18 10 7 9 4
Others – – – 1 – 2
Employed
Church and school 5 2 6 8 8 6
Trade and crafts – 3 5 5 2 8
Others 1 – 2 2 4 3
cial councils, came from their own initiatives. If north
and south agreed, the ministry would often simply
implement the agreement, such as the order of 22 July
1914 on the handling of firearms.77 In other cases the
final rules represented a blend of northern and south-
ern views, such as the all-important possibility of
 lending funds for the construction and purchase of
more expensive equipment.78
Even when issues were put before the councils by
the administration in Denmark, the councils did not
automatically accept suggestions. When the inspector
in Nuuk suggested that borrowers should pay 4% inter-
est on loans, all members strongly disagreed and
argued that loans should be interest-free. On top of
that, it was agreed that if borrowers’ repayments were
regular, they should have their debt reduced by 4% of
the repayment. If this was not a special Greenlandic
understanding of the idea of interest, it was certainly
consistent with the age-old Danish way of disciplining
the Greenlanders: not by punishing failure to follow
rules, but by rewarding compliance. The final rules
allowed interest-free loans, but did not include a
reward for prompt repayment.79
Most of the issues raised by the members con-
cerned minor improvements in everyday life like the
ability (1913) to buy petroleum for hunting expedi-
tions, and the idea (1914) of teaching orphans and the
children of civil servants in kayak rowing at public
expense.80 But certain issues caused a loud and clear
protest to be delivered to the government in Copen-
hagen. In 1924 Denmark agreed to let Norwegians
hunt in the uninhabited areas of East Greenland, but
although East Greenland did not come within the
jurisdiction of the provincial councils both addressed
the matter in the same year. They were outraged be -
cause they assumed it would damage their own hunt-
ing, and because they had heard nothing about the
agreement with Norway before it came into force. The
provincial councils’ statement brought them to the
point of renouncing their allegiance to Denmark. In
the South provincial council they thought it ‘quite
incomprehensible’ that the government could do such a
thing without having ‘a moment’s doubt‘ as to whether
such an agreement would be harmful to the Greenlan-
ders and thus weaken their trust in Denmark.81 In the
north the tone was even sharper. The agreement was a
Danish ‘failure’, ‘Denmark had forsaken the Greenlan-
ders’, ‘an unexpected and crushing blow to everyone in
Greenland’ Denmark had ‘nullified all the expectations
for the future which the Greenlanders had vested in it.’
Hereafter there was ‘no possibility of a genuine coopera-
tion with Denmark.’ The mood was well expressed by
the hunter Ludvig Siegstad who in no way gave the
impression of being a naive colonial, ‘even if the Green-
landers are insignificant people, they know very well that
elsewhere in the world governments do not make deci-
sions of such crucial importance to an entire people with-
out consulting them first, and the Greenlanders had cer-
tainly expected Denmark to ask them before a decision
was made concerning a land which they call their own.’
The council concluded by thanking all who had sup-
ported their case. This obviously excluded the Danish
government.82
This episode was unique at the time, and certainly
gave Denmark a salutary warning as to how far it
could go without forfeiting the loyalty of the Green-
landers. Trust in Denmark had its limits when the
Greenlanders felt their interests threatened.
More Legislation 1925
The Preparations in Greenland
The governing act of 1908 stipulated in its final para-
graph that a revision should be made no later than ten
years after the first election of the provincial councils.
The act of 1912 obliged the Minister to let Greenlandic
issues be discussed in a committee to be made up
mainly of men on active service in Greenland. Thus no
immediate reason for establishing the committee has
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to be looked for in the circumstances of December
1920. The ministry had already asked the provincial
council members to discuss the impending revision
with the people, so that they could make their recom-
mendations at the council meetings planned for 1920.
There seems to have been lively debate all over Green-
land: so many suggestions were presented at the coun-
cil meetings that the total was not even listed, and of
course some were accepted and others rejected by the
councils. The ensuing lists of the two councils were
very different because the proposals submitted to
them were different, and because neither council
knew what the other had proposed. There was not
enough time for the usual procedure of comparing
proposals via the long transatlantic communication
route to and from Copenhagen. This procedure pre-
vented the Greenlanders from presenting an agreed
Greenlandic position.
The two provincial councils did agree in wanting
to allow Danes in Greenland to be eligible for council
membership, and to maintain the current voting age of
twenty-two and the age of eligibility at twenty-five.
This was because a small group of Greenlanders had
hitherto been unable to vote, namely those appointed
to their positions by the King or the Minister. They
were subject to Danish laws and hence had no voting
rights, as in the case for example of the catechists with
authorisation to preach. Both provincial councils
wanted them included in the electorate, either on an
equal footing with other native Greenlanders (south-
ern council) or through inclusion in the Danish elec-
torate (northern council).
The provincial councils disagreed over the issue of
repartition. In the South they wanted the funds to be
used by the community while in the North they
wanted the current situation to continue.
Each provincial council had proposals the other
did not have, of differing political importance. The
North proposed a district elected council at an inter-
mediate level between the municipal and provincial
council. This would of course expand the Greenlan-
ders’ political influence in their own affairs.
In the South the council urged that one council
should not be able to stop the other implementing rules
which the latter desired. As has been seen, neither leg-
islation nor practice prevented different rules from
emerging in the two parts of the country. In spite of
this, the South provincial council had felt itself over-
ruled when the government made common rules based
on the views of the North. Furthermore, the South
provincial council wanted more power placed in the
hands of the inspector by expanding his authority to
approve the decisions of the municipal councils. It also
wanted to expand the power of the council itself by
having an elected rather than an appointed chairman,
and it wanted direct access to the Ministry by-passing
the Greenland administration in Copenhagen. It seems
that the Greenland administration was beginning to be
seen in the same light as its predecessor the directorate
for the Royal Greenlandic Trade Department before
1912 – as an obstacle to the uncensored views of the
Greenlanders reaching those responsible for political
decision-making in Denmark. In a display of self-con-
sciousness ahead of its time the South provincial coun-
cil deliberately kept its distance from the Greenlanders
appointed to the new committee, who had not been
elected by the provincial councils and therefore could
not represent them on the committee.83
This episode typifies a common feature of colonial
political history: the desire of local authorities –
whether native or sent out from the home country –
for more power to be transferred from the centre. It
also shows a sharp awareness of their position and role
among the Greenlandic politicians in the early 1920s.
The 1920 committee
As stipulated by the 1908 Act the committee consisted
almost entirely of ‘men in active Greenlandic service’.
Members were the two inspectors, trading post man-
agers, and a couple of colony managers, physicians,
priests, and officials in the central administration.
There were 22 in total excluding the chairman, direc-
tor Daugaard-Jensen, who apparently did not partici-
pate in the discussions. Three of the members were
Greenlanders: Pastor Karl Chemnitz of Nuuk; the
 trading post manager David Olsen of Sisimiut; and
Rural Dean M. Storch of Ritenbenk. Knud Rasmussen
was also a member although he was not in the Green-
landic service. Born of a Greenlandic mother and a
Danish father he had a foot in both camps. In his works
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Greenlanders as well as Danes were referred to as ‘we’,
and in Greenland he counted as a Dane.84
The situation was advantageous to the official
class. The political task had been done by the provin-
cial councils and the administrative work of preparing
the report for decision by Danish politicians was now
to be done by the committee. A characteristic of the
report of 1921 was that it was divided into minority
statements from varying groups within the committee,
as if everyone wished to state his own opinion rather
than work out a firm body of proposals. In forty-three
cases the members were at odds. Close analysis of
these cases reveals two groups, whose views were
closer to each other than to anybody outside the
group. This was a majority group of thirteen, counting
among others the personnel from the Trade Depart-
ment and the two inspectors. A more radical minority
group of seven counted among others Schultz-
Lorentzen and Knud Rasmussen. Among the Green-
landers Chemnitz stood firmly with the minority
group, and Storch usually did while David Olsen
mostly sided with the majority. These were not fixed
groups because some or all who usually voted with the
minority group sometimes actually jointed the major-
ity.
In spite of these divergences the committee
agreed on several important points. One was the
essential purpose of Danish rule in Greenland: ‘the
development of the Greenlanders to self-reliance, that is
to a moral and economic maturity that will enable them
to live in free communication with the rest of the world in
the future when the present isolation is ended.’85 What
was to be done? As mentioned earlier, the answer was
to tie Greenland to Denmark as closely as possible. The
committee also agreed on righting the wrong of 1908
when Danish officials had been denied access to the
elected assemblies in Greenland. It proposed a new
assembly based on districts in which they would fill up
to half of the seats, and proposed further that Danes
who had lived in Greenland for two years or longer
should have ordinary voting rights and eligibility for
both the municipal councils and the provincial coun-
cils. Over this the committee agreed with the provin-
cial councils. The members also unanimously agreed
on extending the teacher training college in Nuuk with
a branch to prepare Greenlanders for work in the trade
and the administration, so eventually there would be
more Greenlanders in higher positions.
The committee not only commented on the pro-
posals from Greenland, but made recommendations
on its own initiative. Where production was concerned
it emphasised traditional sealing and barely noticed
the new fisheries. The committee attributed the suc-
cess of the emerging fishery to exploration, and rec-
ommended that sealing also should be thoroughly
explored and sustained by experts. This, however,
never happened.
The committee had better luck in proposing old
age pensions in Greenland, which the North provincial
council had already discussed in 1920. Both parties
assumed that this would be financed from the Green-
landic funds, on which the expense had fallen hith-
erto. The proposal became law in 1926, however, with
financial support from Denmark to give higher pen-
sions than had been envisaged in 1920.
Thus, of the proposals from the provincial coun-
cils, the committee had supported some, ignored
some, and made others of their own.
The Passing of the Governing Act of 192586
The bill for the government of Greenland was first
introduced in 1922, but was postponed till 1924
because of a parliamentary election and the conse-
quent return of Denmark’s first Social Democratic
 government. The bill it proposed was however nearly
identical to that of 1922 and was based on the majority
and significant minority recommendations of the 1920
committee. The profits on the Greenland trade would
be divided into two halves, one going to Greenland
and the other into a special emergency fund to be used
in case of future deficits. If this fund exceeded the cur-
rent investment in Greenland, calculated at Dkr. 6 mil-
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lion, a new decision would be necessary. With this the
usual policy for nearly a century was written into the
law. Denmark should not profit from the Greenlan-
ders’ toil, but kept the option open to profit from any
other economic activities that might arise.
Following a recommendation by the 1920 commit-
tee a new district based assembly was introduced – the
‘sysselråd’ – consisting of the municipal council chair-
men and the members of the provincial council elected
in the district. The numbers would be increased by
Danish civil servants becoming members to equal the
number of Greenlanders. The election procedure for
the provincial council remained unchanged. Members
were chosen by electoral assemblies of members of the
municipal councils and district councils in the con-
stituency. All Danish parties happily supported the
Greenlandic wish to allow Danes to be elected to their
assemblies. In fact only two were elected before the
Second World War, the physician Laurent Christensen
of Qaqortoq (1933-38), and Morten P. Porsild, head of
the Arctic Research Station in Qeqertarsuaq in 1927-38.
While the numbers qualified to be elected to the
provincial councils were thus increased the councils’
rôle and tasks remained unchanged. However, the
power to make loans and support for construction and
purchase of working tools by Greenlanders were trans-
ferred to the new district councils with the exception
of loans to sheep farmers, which continued to be
administered by the South provincial council. The
 district councils were also entrusted with the approval
of regulations decided in the district’s municipalities.
Municipal councils still maintained public order and
relieved needy people whether or not they were con-
sidered to have brought their situation on themselves.
However, relief for the physically disabled was to be
paid for by the new district councils because this was a
costly item and recipients were not evenly spread
among the municipalities; The district was thus mov-
ing in to even out the financial burden between the
municipalities. These retained the right to spend on
any matter defined as ‘for the common good’ but the
rest of the income was to be distributed to the
providers as before.
There were also changes in the judicial system.
The governor (new title landsfoged) was to be the
judge in all cases tried under Danish law, with appeal
to the Danish provincial court in Zeeland and he
should have qualifications similar to those of judges in
Denmark. In criminal cases he had the role of prosecu-
tor as well as judge who passed sentence. When these
cases resulted in more than a fine or confiscation they
were handed over to Copenhagen for final decision.
For those subject to Greenlandic law the jurisdiction
was shifted from the municipalities to a district court.
The appointed chairman of the district council backed
up by equal numbers of Danes and Greenlanders were
judges in all cases under Greenlandic law. If there
were procedural flaws, the governor could quash the
verdict, but otherwise the district decision was final.
Parliament went beyond approving the proposals
from the 1921 committee and the Ministry, and
decided that the Ministry of Education should be
involved in planning the Greenlandic school system
and the further education of catechists in Denmark.
Furthermore, an inspector to supervise Greenlandic
schools should be appointed. The law laid down that
the Danish Ministry of Health should have a say in all
health care matters concerning Greenland. A clear ten-
dency of these regulations was to end the Greenland
administration’s sole responsibility for Greenlandic
matters. It also signalled a wish to make conditions in
Greenland more similar to those in Denmark.
Parliament also clarified the intention behind the
Greenland trade, ‘All trading in Greenland shall have
the purpose of improving the economic conditions of the
Greenlandic population, and it is reserved for the Danish
state, supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. The
Greenlanders are permitted to trade freely with each
other,’ and it decided on a standing parliamentary
committee exclusively to keep an eye on Greenlandic
matters. The Minister was not happy fearing that this
would interfere in the administration. However, the
law did not address what became the most important
question in the coming years: the progress of Green-
landic economic life. The Danish parliamentarians
were much more concerned with development in fish-
ing and sheep rearing than the committee of 1920 had
been perhaps in response to the ever-growing fishery
in Greenland or simply because these occupations
were much more familiar to the parliamentarians than
sealing and fowling. However, nothing came out of the
debate, with only J.C. Vanggaard of the Liberal Left
suggesting that certain selected Danes should settle in
Greenland as pioneers in fishing and sheep farming.
References were made in the debates to the need
for financial sacrifices where Greenland was con-
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cerned, but balanced budgets were the creed of the
day, and the Greenland administration saw itself as
obligated to keep the yearly deficits as low as possible,
just as formerly. The Minister shared this opinion; in a
speech in 1927 he saw in the deficits a serious danger
of Denmark losing Greenland because he feared that
the Danish taxpayer would not foot the bill indefi-
nitely.87 This fiscal policy meant an extremely frugal
administration and reluctance to invest, but in spite of
this, during the next ten years the accumulated deficit
rose to Dkr. 3 million, and Parliament underwrote it
willingly. From 1936 ordinary income and special
income from royalties increased, and by 1940 the accu-
mulated balance had reached a surplus of Dkr. 9.2 mil-
lion. The key factor was the royalties from cryolite
mining which rose from Dkr. 2 million in 1930 to Dkr.
7.5 million towards the end of the decade.
The Act on Hunting and Fishing88
The governing act we have been considering was
related partly to the administration of Greenland and
partly with the relations to Denmark. The act on hunt-
ing and fishing was to shield Greenland from the
world outside. Some regulations were maintained
such as the internationally agreed demarcation line
three nautical miles from the coast inside which only
Greenlanders and Danes residing in Greenland could
operate89. No one else could go inside the zone with-
out advance permission. New sections of the act estab-
lished a more detailed procedure for punishing tres-
passers, and dealt with the explicit jurisdiction of the
governor. An expansion of foreign fishing was ex -
pected, so dealings with foreign fishing fleets would
be an inescapable part of the governor’s future work.
The Minister explained that the growing stock of fish
would attract foreign interest so a legal framework
was needed. Parliament agreed and only made a small
alteration to the bill to the effect that fines for tres-
passing should go to the Danish treasury and not to
Greenlandic funds. Fines had not been authorised in
previous regulations.
In the debate C. Zahle of the Radical Left took the
opportunity to argue that Danish and Faroese fisher-
men and sheep farmers should be allowed to settle in
Greenland and operate as pioneers, and the Conser-
vative Halfdan Hendriksen raised the possibility that
Faroese fishermen could have stations on land to sup-
port their fisheries outside the 3 nautical miles limit.
The Minister, C.N. Hauge, promised to consider these
suggestions favourably.
Some years later, on 20 March 1929, a new govern-
ment issued a regulation on acquisition of farmland in
Greenland by Danish farmers, to whom ‘the Admini-
stration found occasion to allocate land in order to be
pioneers in farming’.90 This idea came not from the
Greenlanders, who favoured regulation but had not
mentioned Danish farmers settling,91 but from the Per-
manent Greenland Committee.92 The provincial coun-
cil wrote to the Committee that ‘it was definitely
against giving Danish farmers land that could be used by
the Greenlanders, but it had not suggested change in the
regulation because the administration was still in charge
of finding occasion to allot land to the Danes, and thus
no real change in prevailing rules had been made’.93 This
was a very subtle way to indicate that the council were
against giving land to Danes, but it did not protest
because it trusted the administration would find no
occasion since the Greenlanders could use all land.
It would appear that governor Oldendow substan-
tially contributed to this sort of interpretation. The
provincial council was flatly against it, but he must
have persuaded it to have trust in the Greenland
administration and not protest directly. After all, it was
his duty as an official to carry out the intentions of his
Minister. The Permanent Greenland Committee re -
mained unpersuaded, and urged the administration to
find suitable Danish farmers to settle in Greenland. It
preferred Danish to Faroese farmers although the
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Faroese were accustomed to working in mountainous
terrain and thus in theory better suited to Greenland,
but Danes would bring the Danish language and cul-
ture with them.
In the period that followed the administration
apparently paid more attention than the Permanent
Greenland Committee to the views of the provincial
council. Thus in 1939 the new director, Oldendow,
could tell those taking part in the Danish-Greenlandic
negotiations that advantage had not been taken of the
permission to settle Danish farmers in Greenland. This
was ‘because the atmosphere was unfavourable’.94 This is
a typical case of colonial administrators fighting hard
to defend the interests of ‘their’ natives from the
encroachment of other interests. This time the admin-
istrators won, but it was a victory they were unable to
repeat.
The 1926 Act on Old Age Pensions in Greenland
The social security system in Greenland was simple:
families were supposed to take care of their members,
although people in extreme need could be helped from
municipal funds. The 1920 committee had found the
existing system unfair to those who were careful with
their means and suggested an old age pension avail-
able to all. An additional reason for this was that an
old age pension had been a civil right in Denmark for
people without means since the 1890s.95
The new Social Democratic government that took
office in 1924 was sympathetic. The minister in charge
of Greenland visited his province the following year
and this convinced him that ‘age-old Communism’ in
which the people shared what little they had was
‘diminishing or had disappeared altogether’ through the
influence of an expanding money economy. On the
basis of his report the Permanent Greenland Commit-
tee assisted in preparing the bill.96
The law gave an old age pension to every Green-
lander over fifty-five who was unable to provide for
himself, his wife, and any children under sixteen, pro-
vided that he led a respectable life and stayed clear of
the law and poor relief in the previous three to five
years. The district councils were to deal with the appli-
cations and pay the costs, being reimbursed by the
treasury up to a limit of. Dkr. 100 per person and Dkr.
150 per couple per year. This was about twice the
amount suggested by the 1920 committee, and there-
fore much more than anybody had asked for. It was
only between one third and a quarter of the old age
pension in Denmark, but since wages for unskilled
work were ten times higher in Denmark than in Green-
land, the pensioners in Greenland were relatively well
off. In presenting their case to Parliament the Minister
referred to the Greenlanders as ‘constitutional Danish
citizens’ with the probable implication that the state
was responsible for taking care of them as other citi-
zens. Parliament needed apparently no persuasion,
and passed the bill. The provincial councils were not
consulted before the bill was passed, and thus its
enactment was made conditional on their acceptance.
But no problems were expected, and in fact both
provincial councils expressed their hearty thanks for
the gift.97
The quarrel with Norway over East Greenland
On 5 April 1933 the International Court in the Hague
ruled that occupation of areas of East Greenland by
the Norwegians was without legal basis and therefore
invalid. This put a stop to a public quarrel with Norway
over Greenland, especially the eastern side, which had
soured relations between the two kindred peoples.
‘Occupation’ of areas of Greenland sounds some-
what dramatic, but the events themselves were on a
modest scale. On 28 June 1931 five Norwegian trappers
planted the Norwegian flag at a point on the east coast
and declared the area between Carlsberg Fjord in the
south and Besselfjord in the north to be Norwegian. It
was an uninhabited coastal expanse of 450 km. and
included the area where Norwegian (and Danish)
hunting was allowed under the 1924 agreement. But
who in Denmark or Greenland would lose a moment’s
sleep over what certain Norwegians had said to each
other during a stay in East Greenland? However, it
became a matter of high policy on 10 July when the
Norwegian government accepted responsibility for the
trappers’ actions, although it did nothing else to give
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substance to the occupation. Denmark immediately
brought the case before the International Court in The
Hague. The private pressure group in Norway sup-
porting the occupation acted again on 12 July 1932
‘occupying’ the area, also uninhabited, south of
Ammassalik extending to the southern tip of Green-
land. This occupation was also covered by the Interna-
tional Court’s verdict of 5 April 1933.
The background in Norway was a general Nor-
wegian endeavour to acquire possessions in Arctic and
sub-Arctic areas, such as the Svalbard archipelago in
1920 and Jan Mayen in 1929 to protect their hunting
interests.98
This episode of rivalry between two European
states over a territory outside Europe had all the ele-
ments of an imperialistic quarrel. Denmark legitimised
its sovereignty over Greenland on the basis of me -
dieval history and the Treaty of Kiel 1814, but had exer-
cised authority only in the colonised districts after
1721. Uneasy over a possible challenge to its possession
of Greenland it had extracted a declaration from the
United States in 1916 related to the sale of the Danish
West Indies that the USA ‘will not object to the Danish
Government extending their political and economic
interests to the whole of Greenland.’99 In the following
years Denmark received similar declarations from
other countries, and only Norway refused to cooperate
in spite of a pledge from its foreign minister to do so.100
Consequently, on 21 May 1921Denmark declared that
its control extended to the whole of Greenland, and a
month later the Greenland Administration closed the
East Coast to foreigners. Norway protested, and the
negotiations to secure the continuance of its fur trap-
ping in uninhabited areas of East Greenland resulted
in the agreement of 1924, already mentioned.
The precarious situation in East Greenland drove
the Danes to step up their activity to maintain their
sovereignty. Colonisation of the Ittoqqortoormiit-
district north of Ammassalik was strongly advocated
by nationalistic circles in Denmark, who paid for this
to be done although it was subsequently taken over by
the Danish government. Scientific expeditions were
operating, and there was some private fur-trapping. In
1920-4 the ‘Østgrønlandske Kompagni’ operated but it
went bankrupt in spite of government aid. 1929 saw
the start-up of the ‘Østgrønlandsk Fangstselskab
Nanok’ but it too got into financial trouble, despite pri-
vate and government support. However, it continued
to operate, and some of its trappers later joined the
wartime sledge patrol. It finally ceased its activities in
1952 when the government’s financial support ended.
The assertion of sovereignty was by then no longer
needed.101
The verdict from The Hague was received with
much rejoicing in Greenland. In 1933 the provincial
councils took the initiative in thanking the govern-
ment, pledging their trust, and expressing their best
hopes for the future. In the South the King was con-
gratulated on the recognition of his and the Greenlan-
ders’ right to the whole of Greenland, and the govern-
ment was thanked for its efforts to win the case, the
outcome of which ‘carries in itself promises of a still
more cordial connection between our country and Den-
mark and years of peaceful cooperation for the honour of
Denmark and the benefit of Greenland.’ In the North
authors of the statement were explicitly stated to be
the Greenlandic members to avoid the impression that
it had been dominated by the single Danish member of
the council, Morten P. Porsild. It read ‘We will only
belong to the Danes. May Denmark protect our land and
its sea. May the two nations, the Danes and the Green-
landers combine in cooperation and progress.’102
Faroese fishing in Greenlandic waters
The case in East Greenland was one of external danger
where Danish and Greenlandic interests coincided.
However, the situation on the west coast was more
complicated: the intruders were not foreigners, but
Faroese from another part of the Danish realm. To the
Greenlanders the situation in the East and the West
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was the same: a threat to their very existence. The
Danish government saw it in an altogether different
light, being also government of the Faroese.
Changes in the fishing industry were crowding the
Faroese out of their local fishing grounds. Their hand
lines and long lines were being damaged by the trawls
of British and Germans vessels, and they lacked the
capital to invest in modern equipment. So instead they
headed north to Iceland and Greenland, and because
their boats were relatively small they needed land sta-
tions to store their catch.
Letting the Faroese into inner Greenlandic waters
created several problems. First, it would be a break
with the age-old policy of isolation, which would be
difficult to impose on other countries if it was once
broken: the trade monopoly could not then be upheld
because there would be no way of preventing unau-
thorised trade. The protective aspect of isolation
would be lost. Secondly, fishing by others in inner
Greenlandic waters could be detrimental to the Green-
landers’ fishing and hunting with the increased ac-
tivity probably scaring away seals and other prey – the
latter argument was repeatedly emphasised by the
Greenlanders. The Danish government had to mediate
between Faroese and Greenlandic interests.103
The government chose to support the Faroese, but
not in everything they wanted. They did not get free
access to fish in all waters, including the fiords, and
they were not allowed to employ Greenlanders in their
industry. Land for settlement of Faroese was out of the
question. In 1927 they did get a land station near Ravns
Storø near Arsuk in south Greenland to support their
fishing in international waters. This place was 70 nau-
tical miles from the fishing grounds, and solved no real
problems for the Faroese, so they kept up the pressure.
In 1927 a long struggle began in the course of which
the government, by annual renewable laws, gradually
extended the rights of the Faroese in Greenlandic
waters.
The struggle was with the provincial councils who
according to the 1925 law were to be consulted in such
matters. In June 1925 the South Greenland provincial
council stated in principle with no dissenters, that for
the time being it could not consent to opening up the
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country wholly or partly to Danish or foreign citizens.
This was because of the great amount of work being
put into the development of the new businesses of
sheep rearing and fishing, and its potential for Green-
land. Such opportunities should be reserved for ‘the
land’s own children’. But in spite of this the council con-
sented to the governor’s proposal to allow the Faroese
to have the station at Ravns Storø on condition that
there should be no fishing in territorial waters in-
cluding the fiords, and that trial fishing should only be
allowed for Danish ships and crews and not foreigners.
The general requirements for the land station
were that (1) it must be a natural harbour not lived in
by Greenlanders or used by them for hunting, and situ-
ated far from inhabited settlements; (2) the govern-
ment must employ a supervisor at the station to ensure
compliance with the laws; (3) the visiting ships must
pay fees for services rendered; (4) access to the har-
bour must be granted to each ship individually; and
(5) no Greenlander could be employed in the cleaning
of fish. On the other hand, the provincial council
would welcome specially qualified and interested
Greenlanders participating in the fishing on equal
terms with Danish crew; in fact the council would
make it a condition for the permit that these Greenlan-
ders would be taken onboard for instruction. The
North Greenland provincial council agreed on the
same principles.104
Thus, the provincial councils were not entirely
against it, so after prior application the Minister gave a
one-season permit in 1926 for the use of the natural
harbour at Ravns Storø. The Faroese were far from
 satisfied. The government then gave in and passed an
interim law, which allowed Danish fishing boats –
again after prior application – to operate in Green-
landic territorial waters outside the skerries in the
period 1 June – 15 October 1927. The area was also
extended up to 64007’ N, totalling 97 nautical miles.
The government explained this by reference to the dif-
ficult situation of the Faroese, and was uneasy at not
having consulted the provincial councils first, but
promised that they would be heard if there should be
later moves to make the interim law permanent.105
All the political parties were for this arrangement,
and with only a Conservative, Victor Pürschel, warned
against yielding to the ‘nationalistic’ Faroese argu-
ments and granting them a concession that both
Greenlandic provincial councils had opposed, and
which could be detrimental to Greenlandic fishing.106
But Parliament, moved by the social needs of the
Faroese, passed the act of 30 May 1927. The inconve-
niently situated harbour at Ravns Storø was replaced
by another 54 nautical miles north later in the year
close to the rich fishing banks of the Davis Strait. The
new location was named Faroese Harbour107
Even though the provincial councils could not be
consulted before the bill was passed, they could be and
were consulted afterwards. For the South Greenland
provincial council’s meeting in July 1927 governor Old-
endow, the chairman, had collected the heavy ar -
tillery. Besides the law text and the deliberations in
Parliament he had provided the members with a copy
of the report from the 1920 committee, a copy of a
speech given by the former minister C.N. Hauge and
about fifty newspaper articles covering the debate on
the matter in Denmark. On top of that he reminded the
provincial council of its heavy responsibility in the
matter, and that it should issue a statement if it found
the interim law consistent with Greenlandic interests,
and if therefore the law should be made permanent.
He himself understood the benevolent attitude of the
Danes to the Faroese, but urged the council only to
consider the interests of the Greenlanders. So in
important aspects the future of Greenland could
depend on the answers from the provincial councils.
One can doubt whether the members believed his final
declaration of personal detachment from the council’s
verdict.108
The south provincial council was unequivocally
against the law and against the relocation of the har-
bour from Ravns Storø, but was in no position to
reverse it. It was afraid that this was merely a first step
towards letting the Faroese into the fiords where they
would rob the Greenlanders of their fishing grounds.
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The council also commented on the other elements in
the Governor’s package: it explicitly denounced lifting
the monopoly at this particular time, and possibly
admitting Faroese sheep farmers as settlers. But it also
expressed confidence in the Danish management of
Greenland, resulting in the Greenlanders becoming
more self-sufficient.109
The North provincial council was not directly
involved, but was consulted anyway, and its answer
was confused. A majority statement expressed anxiety
over the interim law and its possible extension, and
vehement denunciations from member Mathias Storch
at letting strangers in who had never at any time bene-
fited the Greenlanders, and from member Frederik
Lynge who protested against the passing of the law
without prior consultation with the provincial coun-
cils. Other members were more sympathetic towards
the prospect including the Danish member Morten
Porsild who saw development potential in allowing
the Faroese fishermen to teach the Greenlanders.110
In 1928, the same procedure was followed as in
1927. The unchanged act was passed in Parliament,
and the provincial councils were asked for their com-
ments on it. Meanwhile, the Faroese had offered to
take Greenlandic crew aboard their boats on equal
terms in order to give them experience of modern fish-
ing. In the South they had acquiesced in the situation
and made no protest, but there was lively debate about
the benefit to Greenlanders on the Faroese boats. The
majority opinion was against. In the North the council
protested at not having been heard before the decision
was made hand, but acquiesced in the fait accompli. A
majority here was also against the Faroese fishing fleet
having Greenlandic crews.111
In each subsequent year the act was passed, and
the provincial councils were not heard any more even
when some extension of the rights of the Danish fish-
ing fleet was granted. In 1931 the area where fishing
was allowed in territorial waters outside the skerries
was extended further north, so that it now covered 180
nautical miles. A delegation from the Danish Parlia-
ment travelled to Nuuk to persuade the South Green-
land provincial council to recommend the opening of
another harbour to the Faroese fishermen. To pacify
the Greenlanders the Faroese member of the delega-
tion, Samuelsen, a member of Parliament, spoke about
the hardship of the Faroese fishermen and promised
not to raise again the question of fishing in the fiords
and the use of Greenlanders in Faroese fishing. The
Greenlanders were swayed by this appeal and agreed
to the new harbour on condition that the promises
made by the Faroese were honoured, and that a more
efficient system of control was introduced and thus
end the numerous violations of rules by the Faroese
fishermen. They were not asked to comment on the
extension of the fishing area.112
In 1934 the new harbour was opened at Toqqusaq
in the Maniitsoq district, and the South Greenland
provincial council agreed to opening Faroese Harbour
to vessels of all nationalities – this was implemented in
1937. In 1936 the provincial councils were asked also to
agree to an extension of Faroese fishing within the
skerries, which both firmly rejected. The situation
seemed deadlocked: the Faroese exerted pressure, the
Greenlanders resisted, and in 1937 the Danish govern-
ment prolonged the interim law for 5 years. Mean-
while Faroese fishing in Greenlandic waters continued
to grow. From 5% of all Faroese fishing in 1926 it
reached nearly 50% in the late 1930s,113 and about 40%
of Faroese cutter crew were employed there.114
Not till the end of January 1939, when a new per-
manent law was passed were the Provincial Councils
asked again. The procedure began with a meeting
between the Faroese and Prime Minister Thorvald
Stauning at which it was agreed to re-open Toqqusaq
and Ravns Storø, and that another harbour should be
established between Sisimiut and Aasiaat, all three
being equipped like Faroese Harbour. Inshore fishing
was allowed in the skerries but not in the fiords. The
total coastline where fishing was allowed was also
extended to a total distance of 425 nautical miles, from
Arsuk in the south to Attu in the north. The Greenland
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administration in Copenhagen had resisted this on
behalf of the Greenlanders but in vain. The agreement
was presented as a bill in Parliament, and carried
through, giving the Prime Minister the authority to
implement the law after consulting the provincial
councils in Greenland.115 In the debate in Parliament
much emphasis was given to the needs of the Faroese
and to the arguments that the interests of the Green-
landers were not being jeopardised.116 During the fol-
lowing months letters reached the Permanent Green-
land Committee from Greenland expressing anxiety
and objections to the fact that the law had been passed
before they could have their say.117 However, someone
in the Danish political establishment must have been
concerned about the reaction in Greenland for later on
the Prime Minister pledged to let a Danish-Green-
landic commission meet and propose what should be
done in Greenland. The newly-appointed director for
the Greenland administration, Knud Oldendow, was
sent to Greenland to ‘make them understand ... and
comply’, as one member put it in a parliamentary
debate.118
Even though Oldendow had had a hard job as
 governor in 1927 persuading the South provincial
council it was much worse now. The law had been
passed, and it contained substantial extensions of the
rights of the Faroese fishing fleet in Greenlandic
waters. The Prime Minister had put his authority
behind the Faroese case right from the beginning in
January. Oldendow had counteracted it as best he
could, but his task now was to get the provincial coun-
cil to accept without the loss of their goodwill towards
the Greenland administration and Denmark.
As soon as the meeting began the pressure built
up. The chairman, Governor Aksel Svane, appealed to
the council to consider the status of Greenland as a
part of the realm, and the importance of having good
and harmonious relations with the Danish govern-
ment. He urged the members to put themselves in the
position of the Danish government and to trust that it
had mediated between Faroese and Greenlandic inter-
ests in the best possible way. Oldendow was on the
defensive from the beginning. In his speech he brought
a greeting from the King, on whose behalf he asked the
members to pass it on to their constituencies. This was
not lost on the audience: the royalist Greenlanders
rose to their feet to honour the monarch. Oldendow
asked the members to understand that the Prime
 Minister had only acted as he had done because he had
no choice. Finally, he requested the councils to appoint
two members each to participate in the Danish-Green-
landic negotiations in the autumn. With this invitation
the two issues raised the year before – representation
in the Danish Parliament and the amalgamation of the
two provincial councils into one – were referred to the
forthcoming commission.
In the debate the members were unequivocal in
their rejection of the new law. The only consolation
they could see was the reported support of Oldendow.
Nevertheless, because the law had been passed in Par-
liament they did not vote against it – perhaps influ-
enced by the words of the chairman, Aksel Svane, who
spelt the situation out clearly during the debate: ‘You
must not forget that the most important point to be con-
sidered is the progress of the Greenlandic economy and
culture. If the steady progress made hitherto is to con-
tinue then everybody has to ensure that the provincial
councils and the Greenland administration are able to
cooperate. A rift between the provincial councils and the
government is much more dangerous than the intrusion
of the Faroese. It would also become a rift between the
provincial councils and the Greenland administration.’
In other words: if you want to remain on good terms
with us, your closest friends, then do as we ask!
The final statement of the provincial council was
as follows: ‘The provincial council, taking all circum-
stances into consideration, is resigned to the law in ques-
tion and does not contest its contents. This is because of a
firmly rooted confidence in the Greenland administra-
tion, and because we fully understand the circumstances
which forced the government to make the law. However,
we make no secret of our regret that our right to be con-
sulted on all matters concerning Greenland was set aside.
It is our firm precondition that no further concessions
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can be given, and that an efficient fishery inspection will
be established according to our later proposals.’ It was
carried seven votes for one against and three abstain-
ing.119
This had been a hard lesson in terms of practical
politics, and the sound of arm-twisting lingered
among the mountains throughout the summer.
The new law turned out to be of little benefit to
the Faroese: later that year the Second World War
broke out and no Faroese fishing took place in Green-
landic waters during the war.
The Negotiations in 1939
The negotiations to which the provincial councils were
invited in 1939 were initiated in the Danish Parliament
by the Conservatives – a clear signal of their interest in
Greenland. Victor Pürschel stated in the Permanent
Greenland Committee in March 1938 that he wished to
discuss the following matters: the position of the
Greenlanders under the Constitution, their possible
representation in Parliament, the differences between
wages paid to Danes and Greenlanders in Greenland,
the unsatisfactory teaching of Danish in the Green-
landic schools, and the access of Danish private indi-
viduals to operate in Greenland. He also wanted a
committee to consider guidelines for the future devel-
opment of relations between Denmark and Greenland.
The committee accepted the relevance of the ques-
tions, but preferred to treat these ‘in a confidential dis-
cussion by people with special insight.’ 120 The Conserva-
tives did not give up. In October 1938 they proposed in
the Upper House of Parliament a bill setting up a com-
mission of twenty men to look into Greenlandic mat-
ters and suggest changes. Again, Greenland’s sup-
posed riches were the primary consideration: the min-
eral resources and the extension of fishing had to be
researched. It was argued that some employment
could also be created for Danes. Finally, the internal
situation of the country needed to be examined.121 In
short this looks like a typical colonial policy – to max-
imise the value of the dependency to the colonial
power – and as such was in line with the practice of the
other European colonial powers of the time, such as
Britain in Nigeria with Lugard’s ‘Dual Mandate’, and
the French ‘mise en valeur’, not to speak of the Belgian
and Dutch policy in the Congo and East Indies (now
Indonesia) respectively.
To the Liberal and Social Democratic side of Par-
liament the Conservative proposal appeared too wide-
ranging. First, the Permanent Greenland Committee
refused to accept that it could not handle the issue so a
commission was not needed.122 Then in the first read-
ing in Parliament Thorvald Stauning, the Prime
 Minister, refused a commission, but supported the
idea of looking into the matter. An internal Parliamen-
tary committee continued the discussion, and a series
of questions to the Prime Minister in December 1938
probably reveal where the hard-core interest lay. How
much was the Greenland administration spending on
mineral research? What was the total royalty from the
cryolite mining, and how often had the director of the
Greenland administration consulted the Permanent
Greenland Committee in the last five years? This last
question revealed a tense relationship between the
Committee and director Daugaard-Jensen. Finally,
some questions were asked about health conditions
and schools in Greenland. The Prime Minister was still
sympathetic to an enquiry, but not by a commission;
the forum should be the Permanent Greenland Com-
mittee attended by the Greenland administration and
representatives from the provincial councils.
The Greenlandic delegates: Pastor Gerhard Egede,
the teacher Augo Lynge, the trade manager Frederik
Lynge and Pastor Jens Olsen arrived in Copenhagen in
the middle of July, the negotiations took place
between 1 August and 7 September, but with the out-
break of war in Europe they had to be brought to a
hasty end so that the delegates could return safely to
Greenland. A report was drawn up, but never pub-
lished.
The outcome of the negotiations made no notice-
able difference, because there was general acceptance
of the prevailing financial policy whereby develop-
ment in Greenland should be funded as part of the
THE DAUGAARD-JENSEN PERIOD, 1912-1940
59
119. LR 1938-1947: 126.
120. Minutes from 16 March 1938, draft letter to the Prime Minister May 1938 (Archives, Permanent Greenland Committee, Box
4).
121. RTA: Law of 19 October 1938.
122. Minutes 26 October 1938 (Archives, Permanent Greenland Committtee).
Greenland Administration’s budget. This was why any
suggestion that greater financial efforts should be
made resulted in a promise from the administration to
scrutinise the cost of the various ideas. And of course
the administration’s wishes for Greenland were ham-
pered when the country was cut off from Denmark by
the German occupation in April 1940. The significance
of these negotiations was primarily that they took
place at all. For the first time representatives of the
provincial councils negotiated Greenland policy
directly with the Danish political establishment. Even
if they did not altogether succeed in bypassing the
almighty administration, they had come close to doing
so.
The work of the committee was largely planned by
the Danes.123 Numerous issues concerning the Green-
landic society were put on the agenda, including the
possibility of abandoning Greenland’s isolation. The
last of the forty-nine points on the agenda was ‘special
questions, which the Greenlandic representatives want to
discuss’ The provincial councils did not have the oppor-
tunity to prepare for the discussions, but the point of
departure on every point was the position of the
provincial councils on the issue, if any. Mineral re -
search, the question which had aroused most interest
among Danish Conservatives, lost its force during the
discussions. Oldendow gave a report on the current
state of coal mining and marble quarrying, and neither
he nor the committee suggested any expansion. The
Prime Minister reported on mineral research, but this
was not even included in the final report.
As for fishing by the Greenlanders, which had
slightly declined during the late 1930s, the Green-
landic delegation raised a number of questions, all
urging expansion and further mechanisation, but
these were fended off. The Greenland administration
promised to investigate whether the number and size
of fish processing plants and their business hours
could be increased, and to look into the possibility of
sending more Danish fishery  experts to Greenland.
The demand for higher prices was simply refused. This
reluctance was due to the acceptance by everyone of
the need for balanced budgets. The subcommittee on
fisheries had agreed with Oldendow that all these sug-
gestions had to be evaluated by the administration to
avoid any ‘excessive expenses’.124 In the same way deep-
sea fishing and fishing for other species besides cod
and common halibut was curtailed, and the question
of factory processing of the catches was not addressed
although it was put on the agenda.
The debate on farming, which in Greenland
means sheep-farming, centred round the possible
 benefit of allowing a few Danish sheep farmers to
 settle and become pioneers in the field. The possibility
had existed since 1929, but had never been activated
because the Greenlanders opposed it. Now the Green-
landic delegates were sympathetic to the idea, but
wanted it discussed in the provincial councils first.
This apparent change of view was only slight. The
Greenlanders were used to Danish experts being hired
by the Greenland administration to teach them new
occupations. Such experts were used for fishing, and
in the discussion in 1939 the committee emphasised
the educational aspect; not much in the minutes and
reports suggested that the Danish sheep-farmers
should settle as colonists.
For the Danes there was another angle as well,
outspokenly expressed by J.C. Vang gaard of the
 Liberal Left. His agenda was to argue that private busi-
ness was superior to the sheep-farming stations run by
the administration in Greenland. His tone was openly
nationalistic: it was important to use ‘loyal Jutland
farmers’ rather than Faroese with their ‘separatist
tendencies ’.125 But Oldendow was strongly against let-
ting Danish farmers settle in Greenland. He did not
believe that they could make a living out of it, and was
very reluctant to take the sparse pastureland from the
Greenlanders and give it to Danes. Nevertheless, the
committee viewed the idea in a generally favourable
way.
Kr. Lynge had raised the question of a coastal ship-
ping line in Greenland in the South provincial council
in 1938. He believed that the new impulses and experi-
ences, which were resulting from this, would benefit
the Greenlanders, as would increased trade between
north and south. The 1939 committee discussed the
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matter sympathetically, but referred it for further
treatment by the administration and the provincial
councils.
Health conditions were treated in the usual way.
First an expert gave a detailed report of the situation
and the administration’s plans for the future, then the
committee asked some questions, and finally the ex -
pert report was summarised in the overall report,
which stated that the committee was satisfied with the
plans and wished to see them realised. Such a proce-
dure could indicate that the administration already
operated as satisfactorily as possible within the bud -
get.
The main issue concerning education in Green-
land became the teaching of Danish in the schools.
This divided the committee and the Greenlanders. A
newspaper article by their colleague from the South,
Augo Lynge, upset Jens Olsen and Frederik Lynge from
North Greenland. The article argued that the Green-
landic language was ill suited for transferring new
learning to Greenland and therefore had no future.
Frederik Lynge responded that if this happened Green-
landic would be excluded from the family of civilised
languages, and argued that the Greenlanders should
keep their Eskimo language which they shared with
other Eskimo peoples: their identity was embedded in
the language. Jens Olsen said that the priorities of the
Greenlanders’ love were: their country, their lan-
guage, and Denmark. In arguing his case Augo Lynge
admitted to having previously been ‘an Eskimo nation-
alist’, but was now convinced that the Greenlanders
had to learn Danish, and have it as a teaching language
so as to be capable of attending higher education in
Denmark.
On the Danish side Vanggaard was the most radi-
cal. He scolded Th. Povlsen of the Radical Left for not
being willing like Augo Lynge to see Danish introduced
in Greenland; this, he claimed, was perverse national-
ism. Oldendow was also strongly opposed to any dani-
fication of Greenland. He had asked thirty of his
Greenlandic friends, and an overwhelming majority
wanted to stick to their own language. He thought that
a tiny group of educated Greenlanders scattered
throughout the country wanted Danish as the medium
of instruction.126
This episode is also characteristic of discussions
between colonizer and colonized in the decolonisation
process. The most westernised natives were on the
committees, and in those days had a strong desire to
Europeanise as much as possible in order to achieve
economic progress. The colonial officials knew how
few the élite were, and how different they were in out-
look from their countrymen, and therefore sided with
the silent majority. The officials were probably right,
but they lost in the end when the views of the native
élite prevailed, although in Greenland this process did
not take place until the 1970s.
The final committee report took the line of the
majority in the middle. The importance of keeping the
Greenlandic language was emphasised along with the
wish to improve the teaching of Danish in Greenland.
The administration was told not to shirk either diffi-
culties or expense.
In the final pages of the main report the Greenlan-
ders gave their view. They bluntly rejected that Green-
land should be opened up to others for the time being.
What they wanted was a vigorous effort to develop
Greenlandic society so free communication with the
world outside could be established. They also rejected
the idea of Danish fishermen and farmers settling in
Greenland. These opportunities should be reserved for
the Greenlanders.
The negotiations came to an abrupt end because
of the outbreak of war. The final meeting was on 7 Sep-
tember, and two days later the Greenlanders were on
their way home where they arrived safe and sound.127
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Towards the war
The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 did
not catch Greenland and the Greenland administra-
tion in Copenhagen completely off-guard. In the sum-
mer of 1939 extra raw materials for manufacturing
tools, medicine and food supplies for the hospitals
were sent to Greenland. Together with the normal sup-
plies, these should have sufficed for three or four
years. Just after the outbreak of war another 1,000
tons of emergency supplies were sent.
In the autumn of 1939 daily life in Greenland con-
tinued as usual, but behind the scenes, the governors
and the administration exchanged telegrams about
how to manage a possible emergency. For example,
ration cards were printed. Before the occupation of
Denmark on 9 April 1940 two ships with supplies had
left for Greenland. Together with the ship from the
Cryolite Mining Company, the Julius Thomsen, they
arrived safely in Greenland. But the biggest ship, the
Disko, was caught fully loaded at the quayside in
Copenhagen.129 Thus maritime traffic between Den-
mark and Greenland came to a stop, and was not
resumed till five years later, simply because neither the
Americans nor the British would allow the govern-
ment in German-occupied Denmark to have any
authority in Greenland. The news of occupation was
immediately brought to Greenland, and soon travelled
far and wide. A Danish expedition on the Bache penin-
sula in Ellesmereland, Canada, got the message carved
by visiting Polar Eskimos from Qaanaaq on a tin can in
their depot: ‘The Germans have captured the Danes and
robbed them of their food. Only the King has not been
taken. There is no more petroleum at the trading posts.130
Inuit did not have a word for war between states so this
was a pretty accurate description of the occupation,
and good advice to be sparing with petroleum pro-
ducts.
The situation for Greenland in 
April 1940
The occupation of Denmark presented Greenland with
immense problems. How could it avoid being occupied
by the belligerent powers? The Germans had Norway
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also and could take the northern route to Greenland.
Defences were non-existent, and could not possibly be
organised with the means at hand. The German threat
was made rather less acute by the British occupation of
the Faroe Islands in April and Iceland in May; but that
only brought the British threat closer. The United
States initiated a hands-off policy towards Greenland
by secretly telling Britain and Canada not to occupy
Greenland to protect the cryolite mine in Ivittuut, but
would not at that time intervene itself. However, the
fortunes of war might change that situation.
Another problem was supplies. How and from
where could deliveries reach Greenland? In spite of
the extra supplies shipped across in 1939, some perish-
able goods were needed every year, and if the war
dragged on, there would be a shortage of all the other
items as well. How and where could Greenland prod-
ucts be sold? Previously all communications had been
with Denmark, and now this route was closed. Sup-
plies were vital. Should they fail and an emergency
happens, the Green landers’ trust in Denmark could be
damaged beyond repair. For the administration safe-
guarding the living standards of the Greenlanders
became tantamount to keeping Greenland for Den-
mark. In December 1940 they reported to the govern-
ment that so far they had had no occasion to choose
between their priorities which were, first, to ensure
that Greenland continued to be a Danish crown colony
and, second, to prevent the population being deprived
of the necessities of life.131
The relations with Kauffmann and 
the United States
Because of the close proximity of Greenland to the
American continent the two governors had in reality
no choice in their foreign policy but to come to an
understanding with the United States, not least
because of the situation with supplies. Canada was at
the time a less attractive alternative because it had
joined Britain as belligerent, and such a relationship
could bring Greenland into the war. Furthermore, the
United States did not favour an exclusive Greenland-
Canada link. Both countries established a diplomatic
presence in Nuuk in 1940, but trade with Canada was
not established till 1941.
Seeking a relationship with the United States was
not simple. The governors must not appear to be invit-
ing the Americans to come and take over the adminis-
tration. First the governors decided to wait for instruc-
tions from Copenhagen, but meanwhile they made a
radio announcement that they would endeavour to
secure the normal summer supplies from America.132
The link to the United States had to be via the Danish
legation in Washington. Already on 9 April Henrik
Kauffmann, the minister there, had initiated his own
policy independent of Copenhagen. He aimed to be
the acknowledged representative of all Danish inter-
ests that were beyond the grasp of the Germans in
order to make every asset available for the fight
against Germany. Greenland and Danish ships outside
Danish waters were the most valuable assets. To play
this role Kauffmann needed to be accepted by the Dan-
ish diplomatic corps abroad and the local authorities
in Greenland, and accordingly he initiated communi-
cation with them. On 13 April he cabled to the gover-
nors that he would no longer take orders from Copen-
hagen, and informed them that the United States tac-
itly accepted him as competent to negotiate on Danish
interests despite this. Furthermore he planned to
establish a committee in the United States to take
charge of supplies to Greenland. The governors did not
immediately reply, and on 16 April he cabled again
stating that Britain would not allow any contact with
Denmark and that they had to act independently. The
governors had received no orders from Copenhagen,
so in reply they gave cautious and non committal
acceptance.133
The Greenland administration and Kauffmann
had conflicting views of their relative positions. Kauff-
mann assumed that he had taken on the rôle of Copen-
hagen, while the governors knew that by the act of
1925 they were the supreme authority when Copen-
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hagen was out of reach so Kauffmann was now their
representative! At first Washington supported the
view of the governors, and in April the State Depart-
ment gave its view that the governors were what
remained of a sovereign Danish government, and
undertook to acknowledge any authority they vested
in Kauffmann.134 However, Kauffmann finally won,
and the decisive factor here was the agreement of 1941
concerning the bases in Greenland, which was made
with Kauffmann. This resulted in a complete break
between Kauffmann and Copenhagen, and an official
US acknowledgement of him as a free and inde-
pendent agent. The US government also gave him con-
trol of all Danish assets in the USA, so he had effec-
tively the final say in Greenlandic matters as well, if he
and the governors should disagree. This was unam-
biguously stated to Kauffmann by the State Depart-
ment in October 1941.135
The governors were very much of one mind when
it came to relations with the United States. The good-
will of the Americans was paramount, and their
wishes had to be complied with. But there was a differ-
ence in their attitude on the appropriate degree of
compliance. Eske Brun, the governor of North Green-
land, believed that willing compliance was the best
means to maintain Danish sovereignty in Greenland,
while Aksel Svane, governor of South Greenland, pre-
ferred to yield only when in a position of unambiguous
coercion. His attitude was parallel to that of the Dan-
ish government towards the German occupying forces:
only to bend before an obviously superior force. He
telegraphed the King in April 1941 that he accepted the
base agreement only because of ‘the extreme coercion of
the situation’.136 The difference became clear in public
when Svane gave a newspaper interview in the United
States in August 1941, arguing that Danes abroad,
especially those in Greenland, should follow the neu-
tral line of their home government and not speak as if
they were belligerent. ‘A good Dane is a quiet Dane’.
This caused trouble for him, and for the rest of the war
he had no influence.137 Strictly Svane had been the
most loyal to his government, but the course of war
forced him, and not Brun, into a defensive posture
when he returned to Denmark in 1945.
Between Brun and Kauffmann there was complete
agreement on high policy. Both chose to side with the
Allies against Germany and were ready to make the
resources they commanded available for the fight, but
there was rivalry between them over who had the final
say in Greenlandic issues. Personal ambitions may
have played a part, but in addition their priorities were
different. Brun’s was to lead Greenland unharmed
through the war in order to keep the Greenlanders
loyal to Denmark, while Kauffmann had a broader
goal to secure the best possible position for Denmark
after an Allied victory.
While the United States was prepared to accord
precedence to Kauffmann in October 1941, Brun never
did so. As late as 1942 he would not accept Kauffmann
as the final arbiter in Greenlandic financial matters or
that he had assumed any of the powers formerly exer-
cised by the Greenland administration in Copen-
hagen.138 The main question which divided them, was
the importance of supplies to Greenland. Kauffmann
wanted greater reductions so that the Greenlanders,
like the Danes back in Denmark, would have to lower
their living standard somewhat: in other words, the
Greenlanders should bear some of the burdens of the
war and thus be able to put a larger surplus at Den-
mark’s disposal after the war. Brun answered emphati-
cally that the Greenlanders already lived at sub-
sistence level and could not tolerate any reduction,
and that if Danish sovereignty was to continue, the
Greenlanders should not loose their confidence in the
Danish regime. He argued that confidence would be
undermined if the Greenlanders’s conditions were to
deteriorate.139
The direct cause of this discussion was control of
the revenue from the cryolite mine, but there is no
record of a serious clash. After all, they agreed on over-
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all policy, and Kauffmann had to rely on advice from
within Greenland to assess what was needed, and
did not wish to get involved in Greenland’s internal
affairs.
The agreement on bases, 1941
Maintaining a hands-off policy in Greenland towards
Britain and Canada steadily became more difficult for
the United States. Aircraft were the main offensive
weapon on the Allied side, and they were mainly pro-
duced in America. The biggest could fly non-stop from
Newfoundland to Scotland, but the smaller ones had
to be freighted on ships, something that became ever
more difficult as German submarine warfare intensi-
fied. However, smaller planes could also be flown over
if they could land and refuel on the way – which is
where southern Greenland entered the picture: with
an airfield there, the fighters could fly Canada-Green-
land-Iceland-Scotland safely out of reach of the Ger-
man submarines.
In the winter of 1941 joint pressure from Britain
and Canada for a base in Greenland persuaded the
Americans to act, and in February 1941 they decided to
build the base themselves. The prospect of Allied vic-
tory was better now that Hitler had lost the air battle
over southern England in the autumn of 1940, and in
March 1941 the Lend-Lease agreement was signed.
Now Britain could draw on American resources, and
the United States was as close to being a belligerent as
possible without loosing neutral status. To maintain
this image of neutrality where Greenland was con-
cerned it was necessary that the Greenlandic authori-
ties asked for protection. Interim protection of the
 cryolite mine in Ivittuut had already been established
in 1940 when the Greenlandic authorities obtained
permission from the United States to buy a gun and to
hire US personnel to operate it. This should prevent
stray German submarines from trying their luck at the
mine.
When the Americans got the impression that
Kauffmann was an easier person with whom to reach
an agreement than the governors, he was naturally
their choice as interlocutor. During the negotiations he
was therefore acknowledged as the highest represen-
tative of Danish interest in the United States, as
already mentioned. On 5 April 1941 the two governors
were then confronted with a ‘fait accompli’, which
they could only accept or reject. Both accepted it,
Svane emphasising that he had approved under coer-
cion, while Brun only complained about the short
notice and the incomplete text presented to them.
The agreement was dated 9 April 1941 thus allud-
ing to the German occupation of Denmark exactly a
year earlier. The agreement authorised the United
States to establish such bases as were necessary to
fend off attacks on Greenland. Danish sovereignty
over Greenland in general as well as over the bases was
confirmed although the Americans exercised jurisdic-
tion over the bases. The agreement was to be valid
until the two parties agreed that ‘the present dangers to
the peace and security of the American Continent have
passed’. (Article X)140 This article was the tricky part. In
spite of the stipulation that each party after ‘due con-
sultation’ could give notice of its intention to terminate
or modify the agreement, the clause gave the United
States a leverage over post-war Denmark in view of
their relative strength.
Legally it was indisputable that neither Kauff-
mann nor the governors had any authority to conclude
agreements that were absolutely binding on Denmark.
Copenhagen dismissed Kauffmann, but not the gover-
nors. The reason was probably that if they were
removed the way would be open for direct American
administration of Greenland – an outcome which
appealed to neither the Danes nor the Germans.141
When the war ended Denmark was still unsure
whether it would be accepted as ally, and therefore
one of the first actions of the Danish Parliament after
liberation in May 1945 was to give retrospective ap -
proval to the agreement and make Kauffmann a mem-
ber of the liberation government.
The bases were established very quickly. In May
1941 the Americans surveyed possible locations, and in
July the work began. Six months later the base was
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ready to use.142 By the end of the war the Americans
had seventeen stations dispersed all over Greenland,
four of which were air bases.
The nine weather stations run by the Danish
administration were concentrated around the Narsar-
suaq air base in the south.
It is difficult to judge the effect of the bases on
daily life in Green land. Most were far from inhabited
places, and fraternisation with the local people was
prohibited. Probably, the contact was no greater than
could be expected when the nights were bright and
clear and there was curiosity on both sides, although
greater problems did occur around the base at
Ammassalik (see below).
Supplies and sale
The cryolite was the decisive export item as it had
been before the war, and financed the deficit arising
from trade in other commodities. The mineral was
used as flux in the production of aluminium, essential
for aircraft construction. Thus, cryolite had been in
great demand since the mid 1930s, and the fact that
Copenhagen was out of reach was no problem.
Business relations had already been established
before the war with the Pennsylvania Salt Manufactur-
ing Company (Pennsalt) which had bought 25% of the
production from Ivittuut, and could easily buy more,
as could the Aluminium Company of Canada (Alcan),
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Diagram 7. War Time Bases in
Greenland. Legend: Flyvebase (amr.) =
American air base; Vejrstation (amr.) =
American weather station;
Marinestation (amr.) = American naval
base; Radiopejlestation o.l. (amr.) =
American direction finder station;
Vejrmeldestation (dansk) = Danish
weather reporting station (Kjær
Sørensen 1983: 96).
which bought through the Americans. Production
before the war had been around 50,000 tons of which
40,000 went to Denmark. In 1940 about 42,000 tons
were shipped to the United States and Canada, in 1941
62,000 and in 1942 85,000. For the rest of the war ship-
ments were smaller, averaging around 50,000 tons in
1940-4, as before the war.143 However, prices rose
slightly during the war and the earnings were there-
fore sufficient to cover the necessary imports. An
interim board consisting of the governors, the govern-
ment supervisor at the mine, and the manager of the
mine was set up to legalise the sales.144
As already mentioned Kauffmann had by October
1941 managed to get control over the use of the
income. Already in June 1940, he had got US$ 500,000
from the Danish government to finance purchases for
Greenland, and on both sides of the Davis Strait prepa-
rations for getting supplies were well under way. In
April Kauffmann had set up a Greenland Committee in
the United States for trading. He acted fast to pre-empt
any action by the American Red Cross. He did not want
emergency aid for Greenland, but merely sought nor-
mal business relations.145
On this point he agreed with the governors. When
governor Brun arrived with a small delegation in July
1940 he had to co-operate with Kauffmann’s commit-
tee because Kauffmann had charge of the money.
Immediately after the occupation of Denmark the US
government had seized Danish assets in the United
States, and Pennsalt was not allowed to release pay-
ments received for the cryolite to the governors.146 Co-
operation between the ‘Greenlanders’ and the Danish-
American committee was not very good, and it was not
improved in the spring of 1941 when governor Svane
became a US resident. In the autumn of 1941 Kauff-
mann’s committee was dissolved, and a section of the
Danish embassy took over the task of buying and sell-
ing. The section was headed first by Svane, and from
April 1942 by Tage Nielsen, a former employee of the
Danish shipping company Lauritzen and the American
trading partner Gillespie & Co. was replaced by the
New York branch of the Danish Ø.K. (East Asiatic Com-
pany).147
No details of what was supplied were published
either at the time or after the war, but it does not seem
that any serious shortages occurred.
Some perishable foods were lacking, like pota-
toes, vegetables, pork, and dairy products during the
summer of 1940.148 Delays occurred due to the lack of
shipping, and some goods were lower quality than pre-
viously. New items were also introduced to replace
those which were no longer obtainable. Some of these
were a clear improvement. For example, the Colza oil
previously used for lightning was unavailable, as were
lamps using animal fat. So in the autumn of 1940
petroleum was introduced for indoor lightning,149 an
event still remembered as a revolutionary improve-
ment of daily life by those who were children at the
time.150
Rationing had already been prepared in 1940 but
was not put into effect until October 1942. Cereals of
all kinds except rye bread, rye flour and sugar prod-
ucts were included – not due to lack of supplies but in
an attempt to rely more on Greenlandic products.151
Apparently the rationing was also sound financially,
THE SECOND WORLD WAR
67
143. Report Greenland Administration 1945: 85-87; Lerche 1946: 65f.
144. Report Greenland Administration 1945: 35.
145. Løkkegaard 1968: 74-83.
146. Løkkegaard 1968: 91.
147. Brun 1945: 30.
148. Governors’ report 28 December 1940: 2 (Archives, Permanent Greenland Committee).
149. Brun 1945: 48.
150. Ole Berglund pers. comm. 1980; Ulloriannguaq Kristiansen in Gynther & Møller (1999: 252).
151. Governors’ report 28 December 1940: 43 (Archives, Permanent Greenland Committee).
Table 16. Imports by countries (tons) (GP 1943: 140; MvGA
1940-5: 184, 241).
1942 1943 1944
United States 7,108 6,054 7,020
Canada 9,851 5,295 5,797
Portugal 1,525 1,585 1,570
Total 118,484 22,934 14,387
because imported foods were sold at a loss, at least if
the cost of freight and trading were included.152
While daily consumption barely changed, the
repair and renewal of machinery caused problems.
The Americans could not deliver spare parts which
therefore had to be produced at an extra cost. By 1945
much machinery was nearly worn out.
There was an acute shortage of shipping tonnage.
The Allies needed all that was available, so the large
supply ships that had previously called in at all har-
bours in Greenland no longer did, so instead the goods
were landed at a few transit harbours, and from there
distributed along the coast by schooners. The com-
plete supply system consisted of four main harbours:
Qaqortoq, Nuuk, Maniitsoq and Aasiaat. Qullissat on
Disko served for the transit of technical items, and
Sisimiut for marine equipment and for tools in
 general.153 Opinions differed on the success of this sys-
tem. On the one hand the ocean freighters spent fewer
days in harbour, and the coastal route used for distri-
bution by schooners was something the Greenlanders
had long called for. On the other hand the frequent
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Fig. 13. The mild climate in South Greenland allows for sheepherding at a modest level. This is a sheep farm at Narsaq Kujalleq in
the far south, 1936. Photo Jette Bang/Arctic Institute.
reloading caused damage and losses. However the war
and the consequent lack of tonnage forced the transit
system into existence, and there was no choice.
Except for the transit system distribution in
Greenland was unchanged. It was handled by the
same personnel, who calculated prices according to
the same principles as those used hitherto. The central
entrepot abroad was now New York instead of Copen-
hagen, and American firms instead of Danish ones
delivered supplies. Purchases could be made by post as
before the war, the only difference being that deliver-
ies were not from Dahls Varehus in Copenhagen but
Sears and other US firms whose catalogues were
printed in colour! The American market was impor-
tant, but it did not enjoy a monopoly: some coal, flour,
wood, sugar and textiles were obtained from Canada
and salt was still mostly delivered direct from Portugal
as before the war.154
Greenlandic exports, like imports can only be
stated approximately. Cryolite was sold to the United
States and Canada, but there was little demand in
America for the other main article, salted fish. From
1941 exports to Portugal were resumed, and during the
war most of the salted fish was sold here. However,
small-scale deliveries went to Spain and the US,155 and
seal oil and seal hides periodically found a market in
America, but there was no demand for sheep products
excepting the hides. The sheep products were there-
fore used in Greenland, except that the wool was
processed into knitting yarn in Canada.156
The overall balance of trade has not been investi-
gated. There were rising prices for both exports and
imports, but whether this meant an improvement or
worsening of the term of trade is unclear; during the
war, no staff was available to make such calcula-
tions.157 After the war, Brun and Svane stated that Dkr.
23 millions from the cryolite income had been allo-
cated to cover the trade deficit on other goods. This
made an average of Dkr. 4.6 million a year and thus an
increase of nearly 50% over the pre-war average of
Dkr. 3.1 million. However, Brun maintained that the
supplies in stock was increased by Dkr. 6-7 million
leaving an actual deficit of about Dkr. 3.3 million, and
thus the same level as before the war.158
Greenlandic production
For some time before the war fish had been the main
product. It was exported as salted cod, and cod was
plentiful during the war.
Thus the catch nearly doubled during the war and
thanks to rising prices fishermen’s income more than
doubled. The cod was both salted and dried; nearly all
of the latter was sold in Greenland while the former
was mostly exported.
Production of the traditional Greenlandic pro-
ducts also rose during the war. Blubber was traded in
on a yearly average of 881 tonnes in 1940/4 a rise of
30% on the four years before the war where the aver-
age had been 679 tonnes. Seal hide production rose by
67% from an average of 15,500 hides a year in 1932/6
to 25,900 in the first four years of the war. Whether
this was due to a larger catch or a larger sale from an
unchanged catch cannot be ascertained because the
catches were not printed during the war. It was not
due to rising prices, because higher prices for these
products were first introduced in March 1945.159
The business that ranked third in importance,
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Table 17. Total yearly landings of cod (tons, whole fresh fish).
Conversion factor from fresh to cleaned fish: 14:10 (GSA
1946: 112).
Tons Value (Dkr)
1938/9 6,565 257,910
1939/40 7,050 276,964
1940/1 7,573 297,511
1941/2 10,398 445,629
1942/3 11,273 483,128
1943/4 11,543 497,700
1944/5 12,311 571,582
namely sheep farming, also increased during the war.
This was due to mild winters and the farmers becom-
ing more experienced. Ewes numbered 6,989 in 1939,
and about 15,000 in 1945, and earnings from sheep
farming accordingly doubled from Dkr 35,756 in 1939
to 70,744 in 1945.160
Whether this progress in Greenlandic production
meant a corresponding rise in living standards is
unknown because basic figures for consumption and
consumer prices are incomplete. However, some of the
main trends are discernible. The administration tried
as far as possible to keep prices unchanged, but it did
not fully succeed. The trading-in prices for fish were
raised, as were those for shark and codfish liver. The
trading-out prices were also raised although the price
setting system was continued. This meant that prices
for most essential foods and tools remained low
regardless of purchase prices abroad. In order to main-
tain a certain balance in the economy a complicated
procedure for calculating higher prices was intro-
duced. If purchase prices abroad exceeded selling
prices in Greenland by more than 50-67%, then the
selling prices were fixed at 80-85% of the purchase
prices. This would certainly cause a deficit, because
neither freight nor trading costs were included. How-
ever, some fixed prices were raised in 1942 and 1943. In
March 1945 they were fixed at a assumed post-war
level – this meant a rise from 15 to 100%, but again no
clear picture emerges.161 Brun claims in his report that
the general economic development during the war
lead to a rising standard of living for the free Green-
landic producers (of fish, and the products of hunting
and sheep), and that the living standard for Greenlan-
ders in employment was maintained by a general wage
increase of 15% and the introduction of an allowance
for families with children. Meanwhile, the real wages
of the employed Danes decreased somewhat due to
their higher consumption of imported goods.162
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Fig. 14. The first commercial fishery took place from rowing boats often tugged to the fishing place by a motorboat. Photo The
Greenland Administration/Arctic Institute, 1919.
The Administration
The war did not catch the governors totally off-guard
when they assumed their new role as supreme author-
ity. Already in August 1939 the Greenland administra-
tion in Copenhagen had drawn the governors’ atten-
tion to their general authority stated in the law article
10 part 3: ‘As the representative of the Danish govern-
ment the governor is the general authority in the country
(i.e. Greenland), and is authorised to make such
arrangement as is needed to safeguard the needs of the
population in extraordinary situations.’
Referring to this law the governors declared on 23
April 1940 that they had taken over the authority of
the Danish government until normal communications
could be restored. In that capacity their power
equalled the power of an autocratic monarch, execu-
tive, financial and legislative. They had to consult the
provincial councils, but as ‘government’ they had the
final say, because no decision in the provincial councils
was valid without approval of the minister in charge.
And the minister was now the governor! This change,
forced by circumstances, meant that everything could
be done much faster; it was no longer necessary to
wait for decisions from Copenhagen. Everything
could be decided in Greenland and executed right
away. Eske Brun remembered the situation as ‘quite
 pleasant’.163
No autocratic monarch ever ruled in a political
vacuum, and the governors did not do so during the
war. They worked hard to continue the administration
in the same spirit as before, and in order to do that
they needed the loyal co-operation of the population
including the provincial councils. They seem to have
succeeded, – if at bad moments they ever feared ob -
struction from the Greenlanders, this according to the
records was unfounded.
When on 9 April 1940 the division from Denmark
took place the governors were at their respective
offices, Svane in Nuuk and Brun in Qeqertarsuaq, but
it soon became clear that all essential functions
needed to be carried out at one place. Nuuk was
 chosen because the US and Canadian consulates were
there, and it remained accessible by ship during the
winter. The governors also decided that one of them
should be in the United States to organise supplies to
Greenland, and Brun was to go first.
In July 1940 he and his small delegation went off
to the United States, and immediately found them-
selves at odds with the Greenland Committee
appointed by Kauffmann. Kauffmann persuaded the
US State Department to request Brun to return to
Greenland in October 1940 in spite of his plans to stay
in America for the whole winter.164
Brun stayed at the cryolite mine in Ivittuut during
the winter of 1940/1, and Svane took a short trip to
America in November-December. In April 1941 Brun
returned to Nuuk, and in June Svane left for America,
and thus things remained for the rest of the war,
whether because the Americans wanted only one
 governor in charge in Greenland as Svane suggested
after the war,165 or because of his unfortunate public
statements in August 1941 as Kauffmann later
hinted.166
From 1941 there was in effect a central administra-
tion in Nuuk because there was only one governor and
all foreign business and all government actions took
place there. Here too were the central offices of the
trade administration and the district physician who
took over the health administration of all Greenland.
The district physician for North Greenland had been
on vacation in Denmark in April 1940, and he re -
mained stranded there during the war. Already before
the war the church and schools had their main office
in Nuuk. The only teacher training college and the
only rural dean was placed there. Judged by the
reports from the central administration in Nuuk the
system worked well. How it was viewed along the
coast remains unknown.
The provincial councils
Bearing the Norwegian ‘occupation’ in East Greenland
in mind, it was not surprising that the Greenlanders
closed ranks around the Danes in times of danger. But
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what to be done when the protector himself needed
protection? This powerful expression of the mood of
the time has often been quoted: ‘For the moment we are
like young birds separated from their mother, uneasily
flying around and calling her.’167
The new situation in April 1940 had to be dis-
cussed with the provincial councils, but they could not
convene till 3 May, and by then the governors had
already established the connection with the United
States. The provincial councils now had to agree, but
this was not a problem. They were informed of the
 situation and the plans for supplies from America, and
the meeting passed off with no awkward incidents. All
who took the floor expressed their confidence in the
Danish administration, and gratitude to the Ameri-
cans, and the necessary resolutions were carried. The
meeting lasted only one day.168
Only two more meetings were held during the
war, in 1941 and 1943 – for some reason 1942 and 1944
were skipped. The two councils held joint meetings if
for no other reasons than that only one governor was
resident in Greenland. The issues brought forward by
the members dominated the agendas because the
councils had no legislation from Denmark to comment
on, and because the governors suggested no changes
that were not absolutely necessary for carrying on
business. Further legislation had to be postponed till
the end of the war.
The issues raised by the members arose from the
problems of daily life. As representatives of the Green-
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Fig. 15. The South Greenland provincial council in session 1939. At this meeting, the council was asked to accept a law allowing
an expansion of the Faroese fishery, a law which was already carried in Parliament. That is why the new director of the Green-
land Administration, Knud Oldendow, was present. He is seen to the left at the window. The gentleman to his right is Governor
Aksel Svane. The two Danes alone wearing ties. Photo Arctic Institute.
landic producers and consumers they expressed the
wishes of producers for higher prices for their pro-
ducts and labour, and of consumers for prices of con-
sumer goods to be lower. They also suggested that
more fish processing plants should be built, and more
motorboats obtained, and complained of the poor
quality of goods. Governor Eske Brun as chairman said
that in general the best available goods were being
acquired and sold at a loss to keep prices down; that
everything possible was being done to further busi-
ness; and that all suggestions to improve business, the
supply situation and the methods of distribution
would be investigated.
In 1943 Brun directly asked the provincial councils
to speak frankly about the wishes and hopes of the
Greenlandic population for Greenland when the world
reorganised after the war. The response was limited to
a few issues that should be postponed till after the war
when the connection with Denmark could be re-estab-
lished. The two war-time meetings were very much
alike in the sense that the procedures consisted mostly
of a dialogue between single members and the chair-
man, especially in 1941 when the chairman tried to
persuade the members to make decisions, which could
be put into effect. In 1943, by contrast, he let the mem-
bers debate and make decisions, which afterwards as
‘government’ he was unable to approve and carry out
in full.
The personal relationship between the provincial
councils and Eske Brun has only been recorded in gen-
eral terms. They speak of great trust in the governor,
and in his firm conduct of affairs – an impression,
which the minutes bear out. He promised to rectify
any muddle and investigate every single complaint.
Several times he emphasised that Danes had no privi-
leges in regard to supplies compared to the Greenlan-
ders. When told by a member that some Danes had cir-
cumvented the regulation on foreign currency, he
characteristically answered: ‘I can guarantee you that if
I discover any Dane violating the rules on dollars the per-
son in question will regret it for the rest of his life’.169
One can still only speculate whether the influence
of the provincial councils on the administration of
Greenland was greater during the war than before.
Theoretically they might have exerted a greater influ-
ence since no second opinion was forthcoming from
Copenhagen, and their wish to continue after the war
as a single provincial council with one governor wield-
ing enhanced authority suggests that they felt they
had a greater say.
The press
The distribution of news in Greenland before 1940 was
very sparse. All families were provided with the maga-
zine, Atuagagdliutit, free of charge, but it was only dis-
tributed along the coast once a year. Thus its 200-odd
pages were unable to carry news. In 1941 the provincial
councils suggested that it should be distributed twice
and not once a year, and so it was. A smaller magazine
printed in Qeqertarsuaq at Disko, Avangnâmioq, was
distributed monthly in North Greenland, but it too
contained no news as such. The provincial councils
financed both these magazines. In Narsaq Frederik
Høegh issued and sold the magazine Sujumut, and in
Nuuk Augo Lynge issued Tarqissuut. This was the full
extent of the written media. However, already before
the war a brief summary of news was telegraphed
from Nuuk to the local stations, and along with other
announcements this was posted on the notice board in
the trading shops.
This system was continued after the forced rup-
ture from Denmark. However, the new situation called
for more regular information to counteract all sorts of
rumours – this was known in Greenland as ‘kamik-
mail’, after the traditional short boot of the Greenlan-
ders. In December 1941 Eske Brun set up a broadcast-
ing station in Nuuk, and hired a stranded biologist
Christian Vibe and the Greenlandic publisher of Atua-
gagdliutit, Kristoffer Lynge, to run it. Daily for one
hour in the evening this station broadcast in Danish
and Greenlandic news which it received from foreign
stations, as well as talks, interviews, plays and music.
Broadcasts began on 5 January 1942 and initiated an
immediate and dramatic spread of information. Not
everybody owned a radio; in 1942 only 100 did so but
by 1945 this had grown to 400. Some radios were
placed in community centres, and listening in at a
neighbour’s house was said to be a common practice,
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with the result that the news travelled far beyond the
actual number of receivers.170 Radio had come to stay.
After the war broadcasting continued to expand, and
is still the most important medium for discussion in
Greenland, ahead of television.
Another phenomenon born during the war was
the Danish-medium magazine Grønlandsposten,
edited by Christian Vibe. According to the statement of
Eske Brun in the first issue published on 16 March 1942
the idea behind it was to create a link between Danes
in Greenland. Publication was twice a month; in con-
trast to the Greenlandic magazines it was not free, and
advertisement space had to be paid for. Even so, it was
widely distributed, also among Greenlanders who
could read Danish. The magazine carried small pieces
on daily life and is thus a good source for providing the
background to administrative sources to life in Green-
land. It also contained articles and a small amount of
debate. After the war it was edited for two years in
Denmark, and then in 1947-50 again in Nuuk to be
merged with the Atuagagdliutit in 1952. Thereafter it
was bilingual, and is still published (2005).
Schools
The war created a new institution for teaching: a Dan-
ish school for the children of the Danish civil servants.
Hitherto these families had taught their younger chil-
dren themselves sometimes by hiring a private Danish
teacher to serve several families. When the children
were about ten years old they were sent to boarding
schools or stayed with relatives to finish school in Den-
mark with the result that children were often separated
from their parents for several years. The war made
Denmark inaccessible, so new ways had to be found. In
the summer of 1941 about ten older children were sent
to schools in the United States and Canada, but as the
war dragged on this solution had to be discontinued
because of the danger from German submarines.171
In the autumn of 1942 steps were taken to estab-
lish Danish schools, and according to a proclamation
of 21 August schools could be authorised if certain
requirements regarding the number of pupils, the
quality of the teaching staff, and the curriculum were
met. The number of pupils had to be ‘enough to count
as a real school’. Any child ‘who had Danish as a natural
means of expression and was able to understand subjects
taught in Danish’ would be accepted. At least one of the
teachers should already be employed in the Green-
landic educational system, and all of them should
themselves have adequate education. The curriculum
should be the same as at the Copenhagen grammar
schools. These new schools were supervised like the
Greenlandic ones by the local authorities and the rural
dean.172 They were tiny: in 1942/3 schools were estab-
lished at Qaqortoq, Nuuk and Aasiaat with a total of
twenty-three pupils, and in the following year Ivittuut
and Paamiut were added, and the number of pupils
grew to thirty-eight. By 1944/5 there were thirty-six
pupils in total as the school in Ivittuut had closed.173
The Danish schools continued for some years after the
war; in 1946/7 the one in Nuuk had nine pupils.174
A political incident
Private citizens too were responsible for some notable
initiatives and a growing number of youth associations
and sports clubs and leisure activities of all kinds were
reported. In 1942 Augo Lynge established one of the
biggest youth associations, named Nunavta Qitornai
(the children of our country). Lynge’s aim was to
awaken the youth to a new era that was opening and
take responsibility for Greenland in close co-operation
with the Danes.175 The emphasis on the Greenlandic
initiative may have caused problems for Augo Lynge
because in 1943 he was transferred from the teacher
training college in Nuuk to a continuation school in
Aasiaat 600 km. to the north. While it was normal for
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priests and teachers to be stationed at different places
during their careers, it was rumoured that in this case
his political activity had become inconvenient for the
local authorities.
When Augo Lynge’s relocation became known in
Nuuk, the inhabitants met to discuss the matter. The
headmaster of the teacher training college forbade the
students to participate on the grounds that they
should not be allowed to discuss their teachers in pub-
lic, but nearly twenty students disregarded the ban. A
meeting of the teaching staff was summoned on 19
March 1943 to decide on an appropriate punishment,
and the headmaster had obtained the agreement of
the supervisor, rural dean Aage Bugge, and the gover-
nor Eske Brun in advance that an example must be
made of the student rebels. The question divided the
teaching staff. The most open dissident was Jonathan
Petersen, the Green landic poet and composer, who
refused to accept that the reason for the transfer of
Augo Lynge was the need for an experienced teacher
in Aasiaat. He had heard rumours of other reasons. He
also totally disagreed with banning students from par-
ticipating in meetings in the town, and even ques-
tioned the headmaster’s authority to do so. Other
teachers pointed out to him that being in charge of a
boarding school the headmaster had the authority to
tell the students how to behave, and they were obli-
gated to comply with the rules and orders.
Reluctantly, Jonathan Petersen accepted a mild
punishment for violating an order. Augo Lynge himself
agreed that discipline had to be upheld although he
could see little harm in allowing the students to par-
ticipate in the meeting, and he advocated leniency. He
was not pleased with the prospect of leaving Nuuk, but
he said later in the summer that he had come to terms
with it.
Other members of the teaching staff were firm
that the need for discipline required disobedience to
be punished. At a further meeting the next day the
staff agreed that three of the offenders should be
expelled at once, and others should have their move-
ments restricted in different ways. The harsh reaction
of the teaching staff was too much for the rural dean,
who pleaded with them to consider mitigating circum-
stances. Consequently the final verdict was that the
three students could stay if they apologised uncondi-
tionally, which they did.176
What makes this incident more than a trivial disci-
plinary issue in a boarding school is that the inhabi-
tants of Nuuk were upset by the prospect of having
Augo Lynge transferred to Aasiaat and began to look
for other reasons besides the official one; and the reac-
tion of the headmaster in Aasiaat, Mikael Gam, sug-
gests that they may have good reason for doing so.
When informed of the transfer Gam sent a telegram
expressing his surprise and requested an explanation.
He obviously never got one, because in his later report
for 1942-3 he was still asking the same question.177
One of the Danish members of the board of the
Youth Association, Finn Gad, later well-known as a his-
torian of Greenland, and at the time on the staff of the
teacher training college, felt that he had to explain to
the Danes in Greenland what the Nunavta Qitornai
stood for, since it had got a bad reputation and been
misunderstood. He assured the public that the
Nunavta Qitornai bore no grudge against anyone
except the complacent and those who were content
with their own superior knowledge – and biases.178 It
seems clear that his target was someone in local
 society.
After the war a discussion in the Permanent
Greenland Committee seemed to raise the issue again.
A Greenlandic participant, Hans Lynge, criticised the
head of the teacher training college for having forbid-
den the students to be members of the Christian Youth
Association. He was corrected by Schultz-Lorentzen
who said that the college did not want its students to
be members of certain associations in Nuuk. Another
Danish teacher from Greenland, Willy Borum, further
explained: ‘The ban on membership of associations is
aimed only at the political ones, not the Christian ones.’
It is only fair to add that the Danish parliamentarians
disagreed with the ban.179 If nothing else, this incident
shows that some of the local authorities in Nuuk dur-
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ing the war were alert to possible subversive activity by
the Greenlanders.
East Greenland
Before the war the two eastern settlements, Ammassa-
lik and Scoresbysund, had been administered and
serviced directly from Copenhagen, and when this was
no longer possible, in 1940 and 1941, the task fell to
schooners from the west coast. From 1942 they were
served by American ships, which had to supply their
own stations anyway. The statistics show no sign of
falling supplies: during the five years trading-out
increased by 30% despite a 35% decrease of trading-in.
This can only be due to a rise in money income, for
which no explanation is known.180
The most direct contact between the Americans
and the Green landers was in the Ammassalik district.
Already in 1941 a weather station was installed in the
Ammassalik settlement, and moved to the Kulusuk
peninsula in 1943. An airfield was built at Ikagteq
between the two principal trading posts, Kuummiut
and Sermiligaq. The base here could hold 800 men,
and contact with the local people could not be pre-
vented despite a strict curfew. The main problem was
the propensity of the Green landers to collect food
from the American waste tip. Even after seven deaths
from rotten meat the activity went on until the Ameri-
cans took stronger precautions to ensure that the cur-
few was observed.181
Otherwise the most dramatic events and the only
real acts of war took place north of Scoresbysund.182
The importance of this area was the presence of the
weather stations from which the weather in Western
Europe could be predicted. Before the war only four
such stations with radio contact existed: a Danish
 scientific station in Mørkefjord (nearly 77° NL), a Dan-
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Fig. 16. US Coast Guard Combat Cutter Eastwind, one of two American vessels operating at the east coast of Greenland in 1944,
unloading captured German supplies at Sandodden to the Danish sledge patrol. Photo US Coast Guard/Arctic Institute.
ish station on Eskimonæs 300 km. to the south which
also functioned as a police station (nearly 74° NL), a
Danish station at Ellaø 200 km. further south (nearly
73° NL), and a Norwegian station in Myggebugten (73°
30’ NL). The direct distance from Ellaø to the settle-
ment of Ittoqqortoormiit was 300 km., but since the
only means of transport was dog sledge and it had to
avoid mountains and open water, the actual travelling
distance was considerably longer.
After the occupation of Denmark the governors
forbade the Danish stations on the East Coast to send
their messages uncoded. The Norwegian government-
in-exile shut down the Norwegian station in 1940, and
in the process arrested the crew of another station
being constructed by workers sent out from German-
occupied Norway.
According to the defence agreement of April 1941
the Americans took over the surveillance of the east
coast. As part of this operation Governor Eske Brun
established a Greenlandic sledge patrol to cover the
coast from Kap Dalton south of Ittoqqortoormiit to
Franske øen (Ile de France) on 78° NL, a direct dis-
tance of 1,000 km. The patrols were manned by the
private trappers, including one Norwegian, and by
Greenlanders from Scoresbysund. They started their
service on 1 August 1941 and their task was to locate
any attempt by the enemy to establish stations along
the coast. If they found any, they were to notify the
Americans who would then destroy them. In this way a
German telegraph station was discovered in the winter
of 1941/2 and captured by the Americans. The patrols
were not supposed to engage in fighting themselves,
but a fight did take place in the spring of 1943. The
Germans had landed a small force on Sabine island
100 km. northeast of Eskimonæs. The Danish patrols
were then reorganised as military units to be protected
by the Geneva Convention in case they were captured.
The Germans attacked the station at Eskimonæs, but
the crew escaped to Ellaø under cover of darkness.
Later in March the Germans ambushed a three-man
Danish patrol, killing one of them, Eli Knudsen, and
taking the other two prisoners. One of these, Peter
Nielsen, was allowed to leave a few days later to give
Eli Knudsen a proper burial, having done which he
took the opportunity to continue to Ellaø. The other,
Marius Jensen, arrived in May at Ittoqqortoormiit with
the German commander from Sabine island, Lieu-
tenant Hermann Ritter, as his prisoner. The story was
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that Jensen had overpowered Ritter when the two of
them were alone, and taken him the 300 km. south to
Scoresbysund. For his deed he was decorated with the
American Legion of Merit and the British Empire
Medal. The German station was bombed and de -
stroyed by American planes.183
Back in 1943 Marius Jensen never told how he
managed to capture the German commander, but
many years later gave an explanation which made the
deed easier to understand. Lieutenant Ritter had been
a trapper at Svalbard before the war and spoke Norwe-
gian, which is easily understood by Danes; actually he
was acquainted with the Norwegian Henry Rudi from
the sledge patrol. He was drafted for the Wehrmacht,
and put in charge of the operation at Sabine island in a
war with which he had no sympathy. By being deliber-
ately careless about carrying his gun when Jensen was
around, Ritter more or less arranged to be captured
and led by the experienced Jensen to inhabited areas.
He was obviously a nice guy, and the authorities in
Ittoqqortoormiit had the greatest difficulty in pre-
venting the local people from liking him.184
In April 1944 the patrols were again involved in
open conflict. They attacked a German station near
Shannon island, but failed, though without any casu-
alties on the Danish side. The Americans took care of
the station itself. Several more stations were discov-
ered and taken out by the Americans without the Dan-
ish patrols being involved. In the great theatre of war
the incidents in northeast Greenland were of little sig-
nificance but they clearly demonstrated the attitude of
the Danish administration in Nuuk, which wanted to
contribute to the best of its ability.
Back in Denmark
The activities of the Greenland Administration in
Copenhagen during the war were necessarily very
modest. They had no supplies to arrange for; none of
the countless issues, which the governors and provin-
cial councils usually sent to Copenhagen to be de -
cided; no legislation to prepare. The redundant staff
was allocated to other ministries, the rest was occu-
pied in making a report describing the development in
Greenland based on the archives. The result was pub-
lished 1942-47 as Sammendrag af statistiske Op lys -
ninger om Grønland (Summary of Statistical Informa-
tion on Greenland) which has been a major source for
my survey of the material development in Greenland
before the Second World War.
In addition to this work the Administration tried
to get all available information from Greenland. The
telegraph line was closed on 9 April 1940, and not
reopened till 22 April. Thereafter people were allowed
to communicate family news, but any administrative
messages were out of the question. Censorship existed
at both ends of the line. Private letters now and then
got through to Greenland, some of them were printed
in Grønlandsposten without saying how the letter had
circumvented the blockade.
A much more important source for the Greenland
Administration was illegal listening to the telegraphic
traffic between Nuuk and the United States. This mate-
rial was the main source for a 163-page report in
March 1945 made by the administration. Not much
could be done except wait and see. Director Oldendow
tried to reach the United States in 1940 to administer
Greenland from there, but the Americans would not
let him in. The Permanent Greenland Committee was
told that he had intended to go on to Greenland if he
had succeeded in getting to the United States.185
In Denmark the main political problem regarding
Greenland was to avoid provoking the Germans to do
anything which could endanger Danish sovereignty
over Greenland. Until 1942 the Germans were equally
eager to avoid giving the Americans reasons to take
over in Greenland. This might be the reason why
Copenhagen did not react to the governors when they
signed the base agreement in 1941. The government
was piqued by the action, but kept its regrets to
itself.186
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In the Permanent Greenland Committee develop-
ments in Greenland were eagerly followed, and the
minutes can give some impression of their political
judgement.187 Director Oldendow became a frequent
guest in the committee. It seems that he shared his
information with the committee. Immediately after
the occupation the committee could hardly under-
stand the actions of Kauffmann and the governors. To
Danish politicians the government was still in business
and running Denmark and her dependencies in spite
of the German occupation. Denmark was not bel-
ligerent, and they could not understand and accept
that the outside world acted as if she was controlled by
Germany.
The Liberal Leftist, Vanggaard, and the Conserva-
tive, Ellinger, were especially upset by the blunt insub-
ordination of Kauffmann and the governors. They
were completely unable to understand the buying of
supplies in the United States in 1940, because extra
supplies had been sent from Denmark to Greenland.
Oldendow showed more understanding for the need
to get extra supplies when possible. As time went by,
the view gained foothold that Kauffmann and the gov-
ernors were acting in what they deemed the best inter-
est for Denmark, and that they had to consider the
American view. On 7 May such views were aired by the
Social Democrat, Hauberg, and by the Radical Leftist,
Oluf Steen on 19 June 1940. The politicians were very
suspicious about the real American intentions in
Greenland. From the autumn of 1941 when the base
agreement became known, and the United States
entered the war this sort of worry became more spo-
radic in the fewer and fewer meetings. But some meet-
ings were held, also after 29 August 1943 when the
Danish government resigned in protest against Ger-
man actions. For the rest of the war no new govern-
ment was appointed, and the Permanent Secretaries
carried out normal administration holding clandestine
meetings with the politicians when needed. The last
meeting in the committee during the war was on 7
December 1944. As at the previous meetings its main
business was a report from Oldendow about condi-
tions in Greenland.
The war resulted in great changes in Greenland.
Supplies and sales moved to the United States, and the
administration was centralised in Nuuk. Financially
speaking there was progress during the war in respect
of production as well as living standards especially for
the Greenlandic providers. The American presence at
the bases inevitably brought the Greenlanders into
contact with foreigners, especially in the district of
Qaqortoq and Ammassalik. But most things remained
unchanged. As little as possible was changed in rules
and regulations. The Danish administration continued
unaffected, politically as well as in trade and supplies.
The trading monopoly and restricted access to the
country was upheld in full for the American bases. The
political main aim: to maintain Greenland under Dan-
ish sovereignty and the Greenlanders’ adherence to
Denmark was never threatened – on the contrary. All
sources testify the still unabated wish of the Green lan-
ders to share the future with Denmark. Money was
even collected to help Denmark to overcome the dev-
astation of war. The purposes and amounts in Dkr. Are
listed in table 18.188
This was a substantial amount for the 20,000-odd
Danes and Green landers in Greenland.
Not until the winter of 1944/5 did the very few
articles written by Greenlanders in Grønlandsposten
begin to reflect on what should be done after the war.
They were concerned with equal salaries for Danes
and Greenlanders, equal jurisdiction and more teach-
ing also in Danish. The main aim was greater self-
reliance for Greenlanders. There was absolutely no ill-
will towards Denmark, but rather confidence that
their wishes would be realised through co-operation
with the Danes.189
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Table 18. Funds collected in Greenland during the war.
For reconstruction in Denmark 84,015
For allied war efforts (sent to the British government) 40,1
For aid to refugees (sent to Stockholm) 38,9
For Red Cross (sent to the American Red Cross) 4,8
For a memorial for those drowned in the loss of 
the Hans Egede in Nuuk 2,25
Total 170,065
There was equal rejoicing in Greenland and Denmark
at the news of the German capitulation. Reports from
along the whole coast told of spontaneous demonstra-
tions of joy in a shared Danish-Greenlandic celebra-
tion. The years of uncertainty were over, connections
with Denmark could be resumed, and a bright new era
beckoned. On 5 May the reunion telegrams flew across
the Atlantic full of hope for the future. Oldendow was
most specific, acknowledging that there had been
changes in Greenland during the war, and saying
that he would be very receptive to suggestions for
change.190
There is no reason to doubt the good intentions,
but people’s experiences during the war had been dif-
ferent, the main division being between those who had
served in Greenland, and those who spent the war
years in Denmark. Different experiences created dif-
ferent ideas for the future.
Positions in the summer of 1945
For Denmark in May 1945 the main problems were to
be recognised as a partner on the winning side in the
war, and to restore normal foreign trade. During the
war Germany had been the sole market, and this was
destroyed overnight. Greenland had always been a
minor issue in Danish politics, and was run largely by
the Greenland administration. It had attracted some
political interest before the war, and more was to come
now, but the government seems to have devoted little
energy to the question. It expected to resume control
on the same lines as before the war, continuing to take
into account the wishes of the Greenlanders.
Oldendow had the task of restoring normal rela-
tions. He had taken over on the death of Daugaard-
Jensen in 1938, and had only one normal year before
the war to prove himself. In 1939 he did what was
expected of him, visiting Greenland and persuading a
reluctant provincial council to accept the extension of
Faroese fishing rights in Greenlandic waters. Unlike
his predecessor, he had managed to establish a good
working relationship with the Permanent Greenland
Committee by providing it with very full information.
For example, he reported Kauffmann’s criticism of the
governors (see above), but he also constantly empha-
sised the need to hear opposing views before making
judgement. He willingly gave credit to Eske Brun for
his management of affairs in Greenland during the
war.191
For Buhl, the Prime Minister, Oldendow prepared
two papers in late June on the general situation just
before Brun returned to Denmark on 31 July 1945. The
papers, read to the Permanent Greenland Committee
on 8 August, were more suspicious of Brun than previ-
ous statements.192 The first paper of 27 July comment-
ed on Brun’s report of 12 May 1945. Oldendow agreed
with him that many seeds for future progress had been
sown during the war, but felt uneasy about ‘the new
desires which the administration would probably be con-
fronted with officially, materially and personally.’ He
suggested to the Prime Minister that a special commit-
tee should be set up consisting of the Permanent
Greenland Committee, four representatives from the
provincial councils, and himself to evaluate new prin-
ciples and procedures for Greenland. He argued that
this would allay any anxieties felt by the public at
large.
The other paper of 28 July evaluated the criticism
which Kauffmann had levelled against the governors.
Oldendow pleaded for leniency for Aksel Svane who
he felt had been sufficiently penalised by being some-
what isolated in the United States during the war due
to the unfortunate press interview. Towards Brun
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The immediate postwar years
Oldendow was more reserved. Brun’s running of inter-
nal Greenland affairs was praised, as was the fact that
he had been backed up by his officials. However,
Oldendow also repeated criticism of Brun, noting that
it was easy to be popular when you do not have to ask
anyone for permission before spending money.
Oldendow certainly did not try to get rid of Brun; he
acknowledged his good services, and confirmed that,
if the new Prime Minister wished, Brun would be
acceptable as assistant director of the Greenland
administration, a post that had been promised him in
1938. As further proof of his goodwill Oldendow did
not mention that the previous Prime Minister Stauning
had cancelled this promise in July 1941.193 On the other
side, Oldendow did mention rumours that Brun would
prefer to stay in Greenland as the sole governor with
extended powers. This seems to reflect the dilemma of
a high-ranking civil servant, unsure of the intentions
of his government, and anxious to cover himself on all
sides.
Oldendow’s effort to cut Brun down to human size
was perhaps needed after the enthusiastic words of
the editor of Grønlandsposten who had written eulo-
gistically of Brun on his departure, praising his strong
will, courage, and determination. The editor looked
forward to seeing the ‘profound development’, begun
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by Brun continued – by Brun himself, because the
future more than ever called for ‘the actions of a strong
man’.194 Brun also impressed the Danish press. The
coverage of his arrival in Denmark was filled with
expressions such as ‘the giant figure of Brun towered
over everyone’, ‘a giant with a giant’s strength’, and ‘the
uncrowned king of Greenland’.195
In the July papers Oldendow had boldly suggested
a discussion of the future in the Permanent Greenland
Committee, with which he had good relations and
which endorsed the plan at its meeting on 16 August
1945. Oldendow forewarned the committee that the
desire for one central authority in Greenland had
strong support among the Danes in Greenland as well
as among the Greenlanders. He was presumably
pleased that the committee did not like this idea. In his
paper of 27 July he himself had advised the Prime
Minister to be constantly aware of the wishes of
Greenland, and benevolently disposed towards them
but at the same time alert to ‘any attempt at division,
and at fomenting separatism.’ It was for exactly the
same reason that the Conservative Ellinger was
against a centralised authority in Greenland, and
Vanggaard later sent the committee a letter along the
same lines. The committee doubted whether North
Greenland really wanted to become merely ‘one great
outpost’, as Oldendow put it.
In Greenland as elsewhere people expected from
1943 that the war would soon come to an end. Eske
Brun in that year suggested to the provincial councils
that they talk about the time after the war; nothing
happened for a while, but the Danes in Greenland
soon began to have ideas about what life would be like
there after the war. The editor of Grønlandsposten,
Christian Vibe, started the debate in 1944 by saying
that Denmark had great plans for Greenland196, but
that plans were also being formed in Greenland. In
May 1944 the school headmaster Mikael Gam, who
later became Minister for Greenland, was more specif-
ic when he listed the most important issues to be dealt
with: it was essential to continue the transit traffic sys-
tem and the location of the central authority in
Nuuk.197 In December Vibe also endorsed the continua-
tion of the transit traffic system although he wanted it
completely mechanised in order to serve the popula-
tion better. As the end of the war came nearer Villy
Borum, a school head, made a list of reforms for
Greenlandic schools. In particular they should be
freed from the surveillance by the church, and Danish
should be the obligatory language of instruction.198
Before Vibe left for Denmark in the summer of
1945 he wrote a farewell article expressing the wish
that Danes now arriving in Greenland would pick up
the work where it was left off in 1945 – not where it
was left off in 1939. Furthermore, new fresh blood was
needed in Greenland – certainly not more civil ser-
vants, but ‘private citizens full of initiative to settle in the
country’. Greenlandic youth should be given faith in
the future to avoid repercussions later. They should
have better teaching in new centralised schools, and
salaries and responsibility should be on an equal
 footing with those of Danes in Greenland.199 These
articles may well have planted some good ideas among
the Greenlanders capable of reading Danish, and at
the same time informed Danish politicians of what
proposals might be expected from Greenland. A more
authoritative message came from Governor Brun,
whom the Prime Minister had asked to give his opinion
on tasks to be faced in Greenland. This he did in a
report of September 1945.200
Brun asked that his views be seen as starting-
points for research, and not indicating what should be
done right away. However, profound changes were sig-
nalled from the beginning. There was no way back to
the old Greenland, because the stock of animals to be
hunted was insufficient for the rising number of
Greenlanders, and the rising level of education and
the wartime experiences of the Green landers had
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made them demand a greater say in their future. His
main idea was to create an economy based on the actu-
al conditions in Greenland, so that the Greenlanders
could earn a decent living. Other costs for administra-
tion, education and the health service would be met
from Denmark. The age-old aim of developing
Greenland so that the Greenlanders could survive
their country being opened up had to be pursued
urgently. The monopoly could be eased for non-essen-
tial goods, and to centralise production and trade at
fewer and larger settlements could strengthen the
economy. This would facilitate mechanisation and
 create a basis for fair wages for the workers. As it was,
wages were insufficient to sustain a decent living stan-
dard, and the workers could not be expected to
 tolerate this indefinitely. A rise in wages should be fol-
lowed by a rise in prices so the Greenlandic price level
would catch up with world prices. This was also neces-
sary because imported, subsidised food would other-
wise drive locally produced food out of the market.
Brun was more hesitant about supporting the much-
discussed introduction of one central authority; he
thought it would come in due course, but he doubted
whether people in North Greenland really wanted it.
In his opinion it should await a genuine popular
demand in Greenland.
Thus Brun highlighted several reforms to speed up
Greenland’s development, but it took five years for the
system to mature enough to make the changes pos-
sible. The main elements were introduced in the great
reform in 1950, and it is fair to say that Brun was the
first to formulate the plans.
There were two main reasons for the delay: the
negative response of Oldendow, which only public
pressure in Denmark was able to overcome, and cau-
tion among the Greenlanders. Their first reactions
clearly favoured modernisation of production and
society. Nicolaj Rosing, a trading post manager and
member of the provincial council, initiated the debate
in February 1945. He said the current rate of develop-
ment was too slow to make the Greenlanders self-
sustaining in the foreseeable future, and to speed it up
he wanted women’s franchise and an increase in edu-
cation. He also wanted greater equality between
Danes and Greenlanders in wages, and before the law.
This line of argument has been common to much
of colonial history when a westernised élite strives to
obtain equal status with the Europeans in the country.
It was also typical of this stage in the growth of a
native nationalism that Rosing had no grudge against
the Danes, but looked on them as co-operators in the
process of leading Greenland to ‘a greater self-depen-
dence.’201 This attitude is well exemplified in the words
of Patrice Lumumba writing from the Belgian Congo
in 1957. ‘We rely with optimism on the good faith of the
Belgian Government and are convinced that no effort
will be neglected, either by the Belgians, or by the native
élites, to facilitate and hasten the evolution of the indige-
nous populations towards autonomy.’ and later ‘Our
dearest wish – perhaps some will find it utopian – is to
found in the Congo a nation in which differences of race
and religion will melt away, a homogeneous society com-
posed of Belgians and Congolese, who with a single
impulse will link their hearts to the destinies of the coun-
try.’202
Before the meeting of the provincial council in
August 1945 Rosing tried to prepare the ground for an
idea which, coming from Greenlanders, was quite
new, though it had been suggested before in Denmark:
to open up the country a little so that Faroese and
Danes as private entrepreneurs could teach the Green -
landers modern fishing.203 The other council members
did not give their views in advance of the meeting, but
two other highly regarded Greenlanders, Frederik
Nielsen of the teacher training college, and his col-
league Augo Lynge, published their views. Nielsen felt
they were on the threshold of a new age as the connec-
tion with Denmark was re-established. He hoped for a
clearer definition of the relationship between Den -
mark and Greenland. He asked: ‘Are we a part of
Denmark with full civil rights or are we a colonial popu-
lation with special laws?’ His preference was for the for-
mer alternative of a close connection. His other wish
was for the Greenlanders to become proficient in
Danish, a necessary pre-requisite for coping with the
era that was beginning. The Greenlandic language
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would survive, but it was imperative that the Green -
landers should become fully Danish-speaking.204
Many Greenlanders did not share such radical
views, but Rosing was not alone. In the 1930s Augo
Lynge had expressed the same opinion, and he now
restated it in a long article in Grønlandsposten.205 This
was an eloquently written essay which set some pol-
itical goals, which no Greenlander – not even Lynge
himself – had expressed before. His starting-point was
the Green landers’ attitude of giving up easily, which
others had described as inertia, weakness, dullness,
laziness, carelessness, and irresponsibility and in other
uncomplimentary ways. The problem was that his
countrymen were led to believe that this described
their fundamental nature – an attitude he wanted to
change. ‘If you want to change people’, he claimed, ‘you
have to start by changing their environment.’ The
 heaviest burden the Greenlanders had to bear was
their language. It kept them spiritually isolated behind
its walls which therefore had to be broken down in
spite of their love of their language – otherwise all
other reforms would be in vain. Lynge’s wish was not
to see the Greenlanders destroyed as a nation; it was to
see them saved as a nation. The nationalism he ad-
vocated did not envisage separation from Denmark or
any attempt to erase the Danish elements in Green -
landic culture. Rather it aimed at awakening the
 people and bolstering ‘its self-esteem, self-confidence,
self- discipline, and dignity’. Greenland was to ‘develop
inside the Danish realm to social, political, economic and
cultural equality. The same demands, the same duties,
the same opportunities for Danes as well as for Green -
landers, or in other words: we want to make a good
Danish citizen out of the Greenlander.’
How many Greenlanders shared these views?
They were expressed by people at Nuuk, the centre.
What of opinion in the small isolated settlements
along the coast with almost no connection to each
other or to the outer world? Views expressed in the
debate in the provincial council may reveal how wide-
spread the Nuuk opinion was: the members were
elected from all along the coast and should be a reli-
able barometer of the mood in Greenland as a whole.
The provincial councils met for a joint session in
Nuuk from 28 August to 20 September 1945, an unusu-
ally long session compared with earlier ones which
normally lasted one or two weeks. The air was thick
with ideas for reform. Oldendow had sent a letter in
advance with a warning not to make over-hasty re -
forms. He expressed his hope – for the benefit of
Greenland and the Greenlanders, that ‘a momentary
mood’ would not carry the day, but that the provincial
councils would be guided as ever by ‘wise and responsi-
ble consideration of what would be of the lasting benefit
to Greenlandic society’. 206 It was only natural that
Magnus Jensen, the civil servant from Denmark who
was attending on behalf of the director put forward
the concrete plans in the same spirit. He maintained
that careful consideration and research were needed
before final plans could be drawn up. There was
 nothing revolutionary in the plans, and both the overt
and covert modernisers in Greenland must have seen
it as a challenge that no reference was made to the
experience gained during the war; instead an appeal
was made to ‘the spirit of the Copenhagen negotiations
in 1939’
Brun had already left for Denmark and in his place
the chair was taken by the interim governor C.F.
Simonÿ, who showed a greater understanding of the
mood in Nuuk. Although he characterised conditions
during the war as exceptional and anticipated a return
to more normal conditions, he acknowledged that
great progress had been made during the war –
progress which should not only be maintained, but
also increased.207 As usual the agenda was filled with
local issues from the constituencies, but this time more
far-reaching questions were raised by the Green -
landers such as the influence of the provincial councils
on the forthcoming revision of the law governing
Greenland, the question of Greenlandic representa-
tion on the Permanent Greenland Committee, and
equal jurisdiction for every inhabitant of Greenland.
Peter Nielsen, a civil servant at Qeqertarsuaq in
the north, started the debate by suggesting that the
final authority should be located in Greenland. It soon
became clear that he wanted the existing central
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authority at Nuuk to continue and he also suggested
that the provincial councils should be amalgamated.
The transit traffic system should remain. His fellow
members – including those from the North- supported
this.208 Therefore speculation that North Greenland
was anxious about having a central Greenlandic
authority in Nuuk appears to be unfounded, but even
so the reform was not easily agreed during the negoti-
ations in Copenhagen the following year.
Gerhard Egede, the pastor in Paamiut, suggested
that the new law should include a clause authorising
the provincial council to participate directly in the
work of the Permanent Greenland Committee. Again
there was general agreement. Another member, the
trading post manager Nikolaj Rosing, called for equal
jurisdiction to apply to everyone in Greenland. If this
could not be done in full straight away, then Danish
law should initially be extended to cover the Danish-
speaking Greenlanders. An internal committee coordi-
nated the suggestions into a composite resolution
which was carried at the end of the session.
A summary follows:209
 The two governorships should be amalgamated
into a single governorship in Nuuk. The reasons
given were the need for quicker decisions and the
belief that ‘a people should be administered from
the country in which they live.’
 The new governor should have more authority
than the governors had before the war, especially
over finance. He should also have a larger staff.
 One provincial council should be established. The
experience of joint meetings during the war had
shown that common interests outweighed local
ones.
 The transit traffic system introduced during the
war should continue. This was for a purely politi-
cal reason. The provincial council was willing to
let economic and practical considerations be deci-
sive in the administration of Greenland, but it
expressed the view that the transit harbours
could encourage the development of an inde-
pendent Greenlandic merchant class, and that the
system would also facilitate a coastal route,
which ‘would be of paramount importance in devel-
oping a feeling among the Greenlanders of belong-
ing together’, and allow an un-monopolised trade
to grow between them.
 There should be equality between Danes and
Greenlanders in Greenland. This point was for-
mulated in a sophisticated way – there should be
no differences between Danes and Greenlanders
when their conditions were the same. This had to
mean that the Greenlanders who were to obtain
equality were those who had the same kind of
jobs as the Danish officials, a group over-repre-
sented in the provincial council.
 The provincial council’s authority ‘to implement
certain laws affecting the Greenlandic people’
should be extended.
 Greenlandic members should be added to the
Danish Permanent Greenlandic Committee in
Parliament.
Finally, the resolution authorised a delegation to
 initiate negotiations in Copenhagen, and requested
that the provincial councils should be consulted again
before any legislation was carried through.
This resolution was the Greenlandic model for
obtaining more political influence as a colonial peo-
ple. On the one hand they wanted more political
power to be located in their country, and on the other
they wanted a greater say in the formulation of
Greenlandic policy in Denmark. Seen in the perspec-
tive of European colonial policy, the increased local
power could be termed the British model leading to
autonomy and independence, while greater influence
on metropolitan policy was the French model leading
to integration and assimilation. As it turned out, the
Danes were keener on the French model, and only
turned to the British model a generation later with the
introduction of Home Rule in 1979.
Besides the issues covered in the composite reso-
lution other matters affecting further developments
within Greenland and her further relationship with
Denmark were discussed. In some of these issues the
political content was most important, the aim being
greater equality with the Danes. Thus the council
wanted the Greenlandic trading post managers to be
ex officio members of the district councils as were
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some of the Danish managers. In the same way the
council wanted to give Greenlanders the possibility of
being employed at the cryolite mine and as seamen on
ships going to Denmark – activities previously barred
to the Greenlanders. However, during the war
Greenlanders had been employed on ships to America,
and they also had cleaning and cooking jobs at the
 cryolite mine. The wartime shortage of manpower
seems to have been a potent equaliser.
A more internal Greenlandic affair was the fran-
chise and eligibility for election of women. The council
agreed on the franchise, but not on eligibility, since
elected members of the municipal councils had some
policing functions which, it was argued, could not be
performed by women. Nikolaj Rosing failed to per-
suade the council to agree to open up Greenland a
 little to Danish and Faroese pioneers: much of this
debate centred round the competition that this would
inflict on the Greenlanders, and the majority did not
wish to remove the protection that isolating it from
foreigners brought to Greenland.210 Another trading
post manager, Ferdinand Knudsen, suggested lifting
the monopoly a little by letting Greenlanders import
goods to sell on the market independently, but the
council rejected this also.
There had long been a wish for improved educa-
tion. Now the council wanted instruction in Danish in
at least two other subjects besides the Danish lan-
guage, and the establishment of Danish boarding
schools; the intention was to make education in
Greenland equivalent to that in Denmark so that
Greenlanders might have the opportunity to qualify
for all positions in the country.
Thus there was a clear wish for a central adminis-
tration in Greenland with greater powers, a perma-
nent connection to the Danish political system, and
greater equality in many areas. However, what was not
demanded should also be noted. The monopoly
 system and the isolation of Greenland should not be
touched – so much for the suggestions from Christian
Vibe and Nikolaj Rosing to move in that direction – and
the proposals of Frederik Nielsen and Augo Lynge for
radical danification also had no chance in the provin-
cial council. A slight increase in the possibility of learn-
ing Danish was all the danification the provincial
council asked for. After the end of the session of the
provincial council further negotiations were to take
place in Copenhagen. The provincial council had
appointed Gerhard Egede, Jørgen Chemnitz, Hans
Lynge, and Peter Nielsen from its members to repre-
sent it in Copenhagen as well as the former members
Augo Lynge and Frederik Lynge who had both partici-
pated in 1939.211
The public mood in Denmark, as reflected in the
press, was sympathetic to the Greenlanders. Under -
standing was shown of the desire for a central authori-
ty in Nuuk, and the newspapers were clearly flattered
by the Greenlanders’ devotion to Denmark which was
a pleasant contrast to Iceland’s declaration of inde-
pendence in 1944, and the movement for independ-
ence in the Faroes.212 When the delegation arrived on
21 December it gave a press conference with received
wide coverage. Besides the issues already aired, others
had arisen, which the delegation must have discussed
during the long sea voyage.213 The wish for larger and
more efficient fishing vessels and for modern fish pro-
cessing factories was mentioned in the newspapers but
not in the provincial councils’ discussions. Im prove -
ments in health care also received more attention in
the press than they had been in the councils.214
The negotiations in 1946215
The Greenland administration and the Permanent
Greenland Committee were still very reluctant to
grant the Greenlanders’ principal wish, which was a
central administration in Nuuk. Before the Green -
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landic delegation arrived in Copenhagen Oldendow
briefed the Committee on the new situation, and
warned against having the central administration in
Nuuk for political reasons, arguing that it might lead
to Green landic separatism. This fear, he maintained,
was the main reason why the provincial councils had
never been summoned to a joint meeting before the
war although it had been possible under the existing
law. But he had diametrically changed his opinion over
introducing Danish in the Greenlandic schools, having
been sceptical before the war; he admitted that it had
been an error not to be more receptive to the Green -
landers’ wish for this merely for ‘national-political rea-
sons’. It is not possible to say whether this was a
 genuine change of view or whether he was merely fol-
lowing the more nationalistic mood in Denmark just
after the war, which for example caused right-wing
politicians to urge reunification with the southern part
of the Duchy of Slesvig (the northern part had been
regained in 1920). The Faroese self-government move-
ment had also stirred up nationalistic feelings.
Negotiations in the Committee began on 16
January 1946. From the very beginning the question of
setting up a proper commission to propose changes in
the law governing Greenlandic matters was set aside.
Earlier (16 August 1945) the inspector for East Green -
land, Ejnar Mikkelsen, had suggested such a commis-
sion to the Committee, and in Parliament a new party,
Dansk Samling, had made the same proposal: such a
commission would be ‘to consider the nascent tenden-
cies among the Greenlandic population towards self-
 government.’216 Now the Greenlandic delegates Fre -
derik Lynge and Gerhard Egede put forward the same
ideas, saying that it was the opinion of both the
Greenlanders and the Danish officials in Greenland
that a commission of experts, like that of 1921, was
necessary. But the chairman, the former Prime Mini -
ster Buhl, promised that all issues including the issue
about governance could be discussed in the Com -
mittee, and that its proposals would be forwarded to
the Prime Minister. This seemed to pacify the Green -
landers who did not press for a commission. The
Greenlandic delegate, Hans Lynge, even saw advan-
tage in having issues discussed in a political committee
rather than in a commission run by the officials from
the Greenland administration.217
In contrast to 1939 the agenda in 1946 was the list
of requests from the Greenlanders. First and foremost
was the wish to unite the two provinces of Greenland
under one central administration and one provincial
council. The fifteen points on the list included several
that had not been discussed in the provincial council in
1945. For a delegation to expand the agenda beyond
what it had been asked to address was unorthodox and
can only be explained by the stage that political cul-
ture in Greenland had reached at the time: the dele-
gates obviously felt free to raise any question they
liked, not only these emanating from the provincial
council.
The argument in favour of centralization in
Greenland was purely political: ‘We wish Greenland to
be one country, and the population to feel like one people
instead of two.’218 But for the Danes that was exactly the
problem, they defended twin administration from
 criticism, and even questioned whether the resolution
from the provincial council truly represented the view
in Greenland. They did not comment on their main
worry – the possible political consequences of central-
isation.
The Greenlanders’ response to this frontal attack
on their main proposals was not united. Frederik
Lynge, from North Greenland, was against the idea of
one governor, since the distance from the centre to the
most remote corners of Greenlandic society would be
so great – as had been the case during the war, he
argued.219 Defeat could be seen looming on the hori-
zon when Eske Brun also expressed doubts that this
was the right time to introduce a central administra-
tion. The Greenlanders had put their trust in Brun sup-
porting them on this issue. At five meetings and addi-
tional subcommittee meetings the debate continued,
and the Greenlanders except Frederik Lynge fought
hard to get the single central administration accepted
by the Danes. They fought a loosing battle. The final
THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR YEARS
87
216. Dansk Samling (Danish togetherness) was a short-lived bourgeois party which emerged in the turmoil of the 1930s and the
war. MP Stærmose in Parliament 30 November 1945 (RTFF 1945/46: 607).
217. Minutes 1946: 2f (Archives, Permanent Greenland Committee). 
218. Jørgen Chemnitz (Minutes 1946: 5, Archives, Permanent Greenland Committee).
219. Minutes 1946: 7, Archives, Permanent Greenland Committee. 
report noted agreement on retaining two governors at
least for the next five years, and a joint session of the
two provincial councils every second year. The majori-
ty of the Greenlandic delegation had their desire for a
central administration noted in principle, and the
Danish members in the committee paid tribute to the
political wish of strengthening the fellow feeling
between the Greenlanders. When this main battle was
lost, nobody seemed to have the strength to press the
other part of the resolution from the provincial coun-
cils: greater influence for themselves. The final report
did not even bother to mention that this was not
obtained.220
The provincial council resolution also proposed
the transit traffic system should continue. But the
Greenlandic delegation was a bit worried about the
isolation which certain settlements would suffer in
this system, and the Danes were not too keen either.
The Greenland Administration was firmly against for
economic reasons. Continuation of the transit traffic
system was not recommended. On the other side the
Danes did agree to the proposal for a coastal trading
route thereby acknowledging the wish for strengthen-
ing internal communications in Greenland. The Green-
land administration would apply to the financial
authorities for permission to build a coastal vessel.
Everybody was pleased.221
The discussion of greater equality between Green -
landers and Danes in Greenland can only be seen in
the final report222 which states that the Greenlanders
did not wish to have Danish laws introduced as a
whole. They only wanted to have some of the privi-
leges which the Danes in Greenland had, such as the
right to import goods from Denmark for their own con-
sumption, including liquor. The committee was in
favour, and the administration promised to co-operate
with the provincial councils on revising the rules.223
In the Nuuk resolution the Greenlanders had
sought a direct path to the Danish politicians circum-
venting the Greenland Administration with the wish to
be represented in the Permanent Greenland Com -
mittee. This proposal met a very reluctant response in
Denmark. Numerous practical objections were raised.
A Greenlandic member could not travel from his home
to the meetings, which were often held weekly, and if
he stayed permanently in Copenhagen this would cut
him off from involvement in political discussion in
Greenland. Furthermore, the committee was a sub-
committee of Parliament, and only members of Par -
liament could be members. The committee was willing
to discuss matters with a Greenlandic delegation when
needed, but actual membership of the committee was
not possible.224 Thus the Danes accepted very little of
the 1945 resolution, and none of the changes that were
accepted needed new legislation.
Some of the provincial councils’ other requests
met the same fate. The idea of having Greenlandic
trading post managers as ex officio members of the
district councils was postponed for discussion with the
provincial councils because a majority of the Green -
landic delegation was against it.225 The reason for
accepting the idea of women’s franchise but rejecting
women’s eligibility was very different. Neither the del-
egation nor the Danes were keen to introduce such a
half-measure, but they resolved to ask the provincial
councils to consider the matter again, and promised
that full women’s rights would be welcomed.226
The improvement of the broadcasting station in
Nuuk was also postponed because of its expense, and
because of the committee’s belief that the new short-
wave station in Denmark could reach all of Green-
land.227
Up to this point we have focussed on the Green-
landic requests which were not accepted. Those re -
quests seemed to aim at strengthening Greenlandic
national feeling, and it is tempting to interpret the
rejection as a Danish move to counteract the first step
on the road to independence. However, analysis has
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shown that this was only certain in the case of the
rejection of a central authority in Nuuk. The official
report did not reveal the real reason, fear of separa-
tion, but covered it up in technical impracticalities.
However important the requests that were re -
jected, they were far fewer than those that were
accommodated. There was no trouble in agreeing on
the introduction of direct election to the provincial
councils,228 an issue raised by the delegation without
prior discussion in the provincial councils. It is safe to
assume that Augo Lynge took the initiative over this,
since he had already proposed direct election in his
magazine, Tarqigssût in 1944, because he argued that
indirect election via the municipal councils for the
more populous settlements was disadvantageous. And
Augo Lynge was the person who presented the Green-
landic requests on behalf of the delegation229 Many
improvements in the economic area were also ac -
cepted, more indeed than the provincial councils had
requested. The same was true of plans for developing
education and health care. The report upheld the
monopoly and the closing of Greenland to outsiders.
This reflected the unanimous wish of the delegation
and, as we have seen, the wish of the provincial coun-
cils. Giving the provincial councils the opportunity to
suggest that Danes with personal connections to
Greenland could be allowed to settle there created a
small opening. And the committee wanted to see re -
stricted tourism in Greenland on guided tours.230
These improvements were all minor, but together
they constituted a new pattern in the overall economic
policy. The suggestions from the committee would
result in a yearly deficit on the Greenland budget of
Dkr. 2 million, and if investments were spread over five
years the result would be an additional yearly deficit of
Dkr. 1.6 million. This amount of Dkr. 3.6 million per
year must be seen against an annual deficit of Dkr.
200,000 in normal years before the war. The commit-
tee was not keen to admit that the changes amounted
to the introduction of a new economic policy towards
Greenland. It recognised that the decision lay with the
financial authorities, but it found the expenses justifi-
able, and assumed that the investments would pay off
in a larger income for Greenlandic society.231
The change in attitude towards balanced budgets
appeared late in the negotiations. On 20 March 1946
Oldendow argued against tourism in Greenland on the
ground that it would result in an increased deficit.
Halfdan Hendriksen, a Conservative, answered that
the main consideration was whether it was of benefit
to Greenland, and that the question of surplus or
deficit in the budget was of secondary importance.
Oldendow was quick to grasp the outstretched hand
and asked: ‘Are we in the administration allowed to con-
sider this statement as the general attitude?’ Hendriksen
confirmed that the Conservative Party would sanction
all necessary and reasonable expenses to create a bet-
ter Greenland, and the Liberal Left, the Radical Left,
and the only Communist in the committee joined him.
P.P. Sveistrup, the office head in the administration,
attempted a further squeeze by asking if the admini-
stration would be allowed to use these statements in
their discussion with the Ministry of Finance about
salaries in Greenland, in which they had hitherto been
bound by the overall policy of balanced budgets. The
politicians jammed on the brakes; they were in favour
of risking a deficit by modernising Greenland, but not
by raising the Greenlanders’ salaries.232
The salaries of Greenlanders rested on a regula-
tion of 1920 which was subject to increases of 15% in
1938 and 40% in 1945. In 1945 the provincial councils
had suggested a rise of 75% over the 1920 figures.233
Oldendow had told the committee earlier that accom-
modating this was totally unthinkable.234 But negotia-
tions on salaries had taken place separately in the
administration, and some revision of views must have
taken place because the resulting figures were far
higher than anyone had demanded. For the tenured
Greenlanders the rise was equivalent not to 175% of
the 1920 regulation but to 237% while the untenured
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staff reached the 175% level. The calculated extra cost
was DKr. 1.3 million; hence the total cost of the negoti-
ations was Dkr. 4.9 million a year. No wonder the
Green landers so easily accepted their defeat over hav-
ing the central administration in Nuuk; they were well
paid off. The Danish newspapers were positive about
the Five-year Plan, as the report was called, and saw it
as a good starting point for the future development of
Danish-Greenlandic relations.235
The Greenlandic delegation was probably well
satisfied when it returned to Nuuk and presented the
report to the provincial council which was in session
from 2 to 22 June 1946. Oldendow presented the
report as information, not as a matter for approval or
objection either in its entirety or in detail. He said that
the various proposals would be presented in due time
on the agenda for approval.236 Thus the mandate given
to the delegation in 1945 by the provincial council was
formally upheld, but the provincial council was pre-
vented from expressing a judgment on the overall out-
come. Still, Isak Lund, a member speaking on behalf of
all, said that there was ‘satisfaction with the report,
even if the provincial council would have preferred to
have joint meetings in all the coming five years.’237 Thus
there was virtually no protest at the failure to achieve a
single central authority in Nuuk although it had been
the main point the year before.
Considering the turmoil in the British and French
empires at the time, it is astonishing how easily the
Danes had their way with the Greenlanders. However,
in the United Nations mobilisation of opinion against
colonialism had barely begun. Being a colonial power
was not the dishonourable status it was to become in
world politics a few years later, and being a colonial
people was not yet an honourable status. Colonial
 peoples, first and foremost had to come to terms with
their colonisers. It is possible that the lame reaction of
the Greenlanders to the rejection of their wishes was
also due to their trust in the Danes, and that they
acquiesced in having their political aspirations cur-
tailed in 1946 mainly because a development pro-
gramme had been proposed that included a substan-
tial rise in their salaries.
However the report transferred some cases for
deliberation to the provincial council. A large majority
voted to stop the age-old repartition of the municipal
funds. And the possibility of letting Danes with per-
sonal connections to Greenland settle there was seen
more positively than the year before, but with a twist
that pointed to the next great reform in 1950: Green-
land should not yet be open to everyone, but a
restricted number of Danes with special knowledge of
fishing and sheep farming could be allowed to settle in
order to assist the Greenlanders in these trades, pro-
vided that they would be on equal footing with the
Green landers. It helped if these Danes were born in
Greenland, but this was not essential.238 Thus the
provincial council accepted what it had rejected the
year before when Nikolaj Rosing had suggested the
same thing. In another matter the provincial council
stuck to its 1945-opinion. The Greenlandic trading post
managers should be ex officio members of the district
councils, and the delegation was criticised for acting in
Copenhagen contrary to the 1945 resolution.239 Over
the delicate matters of women’s franchise, which had
been agreed on in 1945, and women’s eligibility which
had not, the provincial council now accepted both.240
Thus some of the propositions of the report were
accepted by the provincial council while there were
objections to others. In general reaction was moder-
ate. But other circles were less moderate, and attacked
what they considered a far too limited reform, which
led on to their demanding a more radical reform of
Greenland policy than had ever been seen before.
Criticism and tensions, 1946-1948
While the Danish press response to the plan for reform
published in June 1946 was almost uniformly favour -
able, some dissatisfaction appeared in the newspaper
Information. Already on 31 May before the report was
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published it criticised the prospect of continued isola-
tion and an unchanged economic policy. After publica-
tion of the report Information doubted the ability and
willingness of the Greenland administration to carry
through the proposed reforms. It approved the re -
forms as such, but called on Danish business interests
to end what it called ‘the reservation policy’ towards
Greenland.241 The business interests did come forward,
but not till later.
Criticism of the report came primarily from what
could be called the opposition within the Greenland
administration and Danish officials concerned with
Greenland. There was no formal opposition group or
party. People spoke their minds, especially the officials
who had served in Greenland during the war for
whom the report did not go far enough and showed
unawareness of Greenland’s war-time experiences. In
August 1946 the editor of Grønlandsposten, Christian
Vibe, expressed dissatisfaction with the composition
of the committee, which should have been a commis-
sion of experts from Denmark and Greenland; he
could not understand why Danish business was not
allowed to compete on equal terms with Greenlanders.
He set himself the task of creating an alert public
 opinion, so that the Greenland administration could
be prevented from frustrating the reforms. This shows
open distrust of the Greenland administration.
In the same issue of Grønlandposten Finn Gad
criticised the plans for the Greenlandic schools. These
were like a cup of lukewarm tea, he wrote, and the
main problem was that none of the real experts had
been invited to the negotiations. The ‘real experts’,
according to Gad, were the rural dean Aage Bugge and
the headmaster of the teacher training college in
Nuuk, Fuglsang-Damgaard, who had been in charge of
education in Greenland during the war. Therefore, no
radical change had been suggested such as separating
the schools from the church and entrusting supervi-
sion in Greenland to the Danish Ministry of Education.
In October Gad set out the flaws in the report for a
Danish audience in Information.242 His main criticism
was the lack of radicalism. He asked: ‘Why could the
central administration in Nuuk not be continued, and
why did we not have a commission of experts?’ In the
economic field he looked in vain for evidence that the
centralisation of the fishing industry and the mechani-
sation of the harbours had been dealt with. Reluc-
tantly he acknowledged that the Green landers still
favoured the closing of the country. He wanted to see a
’restricted, very closely supervised private initiative’ to
bring Greenland forward to a healthier condition. This
should be allowed although only a few Green landers
wanted it, because the average Greenlander lacked the
background knowledge to judge the issue. ‘On issues
where the Greenlander from lack of experience and
knowledge does not dare to go forward, the mother coun-
try has the obligation to intervene.’ Gad was of course
fully aware that Danish officialdom did not base its
actions on this view, which was why he wrote it. He
wrote the article ‘to awaken the interest in Greenlandic
matters among the Danish people’, because a situation
might develop in Greenland with similar results to
what had happened in Iceland and the Faroes.
The themes touched on such as the demand for an
expert commission, for central authority in Nuuk, and
for independent businesses to be free to operate were
the core issues for the Danish-Greenlandic opposition.
Also it was hinted that Greenland could be lost by
default if the system did not adopt such ideas. In the
beginning, Vibe and Gad were the only open oppo-
nents. Having left the service and no longer having a
Greenland career to consider they could afford to be
critical – the great majority of officials returning from
Greenland expressed no criticism or ideas for Green-
land’s future.243
Eske Brun could probably, if he had wished, have
been the leading figure in the opposition, but he was
thinking of leaving the Greenland service, as Oldenow
with regret told the provincial council in July.244 Brun’s
speeches on various occasions in Denmark on Green-
land during the war were very general about the
future: the Greenlanders should have improved living
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standards, the monopoly could be partly lifted, and
the state could easily pay for public service in Green-
land provided production was economic. Thus he
repeated publicly what he had written internally in
1945 in his report.245
The modernisers got some support from the jour-
nalist Ole Vinding who had travelled in Greenland in
1945. He published his observations in a book246 in
1946, which strongly attacked what he saw as prob-
lems in Greenland. He supported all the demands for
reform made by Nikolaj Rosing, Kr. Lynge, Chr. Vibe,
and others whom he had met. The root of the evil was
in the over-protective policy of the Greenland Admin-
istration, and lack of foresight. This was to blame for
the Greenlanders’ poverty and lack of initiative and
progress. The monopoly had to be abolished in ten
years time, and until then there should be heavy
investment in the fishing industries. The governor,
Simonÿ, had written the foreword, and statements in
praise of the book by a colony manager and two Green -
landers were included. Even Eske Brun agreed with
the main criticism of the Administration for its conser-
vatism when he reviewed the book in Politiken on 5
October 1946. Nobody in Denmark seemed to take any
notice of this criticism, but then the modernisers got
help from another source.
In the autumn of 1946 a large press delegation had
been given permission to visit Greenland, and the
resulting articles echoed round Denmark. They con-
trasted the myth of Greenland as the land of happy
smiles with the reality of everyday Greenlandic
poverty, illness, the outdated economy, and the gen-
eral bleakness. The articles and accompanying editori-
als all accused the Greenland Administration of negli-
gence. Now something had to be done. ‘We lose our
right on the northern latitudes if we don’t cope with this
task’, Børge Outze wrote in Information. Experts such
as Finn Gad modified the information and put it in per-
spective, but he did agree with their main demand.247
The press campaign ran in October-November 1946,
and caused worried questions to be answered in Parlia-
ment. The Prime Minister Knud Kristensen, promised
to carry out the reform programme to the extent that
money and materials were available, and would await
the response from Oldendow to the severe criticism.248
The press campaign seems to have encouraged
Danish-Greenlandic critics. The Greenlandic Society
held discussions on 12 December and 1 January249 at
which the Green landers, the editor Kr. Lynge and
teacher Frederik Nielsen, together with the Danes,
rural dean Aage Bugge, the teacher Mikael Gam, and
Eske Brun, newly-appointed as vice-director of the
Greenland administration, launched the familiar
objections to the report for its insufficiency and lack of
radicalism and unanimously demanded an expert
commission to investigate the situation in Greenland.
They felt, as Bugge put it, that they had been sidelined
in the general debate on Greenland.
This was an additional cause of their anger. In
1920 a committee of Greenlandic officials had formu-
lated proposals for the politicians to act upon, but this
time in 1946 the roles were inverted: the Greenlandic
and Danish politicians had set the agenda, and the
officials were given the task of carrying out the pro-
posals. When, as in this case, officials protest at this
quite normal procedure, it is surely a sign of their deep
frustration over the fact that the more radical sugges-
tions were not properly presented and defended in the
committee. It also shows their lack of faith in the
Greenlanders’ ability to understand what was best for
them, and their distrust of the Greenland administra-
tion. At the December meeting Oldendow alone
defended the 1946 report, and the policy behind it. For
him the objections were well known and had already
been carefully considered. What was needed now was
a period of peace to carry out the work – an attitude to
be expected from a loyal official servant.
The speech by Eske Brun was a direct contrast. He
said that accustomed ways of thinking had to be aban-
doned in order to find principles for building a new
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Greenland. The report, he said, was a working pro-
gramme for the old Greenland.250 Thus Brun brought
the strife out into the open. He certainly was not about
to resign from the Greenland administration; he had
just accepted the position of vice-director – this was
announced at the meeting to loud applause from the
audience.251 The dis crepancy between director and
vice-director was noted in the press. Brun’s promotion
was interpreted as a victory for the modernisers,252
who now looked to him as the man to get things
 moving. But for the time being a plan for the next five
years with quite big tasks had to be carried out. At
intervals throughout 1947 demands for a more radical
revision were heard, but before this can be elaborated,
we must consider two other issues which had a bear-
ing on the re-evaluation of Greenland policy as a
whole. These issues were the international context,
especially the American bases in Greenland, and Dan-
ish business interests, notably in the fishing industry.
The Americans in Greenland253
As already mentioned, the Danish Parliament ap -
proved the Kauffmann base agreement of 1941 with
the Americans as one of its first items of business after
the liberation in May 1945. The Danish politicians
wanted to terminate the agreement because it was
considered a barrier to full Danish sovereignty over
Greenland, and could be taken as an excuse for the
Soviets to remain in the Danish Baltic island Bornholm
which they had liberated from the Germans in 1945.
On the other hand, Denmark needed to be on good
terms with the United States as the only power capable
of preventing further Soviet advance in Europe. So for
the time being the question of the US bases in Green-
land was not raised. However, the Americans were
determined to keep the bases, as well as those in Ice-
land and other places round the world. The Danish
government was aware of the American wish but
 managed to prevent the issue from flaring up in order
not to worsen its precarious security position.
The policy of laying low and not taking Greenland
into an international context led the Foreign Ministry
to oppose any idea that Greenland should be reported
to the UN as a ‘non-self-governing territory’ when
member states were called upon to report on such ter-
ritories. Even well-prepared material about Greenland
from the Greenland administration was recalled from
a meeting of the International Labour Organisation in
Montreal in September 1946 about the ‘non metropoli-
tan territories’. However, at the UN Plenary Assembly
in the autumn the Danish delegation asked that
Green land be reported as a ‘non self-governing terri-
tory’ according to article 73e of the Charter, and the
Foreign Ministry gave in.254
The internal pressure in Denmark grew through-
out 1946 to terminate the base agreement with the
Americans, and in the autumn the government asked
the United States for consultations. During the talks
the Danes learned of the determination of the Ameri-
cans not only to keep the bases but also to build more.
The worsening of the Cold War in Europe in the spring
of 1948, especially the Czech coup, made the Danes
back off, and they told the Americans in April 1948
that they were postponing the issue. In 1949 Denmark
became a member of NATO, and within this frame-
work the continuation of the US base rights in Green-
land was safeguarded in a new treaty of 1951. The
American interest in having Denmark, Portugal and
Iceland as full members of NATO was largely deter-
mined by the possibility of solving the base problem in
this context255 because it was politically more con-
venient for those small, normally neutral, countries to
participate in a multilateral arrangement than for each
to have a bilateral agreement with the United States.
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Moreover, in Denmark at least there was a genuine
fear of Soviet aggression. To let the Americans have
peacetime bases in Greenland in exchange for security
guarantees for mainland Denmark must have seemed
a fair deal. That was how it was seen from Copen-
hagen; how it seemed from Nuuk is hard to evaluate.
Foreign policy was a central government prerogative,
which was not discussed with the Greenlanders.
While the Greenland administration did not par-
ticipate in discussion on the bases, it had a role in tak-
ing over the weather stations, some of which were
operated by Americans whom the US government
wanted to withdraw after the war. The Danish Foreign
Ministry was eager to take over, but had trouble in
finding qualified personnel for the task. The Green-
land administration was not too keen on the project,
which would be expensive – Oldendow was afraid that
he would have to finance it within the normal budget
while the weather reports produced at the stations
were mainly for use outside Greenland.256 Never -
theless, the foreign policy approach won the day. The
Foreign Minister, Gustav Rasmussen, distrusted the
ability of the Greenland administration to handle the
case. In January 1947 a committee war formed to ‘co-
ordinate different tasks in Greenland especially those
which were administered by the American military
 during the war’. The Greenland administration was
represented on the committee, but so were the Foreign
Ministry, the Marine Ministry, the War Ministry, the
Ministry for Traffic, and the Ministry of Finance. The
chairman was Vice-Admiral Vedel.257
This was a clear demonstration that the good old
times when the Greenland administration was in
charge of everything going on in Greenland had
ended. Although it cannot be documented, it is fair to
assume that the prospect of having Greenland drawn
into the international sphere made the Danish politi-
cians re-evaluate Denmark’s relations with Greenland.
The willingness to spend more money manifested in
the 1946 report was a new policy, and during 1946
numerous scientific expeditions to Greenland func-
tioned as an assertion of sovereignty.
The fishermen in Esbjerg
Another attack on the traditional Greenland policy
came from Danish fishing interests. It was probably
provoked by the press campaign in October 1946
reporting on the huge amount of fish which the Green-
landers had no equipment to catch. Danish fishing had
expanded enormously during the war due to the
almost insatiable German market; the German col-
lapse in May 1945 brought this market to an end, and
much of the fishing fleet was out of work during that
summer. Even in 1946 the problem was finding mar-
kets for fish, not lack of fish. However, the other fish-
ing countries around the North Sea were gradually
regaining their fishing capacity and brought pressure
on Denmark to reduce its ‘unnatural’ large fishing
fleet. This situation made the fishing fleet in Esbjerg
look to other fields, and one of the fishing pioneers,
Christian Venø, told a local newspaper that he would
like to go to Greenland once the isolation was broken.
There were plenty of fish in Greenland, he said, and
pressure on the North Sea would be lessened if the
largest cutters went there.258 He expanded the idea in
March by suggesting that some Danes be sent to
Greenland as settlers to get things started.259 Already
in January 1947 another fishing pioneer from Esbjerg,
Claus Sørensen, had said that Greenland could relieve
North Sea fisheries and he went further and suggested
five or six privately owned industrial fishing stations
along the coast.260
The two most important Danish fishing associa-
tions, ‘Vestjysk Fiskeriforening’ and ‘Dansk Fiskeri-
forening’ supported these views at their general
assemblies in the summer of 1947.261 There was seen to
be a substantial difference between what the re-
formers in the Greenland administration wanted from
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Danish fishermen – to act as tutors to the Greenlanders
– and what those fishermen wanted themselves:
which was access to Greenland to earn money in nor-
mal free market conditions, and not to help the Green-
landers in Greenlandic conditions as the provincial
councils had advocated in 1946. The continued cam-
paign in the two fishing journals and the local newspa-
per Esbjergbladet paid little attention to the Greenlan-
ders. At most there were calming remarks about the
great quantity of fish, and about Danish fishing in
Greenlandic waters probably benefiting Greenland as
well. The heat of the debate was directed against the
Greenland administration which was criticised for its
neglect of evident Danish business interests.262 In
August 1947 a pamphlet263 by Oldendow was published
as an answer to the criticism in October 1946.264 It was
a passionate defence of existing Greenland policy that
only considered the Greenlandic angle, and only made
the press repeat its criticism of that policy.
Meanwhile, in May 1947 Chr. Venø and his partner
Knud Schrøder applied to the Greenland administra-
tion for a permit to fish in inner Green landic waters,
and Eske Brun refused it as being against the law. Pre-
sumably Brun informed the two fishermen of the laws
governing Greenland, because later the same year
they applied again with the stated aim of ‘co-operation
with the Greenlandic fishermen’.265
On 13 November 1947, following an election, a new
Social Democratic minority government took office.
Several problems concerning Greenland required
attention: talks with the Americans about the bases,
the take-over of the weather stations, the fierce criti-
cism of the Greenland administration which also
 covered previous Greenland policy, and on top of that,
the Esbjerg fishermen wanting access to Greenland.
The fishermen had a new ally in the Minister of Fish-
eries, a newly-established ministry which the business
had wanted for several years. The minister, Christian
Christiansen, took the initiative in finding a solution.
In the press Eske Brun was more accommodating to
the wishes of the Esbjerg fishermen and said that it
would be beneficial for Danish fishery to obtain the
necessary experience from operating in Greenland on
as liberal terms as possible.266
The attentive listener would have realised that re-
consideration was under way when he heard Prime
Minister Hedtoft state in a broadcast on 30 January
1948: ‘I agree that Danish initiative and vigour should
have as much access to Greenland as possible, and I
anticipate a rich development in the near future.’
Around the New Year the reformers aired their views
again. Eske Brun, Axel Malmqvist, M. Gam, Finn Gad
and Kr. Lynge had advocated a thorough public discus-
sion of the whole problem, and  Grønlands posten ques-
tioned officials and politicians in Greenland as fol-
lows: ‘Do you see a Greenland Commission as a necessity
or not?’ An overwhelming majority of the 102 persons
asked267 were in favour of it.
These signals mark the end of the striving for a
new policy during the first two years after the war. The
government had made a significant decision. There
had to be a change of course.
The clear indications from the government early in
1948 that a reformed Greenland policy was in the mak-
ing were followed by attempts to get support from the
assemblies that had to approve a new policy: the
 Danish Parliament and the provincial councils. The
process began in Parliament.
The start in the Permanent Greenland
Committee
On 27 February 1948 the Danish Prime Minister, Hans
Hedtoft, and the vice-director of the Greenland ad -
ministration, Eske Brun, came to the Permanent
Green land Committee with two cases: Det grøn-
landske Fiskekompagni A/S (the Greenland Fishery
Company Ltd), owned by Claus Sørensen of Esbjerg,
wanted access to Greenland to establish a deep freez-
ing factory, a salting house, and a station for boiling
blubber. The other application was from Grønlands
Havfiskeri A/S (Greenland Deep Sea Fishery Ltd),
owned by Chr. Venø, Knud Schrøder and Kaspar
Myrup, which wanted to conduct fishery research in
parts of the closed territory. They also wanted to
employ Greenlandic crew so that they could ‘gain expe-
rience’.
Thus the Venø fishery was defined as experimen-
tal fishing in cooperation with the Greenland adminis-
tration, comparable to that which the administration
had carried out since 1906. It could thus allow this
fishery without breaking either the law or established
practice. The fact that Hedtoft and Brun took the case
to the Greenland Committee shows however that it
was meant to pave the way for a more important
change in policy. The formal problems concerning the
application from Claus Sørensen were more serious. It
was not for fishing in closed waters but for a station
outside the four harbours allowed in the 1930s. At the
time these harbours were precisely defined, and the
legislation was carried through in spite of protests
from the Greenlanders. Permission to Claus Sørensen
would need new legislation, and consultation with the
provincial councils.
The Greenland administration recommended
both applications ‘in the light of the new perspectives in
the policy’; it would monitor the projects very closely.
Permission for them to go ahead was not to be taken to
confer any advantages or monopolies in relation to ‘the
rules, which we might politically introduce in the future’.
And the Greenlanders should be informed of the proj-
ects. This shows clearly that something new was in
preparation. In his speech Eske Brun said it was neces-
sary to persuade the Greenlanders to use new meth-
ods. He said: ‘the Greenlanders could learn much by
working with Danish fishermen’.
The Committee had asked the Prime Minister to
appear before it to discuss Danish fishing in Green-
landic waters. It got much more. The speech of Hans
Hedtoft in fact represented the ‘new perspectives’ at
which Brun had hinted.
‘Because of the recent development in Greenland I think
that the Danish Greenland policy, at least in the field of
business, has to be carried out from a new perspective
instead of the ‘reservation’ point of view employed so far.
Personally I think that the state should not do this alone,
but we must find a way to make Danish business aware
of the huge national task that has to be done to preserve
Greenland for Denmark. Danish labour and Danish
 capital have to cooperate to accomplish the task in
Greenland, e.g. in the form of a Danish-Greenlandic joint
venture. Yet the state has to be involved also to guarantee
that the enterprise will not be an exploitative campaign
against Greenland. We must win the Greenlanders’ sup-
port for an effort along these lines. If we establish an eco-
nomic policy between Denmark and Greenland with the
purpose of making all Greenlandic primary products
useful for Danish business, we would build a base for a
lasting relationship between Denmark and Greenland,
which will be much stronger than sentimental figures of
speech about common national feelings.’
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This was a skilful speech. It supported the moder -
nisers’ demand for radical changes; it accommodated
the ‘closely surveyed private enterprise’ which Finn Gad
had asked for; took the traditional view into account
by emphasising the protection of the Greenlanders; it
respected the wishes of the Danish fishing industry;
and it mentioned the often-aired fear of losing Green-
land. The speech also suggested a bigger framework
than anybody had done before. Danish capital and
labour should be involved, as should ‘all Greenlandic
raw materials’.
Danish private business was clearly being called
on for nationalistic reasons for the Danish state
 treasury was quite capable of financing anything that
Greenland needed out of its budget. And the mention
of ‘a huge national task’ did not imply easy profits.
This interpretation makes the Danish initiative
different from similar initiatives in Britain and France.
Britain also financed development projects in its
colonies to make them better suited to earn dollars for
the sterling area so that Britain could pay for its
imports. The French too wanted to make their empire
self-sufficient in relation to the dollar and sterling
areas. This European policy was abandoned in the
1950s when the EEC became more promising and the
costs in the colonies continued to exceed the
income.268 The background and reasons might differ,
but the Danish project in Greenland was on the same
lines as were followed in London and Paris. In one
aspect the aim was the same: to preserve the loyalty of
the colonial peoples in the ongoing cold war.
Prime Minister, Hans Hedtoft, was aware that the
initiative was Danish. The Greenlanders’ support had
to be won. But first the Greenland Committee must be
persuaded to support the new policy as well as the two
applications. All its members were in favour of the new
policy. Support ranged from the Communists to the
Conservatives, only the Liberal Left Knud Kristensen
(a former Prime Minister) was reluctant to adopt a
new policy when the possibilities in Greenland had not
been thoroughly researched by experts. Hedtoft prom-
ised that ‘key Danish business interests as well as Green-
landic expertise’ should discuss the project before it
became public. Greenlandic expertise meant the
Greenland administration.
The committee supported the application from
Venø even though they felt the Greenlanders should
have been consulted in advance. Political anxiety
played a decisive part in the refusal of the application
from Claus Sørensen. The committee was certain that
it would meet with Greenlandic opposition. Sørensen
stated his case later before the committee, but the
committee and the Prime Minister stood firm in order
not ‘to disturb the good relations between Denmark and
Greenland.’ At that time, 1 April 1948, the decisions had
already been announced in Greenland. After launch-
ing the new policy in the Greenland Committee Hans
Hedtoft could safely continue to win support for it. He
was aware that opposition could easily be aroused in
Greenland. On 1 April 1948 he told the committee that
the administration had made great efforts to win the
understanding of the Greenlanders for the Venø
 project. They were afraid that a Danish business initia-
tive would endanger their interests, but their reaction
to the project had been ‘rather benevolent’.
The obvious political anxiety not to arouse Green-
landic opposition shows the new mood after the Sec-
ond World War; as late as 1939 the Danish politicians
had not hesitated to enforce an expansion of Faroese
fishing in Greenlandic waters despite clear opposition
from the Greenlanders. Now the Danish politicians
would not introduce anything which might arouse
opposition, and they preferred the Greenlanders to
give their explicit consent. The turbulent years after
the war saw a growing hostility between East and
West, with both sides criticising colonialism and
decolonisation beginning in Asia. In this context win-
ning support for the new Greenland policy in Denmark
was not difficult. Hedtoft went public with it at a meet-
ing on 15 April 1948 with very much the same form of
words as was used in the Greenland Committee. The
response in the press was favourable.269
A new topic was brought into the debate from the
Radical Left. Their member in the UN delegation, Her-
mod Lannung, had already suggested in December
1947 that the colonial status of Greenland should be
removed by giving the Greenlanders direct representa-
tion in the Danish Parliament. His problem was the
increased anti-colonial tone at the UN, where he was
the Danish representative in the Colonial Committee.
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Denmark was never criticised in this connection, but it
was becoming increasingly uncomfortable to be a
colonial power. If Greenland were put on equal po-
litical footing with Denmark, it would cease to be a
colony and Denmark could withdraw as a colonial
power. Again the ‘French model’ was used: integration
of the colony to be an integral part of the realm. Dur-
ing the winter of 1948 Lannung won his party over to
his point of view,270 and the Social Democratic govern-
ment also found it a good idea. It was part of the pack-
age which Hedtoft presented to the press on 10 July
1948 before leaving for Greenland to win the provin-
cial councils round to his point of view. The project,
which had become much more detailed since April
1948 when it was presented to the Greenland Commit-
tee, can be summarised as follows:
 The state-owned Royal Greenland Trading Com-
pany to be replaced by a concessionary Danish-
Greenlandic trading company, financed and led
by private business but with representatives of
the state and the provincial councils in the man-
agement.
 Danish fishing companies and other Danish pri-
vate businesses to have access to Greenland,
these companies to be supervised by the state to
protect the Greenlanders against exploitation.
Permission to operate in Greenland would be
conditional on having Greenlanders participate in
providing capital and management on an equal
footing with Danish participants.
 The Danish scientific expeditions carrying out
research in Greenland to look in future especially
for possibilities of exploitation of the under-
ground resources and water power, and for a
more rational management of farming, forestry,
fishing, breeding animals for their fur, hunting,
and fighting pests.
 Direct contacts between the Greenlandic and the
Danish population to be strengthened and
expanded. The possibility of having Greenlandic
representation in Parliament or in the Permanent
Greenland Committee, and in the Greenland
administration in Denmark to be investigated.
The establishment of Danish schools in Green-
land to be expanded. The teaching of Danish to
be increased, with teaching in Danish as the final
goal. A school giving exams in the Danish lan-
guage to be established. The library system to be
developed, and Greenlandic broadcasting to be
supplied with short-wave transmissions from
Denmark for one and a half hours a day with
news, talks, and music especially for Greenlandic
audiences. These broadcasts were to begin in the
coming autumn.
 Danish medical and legal experts to be sent to
explore the possibilities of reforming the Green-
landic health care system and the local adminis-
tration, including the introduction of modern
civil and criminal law.
 The Greenlandic population to be educated by
means of lectures, films and pamphlets to a
higher level of production, culture and morality.
It was expected that the provincial councils would
approve the project. The UN was informed that Den-
mark was planning to integrate Greenland as an equal
part of its realm.271
From what had been envisaged in the spring the
project had expanded considerably. It seems that
every demand for reform had been collected together.
A new era was clearly at hand. Now the support of the
Greenlanders had to be won.
Meeting the provincial council
Hedtoft’s visit to Greenland was a triumphant success.
Visits of prime ministers were extremely rare; only
Stauning had been there in the past – in 1930. This
time Hedtoft came with a programme that contained
what leading circles among the Greenlanders had long
been asking for – promises of greater political equality
and of huge investment financed by Denmark. His
objective was to gain the Greenlanders’ authorisation
to launch the programme.
Before the meeting with Hedtoft the provincial
councils had been informed about the good progress
of the former five-year programme of 1946. Reform of
the church and school system was planned and about
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to be implemented. The expansion of the health care
system followed the plan, and the planned delivery of
boats and boat motors to the Greenlanders had
already occurred. The hiring of staff and acquisition of
ships was ahead of schedule: the plan had envisaged
one coastal ship and eight motorboats for medical use,
but by 1948 it had grown to five ships and thirteen
boats. On top of that the American weather stations
had been taken over, and new equipment was about to
be installed.272 The smooth implementation of the 1946
programme shows that the new programme was not a
result of poor performance of the former programme;
the change was due to the difference in the national
and international political environment in 1948 com-
pared to 1946.
Hans Hedtoft’s speech to the provincial councils
had a long introduction before he came to the pro-
gramme. He said that Denmark wished to maintain
and strengthen its relationship with Greenland, to
retain sovereignty, and to aim exclusively at the
improvement of living standards for the Greenlanders
by means of the proposed programme. He justified
lifting the trade monopoly by wartime experiences. He
thus erased the parenthesis that Oldendow had so suc-
cessfully put around the war and put it around the
1946 programme instead.
He was careful to present the ideas in the pro-
gramme as suggestions and not as decisions. Con-
cerning business he said: ‘I dare not say yet in what way
private capital and initiative will be brought to Green-
land, whether it should be in the form of a Danish-Green-
landic company under state supervision or whether the
Greenlanders and the administration should establish
co-operative companies, or whether it should be a combi-
nation of Danish and Greenlandic limited companies.’
He ignored the existing system of a state-owned com-
pany. As for political equalisation, Hedtoft raised the
‘possibility of giving Greenland representation in the
Danish Parliament,’ and he finally offered to establish a
commission which he promised would work fast to
examine suggestions, ‘if you want that’.
It is hard to say how the members of the provincial
councils saw the situation. On the one hand, Hedtoft
had presented the programme as open for alterations.
On the other hand, the Greenlanders were familiar
with the Danish interests through newspaper reports,
and now the Prime Minister was there, obviously in
favour of a reform. Did they think they had any
option? Could they dare to turn the Prime Minister
down? Would they? A later sharp exchange between
two of the participants sheds some light on the ques-
tion, even if it does not answer it. Frederik Lynge of
Qullissat called Hedtoft’s proposal an ultimatum that
had been accepted too quickly by the provincial coun-
cil.273 Pastor Gerhard Egede of Paamiut preferred to
call Hedtoft’s suggestion an outstretched hand, and his
opinion was that the population would have been dis-
satisfied and ‘the progressive youth’ would think their
endeavours had been thwarted, if the provincial coun-
cil had declined the offer.274 Lynge was worried about
competition from Danish fishermen while Egede
looked at them as an opportunity for rapid develop-
ment in Greenland. One could say that Lynge’s voice
came from the old Greenland and Egede’s from the
new.
On the next day, 5 August, Gerhard Egede pre-
sented the resolution from the provincial council.
Regarding the trade monopoly it was for ‘substantial
changes’ – the popular wish to reach the level of other
countries in terms of economy and culture having now
grown so much compared to 1946 that the provincial
council could not ignore it. This statement was very
clear, but it continued in a way that makes me question
how free to chose the provincial council actually
believed itself to be: ‘the advent of Danish private enter-
prise makes it more compelling than ever to teach the
Greenlanders modern fishing techniques.’ Formally this
way of reasoning is to regard the matters at issue as
facts.
The resolution was as vague as Hedtoft had been
in specifying how to implement ‘the substantial
changes’. The words were: ‘The Prime Minister wants to
hear the opinion of the provincial council regarding the
three ways of changing the trade monopoly system. The
provincial council would not have a definite opinion
about any of them but would say that it gives its full sup-
port to the introduction of private Danish enterprise in
Greenland under state surveillance. To resolve the matter
THE REFORM OF 1950
99
272. Oldendow 1948.
273. Avangnâmioq November 1948.
274. Atuagagdliutit. Both articles were printed in Danish in Grønlandsposten.
it is paramount that the Greenlandic and Danish author-
ities and the Danish Parliament co-operate to find the
best solution.’275
As for political equalisation, the resolution ack -
nowledged that not all of the Danish legal system
would be suitable for Greenland. Nevertheless, the
council wished to find a way to bring about greater
equality in civil rights. The answer to the offer of rep-
resentation in Parliament revealed a possible misun-
derstanding of the situation. It was: ‘Because of the dis-
persed habitation of the country, the provincial council
does not find the time ripe for representation by a single
member in the Danish Parliament.’ It is hard to believe
that Hedtoft had offered one and only one representa-
tive. If any number had been offered, two would have
been more appropriate, because this was what the
Faroes had from a population of the same size as
Greenland’s. Hedtoft’s manuscript for the speech has
the words ‘representatives’ without specifying any
number, but the official minutes had the word in the
singular.276 It is perhaps evidence of the hectic atmos-
phere at that time that nobody rectified the misunder-
standing. Having rejected representation in Parlia-
ment, the council asked for seats on Parliament’s Per-
manent Greenland Committee, as it had wished in
1945, and asked finally for the commission to assemble
as soon as possible to discuss the new arrangement.
Even if some of the provincial council’s answers
might suggest that they did not understand the issue,
the main point was crystal clear to the Danes. The
provincial council had accepted the introduction of
Danish private enterprise into Greenland and the set-
ting up of a commission to investigate the matter. It
had rejected representation in Parliament but wished
to participate in the work of the Permanent Greenland
Committee.
Hedtoft and Brun were so certain of the answer
that they ventured to push the door at least some way
open to the Promised Land. They had spoken in Nuuk
with Claus Sørensen of Esbjerg, who had gone to Nuuk
to persuade the provincial council to open a harbour
for his business. Both men were sympathetic to the
wishes of Claus Sørensen but would await the ap -
proval of the Permanent Greenland Committee before
finally giving permission. Brun’s memo to Sørensen
ended: ‘if you are prepared to make the venture start on
this basis, you should be allowed to do so. I expect that
the Greenland Committee will deal with the matter so
soon that there would be no time to begin arrangements
in Greenland’.277 But Claus Sørensen acted fast. At the
beginning of September he asked the authorities in
Greenland to assist him in building the factory for pro-
cessing and freezing fish. The machinery was ready to
be loaded in Esbjerg. This provoked a storm of protests
in Greenland. The provincial council’s members
insisted that the commission should complete its work
before any permission was given, and the two gover-
nors, C.F. Simonÿ and N.O. Christensen, supported
them in this interpretation of the summer meeting.
Copenhagen tried hard to persuade the Greenlanders
to abandon their protest, and the Prime Minister Hans
Hedtoft even told them that they would be held
responsible if they made private enterprise lose inter-
est by stopping Claus Sørensen now. Oldendow, who
was on an inspection tour in Greenland, was told that
if he did not change the mood of the Greenlanders all
Sørensen’s preparations would be stopped, and ‘a good
initiative would be delayed for at least a year which
might prevent the right people from being interested in
the project.’ Of course, Oldendow did what his prime
minister wanted him to do, but at the meeting in
Sisimiut in September he could barely conceal scepti-
cism. When asked if he thought the initiative of Claus
Sørensen would benefit the Greenlanders, he
answered that if: ‘the Prime Minister found private
enterprise beneficial to the Greenlanders, he as director
could only believe the same. As a civil servant he could
not speak against his minister.’ After the meeting Ol-
dendow had to telegraph to the Prime Minister that
the Greenlanders were immoveable, and that the gov-
ernors had to support the members if they were not to
risk losing the confidence of the provincial councils.
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Hedtoft acted promptly and announced in a
Greenlandic broadcast that Claus Sørensen would not
be allowed to begin his business in Greenland that
year because the Greenlanders were against it.278
The Greenland Committee was never asked for its
opinion.
This episode shows clearly that the political
strength of the Greenlanders had grown after the war.
Their benevolent cooperation was now essential if the
Danish claim to act in the Greenlanders’ interests was
to be credible. Hedtoft could not afford to act against
them in full view of the Danish public and the interna-
tional community. As late as 1939 the Danish govern-
ment had allowed the Faroese fishing fleet to enter
Greenlandic waters directly against the Greenlanders’
wishes. In contrast after the war the provincial council
could effectively block any unwanted initiative.
Whether Hedtoft ever blamed anyone other than
himself for the political blunder of trying to force
Claus Sørensen’s business through, cannot be deter-
mined here. Oldendow resigned as director at the end
of the year. The official reason was ill health, but he
later asserted the real cause was his fundamental dis-
agreement with the new policy.279 Eske Brun was
appointed director in his place and no one was ap -
pointed to follow him as vice-director. This change was
a complete victory for the modernisers.
The Great Greenland Commission
The commission was appointed on 29 November 1948,
and its mandate took its point of departure from the
resolution of the provincial council the same summer:
to ‘address the problems of social, political, cultural and
administrative development in Greenland and make pro-
posals for future arrangement in these areas.’
The work was immense and resulted in a six-vol-
ume report with a total of 1,100 pages. The great
length was due to its painstaking report on the previ-
ous conditions and its very detailed suggestions for the
future. Thus the report came close to being a total
analysis of Greenlandic society. The commission
started work in January 1949 and the report was ready
for publication in February 1950.
The work was organised in a main commission
with sixteen members: four Danish politicians, four
Greenlandic provincial council members, Katrine
Chemnitz of the Greenlandic Housewives’ Organisa-
tion – a prominent figure, and officials from the min-
istries, among whom were the chairman H.H. Koch
and director Eske Brun. Those two were members of
all nine sub- commissions, as were the four Green-
landic provincial council members.280 The working
arrangements of the commission were designed to
promote efficiency. The treatment of economic issues
in sub-commission 4 was typical. The secretariat of the
main commission delivered a report on the historical
background and the present problems, which was dis-
cussed at one or more meetings. Then the secretariat
wrote a draft report that was further discussed and
amended in the sub-commission. This done, the main
commission approved the report, and the work was
done. This centralisation of suggestions and reporting
gave the huge report a homogeneous character, and it
was carried without any minority statement. Only
careful examination of the commission archives
reveals who had to concede most.
The Greenlanders did indeed participate in the
work, but not on a basis of parity. Five of the sixteen
members of the main commission were Greenlanders,
and in the sub-commissions the provincial council had
appointed a further five Greenlanders and five Danes
who were officials in Greenland. Thus only fifteen
members of the 105-strong commission represented
the Greenlandic point of view directly. One could
argue that the twenty-five officials from the Greenland
administration and thirty-six more from other min-
istries were committed to look after Greenlandic in-
terests even if indirectly. One must assume that the
twenty-two individuals from private business and
organisations were the least inclined to give primary
consideration to the Greenlanders’ interests, but this is
not evident in the report. The representatives of pri-
vate business, like all Danish participants in the com-
mission, were called upon because of their expertise
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and not their views on the Greenland policy. The only
arguments allowed in the report were those tending to
develop Greenland socially, culturally and economi-
cally for the benefit of the Greenlanders. This point
was not a matter for debate.
With this policy Denmark was no different from
other European colonial powers. They too started
development programmes in their colonies. One rea-
son for this was the need to boost the colonial
economies to earn dollars for the reconstruction of
Europe after the war. Another was to win the loyalty of
the colonial peoples so they would stay in the imperial
system, or at least in the Western orbit, in face of the
competition from the Soviet Union in the ever-growing
Cold War.281 The economic aspects were nearly missing
from the official Danish reasons – but not in private
Danish expectations. The Danish endeavours arose
largely from the necessity of a small country behaving
progressively to avoid criticism by the world at large.
The decision of the United States to maintain its bases
in Greenland after the war reinforced the desire to
maintain and strengthen Greenlandic loyalty to Den-
mark.
Compared to Britain and France, Denmark con-
tributed proportionately less, but due to the much
smaller population in Greenland, it received much
more than other colonial peoples. In the first ten years
after the war the 48 million people in Britain provided
£ 12.5 million (=US$ 35 million) annually to the 65
million people in the remaining colonies, i.e. 73 cents
per inhabitant and 54 cents for each inhabitant of the
colonies.
The corresponding French figures were 43 million
French providing US$ 62 million to 20 million inhabi-
tants in the colonies outside Indochina, per inhabitant
they gave US$ 1.45 and the colonies received $ 3.11.
The 4.5 million Danes had a minor task regarding
Greenland’s 25,000 inhabitants. The yearly amount of
only 13 cents per inhabitant of Denmark became US$
23.12 for each inhabitant in Greenland.282
Compared to the running five-year plan of 1946
with a yearly transfer of Dkr. 5 million ($ 720,000), the
new programme of 1950 would cost Dkr. 10 million a
year. This did not deter the commission. It stated: ‘The
proposed programme in the cultural, social, and eco-
nomic areas of Greenlandic society must be considered
imperative in order to bring the society to a reasonable
level. It is furthermore an absolute condition for the
Greenlanders’ growth into a greater cultural and eco-
nomic maturity, so that they can benefit from the oppor-
tunities in the country more efficiently and intensively
than now, and thus create the financial basis for its exis-
tence. To postpone solving the problems will only make
the task more difficult and hence more expensive.’283
Settlements and investments
The first volume of the report considered the alloca-
tion of settlements and investment. It was a leading
idea that the population should move to places where
an industrialised fishery could be established. The
benefit would be better utilisation of investment, a
 better education and health service, increased cultural
input and better use of the work force. Such places
could be Narsaq in the south, Aasiaat in the north, and
a place in the vicinity of the capital Nuuk. On the other
hand, districts such as Upernavik, Uummannaq and
Cape Farewell were fated to suffer if not depopulation,
then considerable thinning out. There was to be no
coercion but encouragement through propaganda –
and by only investing in places with a future!
Political and administrative reform
The second volume dealt with the political/admini-
strative area as well as scientific exploration, fishery
inspection, the coastguard, and the legal system. The
long-standing wish to have only one provincial council
and one governor was accepted. The governor, now
with title of landshøvding could also have a greater say
over the financial means at Greenland’s disposal. He
was to have an enlarged staff of experts to assist in
 various areas under his supervision. Having the final
decision over administration of the law in Greenland
should expand the authority of the provincial council,
which could have full and unquestioned disposal of
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the Greenlandic public funds, while the governor
would ensure that the rules were followed. Thus the
provincial council was placed on an equal footing with
local authorities in Denmark, which were responsible
to the Ministry of the Interior.
Since the provincial council had refused represen-
tation in Parliament in 1948 the commission could not
suggest this. Instead it recommended that the consti-
tutional commission then in session284 should address
the issue ‘since the opinion on this question might
change later.’ The commission also recommended
accommodating the Greenlandic wish to be repre-
sented in the Permanent Greenland Committee in Par-
liament.285
The level below provincial council and governor
was also looked into. The commission recommended
abolishing the district councils and reducing the num-
ber of municipalities, subject to discussion in the
provincial council. The commission also recom-
mended that the new larger municipalities took over
some of the administration formerly belonging to the
colony manager, such as roads, bridges, refuse-collec-
tion and fire fighting. A new agency, the Greenland
Technical Organization, should be established to deal
with the technical aspects of investment in the infra-
structure. Another new agency, the Greenland Geo-
logical Research, would coordinate the search for min-
erals ‘which could have a bearing on economic develop-
ment’.286
The legal system was about to undergo a major
change. A single system would now cover Europeans
(Danes) and Greenlanders, who hitherto had been
subject to separate rules. The courts would be sepa-
rated from the administration by having a court of
appeal headed by a judge, and a court of lay judges in
each municipality. A police force of five men should be
established under the governor. Finally, Greenland
should have its own legal code applying to everyone
resident in Greenland. This change fully complied
with the long-standing wish of the Greenlanders for
the difference before the law between themselves and
the Danes to be abolished. In fact it went further by
separating the prosecutors and judges.
Education and cultural issues
The third volume looked into education, the church
and other cultural issues. The time had come to sepa-
rate education from the church – almost. An educa-
tional board should be formed, consisting of the gover-
nor, the rural dean and a director of education, who
would be selected from among the most able teachers
in Greenland. Each district should have an inspector,
educated to the same level as students at the Danish
teacher training colleges, as head of education.
The aim of these reforms was simply to make edu-
cation in Greenland as good as education in Denmark.
The teaching staff would be better trained by dividing
the students at the Greenlandic teacher training col-
lege in Nuuk into sections, one for students training for
teaching and the church, and the other for those who
would be teacher only. The commission also pleaded
that the Greenlandic teacher trainees should be given
some courses in Denmark if not the whole of their edu-
cation. It was estimated that about fifty teachers were
needed with a Danish teacher education, but only
twenty were available, and so the gap was to be filled
by Danish teachers from Denmark.
There appeared to be no hesitation about the
prospect of educating Greenlandic teachers in Den-
mark, but some thought was given to the possible
problems of transplanting Danish teachers into the
totally different cultural and linguistic environment of
Greenland. Nevertheless, the presence of Danish
teachers in Greenland was deemed necessary to en -
sure proper training in the Danish language, and to
give inspiration to their Greenlandic colleagues and
boost Greenlandic cultural life. This paternalistic role
for the Danish teachers was probably an echo of the
cultural role teachers have had in rural Denmark since
the nineteenth century. This looked like solid cultural
imperialism, and the Danes were confident that they
were sharing their ‘higher’ culture with the Greenlan-
ders. But it was not forced on the Greenlanders. The
upgrading of the teaching of Danish in Greenland had
been demanded by the Greenlanders constantly ever
since the 1920s.
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The reform of education generally went further
than teacher education. In order to make a serious
effort to improve the teaching in Danish, the commis-
sion suggested the establishment of bilingual schools,
with a division in the third grade into a pure Green-
landic-language section and a section with more and
more subjects taught in Danish, except for religion
and the Greenlandic language. If this ambitious pro-
gramme were implemented it would result in a strong
danification of first education and then of Greenlandic
society as a whole. A later generation has wondered at
the lack of foresight in the plan – unawareness of the
problems that would arise from asking a huge part of
the population to acquire a strange language and a
strange culture to the extent that they could function
in that culture just as well as people born into it. But
the consequences were inescapable: Greenland should
be transformed into a modern society on the West
European model – as far as possible. To achieve that,
education was needed and education was only avail-
able in Danish. This was a real dilemma. The Danish
specialists in the different fields of modern education
were not able to translate their knowledge into Green-
landic, and there were no Greenlandic specialists who
could translate knowledge from foreign languages.
They had to be educated first – and the costs of such an
enterprise would be astronomic and very time-con-
suming.
The Greenlandic church was left almost un -
changed. But this part of Danish, if not West European
culture had already been fully integrated into Green-
landic society for half a century.
Health care
The fourth volume was devoted to health care, hous-
ing and social security. Action in this area was urgently
needed, as the Danish press delegation of 1946 had
already noted. The problem of tuberculosis was so
serious that it could not await the work of the commis-
sion; one-third of all deaths in Greenland were caused
by it, an appallingly high percentage compared to the
Danish level of 25 out of 100,000 deaths. During 1949
the whole Greenlandic population were screened for
the disease and innoculated against it.
The commission proposed a substantial expansion
of the primary health service. Six of the existing six-
teen hospitals were found to be unsuitable, and six
new ones were to be established along with two
 nursing homes, a new hospital by the coast for tuber-
culosis patients and a central sanatorium and local
tuberculosis section in Nuuk. In total this meant an
expansion of hospital beds from 342 to 762, and an
increase in the number of physicians from fourteen to
twenty-six and of nurses from twenty-two to thirty-
seven.
Action to improve health did not stop with the pri-
mary health service. The quality of Greenlandic
houses, which by Danish standards was extremely low,
was crucial. A typical one-room house of 10-20 square
meters, often leaky and cold, would hold about six per-
sons. The Danish standard at the time was for at most
two persons per room, not counting auxiliary rooms
such as kitchen, bathroom and entrance hall. Almost
all the dwellings in Greenland were unfit for habita-
tion, and a plan was accordingly made to re-house the
whole population: 6,000 houses would be built over
the next twenty years. The building programme of -
fered eight different types of family houses as shown in
table 19.
The houses were to have kitchen, entrance hall,
storerooms for food and solid fuel, a laundry room and
a toilet – a tremendous improvement of housing stan-
dards, with every person having tripled indoor space.
The predominating one-room house would be a thing
of the past, and quite deliberately so, in order to
improve the people’s health conditions and social and
cultural level. The children should have space and
quiet for their homework and all should have their
own bed. Abandoning the traditional common sleep-
ing place would reduce the danger of infection, not to
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Table 19. Type of family houses in the building programme of
1950.
Type No. of Dwelling No. of Cost
rooms area m2 persons 1000Dkr.
1 1.0 19.7 1 9
2 1.0 29.5 2 12
3 1.5 36.1 3-4 13
4 2.0 42.7 3-4 16
5 3.0 50.9 5-6 17
6 3.0 64.1 Over 6 18
7 4.0 79.1 Over 6 22
8 4.5 90.6 Over 6 25
mention ‘the very early sexual activity and the wide-
spread promiscuity’ together with venereal disease.287
It is hard to understand why the terrible condi-
tions prevailing hitherto had not been taken care of
long before. The Greenland administration was
undoubtedly familiar with the situation, but it was
probably tolerated because Greenland was a very dif-
ferent kind of community from Denmark and the
administration had a very tight budget. The welfare
state in Denmark had started in the late nineteenth
century and taken off in the 1930s. After the war it
increasingly became the common goal of most politi-
cal parties, with the Social Democrats and the Radical
Left Party as its strongest advocates. With greater pub-
lic knowledge of conditions in Greenland it became
intolerable, and a matter of shame, that a people for
whom the Danish state was responsible should live so
far below Danish standards. This was in accord with
the new mood after the war, with colonialism now
under heavy attack in international forums like the
United Nations.
The financing of the building programme became
a heavy burden. Hitherto the Greenlanders had built
their own houses at a cost of Dkr. 1,500-2,000. The
prices of the new houses would be eight or nine times
higher, which was beyond the Greenlanders’ means. It
was proposed that half the cost should be an outright
grant from the state and the balance a loan from the
state. It was envisaged that 24% of total state invest-
ment would be for housing.
Economy and business
Sub-committee 4 – the largest sub-committee with
fifty-three members, of whom sixteen were from the
private sector – examined the economy and the
arrangement of business, and reported in vol. 5.
The main idea in this report was that private
enterprise should be given a free hand in Greenland.
This should be mainly in the hands of the Greenlan-
ders, but since they were considered to lack the know-
ledge and skills as well as the capital to work in this
system, the idea was that Danish private enterprise
should be allowed to operate, partly to deliver the cap-
ital but mostly to enable the Greenlanders to learn
how private enterprise worked. But access to Green-
land would be at a price. It was feared that allowing
Danish private capital a free hand in Greenland would
grind the Greenlanders down before they were able to
compete on equal terms. Therefore, liberal economic
philosophy was restrained and essential parts of the
old policy remained in force. In this there were politi-
cal choices as well as the unavoidable reality of condi-
tions in Greenland.
The political aim was to create preconditions for
primary production, which would eventually pay its
own way. But business cycles had to be smoothed out
through the prices paid to the producers in Greenland.
If world prices were to be fully operative ‘it would result
in devastat ing consequences for the Greenlandic popu-
lation – or face the Danish society with an obligation
to transfer substantial support.’288 The funding for
evening out world market fluctuations should come
from the production in Greenland. Eske Brun was firm
that otherwise Greenland would never come any
closer to being an open economy.
The Royal Greenland Trade Department should be
the central export sales organisation and administer
this fund. This was in order to ensure a high product
quality, and level out prices from the different foreign
markets. The basic condition remained: the products
had to be gathered from a number of small places
where they were produced, and shipped to very dis-
tant markets. Unless this was done by a central organi-
sation, it would not be competitive. Therefore the
actual monopoly over the purchase of Greenlandic
production was maintained. But despite similarities
between the old and the new system there were sub-
stantial differences. Green landic production no longer
had to bear the expenses of social services, or even
finance its own investments. Financing was the task of
the state and Danish private capital.
As already mentioned, the whole operation was
aimed at raising the Greenlanders’ standard of living,
and the method was to open the economy and teach
the Greenlanders how to function in a competitive
economy. The first of these objectives was the essential
one. If a freer economy were to cause a fall in the
Greenlanders’ income, welfare should have a higher
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priority than their introduction to private enterprise,
the blessings of which could be taught in evening
classes and on the radio while waiting for better times
to practise it.289 The same attitude applied to Green-
landic wage-earners. Their income was not to be
allowed to decrease, and they should be guaranteed a
share of the expected increase in productivity. More-
over, a wage rise should not wait for a rise in produc-
tivity; a substantial one should come into force by 1
April 1950, and then a price and salary committee
should monitor future development. It was considered
necessary that the salaries of public servants in Green-
land should develop in parallel with earnings in pri-
vate business, i.e. for fishermen and hunters. How
then should the often-heard demand for equal salaries
between Danes and Greenlanders in public service in
Greenland be resolved? It remained unresolved. If
qualified Danes were to be attracted to Greenland,
their salaries had to equal the salaries in Denmark and
have a bonus in addition. The continuation of the cen-
tury-old system of differences between the salaries of
Danes and Greenlanders in Greenland was the inex-
orable logic of making Greenlandic production self-
sustaining, so that any increase in living standards was
the fruit of their own efforts and not a gift from Den-
mark. This issue became a burning question in the
years to come, when Greenlandic civil servants were
not inclined to accept arguments based on the national
economy when they compared their wage cheques
with those of their Danish colleagues.
This economic policy holds the key to under-
standing how the relationship with Greenland was
actually seen from the Danish side. In spite of all
attempts to transform Greenlandic society in a Danish
mould and make Greenland ‘a part of Denmark’, as the
constitu tional change of 1953 did, it was not an
attempt to assimilate Greenland into Denmark. Green-
land was Greenland, the land of the Greenlanders who
should be able to live there at a standard appropriate
for a welfare state. Perhaps there were those in Den-
mark who cherished the idea that in due time transfor-
mation into a modern society would minimise the dif-
ferences, so that a genuine melting together of the
economy, culture, language and population would
take place, but nobody aired that view, and the 1950
reform certainly stopped short of it. It is probable that
the Greenland administra tion’s solid knowledge of the
Greenlanders and their society prevented the re-
formers from crushing Greenland in their benevolent
embrace.
It was proposed that the existing monopoly for the
purchase of Greenlandic products by the Royal Green-
land Trade Department should also apply to Faroese
and Danish boats fishing in internal Greenlandic
waters. Claus Sørensen, a member of sub-committee 4,
had tried to get easier terms, but Eske Brun, Victor
Gram (Social Democrat) and Oluf Steen (Radical Left)
were very firm on that point; if Danish and Faroese
fishermen wanted to operate in Greenlandic waters
they had to contribute to the Market Fluctuation Fund
as the price for participation,290 and in order that the
Greenlanders could learn occupational skills from the
admission of Danish fishing boats, the commission
suggested that a permit would only be issued if up to
half of the crews were Greenlanders. So much for the
access of private enterprise to Greenland by means of
Danish capital. In political terms its role should be that
of a teacher to the Greenlanders. Greenland should
not be a convenient self-service table. The politicians
and the officials knew of course that the main reason
why private Danish capital wanted to operate in
Greenland was to make money, and this was accept-
able provided it was on an equal footing with the
Greenlanders. To finance existing and future private
businesses in Greenland, a new Business Lending
Fund was proposed to fund up to half of an invest-
ment. For financing of the Green landic fishing fleet,
the subsidies were even bigger.
Besides the rearrangement of production and
sales there was also a monopoly to break in imports.
Also here essential elements of the old system lingered
on, because the state wanted to guarantee supplies to
Greenland and to maintain the system of equal retail
prices all over the country irrespective of the delivery
costs. There was no inclination to let private trade take
over the lucrative deliveries to the larger settlements,
thus leaving the Trade Department with the loss-
 making parts. The monopoly of supplies to Greenland
should be maintained. Shopkeeping could be taken
over by Greenlanders as private enterprise, and those
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who did so should be allowed to import some goods
outside the Royal Greenland Trade Department, but
not essentials such as flour and sugar. The retail trade
should be separated from the administration and
should bear its own costs without subsidies.
Qaanaaq and the East Coast
The 6th volume dealt with the more backward so-
cieties in the far north, Thule, and the settlements at
Ammassalik and Ittoqqortoormiit on the east coast.
They were far from being ready to plunge into moder-
nity, and the commission limited itself to suggesting
improvements in health care and education.
We have now reviewed the main suggestions from
the commission. There is much detail, for the report
provides a more thorough examination of ideas and
proposals than any of the debate in public or in Parlia-
ment. Thus it is the best source to analyse for inten-
tions and attitudes. Furthermore, it can be seen as the
official Danish view, unani mously carried as it was,
and it was the basis for the legislation on Greenland
policy that followed. It almost became the holy writ for
those who had to implement the reforms in Green-
land. Whether it contained what the Greenlanders
really wanted is harder to say. Formally there were no
problems. The provincial council had approved the
guidelines in 1949. The Greenlandic members of the
commission had signed the report. They had certainly
been won over as Hedtoft had intended them to be.
Making the proposals into laws
The route from report to legislation was very short. On
28 March 1950 the report was printed, on 27 April the
eight bills were presented to the lower house of Parlia-
ment, on 3 May they had their first reading, and on 23
May they were carried. The upper house considered
the bills on 24 and 25 May, and on 27 May the King
signed the laws. They laid out the organisation and
framework for the eight areas in question, and they
were completely in harmony with the suggestions
from the commission. The subjects of the laws were:
provincial council and municipal councils, education,
Greenlandic church, the Royal Greenland Trade De -
partment, economic activities, a Greenlandic Business
Lending Fund and public Greenlandic funds.
The major parties supported the bills in Parlia-
ment: the Social Democrats, the Conser vatives, the
Radical Left, and the Liberal Left except for a few
members. The reasons for carrying the laws were
given in the commission’s report, so only the few dis-
senting voices need to be noted here. The Communists
rode their theoretical horse; they were worried about
abandoning the Greenlanders to the mercy of ‘capital-
istic exploita tion’. The Single-Tax Party, Retsforbundet,
advocated an even more liberal economic policy but
was strongly opposed to the idea of transforming the
Greenlander into a Dane, as they put it. It agreed with
assisting the Greenlanders to obtain self-confidence
and freedom of action, but the final goal had to be that
they should have their own existence as a people inde-
pendent of Denmark. The same way of thinking was
evident in the criticism of Elin Appel of the Liberal Left
party. She was strongly against making Green landic
education a copy of its Danish counterpart. It would
degrade the Greenlandic language, and in the end
destroy the Greenlandic population and create a
 Danish one instead. Elin Appel belonged to one of the
leading families in the Danish Folk High School move-
ment, which in the nineteenth century on a national
romantic basis emphasised the value of the mother
tongue and belonging to a nation. In the second read-
ing she was accompanied by a fellow party member,
Jensen-Broby, who was uneasy about the speed in the
plan and the scheme to concentrate the population in
the larger settlements.291
Thus we see the opponents came from very dif-
ferent roots. The voices of Elin Appel and Jensen-
Broby were all that was left of the old cautious attitude
to Greenlandic society. The Extreme economic libe-
ralism of the ‘Retsforbundet’ had had certain advo-
cates in the public debate, but had failed against the
predominant ‘consideration for the Greenlanders’ nur-
tured in the Greenland administration and in the
majority of the political parties. The excessive nation-
alism of the ‘Retsforbundet’ on behalf of the Greenlan-
ders was in direct contrast to what the Greenlanders
themselves wanted. The axiomatic anti-capitalism of
the Communist Party did not have a hold in any Green-
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landic issue. Opponents were few and divided, and did
not press their opposition to a vote. Thus the bills were
carried with 93-95 votes in favour and 13-15 absten-
tions and none against.
Some other laws in the early 1950s also had their
origin in the commission’s report. The act on jurisdic-
tion of 1951 and the criminal code of 1954 both fol-
lowed the commission’s suggestions, resulting in the
distinction between Danish and Greenlandic law being
abolished. The new criminal code related to all mis-
deeds committed in Greenland regardless of the
offender’s nationality. The possibility remained of tak-
ing individuals on a short stay in Greenland to court in
Denmark, the obvious reason being that stray
strangers could thus be punished more severely than
was possible under the Greenlandic criminal code.
This code was remarkable in not having a definite pun-
ishment for a definite offence. Instead it aimed at
keeping the offender from further crime, and the
court’s sanction should be individually adapted to
each person. In this the criminal code had a strong ele-
ment of the traditional Greenlandic way of dealing
with offenders. Both laws were unanimously carried.
The abolition of Greenland’s 
colonial status
Whether Greenland was in fact a colony is a matter of
definition. Greenland had become connected to Nor-
way and later Denmark in the Middle Ages, and in the
Danish perception had the same status as Iceland and
the Faroes, which followed the same path into the
Danish realm. No one ever called Iceland and the
Faroes colonies. But as the Norse settlements in Green-
land died out around 1500, and when traffic resumed
in 1721 only native Eskimos were found there, Green-
land was never governed in the same way as the other
North Atlantic dependencies, but in the typical colo-
nial way with the trading company in charge in the
first period and from 1774 directly under the state with
a local governor in charge. In the middle of the 19th
century, the Faroes were represented in the Danish
parliament on an equal basis with the population in
mainland Denmark, but the Icelanders rejected such
an arrangement and began their long struggle for
independence which they finally obtained in 1918
under the Danish king becoming in 1944 an inde-
pendent republic.
In Greenland nothing of the kind happened: the
rule of the state company continued, and it became
common to refer to the country as a Danish colony like
those in the West Indies. By the end of the Second
World War its colonial status was obvious to contem -
poraries. The Danish parliament enacted laws for
Greenland with no Greenlandic representation in Par-
liament; the Greenlandic population were Danish sub-
jects but were subject to the native Greenlandic juris-
diction while in Greenland; and the Danish constitu-
tion did not cover Greenland. Further clarification was
made when Denmark in 1947 reported Greenland to
the United Nations as a ‘non-self-governing territory’,
which placed it alongside the seventy-four other terri-
tories reported by Britain, France and others. These
were commonly referred to as colonies.
The highly critical tone in the United Nations
towards the colonial powers quickly convinced the
participating Danes that their country had got into bad
company. The same year (1947) they began to prepare
their political system for having Greenland repre-
sented in Parliament so ‘Greenland could have its status
as colony advanced into being an integral part of Den-
mark.’292
The Danish political parties accepted this idea
early in 1948. The provincial council’s rejection of the
offer of representation in the Danish Parliament later
in that year has already been mentioned, but the
Danes did not rest, and in the Greenland Commission
the idea of Greenlandic representation was aired
again. It was recommended that the question be trans-
ferred to the sitting commission on the constitution to
guarantee that the new constitution would make the
integration of Greenland possible.293 This was reported
in 1949 to the provincial council which agreed that this
opportunity should be considered in the coming new
Danish constitution.294
So far it had been the Danes who kept the question
open and the Greenlanders who had hesitantly con-
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ceded the possibility of being represented in Parlia-
ment later. The question was now transferred to the
commission on the constitution. Then it was opened
politically again, and this time by the Greenlanders. A
member of the newly-elected provincial council, Augo
Lynge, who since 1945 had been a staunch advocate of
full integration of Greenland into Denmark, raised the
question. His speech ended: ‘Greenland is a part of Den-
mark and wants to be so for ever. Greenland and its pop-
ulation should have fully equal rights with other Danish
citizens. Therefore we must uphold the desire to have
Greenlandic representation in Parliament. The Green-
landic representatives must have the opportunity to
speak directly in Parliament on behalf of the Greenlandic
population in the same way as the Faroese do. This is in
order to have a direct influence over the laws concerning
Greenland, not least the financial ones.295
The other members of the provincial council did
not comment on this part of the speech, and Augo
Lynge later admitted that it was his personal
 opinion.296 Nevertheless, the Danes seized the oppor-
tunity and asked the sitting commission on the consti-
tution to see to it that the new document would place
Greenland on an equal footing with representation in
Parliament since this was the wish of the Greenlandic
members of the Permanent Greenland Committee. In
1952 a draft of the relevant section of the new constitu-
tion was discussed in the provincial council. It stated
briefly: ‘This constitution is valid for all parts of the
 Danish realm. In consequence Greenland shall be repre-
sented in Parliament.’ Augo Lynge opened the debate,
and said among other things: ‘When we look around
the world we see colonial wars in many places where the
natives fight for liberation from the mother country.
They do so because they deem it best for them. But here in
Greenland we want to do the opposite. We want to use
our right to self-determination to bind Greenland solidly
to the mother country.’ The next day, 9 September 1952,
the Provincial council solemnly declared its support
for the draft.297
This solved the problem for the Danish govern-
ment, which had wanted acceptance from the Green -
landers. Before the referendum was taken in Den-
mark, the relevant section 1 was further reduced to:
‘this constitution is valid for all parts of the Danish
realm’. The Greenlandic representation was stated in
section 28 as being two members.
The referendum in Denmark on the constitution
act of 1953 was taken on 28 May and 77.5 % voted in
favour. However, for Danes the Greenland issue was
not the pivotal one. More important were the abolition
of the two-chamber system in Parliament, leaving the
single chamber ‘Folketinget’ and the simultaneous
change in the law of royal succession so that a daugh-
ter could succeed to throne if there were no sons, as
was the case in 1953. The king, Frederik IX, was
extremely popular and had three daughters, whom the
Danes wanted to succeed him rather than his brother
and his family. The eldest daughter, Margrethe, suc-
ceeded in 1972.
No referendum was taken in Greenland. To a later
generation this seems strange, but contempo raries
found it unnecessary since Greenland had not wished
for a referendum. This point was criticised in the
United Nations in 1954. In its special committee on
colonial matters, questions were raised as to whether
the provincial council had been authorised by the elec-
torate to opt for integration into Denmark. At this
point the two Green landic members of the Danish del-
egation (also members of the Danish Parliament),
Augo and Frederik Lynge, took the floor and declared
that the integration had been in full compliance with
the wishes of the Greenlandic population.298 No one
challenged the missing referendum after that.
Technically the issue in the United Nations was
the pronouncement by Denmark that it would cease
reporting to the UN about Greenland, because the new
constitution had integrated Greenland into Denmark
on an equal footing. A resolution recognising this fact
was carried in the General Assembly by 45 votes in
favour (even including the Soviet Union), 1 against
(Belgium which would not recognise UN’s authority in
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such matters), and 11 abstentions. Three member
states were not present.299The whole operation had
succeeded. Denmark was no longer a colonial power.
The 1950 reform caused a major reconstruction of
Greenlandic society. The colonial period was over and
a new era in which Greenland would be on an equal
footing with the rest of the realm was about to begin.
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The Danish effort to improve almost all aspects of
Greenland’s society characterised its history in the
years following the 1950-reform. Under the headings
of equalisation and good-bye to the colonial period
Greenland would both formally and in fact be brought
up to Denmark’s level with the same economic system,
the same civil rights, and the same standard of living.
This would be done by a short powerful effort. If
colonisation means to create an area abroad in the
image of the mother country, it is an irony of history
that the effort to end colonial status by means of inte-
gration with Denmark meant the introduction of all
things Danish on an unprecedented scale. Never in the
past had so much Danish been introduced in so short
time.
In contrast to some other examples of coloniza-
tion, this was not meant to create opportunities for the
population of the mother country but to improve the
life of the colonial population. It is in this aim that the
programme’s success has been judged in both Den-
mark and Greenland. As mentioned before, the pro-
gramme was similar to the colonial development pro-
grammes of France and Great Britain, and some of the
motives were similar: to keep colonial peoples loyal to
the mother country. In its economic aspects it differed
from the British and French programmes. It was not
aimed at making the colony economically valuable for
the mother country. Private enterprise of the mother
country could participate only if it served the overall
objective: to teach the Greenlanders to operate private
enterprise, as I have argued above.
The impact of the programme on Greenlandic
society can be analysed from every aspect in life: from
the measurable changes in the material development
to the Greenlanders’ evaluation of this development,
and their reaction to it. Many analyses have been
done, but more are needed to permit the writing of a
satisfactory history of Greenland in these years. There
is, for example, no thorough analysis of the role of the
provincial council and the activity of the Greenlandic
members of Parliament. What follows is not a defini-
tive history, but seeks only to provide a broad outline.
The legislation on economic activity was very
much as suggested by the commission.
The Royal Greenland Trade Department was sepa-
rated from the civil administration and got its own
board representing the provincial council, the Perma-
nent Greenland Committee of Parliament, the Green-
land Administration in Copenhagen, the Treasury, and
some Danish business organizations. The task of the
RGTD was now to ‘secure the supply to Greenland of all
goods and equipment for economic activity, and – possi-
bly in cooperation with private enterprise – to buy,
process, and export the Greenlandic produce’. The right
to engage in economic activity in Greenland was
restricted ‘to Danish citizens living in Greenland, and by
special permit from the prime minister to other Danish
citizens as well.’ Everybody producing in Greenland
was allowed to export their products either through
the central sale organisation, which was RGTD, or if
not to pay duties to it. Greenlandic funds, which hith-
erto had been raised by a levy on goods purchase from
the Greenlanders, were now generated by a duty on
the import of sugar, spirits, wine, and tobacco. The
provincial council was to fund the municipalities out
of this money. The new system greatly increased
Greenlandic public funds. In 1948/49-1950/51 the pre-
vious system had produced Dkr. 432,000 while the
import duties in 1951/52 yielded Dkr. 4.3 million, and
in 1957/58 had grown to Dkr. 5.8 million. On top of this
the Danish Parliament voted yearly ever-increasing
sums for investments and costs in Greenland. The level
was about Dkr. 20 million in 1948 which had grown to
Dkr. 100 million in 1958.300
The act increased the power of the provincial
council. A single provincial council, directly elected,
gained increased political authority. Its decisions no
longer required approval from Denmark but came into
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effect at once, unless the governor had reasons to
question their legality. In the interim before the new
constitution gave Greenland two representatives in
Parliament, the provincial council was authorized to
appoint two members to participate in the meetings of
the Permanent Greenland Committee in Parliament.
However, while the new provincial council had greater
power locally than the old one, it was by no means a
nascent parliament on the road to autonomy. It
remained an advisory council. The government was
obliged to hear the advice of the provincial council in
all legislation exclusively concerning Greenland
before parliament made it law. In other legislation of
special relevance to Greenland the Provincial council
should be heard before the law was introduced in
Greenland. Its status was comparable to that of a
County Council in Denmark in some respects with
greater power and in other respects with lesser power.
For example it had no right of taxation. It had been
given more money, but as shown above the decision on
funding Greenland was made in the Danish parlia-
ment. And that was exactly the idea: to make Green-
land as similar to a normal part of Denmark as pos-
sible. The Greenlanders’ political emancipation con-
sisted in having an equal part in legislation on Green-
land and Denmark like any other citizen in the realm.
The existing 66 municipalities in West Greenland
were reduced to 16 roughly corresponding to the colo-
nial districts. They took over local administration of
civil society and were furnished with a civil servant as
accountant and head of administration. Their tasks
were expanded to take care of infra structure such as
roads and bridges. Social welfare was still a major
task, but they were no longer involved in the judicial
system.
Other aspects of life were regulated with new
laws. In 1954 divorce became possible for all citizens in
Greenland. Likewise, the inheritance law of 1958
applied to all in Greenland, be it Dane or Greenlander.
The Labour Market
The Greenlandic labour force outside fishing and
hunting was almost exclusively employed by the state
in 1950, either as civil servants in the administration
and in school and church or in the Royal Greenland
Trade Department. A very few served whole or part
time as servants in private homes. In 1943 the Green-
landic civil servants established a union (Bestillings-
mandsforening) in Nuuk and the idea spread to all set-
tlements along the coast by 1952. Ships’ crews had
started a union in 1951 (Den grønlandske Sømands-
forening), and in 1952 the unskilled workers in Nuuk
established an association to protect their interests. No
union had achieved collective bargaining rights.
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Fig. 19. The first Greenland representa-
tives in Parliament have taken their
seats in 1954. To the left you see
Frederik Lynge (1889-1957) who
served as a manager in the Greenland
Trade Department and was an influen-
tial representative for the northern
constituency 1953-1957. To the right
is seen Augo Lynge (1899-1959) who
was a teacher at the teacher training
college in Nuuk and the most promi-
nent spokesman for new reforms after
the war. He represented the southern
constituency 1953-1959 when he
unfortunately perished at the ship-
wreck of MS ‘Hans Hedtoft’ in January
1959. Frederik was a cousin of Augo’s
father. Photo Arctic Institute.
The great Greenland Commission saw this as a
problem because if private enterprise was to operate in
Greenland there should be somebody to look after the
interests of the employees. The commission wanted to
encourage the establishment of trades unions capable
of collective bargaining as in Denmark.
The Danish T.U.C. (in Danish L.O.) was asked by
the ministry to help establish real trade unions in
Greenland. They started in 1952 by educating the exist-
ing associations in Greenland how to negotiate and to
run a proper union. In the mean time the Danish
T.U.C. got a mandate from their Greenlandic col-
leagues to negotiate their wages in Copenhagen. By
1956 the education had been so successful that the
Greenland Labour Association (Grønlands Arbejder-
sammenslutning) was established covering all workers
on land and sea. The Danish T.U.C. continued to give
advice on collective bargaining in Greenland until
1973.
This transfer of an institution developed in a more
modern industrial society to a less developed colonial
area depicts very well what was going on in Greenland
in those years. An organised labour market was not
established to answer problems in Greenlandic society,
but to create the conditions for a new Greenlandic
society with an economy based primarily on private
enterprise.
Health care
The need for a greater effort was clearly recognised in
1950 and the necessary legislation passed. All that
remained was to fund and construct. A serious effort
was indeed made. The planned twenty-six physicians
were in post in 1957, and the planned thirty-seven
nurses in 1958. On top of that seven physicians and
forty nurses were allocated to the battle against tuber-
culosis. By 1958 there were 685 hospitals beds out of
the planned 762 beds.
The investments in health care seem to have paid
off.
Table 20 shows remarkable improvement, but
there was still some way to go before mortality was
down to Danish levels. The apparent lower overall mor-
tality in Greenland in 1960 was entirely due to the rela-
tive larger number of younger Greenlanders. Mortality
by age groups was in all cases higher in Greenland.
While mortality fell, fertility rose. The birth –
death surplus was in 1950 1.6 % and in 1958 3.73 %. In
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Fig. 20. The most vigorous effort was done in the health sector. The picture shows a patient being brought by helicopter to Søn-
dre Strømfjord Airport to be transferred to Denmark for further treatment. Photo Arctic Institute.
Denmark it was 0.73%. A demographic transition well-
known in developing countries also took place in
Greenland in those years.
Education
The expansion of schools in Greenland was a major
part of the reform programme. The plan was to estab-
lish at least three new bilingual schools, to build some
twenty houses for schoolteachers, and to find about 50
teachers educated in Denmark to provide the staff.
The teacher training college in Nuuk and the three
 junior schools should be expanded. The result after
eight years is shown in table 21.
The 79 more teachers with a Danish education
must mostly be Danes, because only nine of the
twenty-two Greenlanders educated at a teacher train-
ing college in Denmark had returned to Greenland
before 1960.301 The great influx of Danish teachers was
firstly a question of having enough teachers, and
 secondly a question of improving the quality of the
teaching in Danish. The aim of making all Greenlandic
children bilingual was very ambitious, and by 1961 a
report concluded that it was unlikely to be achieved.302
To give Greenlandic pupils a proper training in
Danish some were sent to Denmark to attend Danish
schools. This started in 1961, and by 1980 when the
scheme ended about ten thousand Greenlandic chil-
dren had spent up to a year in Denmark. Equal num-
bers had shorter trips in their summer vacation com-
bined with a few weeks’ school attendance. The costs
were in the main covered by the Danish Ministry of
Education. The ambitious goal to make all Green-
landic children bilingual was not achieved, but most
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Fig. 21. Education had a high priority in
the reform period after World War II.
Here is class in a new school in Kuum-
miut, a settlement in East Greenland,
1961. Photo Jette Bang/Arctic Insti-
tute.
Table 20. Mortality 1950 and 1960 (Beretninger 1951 and
1961)
Greenland Denmark
1950 1960 1960
Per cent death by tuberculosis 
of all deaths 32.20 5.00 < 0.5
Mortality per 1000 inhabitants 25.00 8.30 9.50
Infant mortality < 1 year per 
100 life births 15.00 6.80 2.20
participants later judged their stay in Denmark as ben-
eficial to their knowledge of Danish and to their later
career.303
Housing
Much had been achieved in education reform, and in
housing too, there was significant progress. By 1963
2,950 houses had been built out of the planned 6,000
houses over twenty years.304 In general the develop-
ment plan aimed to strengthen the social infrastruc-
ture as can be seen by the way government investment
was distributed (table 22).
In addition the government lent Dkr. 67 million to
finance the Greenlanders’ houses and Dkr. 17 million
for Greenlandic business in the period 1950-1961.305
This actual building was in the main carried
through by Danish workers and artisans, because the
Greenlanders were expected to continue as primary
producers or to run the new machinery when they had
had a suitable training.
Primary production
Primary production did quite well in those years as
shown in table 23.
As in earlier periods production fluctuated from
year to year. Blubber and seal oil remained fairly static
while seal hides doubled. This suggests that the hunter
families kept fewer hides than before for their own
use. Sheep farming suffered a catastrophe in the win-
ter of 1948/49 when half of the sheep died, but re-
covered to a steady level of about 20,000 ewes in the
late 1950s. There after there were great variations. A
maximum was reached in 1966 with 45,000 sheep and
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Table 21. Development in education (Beretninger 1960: table
14).
1950 1958
Number of school children 4149 5092
Number of places with a school 124 108
Number of classrooms 176 228
Number of teachers in total 251 286
– with Danish education 26 105
– with Greenlandic education 98 92
– with other education 75 61
– with no education 52 28
Number of pupils in junior high schools 
(non compulsary for ages 14-15) 72 131
Number of pupils in ‘realskoler’ (non 
compulsary, mainly vocational, 
for ages 14-16 26 96
Number of students at 
Teacher Training College 9 12
Numbers attending Evening Schools 1797 4511
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Diagram 8. Mortality and Fertility in
Greenland (GSÅ).
a minimum in 1976 with 13,500.306 Sheep farming was
confined to the southern part of Greenland where
there are sufficient pastures but even here they are not
abundant. Another serious check on the number of
sheep is the length of the winters. A prolonged winter
will jeopardize the livestock with shortage of fodder,
and the following shorter summer will produce less
hay for the following winter’s fodder.
The fishery was expected to be the leading in-
dustry, and the fishermen indeed doubled their catch
in the period. And with rising prices the earnings of
the Greenlandic producers were five times higher in
1958 than in 1948. Good as this expansion in catches
was, it could have been better. In the international
waters in the Davis Strait just west of Greenland for-
eign fishing fleets took 8 to 14 times as much as the
Greenlanders.307
The introduction of modern fishery equipment
and fish processing in factories took place very slowly.
Despite the intent of Venø and Claus Sørensen in 1948
(see chapter five), very few Danish fishermen tried
their hand so the grand master plan of letting Danish
private enterprise take the lead in economic develop-
ment did not materialize. This possibility was foreseen
in the report of 1950 which suggested that if private
enterprise failed to build fishery factories, the state
should to do it.308 The reason why Danish capital did
not take this chance has not been researched. It seems
reasonable to assume that the Danish fishery did not
need new fishing areas, because the fishing in the
North Sea and the inner Danish waters was steadily
increasing in those years. Danish catches rose from 146
millions Kg in 1945 to 423 millions Kg in 1956 as the salt
water fishing fleet grew from 73,000 register tons in
1945 to 80,000 register tons in 1956.309 Another reason
for not operating in Greenland may be the cost, for
Danish fishermen in Greenland had to contribute to
the Greenlandic market fluctuation fund on top of nor-
mal expenses.
When Danish private capital did not build facto-
ries in Greenland, the RGTD took over. It was still part
of the plan to modernize the fishing industry by con-
centrating it on those harbours at the coast which did
not freeze in winter. Only in this way could the Green-
landers earn a decent living, and it would also help
concentrate the population at these places to the bene-
fit of better social services. So in 1957/58 the RGTD
started plans for establishing factories. A special law
authorizing the extra costs of Dkr. 57 million over
seven years was passed in May 1959. All Danish politi-
cal parties supported the noble intentions, but the
Conservative Party and the Liberal Left opposed state
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Table 22. Government investment in Greenland 1948/49 –
1958 (Beretninger 1960: table 32).
%
Health care 11.40
Schools, broadcasting, churches 7.00
Harbours, power stations, water supply, roads, etc. 24.20
Weather service 13.90
Cars, machines, cranes, ships and boats 13.40
Shops and storehouses 5.80
Factories 6.20
Houses for civil servants 12.50
Miscellaneous 5.60
Total value (million Dkr.) 300.690
Table 23. Primary production in Greenland 1945-1958 (G-50
Vol. 5, I: 78; Beretninger 1960: tables 17, 18, 23).
Mill kg. Blubber and Seal Female Sales to
Cod seal oil, hides sheep RGTD
tons (Mio Dkr.)
1945 12.3
1946 13.0
1947 14.9
1948 18.6 0.827 21.800 22.300 2.00
1949 17.1 0.704 20.100 10.900 2.30
1950 21.2 0.753 21.100 13.200 3.30
1951 18.2 0.822 23.100 14.000 3.20
1952 18.8 0.736 27.500 16.200 4.20
1953 20.4 0.886 33.100 18.900 5.40
1954 18.7 0.784 32.000 21.300 5.50
1955 21.0 1.062 28.200 20.800 7.40
1956 21.3 0.932 34.700 24.000 8.10
1957 25.2 0.727 37.900 17.300 9.10
1958 26.8 0.899 44.200 19.000 10.70
finance. It would be ‘state socialism’ they claimed. As
an alternative they suggested incentives to Danish pri-
vate capital to invest by relaxing the requirement to
have Greenlanders participating in management and
production and by reducing the dues to the Market
Fluctuation Fund. The government would not wait any
longer for private enterprise arguing that it had had its
chance, but did not show up. A majority in Parliament
backed the government.
This incident shows clearly that when Greenlandic
issues were discussed in the Danish political system, it
was in terms of the issues current in Denmark. Social-
ism and capitalism were certainly not an issue in
Greenland at that time.
The impact of the modernization
on Greenland
The impact of the development programme in Green-
land was immense. One consequence of the invest-
ments was an influx of money into the economy. The
distribution of income is shown in table 24.
The trend was clear. The income from primary
production had risen nine fold, but its proportion of
total income had declined. Public salary income just
soared upwards while the guest workers earned two-
thirds of the total income of the Greenlandic popula-
tion 1955 and eight-tenths in 1962. The proportion of
Danes in Greenland was eight to every hundred Green-
landers, and they were not all guest workers. Not all
this income was spent in Greenland. Danish guest
workers sent a great deal back to their families in Den-
mark, but some capital stayed. It was invested in retail
trade, services, and workshops. The result in 1960 is
shown in table 25.
Compared to the State sector the private sector
was tiny. In 1955 3,665 persons were occupied in hunt-
ing and fishing, and 3,381 persons in different enter-
prises in the state sector. The Dkr. 8.6 million income
from private retail trade in 1960 should be compared
with the Dkr. 56 million sales in the shops of the
RGTD.310 Furthermore, the private enterprises outside
fishing and hunting were largely Danish. The great
plan that Greenlanders would take over business in
Greenland operating as a private sector had scarcely
started so it was far from characteristic of Greenlandic
society as a whole.
The reaction in Greenland
The Greenlandic reaction to all this can be seen at two
levels, politically and more broadly in the population
as a whole. It seemed to the Danes that the Greenlan-
ders were not as happy as expected. Anxiety was aired
in the Danish press and in the provincial council.
Two main troubles seemed to be: 1) the Greenlan-
ders were spectators to the Danish development of the
society, 2) incorporation into the realm on an equal
footing seemed to be understood by the Greenlanders
to mean that they would have the same benefits as
Danes in Greenland especially in terms of salaries.
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Table 24. Distribution of income in Greenland by source (G-60:
20).
1947 1955 1962
Greenlandic products 
including subsistence 63.0% 54.2% 49.2%
Public salary 37.0% 40.6% 44.9% 
Private profits and salaries – 5.2% 5.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Dkr. (millions) 8.100 33.000 73.300
Guest workers (million Dkr.) – 20.700 60.400
Table 25. Private enterprise in Greenland 1960 excluding fish-
ery, hunting and farming (Boserup 1963: 376-401).
Greenlandic Danish owner Total
owner
Number of enterprises 110 66 176
Retail trade etc 86 30 116
Production, service 14 12 26
Workshops 10 24 34
Turnover (mill. Dkr.)
Retail trade etc (71 enterp.) 3.1 5.5 8.6
Production, service ? ? ?
Workshops 1.0 5.0 6.0
Employees
Retail trade etc (32 enterp.) 49 31 80
Production, service ? ? ?
Workshops 45 125 170
Another problem emerged. Articles in the Danish
press reported excessive drinking, violence and other
crimes. This alarmed the administration which in 1955
responded by setting up a committee to study the
impact of reforms on Greenlandic society. This Com-
mittee for Social Research in Greenland did examine a
number of issues in the next eight years.
The first task the Ministry of Greenland (estab-
lished 1955) gave the committee was to report on the
alcohol question. The sale of spirits to the natives had
formerly been prohibited but the law had been gradu-
ally relaxed into very elaborated system by which high
ranking Greenlanders could get permits to buy spirits
and beer. The rest of the population could not buy, but
could brew their own beer, called ‘immiaq’. The ingre-
dients for beer production, hop and mash, were ra -
tioned, also according to your position, but everybody
could buy some unless they were deprived of the right
due to their misbehaviour. This situation was felt as
discrimination by the ordinary Greenlander, and after
some relaxation of regulations 1952-1954, the sale of
alcohol was totally liberated from December 1954, and
everybody could buy all that they could afford.
The committee report was not unduly alarming.
Consumption of imported spirits rose by 57% 1954-
1959, but brewing of immiaq had decreased 47%. Thus
total consumption had decreased by 8%.311
A single jurisdiction for all in Greenland was
established in 1954 as mentioned above. The criminal
law contained a proviso that it should be revised in
1959/60 on the basis of a report on its operation. This
task was given to the Committee for Social Research in
Greenland, which did its research in 1958-60 and
reported in 1962.312 In the new Greenlandic Code 83
sections listed the various misdemeanours, while ten
sections suggested possible action by the courts. The
court’s task was to determine the appropriate response
to persuade the criminal to change his ways and be -
come a useful member of society. Lay judges with
sound knowledge of the offender and local society
manned the lowest courts. This model followed the
former practice of law towards the Greenlanders, and
was deemed most effective in small communities. It
was also in concurrence with modern trends in Danish
and European jurisprudence.
Since the new system had been operating for only
four years, the committee found little to change. About
a third of the sections had not yet been used. Never-
theless, the committee did suggest that sexual abuses
against members of your own gender should be men-
tioned explicitly as in the Danish criminal code to nar-
row the gap between the two criminal codes. Overall
the committee found that the law still was appropriate
and was administered to the satisfaction of the author-
ities involved.
Over the next decade the number of court cases
grew rapidly, but this may reflect better statistics or
better law enforcement rather than more crimes. On
the basis that more court cases suggest modernisation
of society, table 26 may show the different pace of
change in different parts of Greenland.
These statistics suggest that modernization was
most rapid in the capital Nuuk in the first period,
thereafter other townships in the area took over,
notably Paamiut and Maniitsoq.
The pace and unevenness of development in
Greenland can also be seen from the distribution of
lawsuits by kind. Criminal offences were quite stable
over the period in all parts of Greenland with 25 to
28% of the cases. Paternity cases had a declining pro-
portion, while modern cases about economic disputes
had a increasing, but uneven, proportion (see table
27).
In the first period paternity cases were evenly dis-
tributed at around 50%; the proportion fell every-
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Table 26. District Court Statistics, Greenland (Bentzon 1979,
Vol. II: 13). * Until 1964, the North comprised only
Uummannaq and Upernavik districts, thereafter also Thule,
Ammassalik and Ittoqqortoormiit.
Growth in court cases %
1952-1963 1964-1975
South 89.0 113.5
Nuuk 174.5 157.5
others 113.8 228.1
Centre total 136.4 193.2
Disko Bay 120.3 115.9
North * 11.3 91.2
Greenland 106.8 146.6
where, and most markedly in the South and Centre. In
contrast for other civil law suits, the old-fashioned
North was much behind in the first period. It increased
its proportion in the second, but not to the level of the
other districts, led by the modernized South and
 Centre.
Greenlandic society was certainly in the process of
change. This is demonstrated for example by divorce
arrangements. The custody of the children after a
divorce can be decided by agreement between the par-
ents or by the court. From 1955-1959 the children in 4
of 17 cases stayed with the father by agreement, and in
4 of the cases were given to the custody of the mother
by the ruling of the court. In two cases the court ruled
for custody to the father. This reflects the traditional
economy where a woman had little chance of sustain-
ing a family.313 15 years later, 1969-1972, this had
changed. Now children stayed with their mother in
two thirds of the cases by agreement as well as by the
court’s ruling. There were plenty of jobs for women so
they could take care of a family.314
The explicit reactions of the ordinary Greenlan-
ders to rapid modernization and the influx of many
Danes in construction work and administration are
difficult to discover. In numbers the Greenlanders
were still in a clear majority, but many more of them
came into contact with Danes at the workplace and in
the administration. Up to the reform of 1950 only a few
hundred Danes lived permanently in Greenland, all of
them in civil service or trade. By 1950 there were a
thousand Danes among 22,500 Greenlanders increas-
ing to 7,000 among 39,000 Greenlanders by 1970 (dia-
gram 9).
The two groups were supposed to have equal
rights in Greenland and in a lot of respects this was
true. In politics, law, and in the social services the
same rules applied to all. The great difference was in
wages. Firstly, Danish companies mostly sent out the
construction workers, and they had to pay them more
than in Denmark to persuade them to go. In addition,
they worked long hours at higher rates, so financially
it was really rewarding for them. Many a small fortune
was created and put into small business in Greenland
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Table 27. Distribution of law cases about paternity and other
civil cases, % (Bentzon 1979, Vol. II: 18f). * Until 1964, the
North comprised only Uummannaq and Upernavik districts,
thereafter also Thule, Ammassalik and Ittoqqortoormiit.
Paternity Other civil cases
1952-1960 1965-1975 1952-1960 1965-1975
South 49.2 16.9 19.5 48.3
Centre 43.1 17.1 19.9 54.8
Disko Bay 50.1 26.6 14.8 43.4
North * 45.2 29.6 7.3 29.0
Greenland 46.4 20.3 17.4 48.7
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Diagram 9. Population in Greenland by
origin (annual censuses).
or Denmark by these workers, especially by artisans.
Secondly, the Greenlanders in the civil service (about
70 persons) in Greenland had a reduction in their
salary of 20% in order to narrow the gap between their
income level and that of the hunters and fishermen. A
special group of Greenlandic civil servants in the lower
echelons (about 500 persons) were salaried close to
the wage level of ordinary workers.
The Greenlanders perceived this differential as
injustice. There is strong evidence that the Green-
landic conception of Greenland being placed on equal
footing in the realm meant that they should be paid
the same salaries as Danes in Greenland. This was
indeed the conclusion of another report by the Com-
mittee for Social Science Research in Greenland.315
The report looked into difficulties in cooperation
between Greenlanders and Danes in West Greenland.
A survey of group attitudes and self-perceptions re -
vealed interesting similarities and differences.316
In stereotypes the Greenlanders thought of them-
selves as kind, close-knit, primitive and progressive,
but also lacking morals, obedient to authority, lazy
and inefficient. Some respondents thought the Danes
were kind and efficient, but others thought them
unkind and dominant. The Danish respondents
thought of themselves as efficient, kind, and energetic,
but also dominant. They thought the Greenlanders
kind, trustworthy, close-knit and progressive, but also
irresponsible, inefficient, primitive and lazy.317
The survey concluded that ordinary Greenlanders
felt themselves ignored and disadvantaged. Moderni-
sation required qualifications, which the Greenlanders
were hardly educated to obtain. Rapid development
was needed so there was no time to wait for the Green-
landers to acquire the necessary qualifications.318 In
other words: the obstacle for rapid development in
Greenland was that the Greenlanders were too much
Greenlandic.
The political debate
The provincial council was the forum in which the
Greenlanders could debate the development plans and
make their voice heard. Its role has not yet been fully
researched, but there is a number of research theses
on specific issues.319
Greenlandic politicians in the provincial council
and elsewhere were also affected by modernization in
their ordinary lives. They had always belonged to the
top layer of Greenlandic society though this was domi-
nated by the incoming Danes. Between 1930 and 1958
the percentage of Greenlanders in leading positions
had dropped from 49 to 25 percent and from 95 to 75
percent in the lower ranks. Among the skilled workers
Greenlanders were only 28 percent in 1958 against 92
percent in 1930.320
The Greenland development programme was
essentially a Danish enterprise. The ministry with its
agencies in Denmark and Greenland planned and
arranged the work in Greenland. The summer con-
struction work was decided on by some top-level civil
servants in the closing months of the previous year.
The work in Greenland was done by the a new agency,
GTO (Greenland Technical Organisation) assisted by
Danish private companies and some local Green lan-
ders. Thus there was little left for the provincial coun-
cil to do. Of course, it was consulted about new laws
and their comments were always acted upon. The two
following case studies show the role of the provincial
council.
Faroese fishing in Greenlandic waters
This issue emerged in the 1920s and caused disagree-
ment between the provincial council and the Danish
government as described previously. The 1950 reform
opened the Greenlandic waters fishery to Danish citi-
zens living in Greenland and other Danish citizens
with a government permit with specified conditions.321
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The threat of vessels from Denmark and especially the
Faroe Islands was the worst nightmare of the Green-
landers, and they were not slow to react. The governor
made two announcements in the late summer of 1951
stating that the ‘foreign’ fishermen should as far as
possible avoid fishing in the customary Greenlandic
grounds close to inhabited areas. And they should con-
tact local authorities to ensure that Greenlandic inter-
ests were not injured.322
These announcements had been poorly communi-
cated to locals, and a barrage of complains was raised
in Greenland. In the provincial council Augo Lynge
protested vehemently. The Greenlanders opposed
opening up the whole area in principle to any fisher-
man in Denmark and the Faroe Islands at the discre-
tion of the Prime Minister. Instead they wanted some
selected Danish/Faroese fishing boats to teach the
Greenlanders modern fishery, but what had happened
was that 70 Faroese vessels had been allowed to fish
this year ignoring the Greenlanders and making no
contact with local authorities. Lynge suggested that
the provincial council should issue the fishing permits
and not the ministry. 323 Nearly all the members spoke
on similar lines. A sub committee was formed and
defined the coastal area in which the ‘foreign’ fisher-
men were required to obtain the local authorities’ per-
mission to fish, covering all waters north of Nordre
Strømfjord, and half the waters south of this point.324
In Copenhagen the reaction was taken quite seri-
ously. In the early spring of 1952 a new regulation was
issued which fully accepted the Greenlandic terms,
and later a Faroese delegation negotiated with the
Greenlandic municipal authorities to establish the
quite specific conditions for fishing in each of the
delineated areas.325
The concentration policy326
The main idea of the 1950-reform was to concentrate
the population in fewer places in order to maximise
the benefit of investment. The furthest north, Uper-
navik and Uummannaq, and the southern area round
Cape Farewell would be almost depopulated. Coercion
was out of the question, so the means to reach the goal
was to concentrate investment in places with a future
to attract people to places to be developed. There were
three sources of development funds.
 The central government building of harbours,
power plants, hospitals and other public build-
ings. This was determined in Copenhagen by a
small group of senior civil servants, in principle
by the minister.
 The allocation within the Royal Greenland Trade
Department of stores and production units. These
decisions were taken by the company based on
the needs of the economy. The board of RGTD
included representatives from the provincial
council.
 The housing loans and grants decided by the
provincial council out of its own funds. All three
bodies tried to manoeuvre to fulfil the aims of the
reform.
The provincial council in principle favoured concen-
tration. Moving around in search of better places to
hunt was familiar to Greenlanders, but two instances
of population relocation in the early 1950s brought
about heavy criticism in the provincial council. In 1952
Frederik Lynge condemned the fact that lack of public
investment could force people to move even if they
would rather stay.327 The cause of this criticism was the
latest steps in the relocation policy. 350 km north of
Upernavik a scattered group of settlements was
deemed too inhospitable to the population, and they
were offered new homes in the south. However, only
old people and others less fit to earn a living by hunt-
ing wished to move. Between 1954 and 1957 some 240
people did move from the north, but the new promised
heaven did not appear. Mostly unfit to work the incom-
ers became a liability in their new places as they had
been in their old ones.
The evacuation of Aappillattoq had long been
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foreseen, with apparent approval from the local popu-
lation and the council. But in 1950 the newly elected
provincial council member from the area thought oth-
erwise, and in 1952 persuaded the council to support a
continuation of the settlement. Copenhagen did not
comply until 1955 when the administration agreed to
housing loans and repair of the little harbour while the
whole district was further investigated. The Appillat-
toq issue was never raised again.328
In 1953 Frederik Lynge suggested a population
commission to consider the policy of relocation. The
provincial council agreed so as not to leave the overall
investments plans and dispositions of RGTD as the
only forces determining population movements. The
council especially stressed that the expanding sites
should be properly developed with work opportuni-
ties, houses, schools and hospitals before any major
immigration took place. The words of the resolution
were that: ‘the provincial council has decided to appoint
a commission with the task to submit recommendations
to the provincial council concerning the way in which the
concentration of the population which is already going
on in Greenland ought to be continued. The commission
is to throw light on which settlements are not considered
suitable for future habitation, taking into consideration
trade, economy, schooling, and traffic, and which settle-
ments are considered suitable for future habitation but
which, on the other hand, cannot be recommended for
development. Finally, the commission shall examine
which settlements are found appropriate as places for
settlements.’329(meaning to take more people)
The commission worked for 14 years reporting
annually to the provincial council. The bigger reports
came in 1957 and 1961, the last in 1967. Compared with
the attitude of the planning authorities in Copenhagen
which were less hesitant about concentrating invest-
ment the Population Commission wanted more places
developed, fewer abandoned, and the majority kept
steady that is: public support for repair, but no new
investments.
The doomed settlements could receive no public
support whatsoever, the bulk going to the developing
areas. The 1957-report made a clear distinction
between the northern part (Uummannaq and Uper-
navik) where the predominant business was hunting
and therefore not suited for population concentration,
and the southern part that was suitable.330
Meanwhile, concentration at the bigger settle-
ments was taking place on a purely individual and vol-
untary basis at such a pace that housing and other
facilities could not keep up. The yearly advice from the
provincial council to stop planned relocation was thus
easy for Copenhagen to accept. The problem was to
provide suitable places, not to get people to move
there.
The experience of the development plan in the
1950s ignited a new round of reform debate.
In August 1959 the issue was raised in the provin-
cial council. The priest, Erling Høegh of Qaqortoq, pro-
posed a statement to the Danish Parliament. It empha-
sized the strong Greenlandic wish that Parliament
became more aware of Greenland, to formulate a long
term goal for Greenland, and to make clear the will
and the capacity of the state to finance the further
development. Høegh suggested that the two special
agencies GTO and RGTD should be dissolved, and the
relationship between the Ministry of Greenland, the
provincial council and the Parliament should be sorted
out. The goal ought to be ‘administratively and politi-
cally to normalize the conditions in Greenland and
between Greenland and Denmark so that the position of
Greenland as a Danish county with equal rights – no
more no less – could be assured and be a reality in daily
life...’
The speech leading to the statement included a
strong commitment to private enterprise: ‘Competition
and real opportunities for the competent entrepreneur is
commonly recognised as a source of inspiration in the
West European kind of society’, he claimed. The speech
– but not the statement – also proposed the abolition
of the Ministry for Greenland, and until that could
happen, the civil servants in the ministry should be
relieved of their ‘half-political’ work as he put it.
Finally, the provincial council should not in misunder-
stood veneration for tradition block development.
Investment had to be concentrated.331
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Thus, Høegh’s speech supported the development
programme and demanded faster action. On the other
hand, he also felt that development was bypassing the
Greenlanders, especially the provincial council. This
interpretation accounts for the appeal to the Danish
politicians and the critical tone towards the civil ser-
vants.
The Provincial council members agreed with
Høegh that development should be furthered, and
that they should have more influence in decision
 making. Less strongly they supported the central state-
ment: normalisation – political and administra tive – so
Greenland could become a normal Danish county with
equal rights – no more and no less. Parliament was
asked to address the Greenlandic issues. Erling Høegh
was pleased.332
To conclude, the provincial council’s reaction to
development was thus to demand more equality, to
bring conditions in Greenland closer to those in Den-
mark – economically, administratively and politically.
Seemingly, the Greenlandic politicians believed the
problems in Greenland arose because the develop-
ment programme, rapid as is was, was nonetheless too
slow. Therefore the solution was – speeding up.
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The Greenland Committee of 1960
(G-60)
In August 1959 the provincial council had called for a
debate in Parliament. The government proposed, in
opening the session on 6 October 1959 that the issue be
taken to the Permanent Greenland Committee to con-
sider whether ‘these statements and the general de-
velopment in politics and economy should be con-
sidered in a committee or a commission’.333
In the Permanent Greenland Committee the Con-
servatives, the Liberal Left, the two Greenlandic MPs,
and the provincial council’s administrative committee,
which had also been invited, proposed a purely politi-
cal committee of members from the provincial council
and Parliament. But the minister (Kaj Lindberg), the
Social Democrats, the Radical Left and ‘Retsforbundet’
wanted the experts on the committee as well. The
 minister got his way, and with clear conscience I pre-
sume as the Greenlanders changed sides and agreed
with him.334
The minister originally proposed five Danish
politicians, five Greenlandic politicians, four civil ser-
vants, and one representative from private enter-
prise.335 To these were added another civil servant, and
a shared representative for the workers’ and the
 farmers’ cooperatives. The Greenlandic fishermen and
hunters, and the Greenlandic workers’ association got
a representative each. The Danish politicians were
unhappy with the large number of business represen-
tatives, but the minister explained that he had been
put under pressure. The two Greenlandic organisa-
tions had threatened to subvert the work of the com-
mittee if they were not represented.336
The real problems behind these manoeuvres
about the composition of the committee cannot be
found in the records. The attitude from the two Green-
landic organisations seems straightforward: when
Danish business was represented so should the Green-
landic. Their attitude was pure egalitarian policy,
although unusually forthright in the shape it took.
Eske Brun, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of
Greenland from 1955, later said that he did not want
any sort of new enquiries.337 He was remarkably silent
at the opening meetings of G-60. A single remark at
the meeting on 12 Nov. 1959 showed his disapproval:
he pointed out that ‘the statement from the provincial
council has nothing about a committee or commission. It
was first mentioned in the opening statement of the
prime minister.’
The committee’s terms of reference were an -
nounced on 18th February 1960: to consider the politi-
cal, economic, and administrative conditions in Green-
land, and thereafter to suggest policy alterations. In
particular the role of the provincial council in spend-
ing government grants should be examined together
with the political arrangement in North and East
Greenland. The committee was to evaluate the de-
velopment in production, and estimate the need for
investment in relation to the population growth. Fur-
thermore the committee should consider the merits of
public as against private enterprise, and the possibility
of allowing prices to be determined by costs. The gap
between the Danish and the Greenlandic wage
levels and the possibility of introducing taxes in
Greenland should also be considered. Finally, the com-
mittee should look into the possibilities of moving
some  decisions from the ministry of Greenland to
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other  ministries with others to be decided in Green-
land.338
This formidable list included all the problems
raised by the provincial council including its chairman
the governor in Greenland, P.H. Lundsteen, who had
added the population problem and the price problem,
and by Danish politicians. P.H. Lundsteen gave the Per-
manent Greenland Committee a briefing on 23 Octo-
ber 1959. The Committee of 1960 lasted 4 years, per-
haps because it was authorised to make interim re-
commendations which could be acted on at once. No
one questioned the fundamentals of the G-50 policy:
to develop Greenlandic business to generate sufficient
surplus to raise living conditions in Greenland closer
to Danish ones. Thus the committee continued along
the familiar path with the main emphasis on the prob-
lems in politics, administration, and economy.
One of the participants seems beforehand to have
lost his faith in the feasibility of the task on the given
premises as noted above: the permanent secretary
Eske Brun, the main figure behind the G-50 reform. At
the first meeting of the committee in May 1960 he sug-
gested dropping the idea of having the Greenlandic
wage level determined by productivity in Greenland.
Instead, the general Danish wage level should be used.
This would facilitate the introduction of taxes in
Greenland so that Greenland could finance education
and other public expenses. The Greenlanders them-
selves would then be responsible for social reforms.
The Danish government would be left to cover the
greater balance of trade deficit which would result.
This suggests that Brun had come to the conclusion
that the wage difference was intolerable and that one
fundamental of the 1950 settlement – a balanced
Greenlandic economy – should be sacrificed to achieve
another – an increased self respect and self govern-
ment for the Greenlanders.
However, the 1950 philosophy was stronger than
its father. The representatives from the Royal Green-
land Trade Department found this change particularly
hard to accept. To them the Danish wage level was
sheer madness, especially because it would mean post-
poning or even abandoning the introduction of private
enterprise in Greenland. They repeated the slogans
from the 1950-reform debate: that only a surplus in the
Greenlandic economy could end Greenlandic de-
pendence and subservience.339 Eske Brun resigned his
post when the commission’s work was done in 1964.
The development of the economy in the 1950s was
not very promising. Exports through RGTD had for
some years run a surplus of Dkr. 4.6 million which had
been paid to the market fluctuation fund, but in 1956
and after 1959 Dkr. 9.1 million had been paid out to
sustain prices to the producers. Private enterprise had
during the 10 years paid Dkr. 3.1 million. The overall
deficit of Dkr. 3.2 million was in reality a state subsidy
to production in Greenland.340
The newly completed programme on industrial
fish processing might remedy this situation so in the
end faith in the possibility of reaching the goal carried
the day. The report condemned the idea of sustaining
Greenlandic incomes by a permanent government
grant believing that the link between the Greenlan-
ders’ own efforts and their income was essential to
encourage initiative, enjoyment of work, and self
respect.341 This approach linked to the support of pri-
vate enterprise appealed particularly to the Conserva-
tives in the committee.
Questioning the initial bipartisan Greenland
 policy, which had emerged in the discussion of the
industrial program in 1959, was certainly still appar-
ent. The Conservative representative in the commit-
tee, Erik Ninn-Hansen, declared in a newspaper: ‘It is
our party’s intention to smash the socialistic system in
Greenland.’342 By that he meant the state-owned busi-
nesses like RGTD and GTO as well as the cooperatives.
He protested against giving the cooperative stores an
opportunity to take over the stores of the RGTD.343 The
majority in the committee did not share these views,
but hints can be seen in the report p. 137: ‘The commit-
tee did not want to engage in a discussion about princi-
ples involved in transferring the business of the state
agencies either to Greenlandic individuals or to coopera-
tives.’
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The discussions about specific economic issues
showed that much of the 1950 system remained, but
some lessons were learned from ten years’ experience.
Economic development in Greenland was still to
be based on her natural resources which would be
exploited more efficiently by increasing the produc-
tivity of the work force. The fishing season should be
lengthened to the whole year, and workers in the low
productivity settlements and in the northern towns of
Greenland should be induced to migrate to the towns
with open water harbours in the south which had a
labour shortage. This was exactly the same goal as in
1950, and the means proposed were also quite similar:
only to invest in the promising townships, and run
propaganda to convince the population of the better
opportunities in those towns.
The difference to 1950 was a readiness to invest
much more. For the five fish processing plants
(decided in 1959 to be built in Narsaq, Paamiut, Nuuk,
Maniitsoq, and Sisimiut) to work efficiently, 35 fishing
vessels of 100 tons or 14 trawlers of 450 tons were
needed. There were none in Greenland, and the com-
mittee proposed that the government should lead the
way by building five of the 100-ton vessels, later to be
transferred to the private sector. These might produce
200,000 tons of fish a year for processing. In those
years the Greenlanders only caught about 35,000 tons,
but foreign fishing fleets took between 200,000 and
500,000 tons a year in the Davis Strait, so there was
room for a certain amount of optimism. The risk of a
decline in the stock of cod was not overlooked, but it
was deemed small. The committee also proposed
 easier financing of fishing boats and expansion of the
services to fishing with more consultants, more ex-
perimental fishing, biology research and so on.344
All these suggestions were a continuation of the
1950-philosophy. But contrary to 1950 more attention
was paid to the traditional economy, seal hunting, per-
haps because the hunting districts (Uummannaq,
Upernavik, Thule, Scoresbysund, and Ammassalik)
had done quite well in the 1950s. The sale of hides had
doubled, and even the fishing had expanded. Another
reason was probably that the districts would be inhab-
ited for many years to come since the open water dis-
tricts were not yet developed to receive a major influx
of people. Moreover, the proposals to reduce popula-
tion in the hunting districts were very cautiously
phrased: From the township of Uummannaq ‘an emi-
gration should be supported’. From Upernavik ‘a certain
emigration could be foreseen’. From the Qaanaaq dis-
trict ‘a certain moving would be advisable.’ From Ittoq -
qortoormiit ‘Wishes for moving away should be sup-
ported’, and from Ammassalik ‘a certain emigration
was advisable.’ The committee recommended building
hunting huts in all these districts so that hunters could
utilise a greater area, and better financing of motor-
boats served the same purpose. Even salting houses
for fish storing were recommended despite the ques-
tionable financial viability because other occupation
possibilities were scarce. In addition some 400 new
homes out of 4,500 in the building program should be
placed in the hunting districts.345
Nature set its own limits for sheep farming. The
committee though it possible to expand the stock up to
60,000 if every suitable piece of land was exploited.
Thus sheep farming could never be big business.
Among the 196 herds in 1961 only 15-20 were big
enough to sustain a family. The committee thought
this figure could at best be expanded to 40-50 and the
rest had to be part time farming.346
The pre 1950 pricing system was to continue. The
supply monopoly of RGTD had in theory been can-
celled in 1950, but the possibility of monopoly contin-
ued in fact. The law (section 16) allowed authorisation
of importers for certain goods. When import duties
were introduced in 1952 the RGTD was authorised to
import goods liable to duties and the committee sug-
gested no alteration. However, the intended balance
between income and expenditure had not been
achieved. The rise in prices after 1950 did not cover
expenses. Subsidies continued on essential foodstuff
(bread, flour, and vegetables), fuel, and the most
important working tools. Greenlandic products were
sold in Greenland beneath their price on the world
market. The coalmine at Qullissat sold coal below cost,
and thereby further subsidised fuel in Greenland. The
construction industry, power plants, telephone ser-
vice, and the coastal traffic all operated at a loss. The
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reform of 1950 had aimed to end this economic system
of subsidies but failed. And the 1960 committee did
not suggest abolition of the system. It merely sug-
gested moderate price rises, but not enough to cover
costs.347
Why not? The reason was straightforward. The
incomes in Greenland were insufficient to pay market
prices. Charging cost prices for foodstuff would bring
the population to starvation – or below, and cost prices
for other goods would nullify any idea of making busi-
ness in Greenland sustainable. The subsidy system
showed the gap between Danish and Greenlandic
economy. Therefore, refuge was taken in the age old
policy: by manipulating prices and wages to secure a
steadily rising standard of living in Greenland unre-
lated to any economic rationale. Since the committee
proposed to continue subsidies it was endorsing the
traditional policy. Eventually the two economies might
reach the same level, but meantime in Greenland
there would be a lower standard of living than in Den-
mark, though it would have a substantial rise.
The Greenlandic members of the committee had
scarcely participated in the discussion about what the
Danes saw as problems. For Greenlanders profitability
and theoretical discussion of capitalism and socialism
were not the main issues. Their main concerns were
the role of the provincial council in policymaking, and
the question of equal pay. Equal pay was discussed in
the spring of 1961. Erling Høegh made Greenland’s
goal clear. Through the years, the main Greenlandic
dream was to have salaries equal to the Danes in
Greenland. When a Greenlander had proven his
 ability, he should be paid like the Danes and have their
fringe benefits like free housing, free supply of water
and fuel, sabbatical leave and so on.348
This wish was strongly felt. As mentioned above,
Eske Brun was inclined to support something of the
sort. It would be comparatively cheap to satisfy what
was a relatively small group of Greenlanders who were
working with the Danish authorities. A very few native
Greenlanders who had been educated in Denmark and
had then worked there for ten years were salaried as
the Danes. The criterion was home region, which for
them was counted as Denmark. The next top 66
Green landers enjoyed Danish salaries with a 25%
reduction, but including a Greenland bonus. Below
them some 700 Greenlanders enjoyed the same
salaries without bonus. These levels were significantly
above other Greenland salaries which were set with
some regard to Greenlandic productivity.349
These other Greenlanders numbered 6-7,000 per-
sons, and neither GAS nor the Danish TUC would
accept that a small group of highly paid Greenlanders
should get even more while the rest should remain on
the Greenlandic level. The workers’ representative,
Lars Svendsen was invited to address the provincial
council and spoke vehemently against introducing
Danish wage levels in Greenland so Greenland did not
become ‘one big subsidy economy’.350 He suggested in
the committee that wages in Greenland should be
based on GAS wage level. Shortage of manpower
should be overcome by negotiating a special bonus
regardless of the origin of the worker.351
At this point in the spring of 1961 the discussions
stalled. In the summer the economic expert, Mogens
Boserup presented his analysis of opportunities in
Greenland later published in 1963 as ‘Economic Policy
in Greenland’. Boserup had been working for the UN
since 1947 and most recently researched the economy
of India. He concluded that Greenland had a very good
chance to overcome the barriers, which normally pre-
vented rising standards of living in developing coun-
tries. The lack of natural resources was not a major
problem as the Greenlanders could expand their fish-
ing in the Davis Strait, and because the output from
this strait was only a small proportion of world pro-
duction, an increase would not flood the market and
depress prices. Finally, there was no problem with sup-
ply of capital as Denmark could easily finance the
investment.352 He further explained the differences in
wages for locals and outsiders in Greenland by noting
that falling export prices reduced Greenlandic wage
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levels, while rising wage levels in Denmark pushed the
guest workers’ salaries upwards.353
These were familiar points and, as in 1950, the
solution was investment to improve productivity. The
committee put all the proposals together into a ten-
year plan with Dkr. 2.1 billion for investment, and a
further Dkr. 2.1 billion for working expenses. The
investment was to be distributed between sectors as
shown in Table 28.
This was a substantial increase on the Dkr. 57 mil-
lion envisaged in the industrial plan of 1959. Boserup’s
analysis, however, had given grounds for optimism so
the investment was seen to be necessary to obtain the
goals as described in the committee’s report p. 26:
1. To expand employment
2. To continue concentrating the population on the
most suitable settlements
3. To improve business efficiency
4. To give high priority to education
5. To expand house-building
This programme can be seen as a means of increasing
production and thus reducing the wages differential,
but it did not offer an immediate solution. Boserup
recommended maintaining the principle of wages
based on productivity. Improvement of living stan-
dards should be obtained by a family allowance and
subsidising consumption rather than by raising wages
so that exports would not be hampered by increased
costs.
Greenlandic civil servants should no longer suffer
the percent reduction in salaries, while the Greenland
bonus to guest workers should be reduced to the value
of free lodging and fuel bonus and should be paid only
to those born outside Greenland.354 This change meant
replacing a discredited criterion of home region with
birthplace, which was later also discredited. To make
the birthplace criterion more acceptable it was pre-
sented in the report as a suggestion from the Green-
landic committee members.355
To secure agreement between the Greenlandic
parties the final settlement proposed a ten percent
reduction in the Danish wage scale for Greenlandic
civil servants and an increase in GAS wages of ten per-
cent. Taken together with the family allowance every-
body got a 20-25 percent increase, but without any nar-
rowing of the gap between the wages of the Greenlan-
ders. This result was defended in the report by refer-
ence to expected economic growth from the expanded
investment. The Danish ideological belief that wages
should be related to productivity was thus upheld.356
Besides a rise in salaries the provincial council had
also asked for ‘political and administrative normalisa-
tion’. This was much more difficult to achieve. One the
one hand the provincial council had more rights than
any other local assembly in the realm by having the
right to be consulted on legislation and the right to
propose legislation. On the other hand it had less to
administer than a normal Danish county council, be -
cause the huge state financed operations were admin-
istered by the central government. This system was to
continue. In addition the provincial council was
offered greater influence on Greenland policy in gen-
eral. A new agency in Copenhagen, the Greenland
Council (Grønlandsrådet) with five Greenlandic and
five Danish politicians as members should plan and
coordinate Greenland policy. The two Greenlandic
members of Parliament were to be ex officio members,
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Table 28. Investment plans for Greenland 1966-1975 (G-60:
198f).
Million Dkr. %
Export trade 125 6.7
Fishing vessels 135 7.2
Education 160 8.5
Other public institutions 170 9.1
Construction of houses 585 31.1
Public plants 220 11.8
Preliminary works for development 100 5.3
Communication and transport 167 8.9
Supply service e.a. 210 11.2
Subtotal 1,872 100.0
Reserves 228
Total 2,100
and the provincial council would appoint three others.
The five largest Danish parties appointed one member
each, and the King would appoint the chairman. A sec-
retariat under the minister for Greenland would serv-
ice the new council. Its key role can be seen in its terms
of reference:
 To prepare analyses and forecasts of growth in
population, the economy, the need for houses,
the need for education, and health care and other
such matters.
 To prepare long term investment programmes,
supervise day to day building programmes, and
evaluate specific proposals for investment.
 To deal with ongoing business problems.
 To review wage development against planned
growth.
 To survey whether new laws were in harmony
with each other and came in the right sequence
and speed.
 To review the extent to which the plans were
implemented and to assess their outcomes.
Other committees with similar tasks were to be abol-
ished. The Permanent Greenland Committee in exis-
tence since 1925 and the price and wage committee,
establish in 1951, ceased. The new council took respon-
sibility for social research in Greenland. The existing
Committee for Social Science Research in Greenland
was not formally disbanded, but appears to have
ceased to meet.357
In the Greenland Committee of 1960 there were
different opinions about the proposed Greenland
Council. Some of the politicians wanted it to be a
purely political organ with administration, while the
permanent secretary, Eske Brun, warned against strip-
ping the Ministry of Greenland of its planning and
coordination rôles. Nevertheless, the Greenland Coun-
cil was established by act of 4 July 1964.358 Whether the
council in fact acted as its supporters hoped or its
opponents feared has not been researched.
Greenlandic municipalities had previously got all
their finance from the provincial council at its discre-
tion out of the funds raised by import duties. In future
they were to have a fixed proportion of those funds in
order to plan for a longer period. So far, no taxes were
levied in Greenland; the committee discussed the
 matter but decided the time was not ripe for such ex -
periments.359
The Greenland Committee of 1960 was em-
powered to make interim proposals which could be
acted on before its final report. Thus Qaanaaq and East
Greenland were enabled to elect members to the
provincial council by act of 26 April 1961, and the
municipal arrangements and legal system in West
Greenland were extended to cover those two other
areas as well. In 1959 the provincial council had also
wished that responsibilities should be transferred
from the Ministry of Greenland to other ministries.
This was also done in part. The fishery surveillance,
inspection and registration of ships, the lighthouse
agency and meteorological service had already been
transferred to the corresponding Danish agencies,360
and the committee went further to suggest the transfer
of the police (1965), telex service (1967), church mat-
ters (1966), health service (1968), and education
(1970). The two biggest agencies, RGTD and GTO,
were retained but more Greenlandic politicians were
put onto the steering board.361
Finally, from 1966/67 the provincial council was
empowered to elect its own chairman and set up a sec-
retariat; all these changes represented moves towards
making the arrangements in Greenland the same as
those in Denmark itself, but it was far from the ‘nor-
malisation’ asked for in 1959.
The report proposed much greater effort but
retained the basic philosophy of 1950. Bearing later
developments in mind, you might ask why. Several fac-
tor were at play. Firstly, the Greenlandic politicians
wanted no change from the course chosen in 1950. The
various potential problems did not seem insurmount-
able. Secondly, attitudes in Denmark supported a
greater effort. The Danes themselves had experienced
improved welfare provision and the problem of under-
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developed countries was recognised world-wide. In
the competition for the political loyalty of newly inde-
pendent states of the former colonial empires the rich
western world had admitted that poverty, colonialism
and racial discrimination were problems to be dealt
with. The great influx of newly independent countries
into the UN took place in the early 1960s bringing with
it concern for underdevelopment which preoccupied
the organisation as it came to have a majority of vari-
ous formerly dependent territories. The 1960s was
simply proclaimed as the decade of development.
Appeals were made to guilty consciences in the rich
part of the world to help the part that was poor. It
would be natural for Danes to look at Greenland in this
context. Greenlanders in general were without ques-
tion poorer than people in Denmark, and Greenland
was supposed to be an equal part of the realm. Obvi-
ously, Denmark had a clear duty to help.
It was no wonder in this context that the large
grants to Greenland met no political objection in Den-
mark. And it may also explain why the Danish public
criticised the 1960 reforms when they did not achieve
the goal of equalisation. The criterion of birthplace to
justify salary differences was such an issue. The press
attacked it as race discrimination, and in practice it
was often disregarded. But it was not abolished. It had
a solid foothold in Greenlandic society with its gap
between wages for guest workers and the local work
force. As late as 1970 the provincial council regretted
that ‘ it has been impossible to find another criterion bet-
ter suited to do justice to everybody’.362
Greenlandic reaction in public
The educated Greenlanders’ reaction was fierce meas-
ured by Greenlandic standards. A political party was
established: the Inuit Party.363 Behind the party stood a
group of ‘young’ (they were in their 30s) Greenlan-
ders, the editor of the A/G Jørgen Fleischer, assistant
biologist Jens Kreutzmann and journalist Ulrik Rosing.
According to its programme there must be equality
grounded on mutual respect and trust. Therefore, all
fringe benefits for guest workers should be abolished.
The Danish social welfare system should be intro-
duced paid for from Greenlandic funds, but reim-
bursed from Denmark. The party also favoured more
support for private enterprise. Among its supporters
was not surprisingly a pair of Danish retail dealers in
Greenland, Kaj Narup in Nuuk and Anders Hove in
Aasiaat. In 1967 Kaj Narup won a seat in the provincial
council for the party, in 1969 he was replaced by Peter
Nielsen a Greenlander, but the seat was lost in 1971.
The party also stood for Parliament, but failed. In
1964 Peter Nielsen got 26.2% in the northern con-
stituency while Ulrik Rosing got a respectable poll of
33.5% in the southern constituency. Ulrik Rosing tried
again in 1966 in the same constituency wining 20.5%
of the votes and in the next election Jonathan Motz -
feldt nearly made it with 47.4% of the valid votes in the
southern constituency.364
The first chairman of the party, Jørgen Fleischer,
has explained its policy to a broader audience. The
main issue was certainly equal salaries. He warned
that the differentiation between employees in Green-
land by unequal salaries was the greatest threat to
continued ties with Denmark because demands for
political independence would come next. The Green-
lander should not be a second class Danish citizen. The
quest for complete integration was thus still evident.
In addition some hints of the later Siumut policy can
be found in the statement: ‘The Inuit Party hold it
important that the Greenlander does not lose his
national consciousness. Only by recognising its own ori-
gin and cultural heritage can the Greenlandic youth
stand firm and meet the Dane as equal without inferior-
ity complexes.’365
The seeming paradox between these two ideas can
perhaps be solved by imagining a line of thought
which would protect the national characteristics of the
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Greenlanders, without accepting that this may mean
any unequal treatment. The idea of Greenland as an
economic unit separate from Denmark was also con-
sistently rejected. In this policy the Inuit party had fol-
lowers all over Greenland, because it concerned more
than just the wage issue.
Guldborg Chemnitz had very convincingly argued
that point in 1964.366 She was born in a small settle-
ment, moved to Nuuk, and later to Denmark and was
educated as an interpreter. In her article she described
the enormous pressure on the Greenlandic children
and youth to be educated as well as the Danes. Then
they would be as successful as the Danes with: ‘finer
clothes, more extravagant houses, and much more
money’ (p. 18). During her education in Denmark she
incorporated much of the Danish way of life into her
character, both as a result of intentional learning and
as a response to an environment she really liked. The
end result of this development she described: ‘In a way
I have more and more striven to be both a Greenlander
and a Dane, to unite them in my personality, and simply
be a human being who is fond of the Greenlandic and the
Danish things in life.’ (p. 26)
She recognised this situation as full of conflicts,
both in personal terms when moving from one envi-
ronment to the other, and also in being fully accepted
by each environment as one of its own. She had a feel-
ing of not living in either of the two, but between
them. Her positive reaction was to conceive herself as
a link between Greenlanders and Danes (p. 29). It was
the only way to cope with her personal life: ‘I myself am
so much Greenlandic and Danish that it has become a
necessity for me to unite these two ways of life and
expression. Each time I have sensed a rapprochement
between Greenlanders and Danes I felt harmony inside,
on the other hand, when I have felt distance, tension or
conflict I felt my personality split’ (p. 32).
Erling Høegh obviously spoke for others when in
1959 he demanded normalisation. When the result of
the discussion about wages in G-60, to continue dis-
crimination in wages on the birthplace criterion,
became known it was a shock to Guldborg Chemnitz.
She could not believe it, and expected parliament to
block the suggestion. She could not understand or
accept the premises. Over several pages she argued
against it, and concludes: ‘I conceived the extension of
the Danish constitution to Greenland as a Danish prom-
ise of our equal status with the Danes in the realm.’ ... ‘As
Greenlanders we have more or less consciously striven for
a real integration in Denmark expecting to be fully
accepted as Danes even if we could in some way or
another be different ... but now it seems as if the Danes
say stop, you are about to go too far. You are not Danes,
but Greenlanders. You belong to your own country and
your own society. Then I realised that we may not be
meant to be real Danes, to be really accepted as we hoped
for’ (p. 60).
In my view Guldborg Chemnitz expressed sorrow
rather than bitterness in her article. How many felt like
her? We cannot know, but she was not the only one.
The same basic line of thought is found in Knud
Hertling’s 1977 book: ‘Greenlandic Paradoxes’. This
reaction might perhaps affect only the Danish-edu-
cated Greenlanders, but those were exactly the layer
from which Greenlandic politicians were recruited. If
this group shared Guldborg Chemnitz’s evaluation in
some degree, her personal testimony provides a signif-
icant explanation of future Greenlandic politics.
There was some overlap in ideas and policies
between the Inuit Party and the newly established
Council of Young Greenlanders in Denmark, as Jona -
than Motzfeldt was a leading figure in this new organ-
isation. The objection to the birthplace criterion was
identical. The council organised a demonstra tion
against it in Copenhagen in the spring of 1964, draw-
ing much attention from the press. In the Greenlandic
towns of Maniitsoq, Nuuk, and Paamiut there were
demonstrations against the new law. In the newspaper
Information Jonathan Motzfeldt explained: ‘the birth-
place criterion is a ‘ Star of Zion’ (a grim allusion to Nazi
persecutions). It must be erased before we can talk
together as citizens with equal rights in the same
realm.’367
The Council of Young Greenlanders was not the
only organisation for Greenlanders in Denmark. The
organisation: ‘Pêqatîgît Kalâdtlit’ (the assembly of
Greenlanders) founded in 1939 looked after their
interests in Denmark, and commented on Greenlandic
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issues, but its attitude to the wage question has not
been re searched. It was dissolved in 1978.368
The birthplace criterion was as we have seen only
relevant to a small group of Greenlanders. For fisher-
men, hunters, and sheep farmers it had no bearing.
One sheep farmer wrote in the newspaper AG ‘I wonder
if the Inuit Party is nothing more than an organisation of
civil servants who want higher salaries. They have made
the party to bolster their wage claims.’369
The provincial council stood by its acceptance of
the birthplace criterion though without any en-
thusiasm.370 In the spring of 1964 a member Jørgen
Borchersen (a Dane) suggested abolishing the crite-
rion because it led to bitterness between Greenlanders
and Danes in Greenland. Another member, Jørgen
Olsen, suggested a referendum to chose between
maintaining the criterion and paying taxes. The
debate ended with a request to the Ministry for an
evaluation of the possibility of introducing taxes.371
Three years later, Jørgen Olsen raised the question
again. Now he wanted the criterion abolished: ‘Equal
pay for equal work should apply to everybody in Green-
land regardless of their place of birth, their place of liv-
ing, their education, and where they have been trained.’
Even Erling Høegh had second thoughts because
discontent over unequal pay damaged Danish-Green-
landic relations in Greenland. And Elisabeth Johansen
called it a disgrace for Greenlandic society. Peter Heil-
mann alone defended the G-60 philosophy which was
to link the wages of workers and fishermen to the
prices of exports, while avoiding a large gap between
those groups and the civil servants. No decision was
made. The problem was transferred to the committee
for economic planning, a provincial council committee
which was to negotiate on the issue with the ministry
in Copenhagen.372
A working group under the ministry addressing
the problem in Copenhagen, however, found it still
‘necessary to give the non-Greenlanders a bonus to
attract a sufficient supply of workers to Greenland’. The
new law, then, retained the difference between natives
and non-natives (section 10). In the ensuing debate in
the provincial council critical voices were raised, but
the law was finally accepted, because ‘it has been
impossible to find another criterion which to a higher
degree gave justice to all sides’373
Changing attitude to integration
In the mean time the attitude to the birthplace crite-
rion had changed in the Council of Young Greenlan-
ders. The chairman, Moses Olsen, (later a prominent
member of the Siumut Party) stated in 1970 that the
council wanted to maintain the criterion.374 As recently
as l969 the same Moses Olsen had argued that it was
illogical that educated Greenlanders had lower
salaries in Greenland than their Danish colleagues.
After all, the Greenlanders were the experts particu-
larly because they had knowledge of the native lan-
guage.375 The changing attitude was also visible when
another well educated Greenlander, Jacob Janussen,
wrote bluntly at the same time: ‘the birthplace criterion
is the most regular token that equality is impossible. We
must realise this even if it is bitterly hard to come to terms
with. I do not necessarily accept the criterion in its
 present form, but I think it is impossible to have equal
pay in Denmark and Greenland. The basic economic con-
ditions are simply too far apart.’376
It is worth noting that this acceptance of wage dif-
ferences between Denmark and Greenland was not as
previously acceptance of an unpleasant interim period
until Greenland could afford the higher wages. Rather
it had its roots in a national awakening in opposition to
the idea of becoming duplicate Danes.
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School policy
The same tendency to have seconds thoughts about
being as Danish as possible was visible in the educa-
tion policy even if a complete change was not on the
agenda. The first discussion in the provincial council
about a new bill on education (spring 1965) revealed
only a few objections to Danish dominance in schools.
The number of Danish teachers had soared from about
a third in 1960 to more than the half in 1965, reaching
two thirds in 1971.377 The lack of Greenlandic speaking
teachers was obviously the reason why the Green-
landic language as a discipline had been postponed to
the third grade if the parents agreed. The provincial
council had accepted the current situation, while still
supporting the ministry’s goal: ‘to give Greenlandic
youth a general education either in continuation of the
school years or later. When Danish teaching has so
prominent a position in the proposal it is due to the fact
that practically every education must be based on pre-
dominantly Danish teachers, Danish text books, and
Danish institutions.’378
Based on this reasoning it was difficult to decide
the position of the teaching of Greenlandic in second-
ary education. The new bill offered three choices:
teaching the Danish and English language was obliga-
tory, and French and Latin optional. The choice was
whether German and Greenlandic should be obliga-
tory or whether one of them should be optional. In
Denmark German was obligatory. The ministry pre-
ferred to make Greenlandic secondary education
match the Danish system, but with Greenlandic as
optional in order not to strain the pupils (stated in
remarks to article 22 in the bill).
Nobody in the provincial council would contem-
plate anything which might make the Greenlandic
leaving examination inferior to the Danish one de -
manding that the Greenlandic version should also
make Danish, English and German obligatory. Nobody
liked the downgrading of Greenlandic by making it
optional. Some members accepted it as a sacrifice to a
better education (Peter Heilmann, Erik Egede, Hans
Lynge, Jørgen Olsen, and Marius Sivertsen) while oth-
ers referring to the Greenlandic electorate’s feelings
towards their language wanted to put compulsory
Greenlandic in addition to a syllabus identical with the
Danish one. (Anda Nielsen, Elisabeth Johansen, Peter
Jensen, Lars Ostermann, and Knud Kristiansen).379 By
the autumn session of the provincial council an inter-
nal committee proposed a compromise making Green-
landic obligatory in the first and second year in se-
condary school but optional in the third year.380
In the Danish parliament the Greenland represen-
tative, Knud Hertling, focused on the two first years in
primary school. He would not accept postponement of
the Greenlandic language. In the bill’s committee
stage he created so much doubt that the law was post-
poned to the following year’s session. In the final
debate on 2 June 1966 he argued in a nationalistic
tone. He still opposed the postponement which he saw
as a degrading of the Greenlandic language, but his
protests achieved little. The law required the school
board to hear parental views and gain their approval
before it could postpone teaching Greenlandic, pro-
vided that adequate teaching capacity was at hand. It
is hard to see that this procedure would cause any
change in Greenlandic schools since the main problem
was still lack of Greenlandic speaking teachers.
Hertling in fact did admit that the main effect of his
effort was to ensure that the language question in
Greenlandic schools was debated.381 In the following
years the provincial council returned several times to
the issue that under the circumstances was insoluble.
In the primary schools Danish teachers were essential,
and they could not teach Greenlandic.
The teachers
To educate sufficient Greenlandic speaking teachers
was a major problem. The provincial council had
 created a dilemma by demanding education in Green-
land identical with that in Denmark. This deterred
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Greenlanders because they had to master a second
quite different language: Danish. But the council saw
no other way to achieve an education up to Danish
standards.
Doubts about making education in Greenland a
duplicate of the Danish system surfaced first outside
Greenland: in the ministry of Greenland. Just after the
reform of 1950 the strategy was to educate Green-
landic teachers in Denmark. Thus, the Teacher Train-
ing College in Nuuk was reformed in 1957 to train
teachers only for the first two grades. This education
gave less competence than the Danish one, so such
teachers were paid less and this attracted very few
Greenlanders. A further reform in 1964 established
education in Nuuk at the same level as in Denmark,
with nearly the same curriculum. One of the four years
of the course was to be at a Danish teacher training
college. Teachers with this education would be placed
at the same level as those educated in Denmark, and
with some additional study they were qualified to
teach in primary schools in Denmark as well as in
Greenland.382
All these proposals had been debated by the
provincial council in 1963; it welcomed them, as did
Nikolaj Rosing (Greenlander) in Parliament.383 How-
ever, in 1966 a new law for primary schools was en -
acted in Denmark to come into effect in 1969. From
now on students at teacher training colleges were
required to have an A level certificate on entry. What
about teacher education in Greenland? Should it still
be identical with the Danish? The ministry had its
doubts expressed in a statement of the general pur-
pose of school education in Greenland.
To be a true school for the people ‘the school in
Greenland should firstly be staffed by Greenlandic teach-
ers, unless you want the Greenlandic population fully
integrated into the Danish.’ This was moving some way
from the aim in 1963: ‘to further the integration between
Denmark and Greenland it is essential to have a educa-
tion in Greenland which would enable teachers from
Greenland to teach in Danish primary schools.’384 In
1969 the ministry was willing to modify its position to
avoid setting the level of education ‘so high that only a
few Greenlanders would be able to cope.’ Moreover, it
also suggested that a special teacher training was
essential in Greenland in order to produce both Green-
landic speaking teachers, and teachers of Green-
landic.385
The debate in the provincial council in 1969 was
inconclusive. Generally speaking members wanted
Greenlandic education on a level that would make it
valid in Denmark. This was not to educate teachers for
Danish schools, but to make sure that Greenlandic
teachers would not be left behind in salaries and
careers. This meant education at Danish levels with
some minor amendments to suit Greenland.386
The issue returned to the agenda in 1972. The
 ministry explained the long period of inaction with the
excuse that it had been busy on other matters, adding
that the debate on Greenland policy had challenged
the basic aim of making education in Greenland and
Denmark broadly alike. The ministry asked for further
postponement, which was granted. This shows it was
the ministry which had delayed the Danification of
Greenland. This change of view can be dated to about
1970.
Privatisation and self government
In the G-60 report unease about the limited Green-
landic participation in free enterprise was evident, an
unease fully shared by the provincial council. In 1966
the Ministry for Business Activity suggested that the
Danish Trade Act should be introduced in Greenland.
This would mean ending the requirement of 6 months’
residence in Greenland for anyone wishing to start a
commercial enterprise. The provincial council resisted
strongly even suggesting in 1967 that requirement
should be made stiffer by stipulating residence on
local wage levels. The ministry considered this con-
trary to Danish ideas of natural justice, but the provin-
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cial council stood firm.387 On this issue its policy was
clear. Greenlanders should run private business in
Greenland, which was fully in harmony with the Dan-
ish policy generally, and it was indeed one aim of the
1950 reforms.
In 1967 the provincial council was empowered to
elect its own chairman and chose Erling Høegh. The
speeches at his inauguration in May show the conflict
between traditionalist and reformist views. The oldest
member, Jørgen Olsen, chairing the meeting declared
this was a historic day because the Greenlanders had
achieved ‘the rightful claim of every nation: self determi-
nation.’ He even quoted Abraham Lincoln saying: ‘part
of a nation can be subdued in eternity, or a whole nation
can be subdued for many years, but a whole nation can-
not be subdued in eternity.’ These words may sound
more forceful in English that in Greenlandic which
hardly distinguishes between ‘nation’ and ‘people’.
This was, moreover, a somewhat unusual translation
of the remarks attributed to Lincoln.
About the future Jørgen Olsen was more vague.
He thought the provincial council had to consider the
proper status of the ‘Greenlandic group of people’
within the Danish realm, whether they should strive to
be an independent nation, or to be recognised as a spe-
cial minority inside the realm, or to continue the
 struggle for equality with the Danish population in all
fields.388 The latter option was of cause the aim of the
‘normalisation’ policy from 1959, which Jørgen Olsen
had accepted at that time, but obviously, he had now
moved further.
The newly elected chairman, Erling Høegh, had a
quite different view. In September he commented: ‘We
up here have no other wish than to maintain the rela-
tionship established in 1950 between Greenland and Den-
mark based on relations between the two people through
centuries. I do not even see dimly any Greenlandic wish
to alter this.’ The economic development set in motion
should continue: ‘It is our decision not stop and not to be
delayed on the road to the new Greenland.’ 389
His statements show that Erling Høegh like any
politician who hopes to be successful was ready to
respond to changing public opinion as for example two
years later in a television hearing on Greenland. He
had shortly before told the press that Greenland was
moving in the direction of the Faroe Islands (meaning
towards Home Rule), and was asked to elaborate. He
emphasised that secession was not behind the Green-
landic wish for more responsibility, only more self-gov-
ernment. He was even ready to accept a lower stan-
dard of living as a price for it.390
Greenlandic reactions outside the 
provincial council
The general attitude of Greenlanders in the late 60s
could be summarised as: A more Greenlandic Green-
land. This was most obvious in the aims of the Sukaq
party established by Knud Hertling in 1970 (sukaq is
the centre pole in a traditional Greenlandic house,
thus indicating a very solid support). The party should
be ‘a guarantor for cohesion between Denmark and
Greenland.’ However, it should be a Greenlandic party,
and not the branch of any Danish party, ‘because it had
to be in a free position to work for the Greenlandic popu-
lation’. Hertling characterised the party as moderate
socialist. It believed, for example that privatisation
should not be pursued regardless of cost, and the new
organisations should preferably be on a co-operative
basis. In general Greenlanders had to stop measuring
everything in Greenland by the Danish ruler. They
should acknowledge their own worth and their own
identity.391
Moderation was not the hall mark of another
group of Greenlanders joining the debate. Its core was
young Greenlanders being educated in Denmark, and
it seems reasonable to relate their uncompromising
attack on the authorities to the contemporary youth
revolution in Denmark and throughout the world. Like
the youth revolution the Greenlanders soon struck
Marxist overtones. In autumn 1970 the leftist maga-
zine Politisk Revy suggested a socialist Greenland. It
attaked the Greenlandic upper class and the American
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bases in Greenland.392 In December 1970 about a dozen
pages were devoted to the Greenland Problem as it
saw it. A socialist Greenland was the goal, a Green-
landic society constructed by Greenlanders and gov-
erned by them. The Greenlandic lower classes: hun -
ters, fishermen and workers had a duty to make it hap-
pen. The real enemy was the class society that was
seen as a consequence of the Danish presence. Fire
was concentrated on the Greenlandic civil servants
who were paid far more than other Greenlandic work-
ers. The workers must engage in the fight, and ‘expel
the apparatchiks in their own organisations. These
 people who feathered their own nest without paying
attention to the misery around them.’ Thus wrote a
Greenlander Karl Isaksen under the headline: ‘Fight
Back, Greenlander!’
Another Greenlander studying in Denmark, Ar -
qaluk Lynge, was very clear in defining the group’s
strategy and goal. Greater national independence was
the goal to be achieved by resisting further equalising
with the Danes which would only lead Greenlanders to
complete alienation from their culture. A national con-
science should be created, a national solidarity against
those who ‘we on immediate recognition can discern as
not being one of us – and whose interests does not concur
with ours.’ It was admitted that: ‘to concentrate the fire
on the Danes was the most obvious and easiest way’
because they were already scapegoats for what was
going on in Greenland. In his view the majority in
Greenland had been misled by the Greenlandic upper
class by being promised wonders if only Greenland
was integrated in Denmark. He thought that greater
political independence was the only means of obtain-
ing ‘a socialist society without asking the Danish Parlia-
ment for permission.’393
His fierce hostility to Danish bourgeois society was
obvious. In the local paper in Aasiaat, Ausiak, he thun-
dered against the failure to hear the Greenlandic
majority in the debate. Speaking only Greenlandic
they could not participate in a debate conducted in
Danish. He also objected to the formation of political
parties in Greenland because he suspected the leaders
would only look after their personal interests. He saw
the relatively low participation in the elections as a
token of the people’s indifference, and an indication
that the parliamentary system was unsuited to govern
Greenland. He wrote: ‘I hope it is clearly understood,
that democracy is (too!) imported from Denmark, and it
is no good (either!)’. To solve the economic problems in
Greenland he suggested selling Denmark!394
You may question how seriously the different sug-
gestions were meant, but you cannot doubt that he
had an axe to grind. This was a radical throwing down
the gauntlet, challenging the Danes to rule Greenlan-
ders. The selling of Denmark was a radical expression
of this thinking, and perhaps a vehement response to
arguments he had been served in discussions in Den-
mark.
Debate among Greenlanders coincided with de -
bate among Danes. During the 1960s the magazine
‘Grønland’ produced a series of articles highlighting
the danger of a breakdown of ancient Greenlandic cul-
ture, and neglect of the Greenlandic language. The
common remedy was to suggest that Greenlanders
must take control. Several publications took the same
line.395 The recurrent attitude was nicely formulated
by Niels Højlund in ‘Krise uden Alternativ’ 1972. Høj -
lund, a historian, teacher, priest, and journalist, had
spent the years 1968-1970 as a journalist at Greenland
Broadcasting, and he then took two years leave to
work out: ‘what were our aims, what were our motives,
which ideas did we have about the desired outcome, and
when did we assume the task was done?’ (p. 7). For his
part he thought the task was in principle already done.
Apart from still being willing to pay the bills, the task
was no longer a Danish one, but Greenlandic (p. 205).
The debate in parliament
The growing discussion around 1970 about Danish-
Greenlandic relations produced a debate in Parlia-
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ment. Danish hesitations about setting things in mo -
tion in Greenland may be seen by the fact that the ini-
tiative was simply a debate in Parliament. The previ-
ous pause for thought in 1960 had resulted in a com-
mittee, which reported after four years in one volume
and there had been the earlier mammoth report in six
volumes from 1950. This time the debate started from
a report from the Greenland minister, A.C. Normann
of the Radical Left Party. The debate396 may show
where the political parties stood while the minister’s
report presumably expressed the policy of the govern-
ment, a centre right wing coalition of the Liberal Left,
the Conservative, and the Radical Left.
Could any change in policy be detected?
The minister started from the previous report (G-
60), suggesting that its assumptions had been chal-
lenged by the rapid population growth which necessi-
tated a far bigger effort to improve the living standards
(column 5263).
The growth in population was the crucial point for
the minister, far more serious than the steadily grow-
ing subsidy, Dkr. 650 million in 1970 against Dkr. 140
million in 1960, and more important than the decline
in fishing (column 5264). Just as the fish processing
factories were built and a deep sea fishing fleet was
building up, nature had played man a trick by making
the sea temperature slightly colder resulting in a much
reduced cod stock only partially replaced by the grow-
ing shrimp fishing. This development is showed in
table 30.
On the basis of these statistics the minister was
not hopeful about the capacity of business in Green-
land to contribute to a rising living standard. He
thought the main occupation should still be based on
cod fishing because it was an all year round activity,
and he had some hopes of oil and mineral prospecting
– 22 search concessions had been issued so far (co-
lumn 5268f). Increased capital transfer was needed in
the future, but at a slower pace than in the 1960s, he
thought (column 5272). Finally, he could only hope
that rising productivity could keep pace with the
demand for better living standards because otherwise:
‘an increased capital transfer or employment of a greater
number of Greenlanders in Denmark was needed.’
Thus far, the minister had kept to the main philo-
sophy of the years since 1950. The rest of the speech
commented more directly on the current debate. He
admitted: ‘that the acclimatisation to a modern West
European way of life had created immense problems for
the Greenlanders’, but was confident that they could
cope. He admitted that guest workers covered much
work in Greenland, but thought they were indispensa-
ble because too few in Greenland were qualified.
Therefore, education must still have first priority. Con-
cerning the problem of requiring Greenlanders to mas-
ter Danish in order to be educated, another issue in the
current debate, he also maintained the 1950 philoso-
phy: it was a necessity. ‘The mastering of Danish was a
precondition to make it possible for the Greenlanders to
rise to the same economic and cultural level as reigned in
the other Nordic countries’, he claimed and hoped: ’that
ADJUSTING THE COURSE
137
396. FT 1969/1970. The report from the minister 23 April 1970 column 5263-78. The debate 30 April 1970 column 5382-5484.
Table 29. Greenland population 1930-1970. 1930 and 1945
census, thereafter the yearly ministerial reports).
Europeans Greenlanders Yearly growth
for Greenlanders %
1930 413 16,488
1945 580 20,832 1.6
1950 1,061 22,581 1.6
1955 1,867 25,234 2.3
1960 2,762 30,378 3.8
1965 4,483 35,132 3.0
1970 7,62 38,912 2.1
Table 30. Fish production 1960-1970, 1000 tons (Perspektiv -
plan for Grønland 1971-1985: 16). * with head, gutted.
Cod* Shrimp Other fish
1960 24.2 1.8 4.7
1961 29.8 2.6 3.9
1962 30.5 3.4 3.7
1963 20.3 3.3 5.3
1964 14.1 3.8 6.2
1965 20.7 5.1 6.9
1966 24.7 5.2 6.1
1967 23.2 5.6 5.8
1968 17.5 5.6 5.8
1969 17.5 6.7 5.8
1970 15.7 7.8 4.9
Danish would become a useable and living language for
the Greenlanders without giving up Greenlandic.’397
The minister also rejected suggestions in the pub-
lic debate to slow the pace of development and to relax
the policy of concentrating more people in the towns.
‘It is better to make an effort to overcome the interim dif-
ficulties than to delay a development that is bound to
come sooner or later’, he said. His commitment to
modernity in a Danish version was unshaken. Rhetori-
cally he finally asked: ‘I suppose that nobody favours
reducing the quest for education and enlightenment in
our days. Likewise, our welfare society is supposed to
secure the population employment, a fair wage, and a
good social standard.’ The only hints that something
had happened since 1950 were mention of the possibil-
ity of moving more Greenlanders to Denmark, and the
minister’s observation of: ‘a greater understanding of
the link between productivity in Greenland and the living
standard’ (column 5277).
The speakers for the governing parties were of
course in line with the minister, but some variance can
be seen. H.J. Lembourn, Conservative, would ‘slow
down the pace of the development to get a better balance
between its speed and the capacity of the population to
adjust.’ He would prefer ‘a more Greenlandic Green-
land’ to ‘a danicized Greenland with growing conflicts
between the two groups.’ In his view this meant fewer
Danish guest workers at a possible cost of less perfect
work (column 5392f). Holger Hansen, of the Liberal
Left, agreed basically with the minister, but was
inclined to see a problem in the fact that the Greenlan-
ders did not sufficiently feel themselves part of the
development. He put some confidence in the act on
income taxes in Greenland, recently passed in the
provincial council (column 5396f). Svend Haugaard,
Radical Left, brushed aside all talk about too hasty
development by asking which home, which kinder-
garten, and which working place had been built too
early (column 5399). Regarding equalisation between
Greenlanders and Danes the policy was clear. In Den-
mark total equality should prevail. Greenland, how-
ever, should primarily be for the Greenlanders. There-
fore, they should have a greater responsibility to man-
age, even if this meant slower development and errors
of judgement. The essential thing now was to alter the
role of the Greenlanders from being spectators to par-
ticipants, and he argued that most of the endeavours
would be in vain if this was not achieved (column
5402).
The opposition in Parliament took much the same
line as the government. Carl P. Jensen, Social De-
mocrat who had been minister for Greenland 1964-
1968 agreed that ‘the goal was to give the Greenlanders
greater responsibility for development, just like the policy
in Denmark towards local authorities’ (column 5388).
Those who had taken the floor up till now were all
members of the Greenland Council from 1964 and had
consequently a feeling for Greenlandic matters and
they were all from the parties that had been respon-
sible for policy in the period. The spokesman for a
fairly new party, the Socialist Folk Party (a splinter
party from the Communists), Gunhild Due, had just
joined the Greenland Council, and was perhaps as a
newcomer more critical of the political goal. She
favoured privatisation provided it meant Greenlandic
taking over of Danish business, but would prefer the
co-operatives to have a greater role. She also favoured
a reduction of Danish guest workers to be replaced
with Greenlanders. The limited capacity of the larger
open water settlements to accommodate the influx of
people from the smaller settlements she would lessen
by making the lesser settlements more attractive by
building smaller production plants there. She admit-
ted that she had perhaps been too enthusiastic for
making education in Greenland the same as in Den-
mark. A new attitude was cautiously aired: ’Perhaps we
ought to consider having schools in Greenland which
would educate the Greenlanders to those circumstances
most of them will experience.’ Her final advice was:
’Keep your ears open, mister minister, listen to the Green-
landers themselves and their opinions. Try to penetrate
the wall of civil servants here and in Greenland!’ Green-
land should be a good land for the Greenlanders them-
selves, she argued (column 5406-5408). The Socialist
Folk Party followed later its own advice by asking the
Greenlandic politicians Moses Olsen and Lars Emil
Johansen to produce the party’s Greenland policy.
The final spokesman was Kjær Rasmussen from
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the Left Socialists, a splinter from the Folk Socialists in
1968. He seems to have had no contacts with groups in
Greenland, proposing a wide ranging sociological
inquiry in Greenland to discover: ’what the broad so-
called common population in Greenland wanted’ (col-
umn 5413). The party had obviously no policy on the
issue. He favoured modernisation, but asked some
critical questions about Danish dominance, and whose
pockets the state subsidies finally benefited. ‘We can-
not get rid of the suspicion that an imperialistic policy is
followed in Greenland’ (column 5411).
This was what the political establishment in Den-
mark had to say about the future of Greenland. From
the government to the tiniest party in Parliament there
was only a slight difference of opinion. Change must
continue, but the pace could be discussed. Greenlan-
ders should be more involved, but how to achieve this
was not agreed. All deplored the Danish dominance in
civil service and free enterprise (apart from fishing,
sheep breeding and hunting), and saw more education
as a remedy.
Besides the spokesmen from the political parties
some members of Parliament had more particular
interests to safeguard. The president of the Danish
Association of Fishermen, Henry Sørensen, Liberal
Left, wanted Danish fishermen catching salmon in
Greenland to be able to obtain fuel, provisions, repairs
and so on in Greenland for a price similar to those in
Denmark. The Faroese Johan Nielsen, Social Democ-
rat, wanted to maintain the rights of the Faroese in
Greenland, and preferably extend them a little. For-
mer president of the Danish Association for Tourism,
Svend Horn, Social Democrat, argued for a tourism to
be established and administered by Danes in Green-
land. The two later speakers pointed out that these
changes would benefit Greenland as well (column
5427-5431).
The two Greenlandic members of Parliament nat-
urally took the floor as well. Nikolaj Rosing declared
that problems were steadily growing, and that the
 policy had not resulted in activity and involvement on
the Greenlander’s part. On the contrary, it had nour-
ished passivity, carelessness, and discontent. He there-
fore suggested halting the policy of concentration of
the population in bigger settlements, finding more
employment for the Greenlanders, and building small
houses instead of huge blocks of flats. He suggested
abolition of the birthplace criterion for wage differen-
tials arguing that it was the main source of discord in
Greenland (column 5413-18). Knud Hertling agreed
with this, and also wanted to make it more difficult for
Danes to reside and do business in Greenland (column
5418-5424).
Summing up the debate, the minister did admit
the conflict between the aims of a more Greenlandic
Greenland with presumably a lower standard of life,
and an integrated Greenland in which the Greenlan-
ders might be alienated. He also admitted that current
policy was a compromise between these two, which
had not worked out too well. Nevertheless, he called
on Parliament to continue the programmes started in
1950 and supported by the great majority in Green -
land.(column 5444f).
To some Greenlanders the debate in Parliament
was a disappointment. Jakob Janussen for example
could see only limited attempts to discuss the central
issues such as a danicized or more Greenlandic Green-
land. He declared that he was not sorry that Parlia-
ment had left the problems untouched because: ‘Only
the Greenlanders were entitled to answer the general and
to us so essential question about which kind of society we
want in Greenland after a debate in Greenland and in
Greenlandic.’ 398
The Holsteinsborg Conference
Many people in Greenland were willing to have such a
debate. The chairman of the provincial council, Erling
Høgh, had in his 1970 New Year speech issued invita-
tions to a conference about the future of Greenland.
All those invited were Greenlanders: the young Green-
landers from Denmark and Greenland and the Green-
landic politicians of the provincial council, the munici-
palities and Parliament.399
The open invitation was at first regarded with sus-
picion by the young Greenlanders. Would it merely fol-
low the usual procedure with Danish experts formulat-
ing the problems? It had to be ‘the Greenlanders them-
selves who selected the relevant issues and possible solu-
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tions to the problems, Moses Olsen argued.400 But the
nervousness disappeared, perhaps facilitated by the
gesture of goodwill in choosing one of the young
Greenlanders, Lars Emil Johansen, to be the editor of
the conference report.401
The conference took place at the Knud Rasmussen
Folk High School in Sisimiut from 20 to 30 June 1970
with a total of 59 participants from Denmark and
Greenland. Danish experts were not totally excluded,
since the economist Mogens Boserup gave the opening
speech on the language question, while the chief of
RGTD, Jens Fynbo, and the consultant for the Danish
Cooperatives, Sven Thorsen initiated the debate on
business, and the civil servant Claus Bornemann
opened the debate on public information. Despite
these contributions by Danish experts the main work
of the conference was a search by Greenlanders for
their own solution to their problems, and in some
cases such solutions were found.
Several of the objectives were well known such as
the desire of the provincial council for a greater say
vis-à-vis the Danish authorities, and the wish of the
municipalities in Greenland for greater independence
from the provincial council. Similarly the idea of mov-
ing Greenlandic agencies such as the GTO from Den-
mark to Greenland was very familiar. The desire to
employ more Greenlanders in construction work had
been heard before, but now there was a formal pro-
posal to compel visiting firms to ensure that at least
one third of their work force were Greenlanders.402
Mogens Boserup stood by his opinion expressed
earlier that Greenlanders should as soon as possible
become bilingual so they could compete successfully
and loose their feeling of inferiority. He saw no future
for a written Greenlandic, but could imagine a spoken
Greenlandic as a cultural heritage binding the Green-
landers together.403 His ideas were completely re -
jected. Everybody else favoured teaching in Green-
landic from the first day in school arguing that this
would ensure a harmonious development for the chil-
dren.
Rather than downgrading of Greenlandic they
wanted more text books in Greenlandic and teacher
education in Greenlandic too. The suppressed anger at
the depreciating of their language, and the awakening
of the idea that to follow Danish norms was not always
to their benefit can be found in expressions such as:
‘serious consideration should be given to whether the
Greenlandic teacher training should be a duplicate of the
Danish one, or whether other ways can be found.’ And
‘the groups contradict Boserup when he claims that the
Greenlanders can only have full equality if they become
Danish speakers.’ And still more sharply: ‘in conclusion
the majority wish to state that Boserup’s suggestion to
end Greenlandic teaching in the first two years in school
shows a disrespect for the Greenlandic language.’
Clearly the participants had a more ‘Greenlandic’
attitude than had previously been expressed in the
provincial council. They took an elegant departure
from Boserup when he had to leave the conference.
They thanked him for having sparked off the debate on
the use of Greenlandic, and gave him as a present a
model of a kayak, but without cladding because that
would be the image of Greenland ‘if we are deprived of
our language!’404
The question of salary differentials was inevitably
discussed. Most participants favoured maintaining the
birthplace criterion and giving the lowest salaried and
the independent earners the bigger part of any future
rise in income. Everybody was for the introduction of
taxes in accordance with the view of the provincial
council, which had just voted for this in its spring ses-
sion.405
A key policy of the reform of 1950 was the concen-
tration of population in the bigger settlements on open
waters to increase support for fishing and improve
social services. This was explicitly denounced by the
conference: ‘All participants agree that the concentra-
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tion of the population has to be reduced as much as possi-
ble, even completely stopped, because the original pre-
condition is no longer valid,’406 probably meaning that
cod fishing was no longer a promising economic
prospect.
In this way the conference went through the prob-
lems of society one by one: popular education, school
and education, the economy, alcohol problems etce -
tera. All discussions were ended by a resolution op-
posing some ideas and recommending others. The
conference also emphasised the need to let the Green-
landers have a greater say in Greenland, but that
 policy was already signaled in the latest discussion in
Denmark. In a way this had been on the Danish agenda
ever since the establishment of the Guardians’ Coun-
cils in the 1860s accelerating in the twentieth century.
The new element was how this was going to happen.
On some matters the conference set new stan-
dards: more Greenlandic teaching in school, reducing
or ending the concentration of population in fewer set-
tlements. An overall political statement about the
future of Greenland was apparently not discussed.
Some of the ‘young’ participants did, however, suggest
a resolution with a political goal: ‘a politically more
independent Greenland is an essential part of our politi-
cal goal,’ and ‘we are a national minority’ (the Green-
landic version could equally be translated as ‘we are a
Greenlandic people’) and we want this fact respected.’
This would mean a heavier load to carry but the young
were ready for this. However, the connection with
Denmark should not be cut: ‘It would be an irremedia-
ble damage all of a sudden to cut the aid’, they said.
It is worth noting that this resolution did not
request complete independence, but simply a more
self-governing Greenland. The Greenlandic version
has exactly the same idea. The resolution proposed
‘nangminerssorneru lernigssaq’407 which became the
official Greenlandic name for home rule nine years
later.
It was endorsed by seven members, among them
later prominent Greenlandic politicians like Emil
Abelsen, Jacob Janussen, Lars Emil Johansen, and
Arqaluk Lynge.
ADJUSTING THE COURSE
141
406. Johansen 1970: 35.
407. Literally: a means to become more self-reliant.
As described in the previous chapter in the years about
1970 there were several indications that the relation-
ship between Greenland and Denmark had come to a
watershed. The key point was that Greenlanders
aimed to take greater responsibility in running Green-
landic affairs.
In 1971 there were elections for the provincial
council and the Danish Parliament. It was time for the
young Greenlanders to manifest themselves in the
elected assemblies. The provincial council elections
took place on 16 April, but the change of membership
was the lowest ever. Only seven out of seventeen seats
or 41% changed hands. In previous elections the per-
centages of newly elected members had been: 1967:
65; 1963: 50; 1959: 69; 1955: 92, 1951: 92.
Despite the small turnover, some young Greenlan-
ders were successful. Among the new members five
were ‘young’, but only two of them were markedly for
‘a new policy’, while the three others either later
joined the Atassut party or no party at all. On the other
hand, the two ‘new policy’ victories were remarkable.
Jonathan Motzfeldt defeated the chairman of the
council, Erling Høegh, while Lars Emil Johansen took
the seat of the deputy chairman, Nikolaj Rosing. The
change was not a new social class winning political
power, for the two new victors had the same occupa-
tion as their opponents, priest and teacher, respec-
tively. It was rather a change of generation as the
newspaper A/G recognised, hoping too that the elec-
tion would pave the way for a new policy.408
At the general election of the Danish parliament 21
September 1971 Knud Hertling was unopposed in the
northern constituency. In the southern constituency
the sitting member Nikolaj Rosing was nominated,
and so were Erling Høegh and another of the defeated
provincial council candidates, Moses Olsen, who had
lost by a small margin to his uncle, Jørgen Olsen.
Moses Olsen took the seat against the two established
politicians. He won 2550 votes while there were 2437
for Rosing, and 2161 for Høegh. An analysis of the elec-
tion shows that the two established politicians had
blocked each other by winning 3 and 2 communities
each, while Moses Olsen only won one, but came sec-
ond in three others.409
Erling Høegh accepted the consequences of the
election, moved to Denmark and joined the Conserva-
tive Party. Afterwards he stayed out of politics in
Greenland and died in 1993. Rosing in contrast
remained as a candidate for Parliament and regained
the southern constituency in 1973 sitting until his
death in 1976.
This defeat for the new policy in the south was
balanced by victory in the north where Lars Emil
Johansen defeated Knud Hertling holding the seat
until 1979, when he was elected to the new Home Rule
Parliament. Thus, supporters of the ‘new policy’ held
one of the two Greenlandic seats in the Danish Parlia-
ment through the ‘70s. Their role in Danish politics has
not yet been researched.
Support for the policy of Lars Emil Johansen and
Jonathan Motzfeldt grew after 1971 in the provincial
council with the emergence of recognisable political
parties. Siumut (meaning forward) is the oldest.
Already in 1975 a group of ‘new’ politicians started to
publish the magazine Siumut to propagate their pol-
icy. This magazine is bilingual showing the need also
to communicate to Danish readers, and it is a good
source for the party’s attitude in different areas. The
party started in 1976 with local associations in some
settlements and these came together formally as a
party in 1977.
Atassut (meaning interdependent, literally: a
means to hold on) became a party in connection with
the general election of 1977, and got Otto Steenholdt
elected. The party emphasized the value of being
linked to Denmark, in a way continuing the policy of
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the great reform years. A brief, if provocative compari-
son would place Atassut as a party wishing to benefit
Greenlandic society by making it as Danish as possible
with due consideration of special conditions in Green-
land, while Siumut would make Greenland as Green-
landic as possible, and only as Danish as necessary.
This was the starting point. During the next genera-
tion Atassut became more Greenlandic, and Siumut
more cautious in challenging Danish goodwill. None
of the Greenlandic parties wished for union with any
party in Denmark. Cooperation in Parliament, though,
was closest between Atassut and the Social Democrats,
at times with Liberal Left, and between Siumut and
the Folks Socialists.
In Greenland party allegiances became apparent
in the provincial council. Of the members elected in
1971 three later became Siumut, three joined Atassut
but eleven remained independent. The election of 1975
returned eight Siumut and seven Atassut, the inde-
pendents being reduced to two.
Two other parties ran for election to the ‘Landst-
ing’ in 1979. Inuit Ataqatigiit (meaning Inuit associa-
tion) was established in 1977, with a clear left socialist
rhetoric, supported in Denmark by the Left Socialists.
Its president was the above mentioned Arqaluk Lynge.
Sulissartut Partiat (Worker’s Party) originated from
the trade union whose leaders had formerly been Siu-
mut members. Neither of them secured representa-
tives.410
Voting on the Common Market
Although a common feeling about 1970 suggested a
new relationship between Denmark and Greenland, it
was the Danish joining of the Common Market in 1972,
which directly triggered the Home Rule model. In the
referendum in October 1972 the electorates in Den-
mark and Greenland voted differently. The Danes were
for, while the Greenlanders were against. This was the
first time in history where the Greenlanders chose not
to follow the Danish course. The constitutional status
at the time would require that Greenland was included
in joining the Common Market. Thus a new status had
to be found if Greenland were to be excluded.
The issues that worried Greenlanders were the
prospect of a common fishery policy in which fish in
Greenlandic waters could not be reserved for the
Greenlanders. Also fish pricing by auction was dif-
ferent from the Greenlandic fixed price system. Some
opponents in Greenland also criticised the free move-
ment of labour and capital, which would prevent polit-
ical management of the economy. I suggest that these
technicalities could have been overcome, and that the
real issue was the political one of being tied up to Brus-
sels just at a time when all the endeavours were to be
less tied up to Copenhagen. I think the following nar-
rative will substantiate my position.
The advocates of joining the EEC emphasized the
benefit of following the Danish course (they seemed to
have assumed a Danish yes in the referendum). They
also pointed to the possibilities of grants from the
European common funds for regional development
and social welfare. In short: to have access to a money-
box much larger than the Danish treasury.411
In 1967 the Danish parliament authorized the
 government to apply for membership of the Common
Market. Both Greenlandic members supported the
application. The same year the provincial council was
asked for its opinion in accordance with the council’s
right to be heard in issues of special relevance for
Greenland. After a very short debate the council gave
its consent to let Greenland follow Denmark into the
Common Market. Of course, it wished to have special
arrangements to protect the Greenlandic interests in
fishing, the rights to establish business and the subsidy
system which had already been suggested by the
 government. The council also wished to have a more
thorough survey of the consequences for Greenland.
The matter seemed to be uncontroversial at the time.412
But before the issue returned to the agenda in
1971-1972 there had been an election with some new
Greenlandic members in the provincial council and
Parliament. It was from these new members that the
objections and finally the opposition to Greenland
joining came. It started cautiously. Parliament decided
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in May 1971 that a referendum should be held about
joining the Common Market, and in accordance with
the constitution Greenland would vote on the same
day and be included in a single electorate, just as with
parliamentary elections. This arrangement was later
criticised, but at the time the two Greenlan dic mem-
bers (Hertling and Rosing) had no objection.413
The provincial council was in session 15 Septem-
ber to 2 November 1971 and was informed of the on-
going negotiations about joining which were expected
to be concluded during November 1971. The council
did not question the proposed procedure. Jonathan
Motzfeldt displayed some mistrust by suggesting that
the provincial council should send a representative to
Brussels to ensure that the special situation in Green-
land was made clear to the participating countries. He
would demand a permanent special arrangement. The
council was more cautious. It suggested to the ministry
that the executive committee of the provincial council
should participate in the ensuing negotiations – if pos-
sible also in Brussels. Thus, the suggestion from Jona -
than Motzfeldt came to nothing. He had even sug-
gested the representative be the former chairman, Er -
ling Høegh. The suggestion of Høegh might have been
a cunning move from Motzfeldt, or just a token that
the issue was still outside party policy.414
At the final negotiations in Brussels the executive
committee of the provincial council had participated,
and approved the outcome. Moses Olsen had also been
present,415 but in Parliament he abstained from voting
on approval of the result. He did not have special
objections to the results regarding Greenland: Den-
mark was allowed to continue subsidizing Greenlandic
society, and the demand for residence of at least six
months to obtain a business licence could also con-
tinue. So could the exclusive rights of the Greenlandic
fishermen to waters inside 12 nautical miles.416
It seems that the young Greenlandic politicians
made their mind up during the remaining part of the
negotiations which ended on 12 December 1971.
Greenland was not to join. In Parliament Moses Olsen
asked for separate voting in Greenland without mak-
ing it clear whether a separate date or two separate
referenda were in mind. He also raised again the possi-
bility of altering policies once a member. Could the 6-
month’s residence before business license be ex -
tended? Could the fishing limit of 12 nautical miles be
expanded? And what about the (hypothetical, he said)
question of a future demand in Greenland to alter its
constitutional status inside the realm?417 Moses Olsen
got no answer to his hypothetical questions.
The imprecise meaning of ‘separate’ in the re -
marks of Moses Olsen in December became quite clear
in February 1972 when Moses Olsen and Jonathan
Motzfeldt in a broadcast from Greenland Radio de -
manded separate referenda one in Greenland and one
in Denmark each decisive in its area. They argued that
Danish voters should not be entitled to decide whether
Greenland should join or not. The Minister of Green-
land, Knud Hertling supported by doctor of law Ole
Espersen argued that this was not legally possible. The
law about elections in Greenland would have had to
been changed first, and the negotiations with the EEC
would have to be resumed as they had been carried
out on basis of existing laws. This would mean delay-
ing the entry of Denmark into the EEC. Hertling per-
haps unintentionally suggested a goal for the young
Greenlandic politicians to strive for. He said: ‘a sepa-
rate vote in this matter would require a home rule
arrangement as in the Faroes.’418
When two separate referenda was ruled unlawful
by the minister and the legal advice Jonathan
Mozfeldt backed off, but he suggested in the provincial
council session in Spring 1972 that the date of the
Greenlandic vote ought still to be after the Danish
one.419 As this would make no difference in reality it is
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easy to spot the political tactic behind the suggestion.
He linked his political position in Greenland to a
Greenlandic NO at the referendum, and a separate
date would give the best platform to agitate for that.
Support in the provincial council was perhaps greater
than expected. Eight members were in favour, and
seven against with two abstaining.420 In the minutes
(Danish version) ‘separate’ was used in the sense: two
separate dates, but also in the sense: two separate
votes to be counted separately. Who voted which way
was not recorded so it is impossible to say whether this
split was the first sign of the known 8-7 split between
Siumut and Atassut later in the 1970s.
Before the next session of the provincial council in
the autumn it became clear how Jonathan Motzfeldt
could use the idea of a later date for the Greenlandic
vote, especially the fact that it was not accepted. In his
home region in the South he started to collect voters’
signatures to support the demand, and he agitated for
a NO in the referendum because the Danish govern-
ment had been unwilling to accommodate the wish for
a later date.421 The Greenlandic debate was neither of
long duration nor especially intensive.422 A substantial
argument for joining was the need to follow the same
course as Denmark, while the opponents wanted to
keep Greenland clear of the EEC without threatening
the link to Denmark. A hint of the attitude outside the
provincial council came from a conference in Sisi-
miut/Holsteinsborg in the summer. The participants
who were representatives from political parties and
associations in Greenland voted twenty-two to two
against joining the EEC.
In the provincial council the opposition had
grown since spring. On 22 September 1972 it stood
twelve to four against the EEC. The opponents could
look forward with confidence to the day of the referen-
dum, 2 October, and started to prepare the future. In
fact, they were already in action. On 19 September
Jonathan Mozfeldt had proposed to the provincial
council that a Danish-Greenlandic political commis-
sion, committee or working group should be ap -
pointed to investigate how a home rule arrangement
could be introduced in Greenland. The provincial
council should prepare a memorandum for the com-
mission. He was painstaking in stressing that this did
not mean any hidden agenda of secession from Den-
mark, but just home rule similar to the Faroese one. It
was unanimously carried.423 The idea of having home
rule for Greenland became so popular that the maga-
zine A/G and Knud Hertling both later claimed that
they had inspired Motzfeldt to raise the question.424
The referendum on 2 October 1972 turned out a
massive majority of 70.8% of the valid votes in Green-
land against joining the EEC. The only places with a
majority in favour were Ivittuut, a Danish naval base,
and the tiny settlement of Tasiluk in the district of
Qaqortoq. Everywhere else the no votes were in a
crushing majority, as high as 79.9% in Kangaatsiaq
and no lower than 56.7%425 in Thule. The referendum
was a smashing success for the ‘young’ Greenlandic
politicians. They had won their first great case, and
they naturally claimed to have the support of the peo-
ple for their version of a more ‘Greenlandic Green-
land’.
The preparations for the next round started right
away. In a Greenlandic broadcast Moses Olsen de -
clared:’Sooner or later our crystal-clear decision must
lead to political consequences’426 The issue was also
touched on in the opening debate in Parliament on 11
October 1972 when the Radical Left suggested post-
poning the membership of Greenland in the EEC until
the end of 1975 – as the Faroese could – to prevent a
severing of the relationship between Denmark and
Greenland. Moses Olsen suggested preparing a refer-
endum in Greenland immediately about the relation-
ship to Denmark. The minister, Knud Hertling, re -
sponded that a referendum about just that could be
the outcome of the discussion in the committee which
had been announced. The Danish uneasiness about
the outcome in Greenland was imbedded in the
answer from the minister for EEC-affairs, Ivar Nør-
gaard: The arrangement had to continue as agreed,
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‘but should the Greenlanders themselves want another
arrangement with Denmark than the present one, for
example as the Faroese, I can assure you that we would
be able to negotiate other conditions for Greenland in
Brussels.’
The day after in the newspaper Ekstrabladet
Moses Olsen explained his wish for a changed relation-
ship with Denmark. He rejected secession with a word-
ing that became standard in the later Siumut Party
attitude: ‘a complete secession would today and for years
to come be pure wishful thinking. You cannot just throw
away the only real connections we have – and they hap-
pen to go through Copenhagen. Remember, we are a peo-
ple who don’t tread on new ice without being sure it can
support us. Had this been the case we would have fallen
through thousands of year ago.’ What he wanted was a
loosening of the ties to Denmark – a sort of home rule
on the Faroese model.427
The phrasing was sophistical. To characterize
secession as wishful thinking is not to say that you do
not share the wish. The allusion to the ability of the
Greenlanders to survive in a tough environment is a
typical phrase on the part of Siumut. It was an attempt
to bolster the Greenlanders’ self-confidence. This was
a response to much of the debate on the shortcomings
of the development programme in Greenland, which
can be summarised in the view that the Greenlanders
were too much Greenlanders. They were not skilled
enough to manage in a modern society, it was
asserted. That is why education and training played so
great a part. The Greenlanders themselves were so to
speak part of the problem. Siumut turned this upside
down. In their policy the Greenlanders were part of
the solution. That is why their policy was ‘a more
Greenlandic Greenland’.
The Greenlandic Home Rule
committee
The minister for Greenland, himself a Greenlander,
pleased the Greenlanders by establishing a purely
Greenlandic home rule committee, consisting of five
members from the provincial council and the two
Greenlandic members of Parliament. The task was
broadly to suggest how and in what stages the provin-
cial council could have more impact on and more
responsibility – including financial responsibility – for
future development in Greenland. The committee was
also to consider the rôle of the provincial council in
making laws for Greenland within the limits of the
Danish constitution. Finally, the committee should
consider the possibility of the provincial council taking
over more functions from the Ministry for Green-
land.428
The home rule committee worked for two years
with five meetings including a conference in Sisi-
miut/Holsteinsborg in June 1974, held as in 1970 and
1972: a broad representa tion of Greenlandic organisa-
tions and the members of the provincial council and
the municipalities should in groups consider the issues
on the agenda. The minutes from this conference sug-
gest429 that there was a solid backing for the commit-
tee’s proposals. In plain words: an introduction of a
Greenlandic home rule firmly within the Danish realm
consisting of Greenlandic administration of, and
 making regulations for a list of specified activities with
the further possibility of taking over the remaining
Copenhagen government activities in due course.
Foreign policy was clearly within the Danish gov-
ernment’s competence, but a majority of the partici-
pants wanted to exclude fishing limits and interna-
tional agreements on fishing from foreign policy and
to make these matters the responsibility of the Green-
landers themselves. Also the natural deposits of raw
materials should be their own affair, they thought. The
participants also raised the issue of relations to the
EEC, and suggested that the proposed Home Rule
Authorities should deal with this issue.
Fishing limits, raw materials, and the EEC were
not covered by the committee’s proposals, so the con-
ference had been more ‘Greenlandic’ than the commit-
tee had dared to be, perhaps inspired by the radical
minority in the committee. Only Lars Emil Johansen
and Jonathan Motzfeldt and maybe Jørgen Olsen
could be placed as radicals with some certainty, while
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the rest: Lars Chemnitz, Otto Steenholdt, Nikolaj Ros-
ing, Niels Carlo Heilmann, and Agnete Nielsen consti-
tuted the ‘moderate’ wing. With the exception of Niko-
laj Rosing who died in 1976 they all joined the Atassut
party after 1979.
The committee report was issued in February 1975
– printed in A/G 6 March 1975 and as annex 4.1 in the
provincial council minutes autumn 1975. It was
remarkable in expressing the reasons for wanting
home rule. The reasons were to some extent familiar,
but here the Greenlanders themselves expressed them
officially.
The Siumut tone was recognizable: ‘First it has to
be acknowledged that Greenland and its original popula-
tion is so different from the rest of Denmark that the rela-
tionship can never be as between the regional population
groups in Denmark.’ A strong feeling for the language
was expressed. There are, they argued, huge problems
in transforming thoughts from the one language into
the other, and it is not a question of education because
the Greenlandic language has a close connection with
the Greenlandic way of living and thinking. ‘ and the
Greenlanders do not want to give up their language. On
the contrary, they wish to maintain and strengthen it as
a clear precondition for maintaining Greenlandic iden-
tity and culture. Once the Greenlandic language has been
lost as the mother tongue and everyday language we are
very much on our way to extinction as a minority group.’
Also the striving to stop being spectators of the de-
velopment in Greenland was mentioned. These rea-
sons were new compared with the official ones in 1948
and 1959, and can safely be seen as the consequences
of rubbing shoulders with the Danes a lot more since
the rapid growth was set in motion from 1950.
The report followed the conference in the summer
in placing the mineral resources in the special sphere,
but suggested fishing limits and agreements remain a
shared responsibility. Any specific model for home
rule was not described, but the report pointed to the
Faroese model as a possible example.
The committee entitled its report ‘introduction to
negotiation and preliminary report’, suggesting that it
planned to continue the work as several phrases in the
report indicated.430 In accordance with this view the
provincial council appointed new members to the
home rule committee at its next session in Spring 1975,
but the new Minister for Greenland, Jørgen Peder
Hansen, preferred to consult with the Greenland
Council, and then agreed with the executive commit-
tee of the provincial council to set up a new commis-
sion consisting of seven Greenlandic and seven Danish
politicians plus a non-political chairman and a dele-
gate from the Association of Greenlandic Municipali-
ties.431 (KANUKOKA: acronym for Kalaallit Nunaanni
Kommunit Kattuffiat). The provincial council con-
sented to the mandate at its session in the autumn and
the commission was set up on 9 October 1975.
Home Rule negotiations in the
commission
The commission worked for nearly three years and
delivered its report in April-June 1978. The members
were: the non-political chairman, Professor, doctor of
law, Isi Foighel432 was Danish by birth. So were the
seven other members of Parliament appointed by the
political parties according to their size. Thus there
were two Social Democrats, one each from the Pro-
gressives, the Liberal Left, the Radical Left, and the
Conservatives. The Christian Folk Party and the Left
Socialists alternated in one seat.
The provincial council appointed five: Lars Che -
mitz (Atassut), Niels Carlo Heilmann (Atassut), Otto
Steenholdt (Atassut) who was replaced by his brother
Konrad Steenholdt (Atassut) in 1977, Severin Johansen
(Siumut), and Jonathan Motzfeldt (Siumut). The
Green landic members of Parliament Lars Emil Jo han -
sen (Siumut) and Nikolaj Rosing were also members.
Rosing was replaced by Ole Berglund 1976, and he was
in turn replaced by Otto Steenholdt in 1977.
In agreement with the provincial council the man-
date was that: ‘Especially based on the report section
from the Greenlandic home rule committee the commis-
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sion should go through the tasks which the Ministry for
Greenland and other ministries in Denmark had regard-
ing Greenland to examine how to increase the responsi-
bility of the provincial council on these matters,’ there-
after the commission should suggest ‘a home rule
arrangement for Greenland inside the realm.’ Together
with a time table for the establishment of home rule
the commission should prepare the necessary laws to
establish it.433
This mandate was clearly how and not whether
home rule should be established, and the main model
was to transfer to a Home Rule body some of the
authority which Parliament and government in Den-
mark hitherto had in their hands. By introducing home
rule as legislation in the Danish Parliament it could in
theory be taken back again by the same Parliament.
Some scholars argued that this model was wrong. Jens
Brøsted advocated vehemently the alternative: to rec-
ognize the Greenlan ders’ rights as an independent
people, and then negotiate with them which activities
should be managed in common and which should be
run separately.434 Later Frederik Harhoff has argued
the same point in his thesis for the doctorate in law,
1993. His main point is, that even if in theory the
 Danish constitution gives the right of repealing Home
Rule, the circumstances of its introduction make it
politically impossible to do just that unilaterally. Thus
Home Rule in Greenland has added a new aspect to
the Danish constitution.435 In this respect it is not dif-
ferent from the British Parliament setting up Canada,
Australia etc. in the 19th century.
Both scholars were inspired by the new develop-
ment in international law concerning aboriginal peo-
ples. The core juridical issue was whether the Green-
landers were an independent people in their own right
over whom the Danish government had no legitimate
right to rule or whether they were a part of the popula-
tion of Denmark over which the government had such
rights. The Danish government held the latter view. In
case of a Greenlandic wish to secede completely from
Denmark the government would not object, but as
long as Greenland was a part of the Danish realm the
home rule arrangement had to respect the Danish con-
stitution just as the mandate for the commission
stated.
The final distribution of administration and policy
spheres in the Home Rule arrangement of 1979 ended
up in 3 lists:
1. Self financed activities in which the Greenlandic
authorities should have full legislative power:
The administrative system in Greenland, taxes
and duties, land use planning, fishing and hunt-
ing inside the territory, farming and herding, wild
life conservation, regulation of business and com-
petition. These areas should be transferred by
request from either side.
2. Subsidized activities to be conferred on Green-
land by specific laws agreed by both parties set-
ting out the main principles and the size of the
subsidy. The minister was responsible for ensur-
ing adherence to the principles, and Parliament
granted the subsidy, but the administration was
in the hands of the Greenlandic authorities. The
comments on the law presupposed a subsidy size
based on the costs of the activity up till now, and
regulated by the growth in the Danish GDP:
Church and religious matters, social welfare,
labour market regulations, education, culture and
conditions in business. These activities were
expected to be taken over before 1 January 1984.
Later health care, regulation of tenancy, housing
regulation, supply of goods, internal transport,
and protection of the environment could be taken
over. Further areas could with mutual agreement
be transferred in the future.
3. Activities for which the Danish authorities would
retain full legislative and financial responsibility:
The constitution, foreign policy, defence, cur-
rency, the prison system, criminal and civil law.436
Compared to the lists in the report from the Green-
landic Home Rule Committee there was a slight
rearrangement. Activities concerned with the admin-
istration of justice were moved from the self-financed
list to list no. 3. On the other hand some activities that
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the Greenlanders had suggested remain under the
Danish authorities were placed on the subsidized list.
No controversy arose from these differences but
 serious trouble came concerning mineral resources,
over which the Greenlanders wished to have authority.
The question was exempted from the Home Rule Law,
and placed in a special law.
Mineral resources
The act on mineral raw materials in Greenland of 29
November 1978 gave the Home Rule authorities as well
as the Danish government a right of veto on pro-
specting for and processing the minerals. A committee
with equal representation was established together
with a mineral agency under the Ministry of Green-
land. A crucial rule in section 26 stipulated that any
surplus income from mineral activity should be used
for reduction of the government subsidy to Greenland.
Distribution of income beyond that was up to future
negotiations.
This arrangement shows a considerable Danish
political and economic interest. Not only would the
activity be under close observation, but also the
Greenlanders would not be allowed to have the entire
surplus if there really was something to earn. The
treasury should not only be relieved of its subsidies,
but the possibility of future gains should also be safe-
guarded. This was an age-old Danish attitude. Pre-
cisely this line of thinking is found in the laws of 1908
and 1925 concerning the administration of Greenland
as treated earlier in this book. The Danish government
would like to have at least some of the subsidies paid
over the years refunded if possible. On top of that was
the new situation in the 1970s of the energy crisis, and
any extraction of oil and uranium in Greenland would
mean a greater certainty of energy supplies for Den-
mark. Importing nearly 80% of its energy at the begin-
ning of the 1970s Denmark was extremely vulnerable
to Middle East disturbance. It was only around 1990
that oil extraction from the North Sea lifted Denmark
off that hook. The Greenlanders were well aware of
that situation, I presume. Therefore they wanted to
control mineral resources themselves, not necessarily
to avoid repaying the ‘debt’ to Denmark, but rather to
be able to control their own destinies in case the
 minerals really proved profitable.
I shall venture the thesis that Danish reluctance to
let the Greenlanders have the minerals augmented
nationalism in Greenland on top of the EEC referen-
dum. The nationalistic tone was quite clear from the
beginning of the Siumut campaign. From the very first
issue of their magazine ‘SIUMUT’ in January 1975 the
right of the Greenlanders to the minerals was linked to
their being a specific people with their own rights.
‘Greenland and its treasure are owned by the aboriginal
people in the country’, it was claimed. In autumn 1975
Odaq Olsen raised the question in the provincial coun-
cil. He suggested that the opening section of the law
on minerals in Greenland instead of ‘All minerals in
Greenland belong to the state. Research and extraction of
such minerals is the prerogative of the state’ should read:
‘all mineral raw materials in Greenland, and all kind of
riches found in our country are owned by the permanent
residents in Greenland. Research and extraction of such
minerals is the prerogative of the provincial council.’ 437
Several of the council members cautioned that
this was a touchy subject, but were nevertheless in
favour of giving a statement of principle before the
home rule negotiations started. Reluctantly, the chair-
man, Lars Chemnitz, took the question to a vote: ‘He
put to vote that the Greenlandic underground and its
riches belong to the permanent residents, and this should
be stated in the home rule negotiations.’ The fourteen
members carried his suggestion unanimously.438
This is the version in the minutes in the words of
the secretary. According to the taped version the cru-
cial term for the owners was (here translated to Eng-
lish): ‘The riches in Greenland belong to its population’
and ‘Riches in Greenland should belong to the permanent
population in Greenland.’439 It is understandable that
discussion arose about what exactly was decided, and
in the coming political debate there was argument
about who belonged to the permanent population.
The newspaper A/G 6 November 1975 used different
expressions for the ‘owners’ such as the population of
Greenland, the local population, the population in the
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country, the permanent population, the Greenlanders,
the Greenlandic population. The parallel text in
Green landic said (here translated to English): the
Greenlanders, the real inhabitants of Greenland, the
population in our country, the Greenlandic people/
society, and the Greenlandic people.440 The different
expressions show that the nation building was still at
an early stage, but they all excluded the Danish
 government from ownership.
During 1976 the divisions hardened. The Young
Greenlanders’ Council together with some youth
organizations in Greenland held a summer festival
(aasivik in Greenlandic). Their resolution demanded a
free, independent Greenland in which the Danish
authorities had been replaced by Greenlandic ones in
a bloodless revolution.441 The prime minister of Den-
mark, Anker Jørgensen, said in a broadcast interview
on 4 November 1976: ‘No dice! If you want ownership of
mineral resources in Greenland then you must face the
consequences and say that you want to cut the links to
Denmark.’ The expression was remembered in Green-
land. When the prime minister visited Greenland in
1977 he was given a pair of dice cups engraved ‘No
dice!’ (actually in Danish: ’Der er ikke noget at rafle
om’).442 The same attitude expressed in other words
prevailed among the Danish members of the home
rule commission at their meetings in November
1976.443
It was the Siumut party that had raised the ques-
tion of the ownership of the minerals, and it was per-
sistent. Their magazine had a permanent column from
November 1976 to April 1977 in which the wording of
the UN convention of 16 December 1966 was stated:
‘All people have a right freely to dispose of their natural
riches and resources to their own benefit.‘ When the
negotiations reached deadlock on the issue it was Siu-
mut that found a solution. On 17 may 1977 the Nuuk
branch of the party decided to suggest to the commis-
sion: ‘In order to safeguard the basic right of the Green-
landic nation to the mineral resources in Greenland, a
law shall be made which shall stipulate that research and
extraction of the said resources shall take place according
to agreement between the Greenlandic authorities and
the Danish government respecting the existing union
between the two countries.’444 The expression ‘the
Green landic nation’ was too narrow for the Danish
members, so the final version became: ‘The permanent
population in Greenland has basic rights to the natural
resources in Greenland’ (Section 8, 1).
This version would include those born in Den-
mark who for a shorter or longer time lived perma-
nently in Greenland.
Membership of EEC
As described above this question had started the whole
process of introducing home rule for Greenland. In
brief, it could be said that Greenland wanted home
rule to disconnect itself from the EEC. But the law on
home rule in Greenland did not lay down how this
could happen. Section 15 simply stated that the Danish
government in cooperation with the Home Rule
authorities should take care of Greenlandic interests in
the EEC. A brief reference was made in the report, that
home rule would not be an obstacle to changing the
relation of Greenland to the EEC. Such a change would
require action from the central government, and was
not to be regulated in the Home Rule Act.445
The Left Socialist member, Steen Folke, had raised
the question in the commission but the majority
refused it as being outside their mandate.446 On the
other hand, the Danish government had officially
promised that it would respect a wish from the future
home rule authority to alter Greenland’s relationship
to the EEC.447 This was apparently guarantee enough
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for Siumut. As it turned out, Greenland left the EEC in
1985 without any controversy.
Implementation of the Home Rule
1979
The law on Home Rule for Greenland was unani-
mously carried in the provincial council in April 1978,
and was debated in Parliament in May. Only the Left
Socialists who found it too limited, and the Progres-
sive Party who found it too far-reaching expressed
reservations. Lars Emil Johansen, Siumut Party, had to
be in favour as he had accepted the result as partici-
pant in the negotiations. But he did not omit to indi-
cate that the result did not fully comply with their
wishes even if it was better than the present arrange-
ment. ‘We have not given up any of our demands, but we
have realised that due to superior counter force we have
to wait for their fulfilment.’
The final vote in Parliament was taken in Novem-
ber 1978 with all parties in favour except the two men-
tioned at each end of the political spectrum.
The referendum on 17 January 1979 in Greenland
gave a massive 73% in favour. Three parties had advo-
cated a yes: Atassut, Siumut, and the newly estab-
lished Workers Party, while the left wing Inuit Ata -
qatigiit was against. The election to the new local Par-
liament, the Landstinget, took place on 4 April, and
gave Atassut 41.7%, Siumut 46.1% of the valid votes.
Due to the election system Siumut gained 13 of the 21
seats in Landstinget while Atassut took the rest. Siu-
mut members took office in the new home rule
 government, Landsstyret: Jonathan Motzfeldt, prime
minister; Lars Emil Johansen, business affairs; Thue
Christiansen, Culture; Anders Andreasen, outlaying
districts; and Moses Olsen, social welfare.
On 1 May 1979 the home rule authorities took over
responsibly for future development on the agreed
terms. A new era could begin.
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A keynote in the introduction of Home Rule was to
make Greenland more Greenlandic. It has in many
ways succeeded, although slowly, and much of the old
system prevailed now with Nuuk as the centre instead
of Copenhagen. The hard facts of nature and distance
both to the world markets and internally cannot be
changed merely by a new political leadership.
The population
It had been a political goal since the 19th century to
have Greenlanders staffing the adminis tration and
other employment in Greenland. However, the con-
struction of a modern infra structure drew an army of
Danish workers and administrators to Greenland after
1950. Reducing the need for guest workers was there-
fore another goal of the Home Rule authorities. The
development is shown in diagram 10. The number of
Danes in Greenland has recently fallen, numerically as
well as relatively. From 7,620 (16.4%) in 1970 the num-
ber reached a peak of 9,572 (17.7%) in 1987 and has
since fallen to 6,622 (11.8%) in 2000.448
The Home Rule Authorities and the municipalities
followed the same trend in gradually increasing the
percentage of Greenlanders in the public service. The
statistics distinguish only between those employed on
local terms and those employed at expatriate rates.
This will roughly correspond to Greenlan ders and
Danes even though more and more Danes were em -
ployed on local terms. The result can be seen in dia-
gram 11.
The average has risen from about 55% in 1978 to
75% in 1993, the municipalities having the highest per-
centage. The apparent decline in 1979-80 in Home
Rule local staff is due to the take over of staff previ-
ously employed by the Danish administration in
Greenland, and reorganisation of the public agencies
in 1986-87 is responsible for the similar decline in
those years. In reality the administration of Greenland
has become more Greenlandic.
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Diagram 10. Greenlanders and Danes in
Greenland 1970-2000 (GSÅ).
The economy
Running the economy was without question the great-
est single task for the Home Rule Authority. State com-
panies or agencies operated all major business. These
were at an appropriate time to be taken over by the
Home Rule Authority. The proportion of the work
force in the three basic economic sectors has been
fairly stable during the period.
In the primary sector fishing was dominant with
2,419 persons in 1976, and 3,450 in 1996. The second-
ary sector was mostly made up of fish processing fac-
tories. It is significant that between a half and two
third of the work force was employed in public ad-
ministration and in companies and agencies owned by
the Home Rule Authority.
Fishing
Fishing has dominated Greenlandic production since
the 1920s. The develop ment since 1978 is shown in dia-
gram 12. Greenlandic fishing means fishing by Green-
landic vessels predominantly in Greenlandic waters.
Very little is taken outside.
The diagram shows that the shrinking of the cod
fishery continued after 1978 except for some good
years around 1990. Cod fishing is very sensitive to even
small variations in sea temperatures. Shrimp fishing
has taken its place, and in the closing years of the cen-
tury also other species, especially Greenland halibut
and crabs. The overall picture is that the catch has
doubled in the 20 years of Home rule – again with the
exception of the extraordinary good catches around
1990.
The economic importance of fishing is great.
Unfortunately, Greenland Statistics count only the
gross domestic production at factor cost for the whole
economy, and not for the different sectors, so the
annual development cannot be shown. A special re -
port in 1998 calculated the gross turnover for fishing,
hunting and the fish processing industry as Dkr. 2.455
billion out of a total turnover in the whole economy of
Dkr. 9.712 billion, thus corresponding to 25.3%.449
Exports give quite another picture. In these, export of
fish products accounts for about 95 % in the late 1990s.
Hunting
The age-old primary economic activity, the hunting of
sea mammals, has shown a steady growth. But the
decrease of its economic importance is visible in the
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Diagram 11. Local work force in public
service (Petersen & Janussen 1998:
150).
Table 31. Distribution of the work force 1976 and 1996 by sec-
tor (GSÅ 1980: table 69; Danielsen 1998: 124-126, 176-184).
1976 % 1996 %
Primary sector 3,262 17.2 4,11 16.3
Secondary sector 5,1 26.8 4,82 19.1
Tertiary sector 1,976 56.0 16,24 64.5
Total 19,013 100.0 25,17 100.0
Employed by the 
authorities 10,659 56.1 15,143 60.2
fact that Greenland statistics from 1979 to 1992 esti-
mated that 700-800 hunters were active, sustaining a
population of 2500 persons, mainly in the north and
east of the country. In 1993 a system of hunting
licences was introduced, and the number of persons
who hunted for a living and those who hunted as
leisure were recorded together with their catches.
It is quite clear that the number of persons with
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Diagram 12. Greenlandic fishing 1978-
2000 (Grønland 1980-89; Greenland
Statistics 1990-2001).
Fig. 22. Contemporary Greenland is well serviced by modern stores. Photo Aka Lynge/PolarPhotos, 2006.
hunting as their main occupation has declined while
the number of leisure hunters has soared. Nearly
12,000 persons are active in shooting seals, other sea
mammals, birds, and reindeer. This is equivalent to
half of the male population over 15 years of age.450 So
clearly, hunting has still an importance for the popula-
tion as a supplement to the food supply although in
the money economy it is insignificant. In the mid
1980s trading-in of hunting products counted for less
than 0.5% of the GDP451. The catch of seals – although
with no figures 1983-1992 – and the trading-in of seal
hides is shown in diagram 13.
The higher level from 1993 in the catch is no doubt
due to better statis tics, because with the introduction
of the new licensing system all catches were reported
and not only what is traded. It is also clear that only a
frac tion of the hides was traded-in. The rest was used
by the hunter himself or sold to private buyers. It is
interesting to note that in the hey day of seal hunting
around 1900 barely 100.000 seals were caught. 452
Mining
Mining has had a very chequered history in Green-
land. From 1854 to the Second World War cryolite was
a significant economic asset for the Greenland admin-
istration but mining and export finally ceased in 1987
due to exhaustion of reserves. From 1924 to 1972 a
coalmine on the island of Disko contributed to fuel
supplies. A lead and zinc mine operated at Mestersvig
on the east coast 1956-62.453 Then in the 1970s another
lead and zinc mine was opened at an old quarry, Maar-
morilik, just north of Uummannaq. Because of a black
part on the rock wall in the shape of an angel, it was
named ‘The Black Angel’. It was operated by Greenex
A/S (a Danish-Canadian company) from 1973-1990
when the deposits were exhausted. At its height it
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Diagram 13. Seal catch and trading in
of seal hides 1978-2000 (Greenland
Statistics 1980-2001).
Table 32. Hunters in Greenland 1993-2001 (Greenland
Statistics 1995: 88; Greenland Statistics 2001: 104).
For a living For leisure Total
1993 4,067 5,452 9,519
1994 3,150 4,166 7,316
1995 3,294 4,092 7,386
1996 3,996 5,930 9,926
1997 2,617 6,985 9,602
1998 2,573 7,642 10,215
1999 2,706 8,320 11,026
2000 2,585 8,193 10,778
2001 2,669 9,302 11,971
employed around 300 workers, half being Greenlan-
ders454. Over the years much effort has been devoted to
prospecting for minerals and oil. Many concessions
have been awarded, but so far without any economic
success.
The economic importance of mining can be seen
in diagram 14, showing minerals as a proportion of
exports.
In addition to their economic significance mineral
resources and mining played a major role in politics
causing political disagreement in the negotia tions for
Home Rule as noted above (The road to Home Rule).
During the Home Rule negotiations the Greenlanders
resented the proposal that mineral reserves should
remain the property of the central government. After
negotiations a compromise of joint manage ment
between the Home Rule Authority and the central gov-
ernment was agreed. Initially the joint administration
of the mineral business was in Copenhagen, but
moved to Nuuk in 1998. The original agreement from
1978 was that royalties from the mining companies
should be shared equally between Greenland and Den-
mark, but the basic Danish subsidy to Greenland was
to be reduced by the amount of royalties gained on an
annual basis. This was amended in 1988 to give Green-
land 50%
of the revenue up to Dkr. 500 million without any
reduction in the block grant. Sharing of any revenue
above this level was to be negotiated between the par-
ties.455
Other occupations on land
In Greenland – like other modern societies – most of
the work force is employed outside the primary extrac-
tive industries. The distribution of employment in
1996 is shown in table 33.
One quarter of the work force is employed in mar-
itime activities. Of the remainder public administra-
tion, private service, and transport account for 41.1%
of the work force. The infrastructure is operated by
publicly owned companies operating aviation, ship-
ping and energy supply. Other businesses on land are
building and construction, employing nearly 2,000
persons, commerce with 3,540 persons, and various
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Table 33. Distribution of the work force 1996 (Danielsen 1998:
178).
No. employed %
Fishing and fish processing 6,380 25.5
Raw materials 40 0.2
Tourism 210 0.8
Other business on land 8,220 32.7
Public infrastructure 2,130 8.5
Public administration and
private service 7,950 31.6
Marine and air bases 240 1.0
In total 25,170 100.0
other services with 1,040 persons. The remaining
1,640 are employed in hotels and restaurants, as con-
sultants, and production other than fish processing.456
The companies
From the earliest beginning in 1721 one large company
had managed all trade into and out of Greenland.
From 1776 it was organized as the Royal Greenland
Trade Department, which was own by the state. As
time went on the company took control of preparing
products for export and all related business such as
internal transport, carpentry, ship repair, construction
of public buildings and provision of infrastructure. By
1950 the technical aspects were taken over by another
state agency, the Greenland Technical Organisation
(GTO).
An important part of the Home Rule arrangement
was to hand over the administration and financial
responsibility for these companies to the Home Rule
Authority. The largest, the Royal Greenland Trade De -
partment, was to be taken over in stages. The first part,
PROEKS (production and export), was scheduled to be
transferred by 1 January 1984, but was postponed for a
year. It was divided into three independent agencies:
 KTU: Kalaallit Tunisassiorfiat (production)
 GHT: Grønlands Hjemmestyres Trawlervirk-
somhed (Home Rule Authority owned Trawler
Fleet)
 Royal Greenland: internal supplies and export
sales.
The RGTD had run a deficit for many years, which had
been covered by the Danish treasury. Thus it was
agreed that following the Greenlandic take-over a con-
tinued subsidy would be provided by Copenhagen to
cover the expected continuing deficit.
To calculate the deficit was not that easy because
it differed from year to year. From 1980-1983 the aver-
age deficit in production and export was about Dkr.
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Fig. 23. The bulk of export and import is by ship. Here a pile of containers and one of Royal Arctic Line’s carriers in Nuuk harbour.
Photo Axel Kjær Sørensen 2003.
100 million, so it seemed fair that the Danish govern-
ment offered this amount as subsidy. Unfortunately,
the year of the final negotiation, 1984, produced a
much larger deficit of Dkr. 228.2 million. Under these
circumstances the offer was finally raised to Dkr. 165
million. The Greenlanders grudgingly agreed, but they
were not pleased.
The Greenlanders had high expectations for this
part of the economy. Hugh invest ments in the fishing
industry was proposed, and actually carried through.
New forms of management were contemplated, in -
cluding local production committees, made up of local
politicians, trade unions, and the local branch of the
fishermen’ and hunters’ association. These committees
were to have the functions of a Board of Directors for
the factories, but they never operated effectively.
In some ways the PROEKS did well. Dkr. 1 billion
was invested in new trawlers, new processing facto-
ries, and new sales offices in Denmark and other coun-
tries, and the turnover grew from Dkr. 530 millions to
874 millions in three years. The problem was, that the
PROEKS also ran a deficit, as much as Dkr. 321 millions
in 1987. Such losses would threaten the financial basis
of the Home Rule Authority and the whole Greenland
economy, and the agency was reorganized in 1990 by
merging the three branches into a single company,
Royal Greenland Ltd. in which the Home Rule Author-
ity held all the shares.457
In the mean time – by 1 January 1986 – the Home
Rule Authority had taken over the rest of the RGTD
which had handled the supplies to Greenland, the
postal service, retail sales in Greenland, internal and
international passenger traffic, airports and heliports.
Another company owned by the Home Rule Authority,
KNI (Kalaallit Niuerfiat) was put in charge of the busi-
ness. The block grant was enlarged by Dkr. 37 millions,
corresponding to the previous Danish net contribution
to the business. The business principles of the RGTD
continued. The main characteristic was that retail
prices should be the same everywhere in Greenland
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Fig. 24. Greenland has also its own international airline. Here one of Greenland Air’s aircraft in Søndre Strømfjord bound for Den-
mark. Photo Aka Lynge/PolarPhotos, 2006.
regardless of real cost. Thus retail prices in the coastal
cities were higher than necessary to cover the extra
cost in transportation to the outlying settlements thus
leaving room for private retailers to undercut the KNI
in the bigger towns.458
The KNI did rather well in the early years. It ran a
surplus until 1991, taking advantage of being the com-
missioned wholesale importer of dutiable goods to pri-
vate retail dealers. The KNI also aggressively ex panded
their shops in the bigger towns to compete with private
business, in fact with so much success that the organi-
sation hitherto the favourite of Siumut, the coopera-
tives, ran into great difficulties. In 1992 the Home Rule
Authority ordered KNI to reduce its wholesale profit,
and then reconstructed KNI, ending its monopoly on
import of dutiable goods, and splitting the business
into three separate companies from 1 January 1993.
Firstly there was KNI Detail A/S – later Pisiffik – which
was to compete on free market terms in the larger
towns, and was no longer obliged to have the same
prices all over Greenland. Secondly KNI Service A/S –
later Pilersuisoq – was to take over the retail shops in
smaller towns and settlements where the market was
too small for real competition, delivering supplies at
reasonable prices. A yearly subsidy of Dkr. 100 millions
from the Home Rule Authority was given to keep prices
down. Finally Royal Arctic Line A/S covered all sea
transport to and from Greenland and inland freight. At
first a Danish shipping company, J. Lauritzen, became
a partner with two-thirds of the shares,459 but two years
later, 31 May 1996, J. Lauritzen sold his shares to the
Home Rule Authority, and the Royal Arctic Line was
again a public owned company.460
Thanks to the subsidy to Pilersuisoq the whole
KNI-concern managed to run a surplus from 1996.461
The next stage of transfer took place on 1 January
1987 when the huge Greenland Technical Organisation
became an agency owned 100% by the Home Rule
Authority. It was renamed Nunatek and had five sec-
tions:
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Fig. 25. Ilisimatusarfik – University of Greenland is not the biggest university in the Danish realm, but its location is certainly the
most beautiful. Notice the iceberg to the right in the fiord. It has drifted 100 km from the permanent ice cap. The building is the
old station for the Moravian Brethren build in 1738. The university moved in after a restoration in 1987. It has about 150 stu-
dents in 4 faculties: Greenlandic language and literature; business; cultural and social history; and theology. Photo Axel Kjær
Sørensen 2003.
 Nuna-Tek Tele was in charge of telephone and
postal and telegraphic service
 Nuna-Tek byggevæsen (construction of shipyards,
service, energy and water supply)
 Nuna-Tek Værfter (shipyards)
 Nuna-Tek Energi (energy)
The new organisation was supposed to aim at bal-
anced budgets like the old GTO. The yearly deficits
had been covered by the Danish treasury, and the
block grant was augmented by Dkr. 62 millions to con-
tinue this practice.462
Some of the services were later reorganised as
limited companies. Nuna-Tek Tele became Tele Green-
land A/S on 1 June 1994, and its postal services be -
came a division under its own name, Post Greenland,
on 1 July 1997. In 1994 the administration of the houses
and flats owned by the Home Rule Authority was
organised as a limited company under the name of A/S
Boligselskabet INI, the Home Rule Authority holding
all the shares.
The general pattern of these transfers of agencies
has been first a virtually unchanged organisation
under a Greenlandic name, then later in the mid and
late 1990s reorganisation as limited compa nies, proba-
bly following the trend in European and Danish public
administration to privatise state owned companies.
This perhaps took the burden of daily administration
from the Home Rule Authority, but left it as owner
with responsibility for the overall policy all the same.
The last major activity to transfer was the health
care system which was taken over on 1 January 1992
without any reconstruction of the organisation.
By these transfers the Home Rule Authority be -
came responsible for the whole Greenlandic economy
and public administration. The Home Rule Authority
had in some ways the same position as the RGTD at the
beginning of the century, being in charge of all law
A MORE GREENLANDIC GREENLAND
160
462. Skydsbjerg 1998: 104.
Fig. 26. The old harbour seen in 2003. In front the first hospital, beside the flag pole to the left is the house built for Hans Egede
in 1728, and further down the quay are the Trade Department’s buildings, now Greenland National Museum. Above the
museum there are new blocks of flats from the late 20th century. Photo Axel Kjær Sørensen.
making, investment decisions, and of running the
greater part of the economy.
The Greenlandic finance
The overall Greenlandic economy continued in the
Home Rule period to be characterised by a substan tial
subsidy from Denmark, now mostly administered by
the Greenlanders themselves. The subsidy raised the
living standard to a level comparable with continental
Europe. Thus the GDP per inhabi tant in 1997 was US$
19,251 placing Greenland between Cana da and Spain
in affluence. If the subsidy from Denmark is included
the total was US$ 27,209 to spend per inhabitant thus
placing it in the vicinity of the US level.463 From 1980
the subsidy was in two parts, a block grant and some
direct expenses.
The block grant
The block grant was supposed to cover the expenses of
functions where the Home Rule Authority took over
administration with an agreed subsidy. Thus its size
depended on which activities were taken over, and cal-
culated from the net state expenses of the previous
years. The idea was that the Danish treasury should
neither loose nor gain by the transfer. In order to keep
up with inflation it was agreed that the calculated
amount should be adjusted by the change in the Dan-
ish GDP at factor cost in the private sector. This was in
fact very beneficial for Greenland, because it reflected
not only the rising prices but also the real growth in
the Danish economy. Greenland was so to speak guar-
anteed the same percentage of the Danish GDP as it
had in 1979.
The block grant was given by the Danish parlia-
ment. The procedure was that the Danish government
first agreed terms with the Home Rule authorities on
the grant, and then presented a bill to parliament
where a very large majority carried it.
It was expected that the arrangement would be
reviewed every three years. In fact it was reviewed
after one year in 1980, and again in 1982, 1984, 1985,
and several times later, because new functions were
transferred, and a new adjustment principle intro-
duced. This new principle was introduced in 1983 on
Greenland’s request to allow for the fact that inflation
in Greenland was higher than in Denmark. In 1982
Greenland inflation was 13.5% while in Denmark it
was only 10.1%. It was agreed that the increase instead
of following the Danish GDP, should follow the mecha-
nism used for setting the budget of the Ministry for
Greenland which also took inflation in Greenland into
account. In return Greenland agreed that the royalties
from Greenex’s mining should be fully deducted from
the block grant.464 The change was accepted by the
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Fig. 27. The freighter had just unloaded
its cargo at Uummannaq harbour. It
brought chocolate and sweets and
some cans of beer from Denmark, milk
from Norway, cork from southern
Europe, fruit from southern Africa, and
apples from Tasmania. Photo Kirsten
Basse 1975.
Danish parliament, which stressed that the mecha-
nism now agreed should be the final one.465 But later in
1988 when the Ministry for Greenland had ceased to
exist, the system again changed to follow general Dan-
ish inflation. In return Greenland was allowed to keep
up to Dkr. 500 millions of the mining royalties without
any deduction from the block grant.466
In 1983 by these changes Greenland gained a
13.09% increase, against a rise of only 10.1% in Danish
GDP, and 6.9% Danish inflation. But the link to real
growth in the Danish economy was broken. As infla-
tion came under control from the mid eighties Green-
land did not quite follow suit, thus reducing the value
of the block grant in Greenland. Since 1994 however
inflation in Greenland has been slightly lower than in
Denmark, making the block grant – increased by the
Danish rate of inflation – more valuable.
The overall development can be seen in diagrams
15-17. Direct expenses have over the years been
replaced by the block grant.
The total transfer has risen from Dkr. 2.0 billion in
1980 to Dkr. 3.5 billion in 2000. Allowing for Green-
landic inflation, however the value in 2000 was actu-
ally only Dkr. 1.420, a decline of nearly 30%. Using
Danish inflation rates, since most imports to Green-
land comes from Denmark the figures would be Dkr.
1.515 billion in 2000, a decline of 25%, as shown in dia-
gram 16.
This finding is congruent with an analysis made
by the econo mist Martin Paldam who calculated that
while at constant prices the Danish grant tripled 1955-
1979 with an annual growth rate of 4.8%, from 1980-
1992 again at constant prices it declined by 18% giving
an annual decline of 1.5%.467 This means that Green-
land covered more of the expenses herself assuming
that the national income of Greenland was stable
which seems to have been the case.
Diagram 17 has been constructed from figures pro-
vided by the Greenland Statistical Office. The gross
domestic income is made up of local production (GDP)
and the subsidy giving the total available to Green-
landic society for consumption and investment, public
as well as private. After an initial leap of 10% in 1980
the trend was downwards until 1993 with an interme-
diate rise 1987-9. From 1994 the trend was steadily
 rising so the Greenlanders were almost 10% better off
in 2000 than in 1979. This seems to indicate that the
age-old political goal that Greenland should raise its
living standard by its own effort was happening with
the Home Rule Authorities in charge.
The balance of trade
The grant from Denmark allows Green land to run a
deficit in her balance of trade. This has been the case
in most years except in 1989-1990, when there was a
small surplus, but the deficit is not as great as the sub-
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Diagram 15. Trans fer from Denmark,
current prices 1980-2000 (Grønland
1980-89; Greenland Statistics 1990-
2000).
sidy. Up to 50% of the transfer is possibly used for extra
imports, but mostly the deficit is fluctuating around
25% of the subsidy. The reason may be that the guest
workers and others place their savings outside Green-
land and thus create a substantial capital export, but
this is not shown by the statistics which do not cover
capital exports. Exports and import of services are also
missing from the figures.468
Greenland is predominantly a fishing economy,
and has become more so during the Home Rule years.
From around 50% of exports in 1979 it has risen to
between 90-95% in the late 1990s, because export of
minerals ceased about 1990. Since 1990 Greenland sta-
tistics have shown imports divided into goods required
by industry and goods for consumption. The two sets
of figures are of the same magnitude.469
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The political parties
As men tioned in the previous chapter two parties
dominated the early Home Rule years: Sium ut and
Atassu t. They held this position for the next twenty
years although the leftist party, Inuit Ataqatigiit, man-
aged to increase its electoral support from 4.4% in
1979 to 22.1% in 1999. The Workers Party disappeared
after the 1979 election, but other small parties took 1-4
seats 1987-1999. If we consider Siumut, Inuit Ata -
qatigi it and the Workers Party as leftist and Atassut
and the others as centre or rightist parties, then leftist
parties have been the majority for the whole period.
Siumut had always been the largest party, except
in 1983 where Atassut gained 46.6% of the votes and
Siumut only 41.3%, but as Inuit Ataqatigiit got 10.6%
and supported Siumut it stayed in power. Again in
1987 Atassut gained slightly more votes than Siumut,
but from 1984 to 1995 Siumut ruled in coalition with
Inuit Ataqatigiit, and again from 1999. From 1995-1999
a grand coalition of Siumut and Atassut formed the
local government.
Politics
The aim of the new trend in Greenlandic politics from
the beginning of the 1970s was to make Greenland
more Greenland ic and more self-reliant. As shown
above the first step on the economic journey has been
taken, and the composition of the work force is more
Greenlandic in 2000 than in 1979. But there is much
more to it than this. To make Greenland more Green -
lan dic was also to develop a stronger feeling among
the Greenlan ders that they were a separate nation and
that they had much to be proud of. They were not just
incomplete Danes, but a separate nation with its own
culture, language, and values, which demanded to be
recognised as such. To be part of the Danish realm was
acceptable as long as they were allowed to develop
their own society up to modern standards following
their own values. Based on a century long tradition in
Danish Greenland policy they expected to be sup-
ported by Denmark in their endeavours not least
financially. That support was granted.
The concentration policy470
Since the days of hunting the population in Greenland
had lived dispersed in relatively small groups along
the coast, a distribution well suited to a hunting
 society. Colonisation from 1721 did little to change this
situation because hunting was still the primary busi-
ness up till the beginning of the twentieth century.
Then something new happened. The population began
a voluntary movement from the smaller to the bigger
settle ments, after 1950 called towns, as can be seen in
diagram 19.
The speed of concentra tion increased from the
1920s be fore it became official policy in the 1950s
when it may have caus ed the steeper slope of the curve
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during that period. It is also noteworthy that the rate
of concentration was slowing before the Home Rule
Authority began its policy of preserving the smaller
settlements in the early 1980s. Even after 1980 the
decline con tinued steadily. The lesson seems to be that
a popu lation migrates mainly according to pull and
push factors in their sur roundings. State policy may be
influential on the margin, but cannot really change the
course of the movement.
Already in the 1950s the Greenlandic politicians
were becoming reluctant to encourage concentration
because the bigger settlements did not have sufficient
housing and employment to take in substantial num-
bers of coastal people. The general wisdom of concen-
tration was not questioned. A new angle was added to
the issue during the political discussion in the 1970s in
the search for a more Greenlandic Greenland. To live
in small settlements in balance with the surrounding
nature was hailed as the genuine Greenlandic way of
living. In this view the concentration policy, formu-
lated by the Danes, and supported by the Greenlandic
politicians of those days had endangered this piece of
genuine Greenland.471
The new generation of Greenlandic politicians in
charge from 1979 felt that something had to be done to
preserve this vital part of Greenlandic identity. The
Home Rule Authority took action immediately. The
first Home Rule government (Landsstyre) of 1979 was
formed by Siumut, which won 13 of the 21 seats in par-
liament, and 5 of these seats came from the remote
areas. Suddenly the population in these areas held a
crucial political importance. No wonder then that
 settlements and remote districts got their own min-
istry headed by Anders Andreasen, elected in the dis-
trict of Ammassalik on the east coast.
He launched a major programme to give the
smaller settlements and remote districts facilities like
those in the towns. Every settlement should have a fac-
tory for fish processing – smoking, drying and salting.
Furthermore there should be a power station, and an
adequate water supply. The Home Rule Authority
would provide generous financial support, lowering
the local contribu tion from 5 to 2.5% of the invest-
ment. The businesses should be arranged as coopera-
tives, so the local population could own and manage
their own production. Cooperative business has long
been supported by Siumut as a way to escape the dis-
liked capitalistic private enterprise, and the over-
whelming presence of the Royal Greenland Trade
Department. Since 1974 a great many power plants had
been established in the settlements on a cooperative
basis.
Besides investment in production facilities every
settlement was also to have a community centre for
meetings and cultural activities, and a service building
with washing facilities, and facilities for preparation of
hides and mending of tools.
No one in the Landsting dared to contest his pro-
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gramme. It was carried unanimously.472 The key words
were: decentralisation, participation, and cooperative
ownership of the means of production. The implemen-
tation of the programme was however far from easy.
Power supply in the settlements faced problems in
financing and in lack of skilled maintenance staff. On
top of this the price of power was far higher than in the
towns because of the small number of consumers. An
implementation programme for the service buildings
was first initiated in 1983, but by 1991 only 13 had been
build with 5 under construction. 40 settlements were
still without.473
In January 1985 the settlement policy took an -
other direction, in practice if not in theory. A five-year
plan was established with heavy investment in the
fishing industry. The greater part of the investment
went to fish processing plants in the towns and to build
up a high sea fishing fleet, just like all the plans since
1950. For the next 4 years Dkr. 1.5 billion474 were
invested, of which some Dkr. 12 million was reserved
for modernisation of the plants in the small settle-
ments. However, by 1988 only Dkr. 3.8 million was
actually spent.475 The political desire to fulfil the prom-
ises to the settlements obviously remained, but it faced
difficulty in practice. Perhaps someone had got second
thoughts about the economic wisdom of trying to help
the settlements catch up with the towns in facilities. A
report from the Home Rule Authority in 1989 sug-
gested that four smaller settlements with 66, 49, 36,
and 7 inhabitants were too small to receive industrial
production facilities. For all the others the pledge to
modernise their production facilities over time was
maintained.476
The main objective of the five-year plan of 1985
was to make Greenland economically more self
reliant, and a keyword for the operation of PROEKS
was business like. The agencies of the Home Rule
Authority should be oriented towards business and
profit. At the same time the principle of support for the
settlements should rule. The huge investments did not
pay off. The Home Rule Authority borrowed increas-
ingly until in 1988 the brakes were applied. Now the
virtues were frugality and efficiency, to use the avail-
able means as efficiently as possible. In real life that
would mean investment in those towns with a capacity
to utilise the new plant and factories most efficiently.
But smaller settlements should still be developed. In
1989 the minister in charge of fishery, industry and
outer districts, Kaj Egede, managed to secure an
annual commitment of Dkr. 132 million to settlement
development. But this did not happen, perhaps
because the professional management in the industry
did not pursue the goal already having trouble in get-
ting enough fish to process in the town factories, per-
haps because of a tacit political agenda which fa -
voured economic rationality, but did not dare to bring
it out in the open.477
In 1990 the minister for economy, trade and traf-
fic, Emil Abelsen, dared. In the clash between eco-
nomic rationality and continued investment in the set-
tlements, he chose rationality. We must concentrate
our resources in the natural centres of growth, and use
some of the profit from these centres to improve life in
the settlements, was the future policy he proposed for
his party Siumut. Qaqortoq in the south, Nuuk, Sisi-
miut, and Ilulissat on the west coast were singled out
as these natural centres of growth. The plan was
accepted in the Landsting, but a veritable storm of
protest broke out from the mayors of those towns not
named as centres. They were afraid their communities
would not benefit from investment. Emil Abelsen tried
to calm them down in the press by in effect repudiat-
ing the controversial content of the new policy, stress-
ing that the solidarity policy was still in operation.
After the 1991 election Lars Emil Johansen succeeded
Jonathan Motzfeldt as prime minister. He formed a
coalition government of Siumut and Inuit Ataqatigiit,
and further conciliated the mayors at the meeting of
the municipal association in May 1991, declaring that
the new government had a quite different approach to
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development policy. The idea of the four growth cen-
tres was dead.478 Despite this retreat the decline of
 settlement popula tion continued (diagram 19), so if a
more Greenlandic way of living means to live in small
dispersed settlements, the Home Rule period has not
managed to keep Greenland Greenlandic is this
respect.
Leaving the EEC
As described in The Road to Home Rule the inclusion
of Greenland in the European Common Market in 1972
was a major reason for the Greenlanders to seek a
Home Rule arrangement so they could get out again.
In the meantime the Home Rule Authority chose to
play the game. Some investments were reimbursed by
the regional fund from Brussels via Copenhagen; the
magnitude was about Dkr. 46 million a year. Some
social expenses to a value of about Dkr. 33 million a
year were likewise reimbursed. Other funds provided
6 million a year. And the European Investment Bank
provided some Dkr. 32 million annually in loans dur-
ing the 1970s.479 The total reached about Dkr. 84 mil-
lion a year in addition to the loans. The grants from
the EEC represented about 8% of the value of the Dan-
ish grant to Greenland which was about Dkr. 1 billion a
year at 1980 level. The EEC grant corresponded
roughly to the level of income from selling fishing
licenses to the community after Greenland left the EEC
in 1985.
For the direct elections to the European Parlia-
ment in 1979 Denmark got 16 seats, but gave one of
these to Greenland. The Siumut candidate, Finn
Lynge, was elected on 9 June 1979 against Atassut’s
Jørgen Chemnitz. Only 33.5% of the electorate actu-
ally voted. Lynge repeated his victory in 1984 against
another Atassut candidate, Konrad Steenholdt. The
poll was again very low: 35.6%.480 In the meantime a
referendum was held in Greenland on 23 February
1982 on whether to stay in or leave the EEC. Nearly
three out of four voters participated. 52.2% voted for
leaving while 46.0% preferred to stay.481 This was a
clear majority, but much less than the 73% votes
against ECC in 1972.
Greenland actually withdrew from the EEC on 1
February 1985. A status similar to other EEC attached
former colonial dependencies and territories overseas
was negotiated that gave Greenland free access to the
European market, even for fish products. In return
Greenland was to allow a negotiated access to fishing
in Greenlandic waters for EEC fishermen under a
licence, which the EEC paid for.482 The income from
fishing licences became a source of steady income over
the years. Starting in 1985 with some Dkr. 200 millions
on a yearly basis it rose to nearly Dkr. 300 millions in
2000 correspond ing to around 8% of the income of the
Home Rule Authority.483
The negotiated agreement brought political
upheaval in Greenland because of the concession of
access to fishing. In the Home Rule Parliament Inuit
Ataqatigiit voted against while Atassut grudg ingly
accepted, but then supported a no-confidence motion.
The Home Rule statute did not allow dissolution of the
Parliament during the elected period, but the Parlia-
ment then passed such a law, and an election followed
on 6 June1984. The outcome was a stalemate between
Siumut and Ata ssut, as before the election, but now
Siumut and Inuit Ataqati giit formed a new Home Rule
government, a coalition that lasted to 1995.484
Departure from the European Union was not
intended to isolate Greenland from the world. The
intention was rather to maximise control of its own
affairs. It is a matter of political judgement whether
the Greenlandic interests are best taken care of inside
or outside the union. You may argue that being outside
the union Greenland is more on its own, though with-
out being entirely isolated. I think the matter might be
different if Greenland could join the union as a full
member, not as part of Denmark.
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The Greenlandic flag
To build a nation you need a flag. Before 1979 the
 Danish flag was used in Greenland by both the author-
ities and citizens. The newspaper A/G took the initia-
tive in late 1978 by inviting its readers to suggest the
form of a national flag. It received many ideas, but no
action followed. In 1985 the Home Rule parliament
discussed the issue again, and asked the public for pro-
posals. Out of more than 600 suggestions two were
selected for consideration by parliament. The choice
was between a green banner with a white cross, thus
resembling the other Nordic flags, and a red/white
flag with a circle symbolis ing a rising sun over the per-
manent ice and an iceberg in the red water (diagram
20). The parliament chose the sun banner and did not
hold a referendum as had been promised. Inaugura-
tion of the new flag took place on a newly decided
national day, 21 June 1985, the summer solstice.485
The Danish flag was still allowed, and is still used
by some private citizens, even though the sun flag
seems to be more popular.486 In showing the flag
Greenland is thus more Greenlandic now than before
1979 when the only flag was the Danish one.
A brief review of the situation in 2000
The transfer of legislative and administrative functions
from Copenhagen to Nuuk in Greenland has been a
success, and has been carried out virtually as antici-
pated at the time the Home Rule Act was passed. The
Greenland Home Rule Act reserved certain matters to
the Danish parliament – namely constitutional affairs,
foreign policy, defence, currency, the prison system,
criminal and civil law. All other functions could be
transferred to Greenland, either to be paid for by
Greenland or with funding from Copenhagen to cover
costs. By 2000 nearly everything was transferred
 leaving only some supervisory tasks with the Danish
authorities: health and safety at work, veterinary ser-
vice, control of the quality of fish products, meteoro-
logical observations, and the inspection of ships.487 In
all other cases the Home Rule authorities make the
rules and administer the activity. Legislation for
Green land is no longer a matter for Danish politics.
Home Rule has also made itself felt in foreign rela-
tions. Representatives from Greenland can be part of
Danish representation abroad, for example at the
European Union in Brussels since 1992, and 1999-2002
also at the Danish embassy in Ottawa. Greenland also
participates in the Danish delegations to numerous
international organisations dealing with the Arctic
including whaling, and in the various organisations
fostering cooperation between the Nordic govern-
ments and parliaments. In three organisations dealing
with fishing in the North Atlantic Greenland has the
leading role in the delegation of ‘Denmark on behalf of
Greenland and the Faroe Islands’. She is an ordinary
member of the North Atlantic Commission for Sea
Mammals. Greenland has also been a prominent par-
ticipant in creating and running the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference from 1977 and the representation was
taken over by the Home Rule authorities in 1979. The
ICC is a forum for cooperation for all Inuits in the arc-
tic area. A close relationship with Nunavut, the Inuit
Area in Canada, has been established.488
Greenland is now (in 2003) preparing herself to
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Fig. 28. The Greenland Flag. Photo Henning Thing/
PolarPhotos.
claim greater independ ence in foreign policy, leading
to an amendment of the Home Rule Act.489 The politi-
cal background has been the role of the Americans in
the defence of Greenland – and the United States. The
Greenlan ders are worried that the air base in Thule
being part of an American early warning system might
eventually draw fire on Greenlandic soil. They are also
worried about possible pollution of the ground with
nuclear materials and waste of other kinds. The Dan-
ish government is prepared to work closely with the
Home Rule authority in negotiations with the United
States.490
The new relationship with Denmark is described
as Self Governance. Full independence is not on the
agenda of the majority – yet. But it is probably the ulti-
mate goal for many Greenlanders.
Epilogue
Irrespective of the character of the relationship be -
tween Denmark and Greenland since the Middle Ages,
the relationship around 1900 was perceived as a colo-
nial one. Being a colonial power at this time was seen
as enhancing national prestige. And the relationship
had all the characteristics of colonialism. It is fair to
say that Denmark was a benevolent colonial master of
Greenland, perhaps founded on a view of Greenland
parallel to Iceland and the Faroe Isles, the other North
Atlantic Norwegian dependencies taken over by the
Danish king in 1380, which together with Greenland
remained Danish when Norway was ceded to Sweden
in 1814. The difference was that Greenland was a non-
European, non-agrarian, and non-Christian arctic
hunter society at the time of the second colonisation in
1721. Hence the policy became different, taking a colo-
nial flavour.
However, Denmark shared benevolence towards
indigenous people with other colonial powers in other
places in the world where conditions was comparable,
in particular the absence of colonists to oppress the
local population, and the fact that the riches to be
gained were modest, and the burden of sustaining
political control was negligible. The British, the
French, and the Dutch empires can show similar exam-
ples.
Danish Greenland policy was from the very begin-
ning administrated by the Royal Greenlandic Trade
Department, and politics was also to a great extend
formulated by the company, and other civil servants in
Greenland. Political reforms in Denmark were intro-
duced in Greenland by zealous civil servants. The
introduction of local assemblies in the 1850s was mo-
delled on similar local assemblies in Denmark from
1841, the reform years 1900-1912 had their background
in the parliamentary development in Denmark from
1901. The Danish civil servants in Greenland also
played a decisive initiating role in the reforms after the
Second World War in 1946 and 1950. Similar develop-
ment took place in other colonial empires, all in the
endeavour to keep the loyalty of colonial peoples in
the new world order where colonialism came under
heavy fire, and the cold war worsened. Then by re -
questing Home Rule in Greenland the Greenlanders
took the initiative in the early 1970s.
The development in Greenland was thus very sim-
ilar to colonial developments elsewhere. The Green-
landic response to the colonial presence can be found
elsewhere as well. Short of military resistance to the
colonizers the Greenlanders went through the same
political phases as in other empires. From around 1900
the ‘westernised’ elite sought equality with the Danish
civil servants in Greenland regarding jobs and civil
rights. Their vision was to create a Danish-Greenlandic
society as Danish as possible and as Greenlandic as
necessary. The phase of mass mobilisation, to re -
nounce being a Danish duplicate and ultimately to get
rid of the ‘colonizers’ began in the early 1970s.
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The title in Danish was 1782-1925 ‘Inspektør’, 1925-1950
‘Landsfoged’, 1950-1979 ‘Landshøvding’.
1911-1967 the governors in Greenland were ex offi-
cio chairmen of the provincial councils as well.
South Greenland (Nuuk/Godthåb)
Stephensen, Regnar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1899-1902
Bendixen, Ole  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1903-1912
Hastrup. Oluf acting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1913-1914
Harries, Carl Frederik  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1915-1923
Simony, Christian, acting . . . . . . . . . . .  1924, 1945-1950
Petersen, Knud Honoré 491  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1925-1929
Madsen, F.A., acting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1930
Oldendow, Knud  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1931
Svane, Aksel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1932-1941
Brun, Eske acting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1941-1945
North Greenland (Qeqertarsuaq/Godhavn)
Daugaard-Jensen, Jens  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1900-1912
Lindow, Harald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1913-1924
Rosendahl, Philip . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1925-1927, 1929-1939
Berthelsen, Jørgen acting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1928-1929
Brun, Eske . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1939-1945
vacant  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1946-1947
Christensen, Niels Otto acting  . . . . . . . . . . 1947–1950
Greenland (Nuuk/Godthåb)
Lundsteen, P.H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1951-1954, 1957-1960
Christensen, Niels Otto . . . . . . . . . 1955-1956, 1963-1972
Nielsen, Finn acting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1961-1962
Lassen, Hans J.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1973-1979
High Commissioners
After 1979 the title of the highest ranking Danish offi-
cial in Greenland is ‘Rigsombudsmand’, corresponding
to the English title High Commissioner.
Petersen, Torben Hedegaard  . . . . . . . . . . . 1979-1992
Spore, Steen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1992-1995
Martens, Gunnar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1995-2002
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Appendix 1
Governors and High Commissioners
in Greenland
This list is compiled from the meeting minutes. Infor-
mation appears in the following order: constituency
number, family name, Christian name, main occupa-
tion, residence, (attendance).
The Southern Provincial Council (Sydgrønlands
Landsråd)
Elected indirectly in 11 constituencies by the munici-
pality councils members. Eligible: male, 25 years of
age, and with Greenlandic legal status.
1911-1916
Sessions: 7-12 August 1911; 8-13 July 1912; 30 August-2
September 1913; 10-17 August 1914; 10-19 august 1915;
2-10 August 1916
1. Kleist, Josva, senior cathecist, Narsaq Kujalleq
(not 1915)
2. Hansen, Jens, hunter, Nanortalik (not 1915)
2. Mathiesen, Johs, hunter, Salliit (only 1915)
3. Hansen, Gerhardt, hunter, Alluitsup Paa
4. Josephsen, Johannes., hunter, Qaqortoq
5. Egede, Otto, hunter, Narsaq
6. Hegelund, Jakob, hunter, Paamiut
7. Motzfeldt, Hans, senior cathecist, Qeqertarsuat-
siaat
8. Møller, John, photographer, Nuuk
9. Lyberth, Nathan, hunter, Maniitsoq (not 1914)
10. Rosing, Peter, hunter, Kangaamiut (not 1914)
11. Sivertsen, Carl, hunter, Sisimiut(not 1914)
1917-1922
Sessions: 9-14 July 1917; 23-26 July 1918; 12-17 July
1919;12-16 August 1920; 14-15 July 1921; 7-10 July 1922
1. Kleist, Josva, senior cathecist, Narsaq Kujalleq
(not 1917)
1. Knuthsen, Saul, catechist, Aappilattoq (1917)
1. Simonsen, Simon, hunter, Narsaq Kujalleq (1920)
2. Abelsen, Hosias, hunter, Nanortalik (1917)
2. Mathiesen, Johs, hunter, Salliit (not1917, 1919)
3. Hansen, Jens, hunter, Nanortalik
4. Høegh, Pavia, carpenter, Qaqortoq
5. Motzfeldt, Enok, hunter, Narsaq (not 1920)
5. Motzfeldt, Jokum, hunter, Qagssimiut (1920)
6. Petersen, Pavia, hunter, Paamiut
7. Mathæussen, Iver, hunter, Narsaq
8. Lynge, Niels, senior catechist, Nuuk (not 1922)
8. Egede, Abel, hunter, Nuuk (1922)
9. Platou, Albrecht, hunter, Napasoq (not 1921)
10. Rosing, Karl, hunter, Kangaamiut (not 1921)
11. Olsen, Seth, hunter, Sisimiut(1917-19)
11. Olsen, Marius, hunter, Sarfannguaq, (1920-22,
not 1921)
1923-1926
Sessions: 11-18 July 1923; 26 July-1 August 1924; 27
June-1 July 1925; 10-15 July 1926
1. Hammeken, Kristian, trading post manager, Aap-
pilattoq (not 1925)
1. Kleist, Josva, senior cathecist, Narsaq Kujalleq
(1925 subst.)
2. Salomonsen, Kristoffer, hunter, Nanortalik
3. Lund, Isak, senior catechist, Alluitsup Paa
4. Høegh, John, smith, Qaqortoq
5. Lund, Henrik senior catechist, Narsaq
6. Albrechtsen, Peter, hunter, Arsuk
7. Berthelsen, Hisekiel, hunter, Qeqertarsuatsiaat
(only1923)
7. Berthels, Asser, hunter, Grædefjorden (not 1923)
8. Lynge, Kristoffer, printer, Nuuk (not 1926)
8. Petersen, Jonathan, teacher at Teacher Training
College, Nuuk (1926 subst)
9. Petersen, Ole, trading post manager, Maniitsoq
(not 1926)
9. Petersen, Peter, hunter, Maniitsoq (1926 subst.)
10. Rosing, Karl, hunter, Kangaamiut (not 1925)
11. Olsen, Simon, catechist, Sisimiut
11. Olsen, David, trading post manager, Sarfannguaq
1927-1932
Elected indirectly in 11 constituencies by the munici-
pality councils and district councils members. Eligible:
male, 25 years of age, male Greenlander regardless of
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The Provincial Councils 1911-1979
legal status and Danish civil servants with more than 2
years of service in Greenland.
Sessions: 26 July-2 August 1927; 1-8 August 1928,
3-9 July 1929; 2-9 July 1930; 16-18 June 1931; 22 June
1931;13-18 July1932.
1. Hammeken, Kristian, trading post manager, Aap-
pilattoq (not 1932)
1. Kleist, Josva, senior cathecist, Narsaq Kujalleq
(1932 subst.)
2. Lund, Jacob, catechist, Nanortalik
3. Nielsen, Frederik, trading post manager, Alluit-
sup Paa
4. Høegh, Pavia, carpenter master, Qaqortoq
5. Lund, Henrik senior catechist, Narsaq
6. Lauf, Elias, senior pastor, Paamiut (not 1932)
6. Nyekjær, Sofus, hunter, Paamiut (1932 subst.?)
7. Hansen, Nicolaj, hunter, Qeqertarsuatsiaat (1927,
resigned 1928)
7. Berthels, Asser, hunter, Grædefjorden (1928
subst.)
7. Johnsen, Theophilos, hunter, Qeqertarsuatsiaat
(1929, 1930, 1931, 1932)
8. Chemnitz, Jørgen, assistant clerk, Nuuk
9. Lynge, Niels, ordained pastor, senior catechist,
Maniitsoq (not 1932)
9. Petersen, Ole, office clerk, Maniitsoq (1932
subst.)
10. Kreutzmann, Hans, hunter, Kangaamiut (not
1928)
10. Rosing, Karl, hunter, Kangaamiut (1928 subst.)
11. Olsen, Frederik, foreman, Sisimiut
1933-1938
Sessions: 29 July-8 August 1933; 10-20 July 1934; no
session 1935; 25 June-9 July 1936; 5-14 July 1937; 12
July-? 1938.
1. Hansen, Sofus, trading post manager, Sangmissoq
(not 1933, 1937, 1938)
1. Kleist, Josva, senior cathecist, Narsaq Kujalleq
(1933, 1937 subst.)
1. Knudsen, Ferdinand, trading post manager, Aap-
pilattoq (1938)
2. Salomonsen, Kristoffer, hunter, Nanortalik
3. Lynge, Niels, ordained pastor, Alluitsoq
4. Laurent-Christensen, A., district physician, Qaqor-
toq (not 1936, 1938)
4. Høegh, Pavia, carpenter master, Qaqortoq (1936,
1938 subst.)
5. Egede, Otto, hunter, Narsaq
6. Egede, Gerhard, senior pastor, Paamiut (not 1933)
6. Petersen, Sem, catechist, Narssalik (1933 subst.)
7. Petersen, Hans, hunter, Qeqertarsuatsiaat (not
1933)
8. Lynge, Kristoffer, editor, Nuuk (not 1937)
8. Egede, Lars, hunter, Saarloq (1937 subst.)
9. Petersen, Ole, office clerk, Maniitsoq (not 1936)
10. Rosing, David, hunter, Kangaamiut
11. Mathiesen, Karl, hunter, Sisimiut (only 1933)
11. Kleist, Elias, hunter, Sisimiut
1939-1944
Sessions: 2-20 July 1939; 3 May 1940 (joint session
with North); 23 June-2 July 1941 (joint session); 15-31
July 1943 (joint session).
1. Knudsen, Ferdinand, trading post manager, Aap-
pilattoq (not 1940)
2. Simonsen, Josva, hunter, Narsaq Kujalleq (not
1940)
3. Høegh, Frederik, trading post manager, Ammas-
sivik (not 1940, 1941, 1943)
3. Simonsen, Josva, hunter, Alluitsup Paa (1941)
3. Poulsen, Morthen, hunter, Alluitsup Paa (1943)
4. Lynge, Hans, author, Qaqortoq
5. Egede, Niels, retired teacher, Narsaq (not 1943)
5. Egede, Otto, sheep farmer, Narsaq, (1943 subst.)
6. Egede, Gerhard, senior pastor, Paamiut
7. Motzfeldt, Egede, baker, Qeqertarsuatsiaat (not
1940)
8. Lynge, Kristoffer, editor, Nuuk
9. Petersen, Pavia, retired catechist, Maniitsoq (not
1943)
9. Skifte, Albrecht, shipmaster, Maniitsoq (1943
subst.)
10. Kreuzmann, Karl, hunter, Kangaamiut
11. Lennert, Frederik, trading post manager,
Assaqutaq
1945-1950
Sessions: 28 August-20 September 1945 (joint session);
2-22 July 1946 (joint session); 1-12 July 1947; 31 July-14
august 1948 (joint session); 23 July-5 August 1949
(joint session); 25 July-5 August 1950 (joint session).
1. Knudsen, Ferdinand, trading post manager, Aap-
pilattoq (not 1948, 1949, 1950)
1. Mouritzen, Silas, hunter, Aappilattoq (1948, 1949,
1950)
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2. Boassen, Egede, hunter, Nanortalik (not 1946,
1948, 1949, 1950)
2. Abelsen, Jacob, office clerk, Nanortalik (1946,
1948, 1949, 1950 subst.)
3. Lund, Isak, senior catechist, Ammassivik
4. Lynge, Hans, author, Qaqortoq (left Qaqortoq
1945)
4. Lynge, Klaus, foreman, Qaqortoq (1946 subst.,
1947, 1948, 1950)
4. Nielsen, Frederik, headmaster, Qaqortoq (1949
subst.)
5. Lund, Isak, sheep farmer, Narsaq (not 1950)
5. Motzfeldt, Lars, sheep farmer, Qagssiarsuk (1950)
6. Egede, Gerhard, senior pastor, Paamiut (not 1946,
1949, 1950)
6. Berthelsen, Kristian, hunter, Paamiut (1946, 1949,
1950 subst.)
7. Motzfeldt, Egede, baker, Qeqertarsuatsiaat
8. Chemnitz, Jørgen, office assistant, Nuuk (not
1949)
8. Lynge, Augo, college teacher, Nuuk (1949 subst.)
9. Skifte, Albrecht, shipmaster, Maniitsoq
10. Kreuzmann, Karl, hunter, Kangaamiut
11. Lennert, Frederik, trading post manager, Sarfan-
nguaq (not 1949)
11. Olsen, Jørgen C.F., telegraphist, Sisimiut (1949
subst.)
The Northern Provincial Council (Nordgrøn-
lands Landsråd)
Elected indirectly in 12 constituencies by the municipal
councils members. Eligible: male, 25 years of age, and
with Greenlandic legal status.
1911-1916
Sessions: 14-17 August 1911; 25 July-2 August 1912; 27-
31 July 1913; 28-29 August 1914; 26-31 July 1915; 27 July-
1 August 1916.
1. Frederiksen, Abel, hunter, Iginniarfik (not 1911)
1. Rasmussen, Jacob, hunter, Attu (1911)
2. Stork, Abia, hunter, Manermiut
3. Brandt, Wille, hunter, Aasiaat (not 1915)
3. Brandt, Abia, hunter, Aasiaat (1915)
4. Zeeb, Peter, hunter and catechist, Ikamiut (not
1911, 1916)
4. Banke, Isak, hunter, Eqe (1916)
5. Jeremiassen, Isak, hunter, Kitsissuarsuit
6. Lange, Johan, hunter, Sarqaq (not 1916)
6. Hendriksen, Adam, hunter, Ritenbenk (1916)
7. Stork, Gudmand, hunter, Skansen (not 1911)
8. Josefsen, Albrecht, hunter, Niaqornat
9. Henningsen, Johan, hunter, Uummannaq
10. Løvstrøm, Thomas, hunter, Illorssuit (only 1911)
10. Zeeb, Isak, hunter, Illorssuit from 1912 (not 1916)
11. Mørch, Ole, hunter and catechist, Upernivik (not
1914)
12. Svendsen, Jan, hunter and catechist, Aappilattoq
(not 1914)
1917-1922
Sessions: 27 july-1 August 1917; 23-26 July 1918; 4-6
September 1919; 18-25 August 1920; 11-12 July 1921; 7-
10 August 1922.
1. Frederiksen, Kasper, hunter, Iginniarfik
2. Stenholdt, Nathanael, hunter, Kangaatsiaq (died
1919)
2. Mikisuluk, Jonas, hunter, Kangaatsiaq (1919-1921,
died 1922)
3. Sørensen, Valdemar, cooper, Aasiaat
3. Frederik Lynge, manager assistant, Aasiaat (1922)
4. Samuelsen, Johan, hunter, Akulliit (not 1921)
5. Gundel, Johan, hunter, Ilulissat
6. Zethsen, Jonas, hunter, Ritenbenk
7. Geisler, Jeremias, hunter, Skansen
8. Cortzen, Jonas, hunter, Niaqornat
9. Zeeb, Enoch, hunter, Saatut
10. Løvstrøm, Thomas, hunter, Illorssuit (not 1918)
10. Villumsen, Tobias, hunter, Ukkusissat (1918, 1919)
11. Christiansen, Siegvard, hunter, Kangersusuatsiaq
(not 1917, 1919)
12. Bidstrup, Johan, trading post manager (not 1917,
1918, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922)
12. Hejlmann, Sigvard, senior catechist, Tasiusaq
(1918, 1920, 1921, 1922)
1923-1926
Sessions: 7-11 August 1923; 7-11 August 1924; 6-15
August 1925; 21 July-4 August1926.
1. Geisler, Gerth, trading post apprentice, Attu
2. Hendriksen, Karl, reader, Kipingasoq
3. Abelsen, Isak, hunter, Aasiaat
4. Petersen, Julius, hunter, Ikamiut
5. Siegstad, Ludvig Geisler, hunter, Ilulissat
6. Zethsen, Jonas, hunter, Ritenbenk
7. Kleist, Isak, hunter, Qeqertarsuaq
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8. Lyberth, Karl, miner, Qaersuarssuk (not 1925,
1926)
8. Cortzen, Jonas, hunter, Niaqornat (1926 subst.)
9. Pollas, Pavia, foreman, Uummannaq (not 1925)
10. Jonathansen, Jonas, hunter, Illorssuit (not 1925)
11. Hansen, Hans, senior catechist, Upernavik (not
1925)
12. Kristiansen, Karl, catechist, Kuuk (not 1925)
1927-1932
Elected indirectly in 12 constituencies by the munici-
pality councils and district councils members. Eligible:
male, 25 years of age, Greenlander regardless of legal
status, and Danish civil servants with more than 2
years of service in Greenland.
Sessions: 30 July-13 August 1927; 18-31 July 1928; 29
July-7 august 1929; 14-24 July 1930; 9-16 July 1931; 15-
24 June 1932.
1. Filemonsen, Johannes, hunter, Tunungasoq (only
1927)
1. Geisler, Gerth, trading post apprentice, Attu (not
1927)
2. Lundblad, Peter, hunter, Kangaatsiaq (not 1929
died 1930)
2. Schmidt, Isak, hunter, Vestre Ejland (1929 subst.)
3. Lynge, Frederik, manager assistant, Aasiaat
4. Jensen, Pavia, trading post manager, Ilimanaq
(1927-29)
4. Olsvig, Carl, foreman, Qasigiannguit (1930, 1932
subst.)
5. Storch, Mathias, vice dean, Ilulissat (not 1929,
1931)
5. Thomsen, Boye, catechist, Ilulissat (1929, 1931
subst.)
6. Rosing, Jens, hunter, Ritenbenk
7. Porsild, Morten P., head of Arctic Station, Qeqer-
tarsuaq (not 1930)
7. Dalager, Peter, assistant clerk, Qeqertarsuaq
(1930 subs.)
8. Kruse, Tobias, hunter, Niaqornat
9. Kruse, Edvard, senior catechist, Uummannaq
10. Larsen, Thomas, catechist, Ukkusissat (only 1927)
10. Møller, Samuel, senior catechist, Illorssuit (not
1927)
11. Hansen, Hans, senior catechist, Upernavik
12. Pjetursson, Johannes, hunter, Ikerasaarsuk
1933-1938
Sessions: 7-14 July 1933; 14-19 July 1934; no session
1935; 29 June-9 July 1936; 26 July-2 August 1937; 28
July-? 1938.
1. Filemonsen, Johannes, hunter, Tunungasoq
2. Lundblad, Lars, hunter, Kangaatsiaq
3. Kaspersen, Søren, senior catechist, Aasiaat (not
1938)
3. Rosing, Nikolaj, teacher, Aasiaat (1938)
4. Petersen, Jonas, senior catechist, Qasigiannguit
5. Thomsen, Boye, catechist, Ilulissat
6. Street, Peter, senior catechist (not 1933)
6. Nielsen, Mathæus, foreman, Qullissat (1933, 1937,
1938 subst.)
7. Porsild, Morten P., head of Arctic Station of sci-
ence, Qeqertarsuaq
8. Petersen, Hans, trading post manager, Niaqornat
9. Johansen, Jørgen, hunter, Uummannaq
10. Møller, Samuel, senior catechist, Illorsuit
11. Kleemann, Rasmus, hunter, Sdr. Upernavik (only
1933)
11. Kristiansen, David, hunter, Kangersusuatsiaq
12. Olsen, Hendrik, trading post manager (not 1933)
12. Nielsen, Hans, trading post manager, Tasiusaq
(1936, 1937, 1938)
1939-1945
Sessions: 4-17 June 1939; 3 May 1940 (joint session
with South); 26 June-2 July 1941 (joint session); 15-31
July 1943 (joint session).
1. Petersen, Niels, hunter, Aulatsivik
2. Siegstad, Isak, catechist, Kangaatsiaq (not 1943)
2. Rosing, Nikolaj, trading post manager, Kangaat-
siaq (1943 subst.)
3. Abelsen, Knud, office clerk, Aasiaat
4. Jensen, Frederik, trading post manager, Akulliit
5. Fly, Amasa, hunter, Ilulissat
6. Lynge Frederik, trade manager, Qutdligssat
7. Kleist, Isak, hunter, Qeqertarsuaq
8. Petersen, Hans, trading post manager, Niaqornat
(not 1939)
9. Kruse, Edvard, senior catechist, Uummannaq (not
1939)
10. Møller, Samuel, senior catechist, Illorssuit (not
1939)
11. Olsen, Hendrik, manager assistant, Upernavik
(not 1940, 1941)
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12. Nielsen, Jens, trading post manager, Nutaarmiut
(not 1939, 1940, 1941)
12. Bidstrup, Knud, hunter, Tasiusaq (1939 subst.)
1945-1950
28 August-20 September 1945 (joint session); 2-22 July
1946 (joint session); 10-22 July 1947; 31 July-14 August
1948 (joint session); 23 July-5 August 1949 (joint ses-
sion); 25 July-5 August 1950 (joint session).
1. Street, Peter, senior catechist, Attu (not 1946,
1948, 1950)
1. Filemonsen, Johannes, hunter, Attu (1946, 1948,
1949, 1950 subst.)
2. Rosing, Nikolaj, trading post manager, Kangaat-
siaq (not 1949)
2. Lundblad, Lars, hunter, Kangaatsiaq (1949 subst.)
3. Kaspersen, Søren, senior catechist, Aasiaat
4. Jensen, Frederik, trading post manager, Akulliit
5. Sivertsen, Marius, forman, Ilulissat
6. Mathæussen, Peter, senior catechist, Sarqaq
6. Lynge, Frederik, trade manager, Qullissat (1949)
6. Lange, Johan, office clerk, Qullissat (1950)
7. Nielsen, Peter, office assistant, Qeqertarsuaq (not
1949)
7. Dalager, Peter, office clerk, Qeqertarsuaq (1949
subst.)
8. Kruse, Tobias, hunter, Niaqornat
9. Fleischer, Peter, manager assistant, Uummannaq
10. Johansen, Kristian, trading post manager, Ukku-
sissat
11. Mathæussen, Samuel, senior catechist, Kanger-
susuatsiaq (not 1949)
11. Olsen, Hendrik, manager assistant, Upernavik
(1949 subst.)
12. Thomasson, Johan, hunter, Tussaaq
Greenland Provincial Council 1951-1978 (Grøn-
lands Landsråd)
1951-1954
Directly elected in 13 constituencies by all voters in
Greenland regardless of their legal status and sex.
Sessions: 26 September-23 October 1951; 28
august-29 September 1952; 3-19 September 1953; 30
July-27 August 1954.
1. Nielsen, Jakob, trade manager, Aappilattoq
2. Nielsen, Frederik, headmaster, Qaqortoq
3. Egede, Gerhard, pastor, Narsaq
4. Kristiansen, Abel, senior catechist, Arsuk
5. Lynge, Augo, college teacher, Nuuk
6. Egede, Peter, trading post manager, Kangaamiut,
Nuuk
7. Olsen, Knud, store assistant, Sisimiut
8. Rosing, Nikolaj, trading post manager, Kangaat-
siaq
9. Lynge, Frederik, trade manager, Aasiaat
10. Sivertsen, Marius, foreman, Ilulissat
11. Olsen, Jens, pastor, Qeqertarsuaq (not 1954)
11. Berthelsen, Hans Egede, printer, Qeqertarsuaq
(1954 subst.)
12. Fleischer, Peter, manager assistant, Saatut
(Uummannaq)
13. Olsen, Hendrik, manager assistant, Upernavik
1955-1958
Sessions: 2 august-5 September 1955; 12 July-14 august
1956; 15 July-24 August 1957; 21 July-30 august 1958;
10-17 March 1959.
1. Nielsen, Jakob, trade manager, Aappilattoq, Nan-
ortalik
2. Lynge, Klaus, office clerk, Qaqortoq
3. Egede, Carl, fisherman, Narsaq (not Marts 1959)
3. Motzfeldt, Lars, sheep farmer, Qassiarsuk (Marts
1959 subst.)
4. Høegh, Erling, pastor, Paamiut
5. Nielsen, Peter, office clerk, interpreter, Nuuk
6. Møller, Lars, senior catechist, Maniitsoq
7. Olsen, Jørgen F.C., senior telegraphist, Sisimiut
8. Karlsen, Nikolaj, fisherman, Aqigsserniaq, Kanga-
atsiaq
9. Brandt, Ole, teacher, Aasiaat
10. Jensen, Frederik, trade manager, Akulliit, Bugten
11. Olsen, Carl, master smith, Qullissat, Disko (not
Marts 1959)
12. Kruse, Edvard, senior catechist, Uummannaq (not
Marts 1959)
13. Nielsen, Ole, trading post manager, Upernavik
(not Marts 1959)
1959-1962
Number of constituencies expanded to 16.
Sessions: 23 July-12 September 1959; 8 August-10 Sep-
tember 1960; 8 August-12 September 1961; 10 August-
15 September 1962; 13-17 May 1963.
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1. Nielsen, Jakob, trade manager, Aappilattoq,
Nanortalik
2. Høegh, Erling, pastor, Qaqortoq
3. Egede, Erik, sheep farmer, Narsaq
4. Jakobsen, Nathan, trading post manager, Avigaat,
Paamiut
5. Heilmann, Peter K.S., college teacher, Nuuk
6. Møller, Lars, senior catechist, Maniitsoq
7. Olsen, Jørgen F.C., senior telegraphist, Sisimiut
8. Karlsen, Nikolaj, fisherman, Aqigsserniaq, Kan-
gaatsiaq
9. Lynge, Hans J., senior telegraphist, Aasiaat
10. Sivertsen, Marius, foreman, Ilulissat (Bugten)
11. Nielsen, Andreas (Anda), office clerk, Qullissat
(Disko)
12. Johansen, Elisabeth, midwife, Uummannaq
13. Svendsen, Ole, hunter, Kangersusuatsiaq, Uper-
navik (not May 1963)
13. Kleemann, Rasmus, skipper, Upernavik (May
1963 subst.)
14. Jensen, Peter, catechist, Qaanaaq (from 1961)
15. Abelsen, Hendrik, senior cathecíst, Ammassalik
(from 1961)
16. Arqe, Magtikalaat, hunter, Ittoqqortoormiit (from
1961)(not 1962)
1963-1966
Sessions: 15 August-21 September 1963; 2-18 March
1964; 31 August-9 October 1964; 10-24 May 1965; 31
August-9 September 1965; 14-31 March 1966; 22
August-7 October 1966.
1. Poulsen, Jørgen, catechist, Tasiusaq (Nanortalik)
2. Høegh, Oluf, electrician, Qaqortoq
3. Egede, Erik, sheep farmer, Narsaq
4. Petersen, Anton, fisherman, Paamiut
5. Heilmann, Peter K.S., deputy-headmaster, Nuuk
6. Josefsen, Albrecht, fisherman, Maniitsoq
7. Olsen, Jørgen F.C., senior telegraphist, Sisimiut
8. Ostermann, Lars, trading post manager, Attu
(Kangaatsiaq)
9. Lynge, Hans J., radio assistant, Aasiaat
10. Petersen, Richard, senior catechist, Ilulissat
(Disko Bugten) (not May 1965)
10. Sivertsen, Marius, foreman, Ilulissat (May 1965
subst.)
11. Nielsen, Andreas (Anda), office clerk, Qullissat
(Disko)
12. Johansen, Elisabeth, midwife, Uummannaq
13. Kristiansen, Knud, catechist, Upernavik
14. Jensen, Peter, catechist, Thule
15. Borchersen, Jørgen, trade inspector, Ammassalik
(not Autumn 1966)
15. Ignatiussen, Harald, hunter, Ammassalik
(Autumn 1966)
16. Arqe, Magtikalaat, hunter, Ittoqqortoormiit (not
May 1965, March 1966)
16. Petersen, Sivert, catechist, Ittoqqortoormiit
(March 1966 subst.)
1967-1970
Up to 5 supplementary seats can be elected.
Sessions: 23-27 May 1967; 5 September-12 October
1967; 9 august-26 September 1968; 19 april-13 may
1969; 16 September-17 October 1969; 17 March-16 April
1970: 17 September-18 October 1970.
1. Abelsen, Marius, headmaster, Nanortalik
2. Høegh, Erling, pastor, Qaqortoq (chairman)
3. Egede, Erik, sheep farmer, Narsaq (died 1967)
3. Holm, Niels, policeman, Narsaq (from Autumn
1967)
4. Petersen, Iboseth, skipper, Paamiut
5. Heilmann, Peter K.S., deputy-headmaster, Nuuk
6. Josefsen, Albrecht, fisherman, Maniitsoq
7. Olsen, Jørgen F.C., senior telegraphist, Sisimiut
8. Reimer, Edvard, trading post manager, Kangaat-
siaq
9. Skou, Karl, pastor, Aasiaat
10. Chemnitz, Lars, headmaster, Ilulissat (Bugten)
11. Broberg, David, fisherman, Qeqertarsuaq (Disko)
12. Johansen, Elisabeth, midwife, Uummannaq
13. Kristiansen, Knud, catechist, Upernavik
14. Kristiansen, Qissunguaq, hunter, Thule
15. Davidsen, Aron, cathecíst, Ammassalik (not 1968)
15. Jonathansen, Erinarteq, hunter, Ammassalik
(1968 subst.)
16. Simonsen, Jakob, trading post manager, Ittoqqor-
toormiit(not Autumn 1969)
17. Narup, Kaj, merchant, Nuuk (supplementary
seat, Inuit Party until summer 1969)
18. Nielsen, Peter, interpreter, Nuuk (from autumn
1969 suppl. seat, Inuit Party)
1971-1974
Sessions: 4-17 May 1971; 15 September-2 November
1971; 21 March-1 May 1972; 15 September-20 October
1972; 6 March-4 April 1973; 21 September-24 October
THE PROVENCIAL COUNCILS 1911-1979
176
1973: 8 March-2 April 1974; 20 September-24 October
1974.
1. Abelsen, Marius, headmaster, Nanortalik (died
1972)
1. Poulsen, Jørgen, teacher, Tasiusaq (from Autumn
1972, died 1973)
1. Nielsen, Hendrik, fisherman, Alluitsup Paa, (from
spring 1974)
2. Motzfeldt, Jonathan, pastor, Qaqortoq (vice-
chairman)
3. Knudsen, Johan, merchant, Narsaq (died 1973)
3. Godtfredsen, Lars, restaurant keeper, Narsaq
(from spring 1974)
4. Berglund, Ole, teacher, Paamiut (until 1973)
4. Tobiassen, Mathæus, senior catechist, Paamiut
(from spring 1974)
5. Johansen, Lars Emil, teacher, Nuuk
6. Josefsen, Albrecht, fisherman, Maniitsoq
7. Olsen, Jørgen F.C., senior telegraphist, Sisimiut
8. Karlsen, Nikolaj, fisherman, Aqigsserniaq, Kan-
gaatsiaq
9. Steenholdt, Otto, teacher, Aasiaat
10. Chemnitz, Lars, headmaster, Ilulissat (Bugten)
(chairman)
11. Broberg, David, fisherman, Qeqertarsuaq (Disko)
12. Johansen, Elisabeth, midwife, Uummannaq
13. Kristiansen, Knud, catechist, Upernavik
14. Kristiansen, Qissunguaq, hunter, Thule
15. Jonathansen, Erinarteq, hunter, Ammassalik
16. Sanimuinaq, Andreas, master painter, Ittoqqor-
toormiit
17. Heilmann, Niels Carlo, fisherman, Maniitsoq
(suppl. seat for KNAPP)
1975-1978
Sessions: 2-14 May 1975; 26 September-31 October
1975; 9 March-5 April 1976; 10 September-8 October
1976; 4-29 March 1977; 9 September-11 October 1977;
4-20 April 1978; 19 September-24 October 1978.
Political party: [A] =Atassut, [S] = Siumut)
1. Nielsen, Hendrik, fisherman, Nanortalik [S]
2. Motzfeldt, Jonathan, pastor, Qaqortoq (vice-
chairman) [S]
3. Godtfredsen, Lars, restaurant keeper, Narsaq [A]
4. Møller, Lamik, fisherman, Paamiut [A]
5. Chemnitz, Lars, headmaster, Nuuk (chairman)
[A]
6. Heilmann, Niels Carlo, fisherman, Maniitsoq [A]
7. Olsen, Jørgen F.C., senior telegraphist, Sisimiut
8. Karlsen, Nikolaj, fisherman, Kangaatsiaq [S]
9. Steenholdt, Otto, teacher, Aasiaat [A]
10. Steenholdt, Konrad, teacher, Qasigiannguit
(Bugten) [A]
11. Kristiansen, Knud, artist, Qeqertarsuaq
12. Johansen, Severin, town clerk, Uummannaq (not
autumn 1976, spring 1977) [S]
12. Johansen, Hans, carrier, Uummannaq (Autumn
1976, Spring 1977)
13. Frederiksen, Bendt, hunter, Upernavik [S]
14. Sadorana, Asiajuk, hunter, Qaanaaq [S]
15. Andreasen, Anders, policeman, Ammassalik [S]
16. Arqe, Emil, ship’s carpenter, Ittoqqortoormiit [A]
17. Olsen, Odaq, union president, Nuuk (suppl. seat
for GAS)
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Information appears in the following order: con-
stituency, name, main occupation, residence (political
party: A=Atassut, IA=Inuit Ataqatigiit, AP=Akulliit
Partiat, IP=Issitup Partiia, S= Siumut, NP= non-
party)
1979-1983 elected 4 April 1979
18 constituency seats (South 4, Central 5, Disko 4, + 5
from outer districts) and up to 3 supplementary seats.
Southern:
Motzfeldt, Jonathan, pastor, Qaqortoq (chairman) (S)
Nielsen, Hendrik, teacher, Alluitsup Paa (S)
Nielsen, Niels, fisherman, Narsaq (S)
Ostermann, Peter, policeman, Qaqortoq (A)
Central:
Chemnitz, Lars, headmaster, Nuuk (A)
Christiansen, Thue, deputy-headmaster, Maniitsoq
(S)
Davidsen, Anguuteraq, foreman, Sisimiut (A)
Heilmann, Niels Carlo, fisherman, Maniitsoq, (A)
Johansen, Lars Emil, teacher, Nuuk (S)
Disko:
Lange, Preben, teacher, Qasigiannguit (S)
Rosbach, Frederik, director, Ilulissat (S)
Steenholdt, Konrad, teacher, Qasigiannguit (A)
Steenholdt, Otto, teacher, Aasiaat (A)
Uummannaq: Nielsen, Pavia, hunter, Uummannaq
(S)
Upernavik: Frederiksen, Bendt, hunter, Upernavik (S)
Thule: Joelsen, Sofus, town clerk, Qaanaaq (S)
Ammassalik: Andreasen, Anders, policeman, Ammas-
salik
Scoresbysund: Hammeken, Aage, headmaster, Illoq -
qortoormiut (S)
suppl. seat 1: Godtfredsen, Lars, restaurant keeper,
Narsaq (A)(until 1/5-1981)
suppl. seat 1: Nielsen, Agnete, mayor, Narsaq, (A)
(from 1981 autumn)
suppl. seat 2: Olsen, Moses, chief of secretariat, Sisim-
iut (S)
suppl. seat 3: Sivertsen, Jakob, trade manager, Kuum-
miut (A)
1983-1984 elected: 12 April 1983
23 constituency seats (South 5, Central 8, Disko 5, + 5
from outer districts) and up to 3 supplemen tary seats
Southern:
Høegh, Ingvar, factory manager, Narsaq (A)
Lund, Isak, sheep farmer, Narsaq (S)
Motzfeldt, Jonathan, pastor, Nuuk (S)
Nielsen, Hendrik, fisherman, Alluitsup Paa (S)
Ostermann, Peter, policeman, Qaqortoq (A)
Central:
Chemnitz, Lars, consultant, Nuuk (A)
Davidsen, Anguuteraq, foreman, Sisimiut (A)
Heilmann, Niels Carlo, fisherman, Maniitsoq, (A)
Jensen, Allan Idd, director, Nuuk (A)
Johansen, Lars Emil, teacher, Nuuk (S)
Lynge, Arqaluk, programme secretary, Nuuk (IA)
Olsen, Moses, chief of secretariat, Nuuk (S)
Rosing, Hans Pavia, president ICC, Nuuk (S)
Disko:
Iversen, Hans, fisherman, Ilulissat (S)
Lange, Preben, teacher, Qasigiannguit (S)
Sivertsen, Holger, mayor, Ilulissat (A)
Steenholdt, Konrad, teacher, Qasigiannguit (A)
Steenholdt, Otto, teacher, Næstved (A)
Uummannaq: Nielsen, Pavia, hunter, Uummannaq
(S) (not Dec. 1983)
Upernavik: Frederiksen, Bendt, hunter, Upernavik (S)
(not Dec. 1983)
Thule: Joelsen, Sofus, town clerk, Qaanaaq (S)
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Ammassalik: Sivertsen, Jakob, trade manager, Kuum-
miut (A) Not Dec. 1983)
Scoresbysund: Hammeken, Aage, headmaster, Illo-
qqortoormiut (S)
suppl. seat 1: Geisler, Jens, headmaster, Aasiaat, (IA)
suppl. seat 2: Lynge, Torben Emil, headmaster, Narsaq
(A)
suppl. seat 3: Petrussen, Amandus, pastor, Nanortalik
(A)
1984-1987 elected: 6 June 1984
23 constituency seats (South 5, Central 8, Disko 5, + 5
outer districts) and up to 3 supplemen tary seats.
Southern:
Høegh, Ingvar, factory leader, Narsaq (A)
Lund, Isak, sheep farmer, Narsaq (S)
Motzfeldt, Jonathan, pastor, Nuuk (S)
Nielsen, Hendrik, fisherman, Alluitsup Paa (S)
Ostermann, Peter, policeman, Qaqortoq (A)
Central:
Christoffersen, Jan Streit, physician, Nuuk (A)
Heilmann, Niels Carlo, fisherman, Maniitsoq, (A)
Johansen, Lars Emil, teacher, Nuuk (S) till May 1986
Lennert, Emile, clerk, Sisimiut (A)
Lybert, Jens, (S)
Lynge, Arqaluk, programme secretary, Nuuk (IA)
Olsen, Marius, fisherman, Sisimiut (S) from May 1986
Olsen, Moses, chief of secretariat, Nuuk (S)
Steenholdt, Otto, teacher, Næstved (A)
Disko:
Iversen, Hans, fisherman, Ilulissat (S)
Lange, Preben, teacher, Qasigiannguit (S)
Sivertsen, Holger, mayor, Ilulissat (A)
Steenholdt, Konrad, teacher, Qasigiannguit (A)
Sørensen, Knud, trade manager, Aasiaat (A)
Uummannaq: Nielsen, Pavia, hunter, Uummannaq
(S)
Upernavik: Frederiksen, Bendt, hunter, Upernavik (S)
Thule: Qujaukitsoq, Ussarqaq, hunter, Qaanaaq (S)
Ammassalik: Sivertsen, Jakob, trade manager, Kuum-
miut (A)
Scoresbysund: Sanimuinaq, Andreas, master painter,
Ittoqqortoormiit(A)
suppl. seat 1: Geisler, Jens, headmaster, Aasiaat (IA)
suppl. seat 2: Rasmussen, Henriette, teacher, Nuuk
(IA)
1987-1991 elected: 26 may 1987
23 constituency seats (South 5, Central 8, Disko 5, + 5
from outer districts) and up to 4 supplementary seats.
Southern:
Lynge, Torben Emil, headmaster, Narsaq (A)
Motzfeldt, Jonathan, pastor, Nuuk (S)
Motzfeldt, Josef, teacher, (IA) (until 12 April 1988)
Kanuthsen, Aqqaluikasik, sheep farming consultant,
Qaqortoq (IA) (from April 1988)
Nielsen, Hendrik, fisherman, Alluitsup Paa (S)
Ostermann, Peter, policeman, Qaqortoq (A)
Central:
Chemnitz, Lars, consultant, Nuuk (A)
Heilmann, Niels Carlo, fisherman, Maniitsoq, (A)
Lennert, Emile, clerk, Sisimiut (A)
Lyberth, Jens (S)
Lynge, Arqaluk, programme secretary, Nuuk (IA)
Johansen, Lars Emil, teacher, Nuuk (S)
Olsen, Moses, chief of secretariat, Nuuk (S)
Steenholdt, Otto, teacher, Nuuk (A)
Disko:
Geisler, Jens, headmaster, Aasiaat, (IA) (resigns Sum-
mer 1990)
Iversen, Hans, fisherman, Ilulissat (S)
Lynge, Ole, ship carpenter, Aasiaat (IA) (from Sum-
mer 1990)
Lange, Preben, teacher, Qasigiannguit (S)
Steenholdt, Konrad, teacher, Qasigiannguit (A)
Sørensen, Knud, trade manager, Aasiaat (A)
Uummannaq: Petersen, Mikael, machinist, Uumman-
naq (S)
Upernavik: Frederiksen, Bendt, hunter, Upernavik (S)
Thule: Qujaukitsoq, Ussarqak, hunter, Qaanaaq (S)
Ammassalik: Sivertsen, Jakob, manager assistant,
Ammassalik (A)
Scoresbysund: Danielsen, Jonas, hunter, Ittoqqor-
toormiut (S) (resigns Summer 1988)
Hammeken, Ane Sofie, teacher, Ittoqqortoormiut (S)
(from Summer 1988)
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suppl. seat 1: Rasmussen, Henriette, teacher, Nuuk,
(IA)
suppl. seat 2: Sivertsen, Holger, mayor, Ilulissat (A)
suppl. seat 3: Jensen, Godmand, hunter, Upernavik
(A)
suppl. seat 4: Heinrich, Nikolaj, fisherman, Nuuk
(IP)
1991-1995 elected: 5/3-91
23 constituency seats (South 5, Central 8, Disko 5, + 5
outer districts) and up to 4 supplemen tary seats.
South:
Egede, Kaj, sheep farming consultant, (S)
Motzfeldt, Jonathan, pastor, Nuuk (S)
Motzfeldt, Josef, teacher, Nuuk (IA)
Nielsen, Agnete, retired mayor, Narsaq (A)
Ostermann, Peter, policeman, Qaqartoq (A)
Central:
Abelsen, Emil, company director, Nuuk (S)
Chemnitz, Lars, consultant, Nuuk (A)
Johansen, Lars Emil, director, Nuuk (S)
Kreutzmann, Bjarne, policeman, Nuuk (AP)
Lynge, Aqqaluk, journalist, Nuuk (IA)
Olsen, Ove Rosing, physician, Nuuk, (S)
Rasmussen, Henriette, section leader, Nuuk (IA)
Steenholdt, Otto, teacher, Nuuk (A)
Disko:
Iversen, Hans, fisherman, Ilulissat (S)
Lynge, Ole, ship carpenter, Aasiaat (IA)
Samuelsen, Peter Grønvold, teacher, Qasigiannguit
(S)
Steenholdt, Konrad, teacher, Qasigiannguit (A)
Sørensen, Knud, mayor, Aasiaat (A)
Uummannaq: Nielsen, Pavia, hunter, Uummannaq
(S)
Upernavik: Frederiksen, Bendt, hunter, Upernavik (S)
(chairman)
Avernersuaq: Qujaukitsoq, Ussarqaq, hunter, Qaanaq
(S)
Tasiilaq: Sivertsen, Jakob, mayor, Ammassalik (A)
Scoresbysund: Hammeken, Ane Sofie, teacher, Illo-
qqortoormiit (S)
suppl. seat 1: Lennert, Emilie, clerk, Sisimiut (A)
suppl. seat 2: Egede, Hans Pavia, director, Nuuk (AP)
suppl. seat 3: Olsen, Johan Lund, social adviser, Nuuk
(IA)
suppl. seat 4: Heinrich, Nikolaj, fisherman, Nuuk (IP)
1995-1999 elected: 4/3-95
26 constituency seats (South 6, Central 9, Disko 6, + 5
outer districts) and 5 supplementary seats.
Andreassen, Anders, policeman, Ammassalik (S)
Berthelsen, Manasse (IA) (from 1997)
Brøndlund, Evald, foreman, Ittoqqortoormiit (IA)
Davidsen, Agnethe, mayor, Nuuk (S) (until 1997)
Enoksen, Hans, trade manager, Sisimiut (S)
Frederiksen, Anthon Thue, policeman, Ilulissat (NP
candidates union)
Heilmann, Paaviaaraq, office head, Nuuk, (S) (from
1997)
Heilmann, Ruth Thomsen, senior teacher, Maniitsoq
(S)
Heilmann, Siverth Karl, company director, Maniitsoq
(A)
Jensen, Lars Karl, fisherman, Qeqertarsuaq (S)
Jensen, Marianne, teacher, Ilulissat (S)
Johansen, Lars Emil, Nuuk (S) (until 1997)
Karlsen, Finn, inspector, Narsaq (A)
Kleist, Kuupik, director of Home Rule Authority For-
ereign Relations, Nuuk (IA) (until 1996)
Kreutzmann, Bjarne, policeman, Nuuk (AP)
Lyberth, Karl, fisherman/hunter, (S)
Lynge, Laanguaq, librarian, Nuuk (S) (from 1997)
Mattaaq, Johan Niels, porter, Upernavik (S)
Motzfeldt, Jonathan, pastor, Nuuk (S)
Motzfeldt, Josef, teacher, Nuuk (IA)
Mølgaard, Maliinannguaq Marcussen, journalist,
Qeqertarsuaq (IA)
Nilsson, Anders, newspaper editor, Nuuk, (A)
Olsen, Johan Lund, social adviser, Nuuk (IA)
Ostermann, Peter, policeman, Qaqartoq (A)
Petersen, Mikael, machinist, Nuuk (S)
Petersen, Naimanngitsoq, hunter, Qaanaaq (A)
Raahauge, Kristine, office assistant, Nanortalik (S)
Samuelsen, Peter Grønvold, teacher, Qasigiannguit (S)
Sivertsen, Jakob, trade manager, Ammassalik (A)
Skifte, Daniel, headmaster, Nuuk (A)
Steenholdt, Konrad, teacher, Qasigiannguit (A)
Steenholdt, Otto, teacher, Nuuk (A)
Sørensen, Knud, trade manager, Aasiaat (A)
Sørensen, Lars, office clerk, Paamiut (IA)
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1999 – 2001 elected: 16 February 1999
31 members (the whole of Greenland being one con-
stituency)
Andreassen, Anders, policeman, Ammassalik (S)
Berthelsen, Per, teacher, Nuuk (S)
Enoksen, Hans, trade manager (S)
Frederiksen, Anthon Thue, policeman, Ilulissat (NP
candidates union)
Grønvold, Mads Peter (NP candidates union)
Heilmann, Ruth Thomsen, senior teacher, Maniitsoq
(S)
Heilmann, Sivert Karl, director, Maniitsoq (A)
Henriksen, Loritha (OP candidates union)
Jensen, Lars Karl, fisherman, Qeqertarsuaq (S)
Johansen, Jørgen Wæver, party secretary, Nuuk (S)
Karlsen, Finn, inspector, Narsaq (A)
Kleist, Mogens (OP candidates union)
Lynge, Ole, ship carpenter, Nuuk (IA)
Marø, Tommy, office leader, (S)
Mikaelsen, Vittus, hunter and mayor, Tasiilaq (S)
Motzfeldt, Jonathan, pastor, Nuuk (S)
Motzfeldt, Josef, teacher, Nuuk (IA)
Mølgaard, Malinannguaq Marcussen, journalist,
Qeqertarsuaq (IA)
Narup, Asii Chemnitz, (IA)
Nilsson, Anders, office clerk, (A)
Olsen, Johan Lund, social adviser, Nuuk (IA)
Olsen, Simon, Nuuk (S)
Petersen, Mikael, machinist, Nuuk (S)
Poulsen, Olga, (IA)
Rasmussen, Godmand, (A)
Rosing-Petersen, Per, pilot, Nuuk (S)
Salling, Augusta, teacher, Qeqertarsuaq (A)
Sivertsen, Jakob, manager assistant, Ammassalik (A)
Skifte, Daniel, headmaster, Nuuk (A)
Steenholdt, Otto, teacher, Qasigiannguit (A)
Sørensen, Lars, office clerk, Paamiut (IA)
Note: The sources for this appendix are rather incom-
plete. The list is based on the Parliament’s minutes
and up to summer 1984 it is accurate, but minutes are
missing 1985-1988 and publication ceased altogether
to be published in 1993. The gaps are filled in from the
newspapers A/G and Sermitsiaq when possible. From
1995 the main source is ‘Kongelig Dansk Hof og
Statskalenderen’ (a Danish annual register of people
in public office).
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Home Rule Government: landsstyre
Prime minister: landsstyreformand
Minister: landsstyremedlem.
Party in brackets: S = Siumut; A = Atassut; IA = Inuit
Ataqatigiit
1979
Motzfeldt, Jonathan (S) prime minister
Christiansen, Thue, (S) culture and education
Johansen, Lars Emil (S) trades and industries
Olsen, Moses (S) social welfare
Andreasen, Anders (S) settlements and outer districts
1983
Motzfeldt, Jonathan (S) prime minister
Johansen, Lars Emil (S) trades and industries
Olsen, Moses (S) economy and housing
Heilmann, Stephen (S) culture, church, and educa-
tion
Davidsen, Agnethe (S) social welfare
Nielsen, Hendrik (S) settlements, labour market and
youth issues
1984
Motzfeldt, Jonathan (S) prime minister
Lynge, Arqaluk, (IA) social welfare and housing
Johansen, Lars Emil (S) fishing and industry (until
February 1986)
Olsen, Moses (S) economy until February 1986; fish-
ing and industry
Rosing, Hans Pavia (S) economy (from February
1986)
Motzfeldt, Josef (IA) trade and vocational training
Heilmann, Stephen (S) culture, church and education
Nielsen, Hendrik (S) settlements, labour market and
youth issues
1987
Motzfeldt, Jonathan (S) prime minister
Lynge, Arqaluk, (IA) social welfare, housing, technical
matters, and environment
Rosing, Hans Pavia (S) economy (until September
1987)
Abelsen, Emil (S) economy (from September 1987)
Motzfeldt, Josef (IA) trade, traffic, and youth issues
(until March 1988)
Petrussen, Johanne (IA) trade, traffic, and youth
issues (from March 1988)
Lybert, Jens, (S) culture, education, and labour mar-
ket
Egede, Kaj (S) settlements and outer districts
1988
Motzfeldt, Jonathan (S) prime minister
Abelsen, Emil (S) economy, trade, and traffic
Olsen, Moses (S) social welfare and housing
Egede, Kaj (S) fishing, industry, and outer districts
Lyberth, Jens, (S) culture, education, and labour 
market
1991
Johansen, Lars Emil (S) prime minister
Kleist, Kuupik (IA) housing and technical matters
(until May 1992; from same date public works
and traffic)
Egede, Kaj (S) fishing, industry, and outer districts
(until May 1992)
Iversen, Hans (S) fishing, hunting, and farming (from
May 1992)
Abelsen, Emil (S) economy and housing
Rasmussen, Henriette (IA) social welfare (from May
1992 also labour market)
Jensen, Marianne (S) culture, education, church,
(and labour market until May1992; from same
date also research)
Olsen, Ove Rosing (S) health, environment, industry
and trade
1995
Johansen, Lars Emil (S) prime minister (until May
1997)
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Home Rule Government
Motzfeldt, Jonathan (S) prime minister (from May
1997)
Skifte, Daniel (A) economy and housing
Samuelsen, Peter Grønvold (S) business, traffic, and
supplies
Heilmann, Paaviaaraq (S) fishing, hunting, and 
farming
Steenholdt, Konrad (A) culture, education, and
church
Thorsteinsson, Benedikte (S) social welfare and
labour market (until May 1997)
Petersen, Mikael (S) social welfare and labour market
(from May 1997)
Jensen, Marianne (S) health, environment, and
research
1999
Motzfeldt, Jonathan (S) prime minister
Motzfeldt, Josef (IA) economy and trade
Olsen, Simon (S) business
Lynge, Steffen Ulrik (S) infrastructure and housing
Jacobsen, Alfred (IA) health, environment, and
church
Petersen, Mikael (S) social welfare and labour market
(until November 1999)
Johansen, Jørgen Wæver (S) social welfare and
labour market (from November 1999)
Lennert, Lise Skifte (S) culture, education, and
research
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The committee existed as a joint committee from the
two chambers until 1953 when the Danish first cham-
ber was abolished. In Danish the name was ‘Rigsda-
gens Grønlandsudvalg’ til 1953, and after ’Folketingets
Grønlandsudvalg’.
Danish members
Vanggaard, J.S. (Liberal Left) 1925-45
Degnbol, M. (Liberal Left) 1925-39
Olufson, J.P. (Social Democrat) 1925-34
Kammersgaard, P. (Social Democrat) 1925-35
Pürschel, V. (Conservative) 1925-39
Ellinger, H.O. (Conservative) 1925-45
Zahle, C. Th. (Radical Left) 1925-29, 1935-37
Povlsen, Th. (Radical Left) 1925-42
Steen, Oluf (Radical Left) 1929-35, 1937-63
Rasmussen, Hans (Social Democrat) 1934-45
Rasmussen, V. (Social Democrat) 1935-37
Hauberg, Th. (Social Democrat) 1937-50, 1953-54
Hendriksen, Halfdan (Conservative) 1939-40, 1945-57
Stegger Nielsen, S. (Liberal Left) 1939-53
Westermann, C.A. (Conservative) 1940-47
Nygaard, Kr. (Liberal Left) 1943-45
Buhl, V. (Social Democrat) 1945-47
Jensen-Broby, J. Chr. (Liberal Left) 1946-47
Hindsgaul, Lisbeth (Conservative) 1946-63
Larsen, Aksel, (Communists) 1945-50
Bomholt, Julius (Social Democrat) 1947-50
Kristensen, Knud (Liberal Left) 1947-48
From, Simon (Liberal Left) 1948-63
Gram, Victor, (Social Democrat) 1950-62
Hedtoft, Hans (Social Democrat) 1950-53
Hansen, Hans (Social Democrat) 1950-53
Jensen, Carl P. (Social Democrat) 1953-60
Eriksen, Erik (Liberal Left) 1953-63
Nielsen, Peter (Liberal Left) 1954-63
Ninn-Hansen, Erik (Conservative) 1957-63
Dupont, W. (Social Democrat) 1960-63
Nielsen, Axel K. (Social Democrat) 1962-63
Greenlandic members (appointed by the 
Provincial Council)
Nielsen, Peter 1950-51
Chemnitz, Jørgen 1950-51
Lynge, Frederik 1952-53
Lynge, Augo 1952-53
Greenlandic members (as members of 
Parliament)
Lynge, Frederik 1953-57
Lynge, Augo 1953-59
Lauf, Elias 1957-60
Rosing, Nikolaj 1959-63
Gam, Mikael 1960-63 (Gam was a Dane elected in
Greenland. Neither he nor his substitute ever 
participated in the meetings)
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Members of the Permanent Greenland
Committee, 1925-1963
The Greenland Council is a joint committee of Danish
and Greenlandic members. Chairman appointed by
the King, 5 appointed by the parties in Parliament, the
two MPs from Greenland, 3 appointed by the provin-
cial council.
Chairmen
Kock, H.H. 1964-74
Nørregaard-Rasmussen, P. 1975-79
Members
Groes, Lis (Social Democrat) 1964-67
Kirkegaard, Jacob (Radical Left) 1964-66, 1969
Ninn-Hansen, Erik (Conservative) 1964-67
From, Simon (Liberal Left) 1964-67
Vivike, Holger (Folk Socialist) 1964-70
Hertling, Knud (MP for Greenland) 1964-71
Rosing, Nikolaj (MP for Greenland) 1964-71, 1974-76
Heilmann, Peter K.S. (provincial council) 1964-70
Egede, Erik (provincial council) 1964-67
Christensen, N.O. (provincial council (Greenland 
governor)) 1964-67
Normann, A.C. (Radical Left) 1967
Abelsen, Marius (provincial council) 1967-70
Høegh, Erling (provincial council) 1967-70
Lembourn, H.J. (Conservative) 1968-74
Hansen, Holger (Liberal Left) 1968-73
Haugaard, Svend (Radical Left) 1968-77
Jensen, Carl P. (Social Democrat) 1968-70
Ree, Eva (Liberal Left) 1968
Due, Gunhild (Folk Socialist) 1970
Chemnitz, Lars (provincial council) 1971-79
Johansen, Lars Emil (provincial council) 1971-73, MP
for Greenland 1974-79) 1971-79
Motzfeldt, Jonathan (provincial council) 1971-79
Olsen, Moses (MP for Greenland) 1972-73
Dam, Poul (Folk Socialist) 1972-73
Hansen, Jørgen Peder (Social Democrat) 1972-74
Svendsen, Niels (substitute for K. Hertling) 1972-73
Olsen, Jørgen C.F. (provincial council) 1974, 1977-79
Brixtofte, Peter (Liberal Left) 1974-77
Dohrmann, H. (Progressive Party) 1974-79
Jørgensen, Søren B. (Social Democrat) 1975-79
Steenholdt, Otto (provincial council) 1975-77, MP for
Greenland 1977-79) 1975-79
Bugdorf, Johs. (Conservative) 1976-79
Berglund, Ole (MP for Greenland) 1976-77
Kjærulff-Schmidt, Steffen (Progressive Party) 1976
Nielsen, Hendrik (provincial council) 1976
Maisted, Ole (Progressive Party) 1977
Pedersen, Aksel (Social Democrat) 1977-78
Prehn, Ernst (Centre Democrat) 1977
Glensgaard, Leif (Progressive Party) 1978
Andersen, Yvonne Herløv (Centre Democrat) 1979
Rasmussen, Anders Fogh (Liberal Left) 1979
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Members of the Greenland Council,
1964-1979 (Grønlandsrådet)
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Party in brackets: S = Siumut; A = Atassut. No brack-
ets = non-party
1953-57: Augo Lynge and Frederik Lynge
1957-59: Elias Lauf and Augo Lynge
1959-60: Elias Lauf and Nikolaj Rosing
1960-63: Mikael Gam492 and Nikolaj Rosing
1964-71: Knud Hertling and Nikolaj Rosing
1971-73: Knud Hertling and Moses Olsen (S)
1973-76: Lars Emil Johansen (S) and Nikolaj Rosing
1976-77: Lars Emil Johansen (S) and Ole Berglund (A)
1977-79: Lars Emil Johansen (S) and Otto Steenholdt
(A)
1979-88: Preben Lange (S) and Otto Steenholdt (A)
1988-98: Hans Pavia Rosing (S) and Otto Steenholdt
(A)
1998-2001: Hans Pavia Rosing (S) and Ellen Kristen-
sen (A)
492. Mikael Gam was a Dane, the only one elected in Greenland ever.
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Prior to the establishment of the Ministry for Green-
land in 1955 the ministers listed here are those who
took responsibility for Greenland in the ministry.
Ministers of the Interior
Bramsen, L. (Right Party) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1900-01
Sørensen, Enevold (Liberal left)  . . . . . . . . . . . 1901-05
Berg, Sigurd (Liberal Left) . . . . . . . . . 1905-08, 1920-22
Berntsen, Klaus (Liberal Left)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1908-09
Munch, Peter R. (Radical Left)  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1909-10
Jensen-Sønderup, Jens (Liberal Left)  . . . . . . . 1910-13
Rode, Ove (Radical Left)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1913-20
Oxholm, W. (civil servant) . . . . . . . . . . . . 10/3-5/4 1920
Vedel, H. (civil servant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5/1-5/5 1920
Kragh O.C. (Liberal Left) . . . . . . . . . . . 1922-24, 1926-29
Hauge, C.N. (Social Democrat)  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1924-26
Prime Ministers
Stauning, Thorvald493 (Social Democrat)  . . . . 1929-42
Scavenius, Erik J.C. (Radical Left)  . . . . . . . . . 1942-43
Buhl, V. (Social Democrat)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1945
Kristensen, Knud (Liberal Left)  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1945-47
Hedtoft, Hans (Social Democrat) . . . . 1947-50, 1953-55
Eriksen, Erik (Liberal Left) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1950-53
Minister for Greenland
Kjærbøl, Johannes (Social Democrat) . . . . . . . 1955-57
Lindberg, Kaj (Social Democrat)  . . . . . . . . . . . 1957-60
Gam, Mikael (non-party)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1960-64
Jensen, Carl P. (Social Democrat)  . . . . . . . . . . 1964-68
Normann, A.C. (Radical Left)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1968-71
Hertling, Knud (non-party)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1971-73
Hansen, Holger (Liberal Left)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1973-75
Hansen, Jørgen Peder (Social Democrat) . . . . 1975-81
Larsen, Tove Lindbo (Social Democrat)  . . . . . 1981-82
Høyem, Tom (Centre Democrat)  . . . . . . . . . . . 1982-87
The ministry was abolished 10 September 1987 when
remaining responsibilities were passed to the prime
minister.
493. 1929-33, in his capacity as Minister for Shipping and Fishery.
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A/G. Atuagagdliutit/Grønlandsposten 1952 ff. (Bilingual maga-
zine published in Nuuk).
Albertini, Rudolf von 1982. Decolonization : The Administration
and Future of the Colonies 1919-60. – New York, Africana
Publishing Company, 680 pp.
Amstrup, Niels 1978. Grønland i det amerikansk-danske for-
hold 1945-48. – In: Amstrup, Niels & Faurby, Ib (ed.). Stu-
dier i Dansk Udenrigspolitik tilegnet Erling Bjøl. – Århus,
Politica: 155-198. (Greenland in the American-Danish
relationship 1945-48).
Andersen, Jens Peter 1979. Baggrunden for den grønlandske
nyordning 1908. – Unpublished thesis, History Depart-
ment, University of Aarhus. (The origins of reforms in
Greenland 1908).
Archives, Permanent Greenland Committee. – Library of the
Danish Parliament.
Bentzon, Agnete Weis 1979. Ret og Reformer, Vol I & II. –
Copenhagen, Nyt fra Samfundsvidenskaberne, 174 + 202
pp. (Justice and Reforms).
B&K: Beretninger og Kundgørelser vedr. Grønlands Styrelse
1909-37. – Copenhagen. (Official Reports from the Admi-
nistration of Greenland).
Beretninger 1938-49. Beretninger vedr. Grønlands Styrelse 1938-
49. – Copenhagen. (Official Reports from the Administra-
tion of Greenland).
Beretninger 1950-67. Beretninger vedr. Grønland 1950-67. –
Copenhagen. (Official Reports from the Administration
of Greenland).
Blom, Ida 1973. Kampen om Eirik Raudes Land. – Oslo, Gylden-
dal Norsk Forlag, 439 pp. (The Dispute about the Land of
Eric the Red).
Bobé, Louis 1936 (ed.). Diplomatarium Groenlandicum, 1489-
1814. – Meddelelser om Grønland 55, 3. Copenhagen, 431
pp.
Boserup, Mogens 1963. Økonomisk Politik i Grønland. –
Copenhagen, 507 pp. (Economic Policy in Greenland).
Bro, Henning. 1991. Dansk privatkapital og KGH’s monopol i
Grønland omkring 1900-1917. – Tidsskriftet Grønland:
225-249. (Danish private capital and the monopoly of
RGTD in Greenland 1900-17).
Brun, Eske 1945. Landsfoged Eske Bruns rapport vedrørende
forholdene i Grønland under krigen, 12/5-1945, bilag til
forhandlingerne 1946. – Archives, Permanent Greenland
Committee. (Report from Governor Eske Brun 12 May
1945 about conditions in Greenland during the war).
Brun, Eske 1946 a. Grønland under Adskillelsen. – GSA: 35-58.
(Greenland during the separation).
Brun, Eske 1946 b. Grønlands Problemer. – Grønlandsposten:
178-81. (Greenland’s problems).
Brun, Eske 1947. Speech at December meeting 1946. – GSA: 55-
61.
Brun, Eske 1952. Letter, 5 February 1952. – Archives, Perma-
nent Greenland Committee: Box 13.
Brøsted, Jens 1979. Beskåret Hjemmestyre. – Rhodos, Copenha-
gen, 149 pp. (Curtailed Home Rule).
Bugge, Aage 1926. Den Grønlandske Skole. – GSA: 39-46. (The
Greenlandic school).
Bugge, Aage 1931. Danskundervisningen i Grønland, – GSA: 5-
19. (The teaching of Danish in Greenland).
Bugge, Aage 1946. Den grønlandske kirke og skole under
adskillelsen. – GSA: 71-84. (The Greenlandic church and
school during the separation).
Christensen, K.N. 1946. Faareavlen og Landbruget i Grønland
under Krigen. – GSA: 146-54. (Sheep breeding and farm-
ing in Greenland during the War).
Dahl, Jens 1986. Arktisk Selvstyre. – Copenhagen, Akademisk
Forlag, 216 pp. (Arctic self government).
Danmark – Forord til regionaloversigterne. – EEC document
XVI/TFC/6/84-DA of 20/1-1984. Brussels. (Denmark –
Preface to the regional surveys).
Danmarks traktater efter 1814, Vol. 7. – Copenhagen, 1951. (The
treaties and agreements between Denmark and foreign
powers after 1814).j
Dansgaard, Willi 1975. Indlandsisen. – In: Palle Koch (ed.)
Grønland. Copenhagen, Gyldendal: 48-82. (The Ice Cap).
Darwin, John 1991. The end of the British empire : the historical
debate. – Oxford, Blackwell, 128 pp.
De grønlandske landsråds forhandlinger 1938-47. Copenhagen.
1948. (Minutes from the provincial councils).
DUPI 1997. Grønland under den kolde krig. Dansk og ameri-
kansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945-1968. – Copenhagen,
Danish Institute of International Affairs, 614 pp. (Green-
land during the Cold War. Danish and American security
policy 1945-68).
Fieldhouse, D.K. 1986: Black Africa 1945-80. Economic Decolo-
nization & Arrested Development. – London, Allen &
Unwin, 260 pp.
Fiskeriårbogen 1933-38. – Copenhagen. (Yearly statistics on
Danish fishery).
Fleischer, Jørgen 1967. Inuit partiet, blot et intermezzo. –In:
Tidsskriftet Grønland: 345-48. (The Inuit Party, just an
intermezzo).
Forchhammer, Søren. 1996. Gathered or dispersed? Four
decades of Development Policy Debate in Greenland. –
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